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ABSTRACT
As a man of letters with an exceptionally extensive and
diverse output, Samuel Johnson (1709-1784) has invited
consideration from a variety of angles. The present study offers
a 'reading' of Johnson as a framer of distinctions. His
distinction-making activity is viewed as a capital feature of the
oeuvre, characterizing it across almost its entire range. A very
substantial body of evidence is adduced in support of this
reading. Broken up by distinction-type, the mass of evidence
sorts itself out into seventeen different categories themselves
grouped under seven 'thematic' heads. The organization of the
inquiry on taxonomic lines is intended both to throw into relief
the multiform character of Johnson's distinction-making praxis
(something not heretofore remarked) and also to provide a
comprehensive, systematic and easily 'readable' account of it.
That the evidence testifying to Johnson's distinction-making
turned out to be so voluminous could not but occasion the thought
that it might be an involuntary activity, a 'drive' grounded in
the very 'set' of his psyche which comes in consequence to be
viewed as in some sort 'formed for distinction-making' . This
thought evolved into the thesis that the present study undertakes
to defend, in doing which it becomes a psychocritical
investigation inscribed within the theoretical frame of
psychological stylistics whose aim is to make inferences and
advance hypotheses about the build and workings of a mind from
an analysis of the linguistic and stylistic data it generates.
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INTRODUCTION
In the Preface to her book Samuel Johnson and the
Scale of Greatness, a study of Johnson's attitude to
worldly greatness, Isobel Grundy writes:
When I first began to pursue these ideas I
marvelled that among the many views offered of
Johnson nobody seemed to have taken my own,
although it pressed itself upon me as central -
a position from which the landscape of his works
may be triangulated [and] new prospects
opened...
The sentiments expressed in this passage well describe
my own as I worked on the present study, an inquiry into
Johnson's distinction-making activity viewed as a
manifestation and mirror of the particular build and bent
of his mind. His 'drive to distinguish', as I term it,
gesturing by way of this expression to what I regard as a
constitutional, inwoven feature of his psychical make-up,
struck me too as something central and pivotal - and
certainly as a vantage-point from which the 'landscape of
his works [could] be triangulated [and] new prospects
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opened' . Again, like Grundy, I marvelled, as my work on
this study progressed, that, with only two exceptions,
Johnson's distinction-making bent, which impressed itself
upon me as a pre-eminent feature both of his mental
organization and of his oeuvre, appeared almost completely
to have escaped critical notice. The two exceptions to
which I allude were Kathleen Wales's article "Johnson's Use
of Synonyms in Dictionary and Prose Style" (1985), and W
K Wimsatt's pioneering book-length study The Prose Style
of Samuel Johnson (1941). While I was engaged in the
research phase of this project, these were the only two
investigations I knew of that bore directly upon Johnson's
distinction-making activity - though not from the angle
that really interested me; that is, the psychocritical
angle, thanks to whose 'refractive deflection' it is
perceived as both the expression and the evidence of a
particular cast and operation of the mind. Then, in April
of 1994, well after I had started writing up this study,
I came upon Pat Rogers's newly published book on Johnson
in the Oxford "Past Masters" series. In his Introduction
Rogers makes precisely the connection which by then I was
myself working out in detail; in other words, he locates
Johnson's distinction-making praxis within the context of
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a particular mindset, a particular mode of psychical
organization. So it is obvious that there exists a
considerable measure of overlap between what he says in his
Introduction and what I try to do in this study;
accordingly, to cite from Rogers the passage which from my
standpoint goes to the heart of the matter is to bring into
view the very thesis which it will be my task to defend and
substantiate in the ensuing investigation:
His cast of mind led him towards the central
critical task of discrimination. Boswell cites
Reynolds... on the way Johnson's views regarding
his own friends derived from a particular mental
pattern: 'He was fond of discrimination, which
he could not show without pointing out the bad
as well as the good in every character. . . '
. . .Johnson had grown up in the high moment of
Augustan critical thought, when discrimination
was allied with sound judgement against
dangerous and capricious wit. Judgement had
been described by a writer whom Johnson had
read, Obadiah Walker, as 'the deliberate
weighing and comparing of one object, one
appearance, one reason with another, thereby to
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discern and choose true from false, good from
bad, and more true and good from lesser'. It is
this mode of discernment that Johnson habitually
practised. We can see it in his moral essays,
in his critical works, in his books of cultural
analysis (such as the Journey to the Western
Islands of Scotland) , and regularly in his
conversation as reported by the biographers. (6)
Having thus, in his Introduction, propelled into the
spotlight the idea of Johnson's distinction-making as the
expression of a particular cast of mind, Rogers
unaccountably does nothing more with it in the remainder
of the book which follows the conventional 'setting, life,
ideas and works' format of the Past Masters series. So
from one point of view the present study may be seen as an
attempt to clothe with evidential 'flesh' the naked frame
of Rogers's uncorroborated insights.
And so we arrive at the crucial issue of the role of
evidence in an inquiry conducted, as this one is, along
psychocritical lines. The essential point, lying at the
heart of the issue, is that where something as complex,
shadowy and enigmatic as the build and functioning of a
mind is in question, the problem will always rather be that
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of furnishing enough evidence in support of one's
hypothesis than of furnishing too much. In investigations
of a psychocritical character, where the quantity of
evidence brought to bear is not less important than its
cogency, the question really does arise whether one can
ever adduce too much of it - not only because this type of
investigation cannot hope to carry weight or conviction
without a massively solid evidential foundation, but also
because such a foundation is the only counter there is,
really, to an imputation to which the psychocritical
approach is particularly vulnerable, the imputation of
circular reasoning. The allegation here is that
psychocritical investigations notoriously seek to account
for a given linguistic datum in terms of psychological
assumptions for which the only evidence is the very datum
that requires to be accounted for. The only effective
answer to this allegation is to amass a body of linguistic
evidence voluminous enough to shield one's psychological
hypothesis from refutation on the grounds of circularity
(or any other grounds, for that matter). Mindful of these
points, I have thought it well to bring forward a very
substantial corpus of evidence which, even so, represents
only a fraction of what I amassed during the reading and
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research phase of this project. I can only hope that as
my reader locks horns with the dense thickets of citation
in Chapter Three she or he will yet find it possible to
allow that things could not have been ordered differently.
The evidential foundation supporting the psychological
hypothesis advanced in this study benefits from a uniquely
lucky circumstance - the fact that it consists not only of
a very ample written component but also of a remarkably
comprehensive spoken one which is preserved in numerous
"Interviews" and "Recollections", in Sir John Hawkins's
Life, in Mrs Thrale's Anecdotes. and, above all, in James
Boswell's Life and in the Journal of the Hebrides tour
which he undertook with Johnson in 1773. Taken together
these documents constitute an archive of Johnson's
conversation that is voluminous almost beyond belief and,
uniquely in the history of English literature, not all that
much less voluminous than the testimony of the written
record. The consequence of this stroke of luck is to make
Johnson a particularly suitable candidate for treatment
from a psychocritical point of view inasmuch as it greatly
improves the odds in favour of framing a credible,
defensible hypothesis about the build and quality of his
mind. How so? Well, if one proceeds from the assumption
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(a warrantable enough one, it seems to me) that a mind
engaged in generating conversation operates at a level of
considerable spontaneity, 'unrehearsedness' and even
' involuntariness' (at any rate, when compared to one
engaged in the more planned, more structured, more
deliberate activity of writing)1, it follows that an 'arc'
of talk (captured, perhaps, in a conversational transcript)
may not unreasonably be viewed as the record of a mind
revealing itself with more than usual candour and, in so
far, revealing something about its inner workings and true
bent. This granted, it follows, with respect to Johnson,
that the instances of distinction-making encountered in the
conversational record will enjoy a rather special status,
asking to be viewed as more than ordinarily significant in
terms of their potential for shedding light on the
distinctive quality and characteristic workings of his
psyche1 2. Not, of course, that the examples of distinction­
1 In this connection the following remark by Johnson bears citing: 
"...in conversation we naturally diffuse our thoughts, and in writing 
we contract them; method is the excellence of writing, and 
unconstraint the grace of conversation" (Adventurer 85, II 416) .
2 This conclusion is of course contingent upon our being able to feel 
confident about the accuracy and trustworthiness of the records of 
Johnson's conversation that have come down to us. For the purposes of 
the present inquiry this really boils down to the question of the 
accuracy of James Boswell's record as presented both in the Life and 
in the Journal of the Hebrides tour. How trustworthy a witness and 
recorder was Boswell? In my judgment, trustworthy enough. My reasons 
for arriving at this judgment are given in Appendix A.
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making culled from the written record are not charged with
this kind of potential too; they are, but not to the same
degree as those drawn from the conversational record.
Anyhow, this suggestive potential relating to the 'set' and
workings of Johnson's psyche, which appeared to inform a
rapidly expanding body of evidence harvested from the
spoken and written records alike, rendered the choice of
the psychocritical approach more or less inevitable for the
present inquiry. It all but chose itself: no other
approach seemed as well able to do justice to the
suggestive potential just adverted to; no other seemed as
well adapted not only to making sense of the signals
emanating from the evidential corpus but also to organizing
them and turning them to account in the form of a coherent,
though possibly controversial, hypothesis3. It is not
however my wish to be controversial. My aim is to frame
a credible hypothesis and to arrive at defensible
conclusions. And those will be the more defensible for
resting upon data drawn in equal measure from both parts
of the evidential record, the spoken and the written alike.
3 Another way of putting this is to say that the psychocritical 
approach was able to "systematize the widest range of facts" - in 
doing which it satisfied the primary condition for being regarded as 
the "best kind of theory" (Katz 127).
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It is obvious that my claim to be saying something
pertinent and plausible about Johnson's 'drive to
distinguish', considered as an elemental and inveterate
feature of his psychical make-up, can only gain in
credibility from a balanced and broad-based use of the
evidential record. Mindful of this, I shall be at some
pains in the ensuing investigation to draw my evidence in
equal measure from Johnson's conversation and writings
alike4.
Fruitful as the psychocritical approach may be when
4 It is worth remarking that for Lord Macaulay the dual composition of 
the Johnsonian record furnished a reason (possibly a pretext; at any 
rate, an opportunity) for postulating a 'two-Johnsons' hypothesis, in 
terms of which Johnson the practitioner of the spoken word is viewed 
as quite distinct from Johnson the practitioner of the written. Thus, 
in an essay of 1831, which was to become extraordinarily influential, 
Macaulay argues that in the former capacity, as conversationalist, 
Johnson could not be faulted: "When he talked, he clothed his wit and 
his sense in forcible and natural expressions." However, " [a] s soon 
as he took his pen in his hand. . .his style became systematically 
vicious. ...It is clear that Johnson himself did not think in the 
dialect in which he wrote. The expressions which first came to his 
tongue were simple, energetic, and picturesque. When he wrote for 
publication, he did his sentences out of English into Johnsonese" (II 
560). This dichotomizing portrait of a Johnson divided into two more 
or less uncommunicating halves, the one taking charge of utterance, 
the other of writing, strikes me as ill-founded in general terms, but 
certainly at the level of his 'drive to distinguish' it will not bear 
scrutiny. For all the evidence, drawn from his conversation and his 
writings alike, lends support to the view that at this level there was 
but one Johnson who, whether his role at any given moment was that of 
conversationalist or writer, was subject to a single, indivisible 
'lexicographic' compulsion to frame distinctions and multiply 
discriminations. Indeed, to pass in review the huge body of evidence 
testifying to his 'lexicographic turn of mind', whether expressed in 
spoken form or written, is to be persuaded that there was something 
altogether inevitable about his turn towards dictionary-making in the 
late forties and early fifties of the eighteenth century.
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brought to bear upon the Johnsonian mindset and oeuvre, it
will never, even at its most serviceable, possess more than
suggestive force; to look to it to produce conclusive
'proofs' is to look to it in vain. This said, I would
still however want to insist on the utility and legitimacy
of psychological criticism as an investigative and
interpretative tool provided it is backed up by enough
evidence. The critic, Richard Ohmann, mounts a vigorous
(if perhaps over-partisan) defence of this approach,
viewing it not just as a much-needed corrective to the
privileged position enjoyed at the time (the late nineteen-
sixties) by the New Critical doctrine of the autonomy and
self-sufficiency of the literary text, but as in fact
antecedent to this doctrine, and as underpinning it. Here
is Ohmann's defence of the psychocritical approach:
For a long time now it has been common for
critics and critical theorists to say that the
only legitimate focus for literary study is the
work itself, and to mean by that the text: the
self-contained structure made of words. That
was, and perhaps still is, a salutary doctrine,
.. as against the always present tendency of
criticism to drift off into biography on one
10
side or into a solipsism of the sensitive reader
on the other. But whatever its strategic
virtues, the position is strictly speaking
untenable. The text in itself, without the
background system of the language, is simply
marks on a page, or noises. And the locus of a
language is the minds of its speakers. Quite
literally, the structures and forms in a
literary work can only be forms - be realized as
forms - in some mind. It follows that literary
criticism is the study of mental structures, and
that the sense of objectivity one may get from
insisting on the "real" work, out there, the
work-in-itself, is illusory...
An ecumenical spirit is leading many
linguists to think of their subject as a part of
psychology. Literary criticism would profit
from a similar accommodation... (in Zale 209­
10) [emphasis in original]
Taking leave of the psychocritical approach as such,
I turn now to a consideration of the data upon which it is
brought to bear in the present inquiry. By 'data' I mean
the actual instances of Johnson's distinction-making which
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are certainly to be numbered in the hundreds on a
conservative estimate. In this context three points stand
out as deserving of special notice. The first is that
Johnson's distinction-making praxis is multiform; in other
words, the distinctions he draws break down naturally into
a number of different types or strains. This is a
phenomenon that has gone unremarked even by those few
critics who have managed to 'tumble to' his distinction­
making drive: they have spotted the compulsion, remarked
the praxis in general terms but have failed to notice the
variety of distinction-types. My own growing awareness of
the multiform character of his distinction-making activity
arose from the fact that as I accumulated more and more
individual examples of it, these tended quite naturally to
sort themselves into a number (an increasing number as time
went on) of separate batches or sets, each based on
distinctive shared attributes. By the time I reached the
end of the evidence-gathering phase, the hundreds of items
I had collected had sorted themselves out into no fewer
than seventeen separate aggregations or categories, each
predicated upon a different distinction-type. I next
sorted the categories themselves into seven larger
groupings, my object being both to point up affinities
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between them (the categories, that is) and to lay them out
in a more coherent, more 'readable' way. Constituting the
larger groupings on a broadly 'thematic' basis, as I saw
it, I accordingly conferred upon them such vaguely
'thematic' designations as "Verbal", "Philosophical",
"Rhetorical", and so forth. (A tabular digest of the
seventeen categories as arranged under the seven 'thematic'
heads is presented in Appendix B) .
It bears pointing out that among the many hundreds of
distinctions framed by Johnson there exist a fair number
that may well be described as 'hermaphroditic'; these are
items within which are contained the attributes of more
than one category, resulting in the phenomenon of category-
straddle within the compass of one and the same instance
of distinction-making. In the most problematic cases the
phenomenon of category-straddle becomes that of category-
indeterminacy; this occurs when a given item is of a
complexion so ambiguous (because the attributes it contains
are so evenly balanced as between rival categories) that
it is equally well qualified for inclusion in either; and
the question then arises of which of the claimants it
should be awarded to. These matters are dealt with in
greater detail in the earlier part of Chapter Three. I may
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add that when .items characterized by category-straddle or
category-indeterminacy crop up among my examples, I note
the fact in square brackets immediately after the citation.
Just as some individual instances of distinction­
making straddle categories, so some of the categories
themselves straddle some of the larger groupings. This
issue too is dealt with in more detail in Chapter Three.
The second point I want to make is this: such
attention as has been paid to Johnson's distinction-making
praxis has tended to focus on his handling of antithesis
(Wimsatt's 1941 study is an example), a rhetorical figure
that posits an antipodal opposition of ideas and hence of
the signifiers that gesture towards them. But in fact by
far the greater number of distinctions Johnson frames turn
not on antithesis but on dissimilitude, which implies
unlikeness of an altogether less diametrically opposed
cast. Another, more technical, way of putting this is to
say that the vast majority of his distinctions turn upon
'graded' (or 'gradient') rather than upon 'polar'
oppositions. (To clarify by way of example: 'day' and
'night' are polar oppositions, diametrically opposed
contraries; 'morning' and 'afternoon', by contrast, are
'graded' oppositions, that is, instances of unlikeness at
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the level simply of dissimilitude). So whereas the
concept of antithesis implies clear-cut, sharply polarized
oppositions, the notion of dissimilitude evokes instead the
image of an extended continuum made up of numerous
gradations of unlikeness, 'shallow' in their degree of
differentiation at the one end of the scale, though
decidedly 'steep' at the other - but never so 'steep' as
to become antipodal. That Johnson had in his head some
such image, or at any rate that he perceived there was a
whole gamut of difference to be traversed before one
arrived finally at out-and-out contrariety, is not to be
doubted: "he who differs from us", he declared, "does not
always contradict us" (Adventurer 107, II 445).
The kinds of difference upon which he seemed to bring
his distinction-making powers to bear with the greatest
relish, as well as with the greatest dexterity, were those
characterized by a notably 'shallow' degree of opposition -
in other words, really fine differences. The arena in
which he most conspicuously displays his skill in this
department is of course his Dictionary of the English
Language. No English lexicographer before him had so
expertly pinpointed, so skilfully teased apart or so
accurately elucidated the fine shades of difference between
15
the various senses of a given word. The 'brief' he
proposed for himself in the Dictionary included, after all,
as he informs us in the "Preface", the objective of
"separat [ing] similitudes" (in Bronson (1971) 253), by
which is meant the pinpointing and 'nailing down' of the
fine shades of difference between words 'near allied' (or
between the various senses of a single word) which so
habitually escape the notice of ordinary understanding that
so far as it is concerned such words (or senses) seem to
be not dissimilar at all - seem, in other words, to be
'similitudes'. Well, if Johnson is ever about the business
of distinguishing between 'similitudes' (as well as between
more clear-cut oppositions too, of course) in the
Dictionary, he is ever about the same business outside the
Dictionary as well. The relish, no less than the address,
with which he goes about the task of 'separating
similitudes' in the oeuvre outside the Dictionary finds
expression in Chapter Three in the form of a well-
provisioned category entitled 'Distinctions between Near­
Synonyms' which is billetted under the 'thematic' head of
'Verbal Distinction-making'. This category stands out as
a conspicuous instance of Johnson's lexicographic bent
coming into prominence outside the formal, 'contractually'
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determined bounds of the Dictionary; however, considering
that the act of distinction-making is situated at the very
heart of the lexicographic enterprise and is therefore in
its substantive nature a lexicographic operation, it
follows that all Johnson's distinction-making is
lexicographic in its essential character, regardless of how
much, or how little, of this character is ever displayed,
or discerned, for what it really is. In other words, his
distinction-making praxis is lexicographic by definition:
every time he frames a distinction he necessarily enacts
a lexicographic 'move'. The two operations are
indivisible, and this is something to which I have sought
to give recognition in the very title of the present
inquiry - not just by way of the reference to Johnson's
'lexicographic turn of mind' in its second segment but also
by way of its appositional structure whose built-in
parallelism of denotation strongly enforces the suggestion
that his impulse to distinguish (the subject of the first
member) and his 'lexicographic turn of mind' (the subject
of the second) bore importantly upon - were, indeed,
profoundly implicated in - each other. There exists
another sense too in which Johnson's overall distinction­
making praxis may justifiably be described as
17
'lexicographic', and here I have in mind the way in which
it exhibits the same rigour, precision, succinctness and
elegance5 that characterize his distinction-making activity
in the Dictionary.
The linguistician R W Brown remarks that "we make
distinctions where it matters" (in Hormann 3 05) . To
Johnson it seemed to matter all the time. Hence my
5 From the standpoint of their 'well-turnedness' , logical tightness, 
precision and elegance - in other words, from the standpoint of their 
workmanship and their technical mastery, the distinctions Johnson 
frames are of notably high quality, as I believe the numerous examples 
of his praxis marshalled in Chapter Two more than adequately 
demonstrate. Nor should we expect less from one as practised and 
expert in this department as Johnson was. Yet even he was not proof 
against the occasional lapse, as the following instance shows: "To 
remember and to recollect (said he) are different things. A man has 
not the power to recollect what is not in his mind; but when a thing 
is in his mind he may remember it" (Life 1163).
Does what Johnson says here make any sense? To me, I have to 
admit, it doesn't. For if one's point of departure is that something 
is not in a person's mind to begin with, can there be any sense at all 
in speaking of a difference between remembering and recollecting when 
the one is bound to be as unavailing as the other? And if, 
conversely, one's point of departure is that there is something in a 
person's mind to begin with, why should it not be as readily available 
to recollection as to memory? Either way, then, there appears to be 
no difference between these two terms - not, at any rate, the kind of 
difference that Johnson seems to be arguing for. So in proposing the 
distinction he does, he is really just muddying the issue; and the 
definitions he gives for 'remember' and 'recollect' in the Dictionary 
indicate as much, for he there defines them in terms of each other; 
that is to say, he treats them interchangeably, as synonyms:
remember: "to recollect; to call to mind" (sense 2) 
recollect: "to recover to memory" (sense 1)
That Johnson on the rare occasion slips up as a distinction- 
maker does not of course diminish his insistence upon the strictest 
standards for distinction-making itself. Indeed, he at times carries 
his fastidiousness on this score (or his fastidiousness carries him) 
to hyperbolical, even comical, lengths, as when he puts forward the 
view that the reader "will not pay much regard to [Sir Richard 
Blackmore's] determinations concerning ancient learning" once he 
discovers that "he did not know the difference between aphorism and 
apophthegm" ("Blackmore", Lives II 251) [emphasis in original].
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hypothesis that his was a mind formed for distinction­
making; hence my impulse to visualize it as a kind of
distinction-making mill. This granted, one ought not,
however, to underestimate the role played by Johnson's
acquaintance and by his milieu in energizing and exercising
his distinction-making bent - keeping it 'on the stretch',
and 'on its mettle'. To speak first of his acquaintance:
diverse, wide-ranging and including some of the most gifted
minds of the age, it constituted a genuine intellectual
elite; and when, as often happened, various of its members
forgathered with Johnson as a conversational fellowship,
his distinction-making powers (as well as his general
powers of conversation, of course), spurred by the
discussion (and spurring it in turn), invariably shifted
into 'top gear'. The conversational fellowship with which
Johnson's name is most closely linked was the Literary
Club, as it finally came to be known; its membership
constituted, in Boswell's words, "a very capital
university" (Hebrides Journal 217); in W J Bate's, "the
most remarkable assemblage of diverse talents that has ever
met so frequently for the sole purpose of conversation"
(1975:366). Is it any wonder that Johnson's distinction­
making powers, thriving on the regular and vigorous
19
stimulus furnished by conversational company of such
brilliance, were maintained at an exceptionally high level
of efficiency and readiness. In Chapter Three I present
an extended citation, excerpted from the Life (538-43),
which records the dinner-table talk of a conversational
fellowship (not the Literary Club); the excerpted passage,
orchestrated, like so many others in the Life. as a
dramatized scene, opens a revealing window on the way in
which Johnson's distinction-making bent, responding to the
stimulus provided by an able and seasoned company of
interlocutors (as well as by an interesting topic of
conversation) , kicks into vigorous life and then goes
barrelling ahead on full throttle, as it were. The milieu
Johnson inhabited likewise gave encouragement to his
distinction-making bent. This was the milieu of the
Enlightenment, and while certainly he was not always in
sympathy with its outlook or ideals (in particular where
matters of religion were concerned), the point is, having
regard to the kinds of books he read and the circles he
frequented, that the air he breathed was Enlightenment air
- and the Enlightenment was a milieu in which "distinction,
separation... and hierarchy [were] almost self-evident
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ethical principles6" (Fussell (1965) 120).
These 'self-evident' Enlightenment desiderata have
themselves to be situated within the more inclusive
referential frame of the epoch's emphatic valorization of
analytical thought. Ranking as one of the capital
distinguishing traits of the Enlightenment period as a
whole, the push towards an analytical orientation also
happens to share a significant area of overlap with
Johnson's distinction-making bent which by definition is
analytical in its tendency. Consequently, the following
exposition by Ernst Cassirer highlighting the centrality
of the analytical orientation within the Enlightenment
outlook can also be seen as providing a contextualizing
frame for Johnson's drive to distinguish:
The philosophy of the eighteenth century...is
not content to look upon analysis as the great
intellectual tool of mathematico-physical
knowledge; eighteenth century thought sees
analysis rather as the necessary and
indispensable instrument of all thinking in
6 In contrast to the animating ethos of the succeeding Romantic age 
which "is defined by [the] effort to overcome... the split between 
subject and object, the self and the world, the conscious and the 
unconscious. This is the central creed of the great romantic poets in 
England, Germany, and France" (Wellek 213, 220) .
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general. This view triumphs in the middle of
the century. However much individual thinkers
and schools differ in their results, they agree
in this epistemological premise. Voltaire's
Treatise____ on____ Metaphysics, d'Alembert's
Preliminary Discourse, and Kant's Inquiry
concerning the Principles of Natural Theology
and Morality all concur on this point.
...Voltaire says that man, if he presumes to see
into the life of things and know them as they
really are in themselves, immediately becomes
aware of the limits of his faculties; he finds
himself in the position of a blind man who must
judge the nature of color. But analysis is the
staff which a benevolent nature has placed in
the blind man's hands. Equipped with this
instrument he can feel his way forward among
appearances, discovering their sequence and
arrangement; and this is all he needs for his
intellectual orientation to life and knowledge.
"We must never make hypotheses; we must never
say: Let us begin by inventing principles
according to which we attempt to explain
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everything. We should say rather: Let us make
an exact analysis of things..." (12)
Given the native vigour of Johnson's innate
distinction-making drive, given the role played by the
external facilitating and seconding factors noted earlier,
given also his perpetual quest for determinate verbal
meaning and perspicuity of statement, for which, as often
as not, the drawing of distinctions was a prerequisite
condition - given all this it is hardly surprising that he
turned out to be an inveterate distinction-maker. Now,
while his penchant for framing distinctions has been
remarked and formally inquired into by only a handful of
professional critics, it has been intuited, not
unexpectedly, by a larger number of readers who, after
having been 'let into the secret' of Johnson's distinction­
making bent, then claim to 'know' (meaning, usually, to
have known from the first) all about it. Sometimes this
claim goes further, becoming the argument that 'everybody
knows' Johnson was an habitual maker of distinctions, so
why the to-do of writing up a whole thesis to show it? The
third point I want to make is my rejoinder to this
argument. To begin with, one would want to say that there
always has to be a first time for showing systematically
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and comprehensively what 'everybody' supposedly already
'knows'; and my second proposition is that claims to
'knowledge' in the absence, or in advance, of such
comprehensive demonstration are invariably found, upon
closer examination, to have much less to do with knowledge,
properly so called, than with hunches. It seems to me,
therefore, that the claim to 'know' (using this verb in a
legitimate sense) that Johnson was an inveterate maker of
distinctions cannot heretofore have been convincingly
sustained because, so far as I am aware, nobody has
previously undertaken, in a comprehensive, systematic and
detailed fashion, to show him discharging the role of
habitual distinction-maker and, in that role, framing
distinctions of many different kinds. To that extent, the
present study, I believe, constitutes original research -
'original' in both of the senses Johnson specifies for this
concept: for even as the ensuing inquiry brings into view
"truths hitherto unknown", those already 'known' are
"enforced by stronger evidence, facilitated by clearer
method...elucidated by brighter illustrations" (Rambler
154, V 59).
** *
24
My investigation proceeds according to the following
plan: Chapter One consists of a theoretical exposition
whose principal focus is psychological stylistics, the
particular psychocritical orientation appealed to in the
present study to serve as an organizing and referential
frame within which to situate, survey and 'triangulate' the
Johnsonian oeuvre, both spoken and written. One of the
many branches ramifying from the broad trunk of
psycholinguistics, psychological stylistics seeks to frame
hypotheses about the characteristic 'set' of a mind from
an analysis of the involuntary stylistic-linguistic
patterns, whether written or spoken, which it generates.
Stylistic formations which meet rather strict criteria of
distinctiveness and regularity qualify for consideration
as 'involuntary', 'unwilled' or 'unconscious'
manifestations7, and, to that extent, as symptoms and
tokens of the characteristic 'set' and workings of the mind
that produces them. As a theoretical model, psychological
stylistics has attracted a fair amount of adverse
criticism. One of its most forceful detractors is Stanley
Fish whose strictures I summarize and endeavour to counter. * 10
7 Cf. Ellegard: "The constant features of an author's style 
are...likely to be unconscious or subconscious linguistic habits..."
(10) .
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Moreover, as it seems to me, with the advantage of
hindsight, that in no small measure it was as a result of
my entering the 'hermeneutic circle7 (no doubt unwittingly)
that I arrived at my sense of Johnson as a maker of
distinctions, I also give a brief account of the theory of
the 'hermeneutic circle7 in the opening chapter.
The second chapter is described in its title as an
exercise in 'mindmapping7. What this term gestures to is
my attempt to 'map7 Johnson's psyche by bringing under
scrutiny, in the form of a critical-historical survey, some
two hundred and fifty years of comment and opinion on it;
this sizable body of data, shaped and patterned as it
accumulates, is intended finally to fall into place as a
kind of map of the Doctor's mind. The principal patterning
devices used are the classification of the eighteenth-
century views of his mental character under seven separate
heads, and the appraisal of the later data in relation to
the two major literary-cultural 'impulses' or forces that
have been instrumental in changing the ways of viewing and
evaluating his psyche - to wit, Romanticism and
psychological theorizing. As the entry into the picture
of these forces happened to coincide in each case with the
arrival of a new century, Romanticism 'coming in7 roughly
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at the beginning of the nineteenth century, psychological
theorizing roughly at the beginning of the twentieth, it
has in consequence been possible for me to organize my
survey on a century by century basis. The 'mind-map' I
endeavour to construct in this chapter has been assembled
with an eye to its contextualizing role and function: it
is meant to serve as a backdrop against which my own
hypothesis regarding the 'set' and workings of Johnson's
mind may be projected; or, to change the metaphor, as a
frame into which that hypothesis may be inserted and with
reference to which it may be evaluated.
The third, and last, chapter, though very long, is
broken up into many sections and subsections corresponding
to the seven larger groupings and the seventeen categories
amongst which are distributed the very large number of
actual instances of distinction-making that in their mass
form the evidential base of this study. In bringing
forward my evidence, I preface its formal presentation, in
each of the categories, with an account of the distinctive
attributes shared in common by the items grouped under it.
This account is sometimes supplemented by a specification
of my grounds for keeping the items making up a given
category (or compartment within it) separate from those
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making up contiguous ones. In a number of cases I have
also thought it well to give an account of the
considerations that prompted me in the first place to bring
a given category into being as a separate and autonomous
entity.
Chapter Three is encumbered with a number of lengthy
footnotes. I would have wished it otherwise but they
appeared to me to be required by the demands and shape of
my overall conception, and so I have let them stay. It
doesn't seem to me that their 'gravitational pull' knocks
the study as a whole off balance.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE THEORETICAL FRAME
The notion that the lineaments of a person's mind are
imprinted upon his utterance, mirrored in the configuration
of his discourse whether spoken or written, is of ancient
provenance. This is attested by a number of proverbs which
have come down to us from Greek and Roman antiquity; for
example: "hoios ho tropos, toioutos kai ho logos" (speech
mirrors character; in Norden 11) , "andros character ek
logou gnorizetai" (a man is known by the way he talks; in
Herford & Simpson XI 272) , "oratio vultus animi" (speech
is the visage of the mind (or soul) ; in Spitzer 171) ,
"oratio imago animi" (speech is the copy of the mind/soul;
in Hagstrum 97), "[oratio] mentis character" (speech is the
mind's imprint; idem). Situated on the same trajectory is
Longinus's celebrated pronouncement: "Sublimity [of
utterance] is the echo of a noble mind" (in Russell (1965)
9) . The Renaissance humanists, in their reverential
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appropriation of the culture of classical antiquity, also
appropriated, even as they somewhat embellished, the notion
of speech as the mirror of a person's mind. So, for
example, we come upon the following statement by the
notable sixteenth-century Spanish humanist, Juan Vives (the
translation from the original Latin is Ben Jonson's, in
Discoveries): "Language most shewes a man: speake that I
may see thee. It springs out of the most retired, and
inmost parts of us, and is the Image of the Parent of it,
the mind. No glasse renders a mans forme, or likenesse,
so true as his speech" (Herford & Simpson VIII 625). In
similar vein George Puttenham argues, in The Art of English
Poesie (1589), that the "continuall course and manner of
writing or speech sheweth the matter and disposition of the
writers minde... therefore there be that haue called stile
the image of man, mentis character; for man is but his
minde, and as his minde is tempered and qualified, so are
his speeches and language at large..." (in Smith II 154).
The ancient sayings, together with their Renaissance
restatements, light the way, so to speak, to Buffon's
renowned maxim "le style c'est 1'homme meme" (1753). The
underlying attitude shared by all these dicta comes to a
point of crystallization in the words of the Prussian
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polyhistor Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) who, probably
unpremeditatedly, recruits the very metaphor embedded in
one of the latin saws cited above: " [L]anguage", he writes,
"is never a mere tool of communication, but an imprint of
the mind and the world-view of its speakers" (in Mueller-
Vollmer 12)1.
With the Romantic ascendancy in the early decades of
the nineteenth century, the centre of gravity in literary
endeavour shifts from 'external' topics of whatever kind -
the 'manners and morals of men', for example, or the so-
called 'text-book' poems of the eighteenth century (Dyer's
The Fleece, Armstrong's The Art of Preserving Health,
1 For Noam Chomsky language is a 'mirror of mind' in a sense so basic 
as to bring "biological necessity" into the picture:
One reason for studying language... is that it is tempting 
to regard language, in the traditional phrase, as "a 
mirror of mind". I do not mean by this simply that the 
concepts expressed and distinctions developed in normal 
language use give us insight into the patterns of thought 
and the world of "common sense" constructed by the human 
mind. More intriguing... is the possibility that by 
studying language we may discover abstract principles that 
govern its structure and use, principles that are 
universal by biological necessity and not mere historical 
accident, that derive from mental characteristics of the 
species. A human language is a system of remarkable 
complexity. To come to know a human language would be an 
extraordinary intellectual achievement for a creature not 
specifically designed to accomplish this task. A normal 
child acquires this knowledge on relatively slight 
exposure and without specific training. ...For the 
conscious mind...it remains a distant goal to reconstruct 
and comprehend what the child has done intuitively and 
with minimal effort. Thus language is a mirror of mind in 
a deep and significant sense. It is a product of human 
intelligence, created anew in each individual by 
operations that lie far beyond the reach of will or 
consciousness. (4)
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Erasmus Darwin's The Botanic Garden, to name but a few)
to the writer's own inferiority as the great literary
topic2. The predictable consequence of this shift and of
the concomitant Romantic doctrine that a "work of art is
essentially the internal made external" (Abrams (1953) 22)
is a disposition to view the literary artifact as really
just "a disguised projection of its author" (ibid. 239),
and hence to read back from the work to the mind and
personality of that author. What makes the Romantic
critics who proceed on these principles recognizably
'modern' is an inclination to appraise the reading-back
process as a specifically psychological proceeding -
witness Carlyle's observation, made in an essay of 1827,
that the "grand question...usual with the best of our own
critics at present...is a question mainly of a
psychological sort, to be answered by discovering and
delineating the peculiar nature of the poet from his
poetry" ("The State of German Literature", I 3 8-39) .
While therefore the temptation (let's call it an
invitation) to make inferences about the build and quality
of a mind from the shape, complexion and register - in
2 "...one decisive change marks off the criticism in the Age of 
Wordsworth from that in the Age of Johnson. The poet has moved into 
the center of the critical system..." (Abrams (1953) 29).
32
brief, the style - of the discourse it generates is clearly
nothing new, this predilection has come to be systematized
in our century as a branch of literary stylistics that goes
by the name of psychological stylistics or, to use the
older appellation, mentalism. In common with all
psychological approaches to literature, psychological
stylistics tends to look "through the text rather than at
it" (Johan Muller, in Ryan and Van Zyl 184; emphasis in 
original). For the psychologizing critic, therefore, a
literary text subsists as a "set of signs which indicates,
if correctly read, a second tapestry of signs which in turn
charts the psychological activity controlling the 'doing'
of literature" (idem). The principal premise of
psychological stylistics has been articulated by Louis T
Milic in these terms: . .the style of a writer is an
idiosyncratic selection of the resources of the language
more or less forced on him by the combination of individual
differences summarized under the term 'personality'"
("Unconscious Ordering in the Prose of Swift" in Leed 82).
This premise harbours a number of assumptions and
entailments that bear inquiring into.
A key assumption is that the features of a writer's
(or speaker's) style which most truly open a window on the
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build and workings of his psyche are the ones that are
'more or less forced on him' by his 'personality' ; the
reference, in other words, is to stylistic peculiarities
and regularities that are an involuntary, unpremeditated
product of his mental operations and organization - his
unconscious choices, in short. These kinds of choices need
to be distinguished from others whose occurrence in a text
will not be 'stylistically relevant', meaning that they
cannot qualify as 'style-markers' capable of providing
insight into the configuration of a writer's psyche.
Subsumed under this head are verbal collocations so common
that they may be expected to occur with great frequency in
any text (e.g. "in the...", "from a...", even "not
only. . .but also. . .") . The verbal and syntactical
formations which cluster at the opposite extreme equally
fail to qualify as style-markers indicative of involuntary
stylistic choices - in this case however because of the
high degree of deliberateness and artifice they exhibit;
encountered under this head are (to cite Milic once again)
"significant lexical choices, word order for emphasis, the
kinds of sentence arrangements which are subsumed under
some of the rhetorical figures...and the logical ordering
of the parts of the discourse" ("Rhetorical Choice and
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Stylistic Option" in Chatman 85-86). These conscious
(often, indeed, self-conscious) determinations Milic labels
"rhetorical choices" while the unconscious ones that are
truly revelatory of the 'set7 of a writer's mind he calls
"stylistic options"3, and these latter tend to be
"manifested at the...syntactic level" (ibid. 85). To give
an example: Richard Ohmann calls attention to Saul Bellow's
relish for (more properly, perhaps, his addiction to) post­
nominal modifiers (ordinarily participles, past or present,
following the noun they refer to; also appositive phrases).
As this feature of style marks a deviation from the normal
pattern of English syntax which favours pre-nominal
modification (i.e. noun preceded by adjective), it invites
notice as a stylistically relevant manifestation, the more
so considering how frequently Bellow makes use of it. To
illustrate his point Ohmann cites the following passage
from Herzog:
Moses,a collector of pictures, had kept a
photograph of Madeleine. aged twelve. in riding
habit. She was posed with the horse, about to
3 To my mind Milic's use of the word "options" is not a happy one since 
for a term intended to characterize unconscious selections it implies 
too great a degree of conscious choice. A more felicitous term which 
describes the same phenomenon as that gestured to by Milic's phrase is 
Richard Ohmann's "stylistic intuitions" ("Mentalism in the Study of 
Literary Language" in Zale 195).
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mount. a stocky long-haired girl with fat wrists
and desperate dark shadows under her eyes,
premature signs of suffering and of a craving
for revenge. (Ohmann7s emphasis)
Commenting on the passage, Ohmann writes: "Here ten
post-nominals, some with pre-nominals embedded, crowd into
two sentences... and this concentration is only a little out
of the ordinary77 ("Mentalism in the Study of Literary
Language77 in Zale 197) . As for the "conceptual impulse77
(ibid. 199) lying behind the novelist's idiosyncratic
passion for post-nominal modifiers, Ohmann advances the
following hypothesis: noting that "post-
nominals ... represent a compact and efficient form within
which to house incidental or supplementary information77,
he ascribes Bellow's appetite for them to an impulse to
admit into his novels "a generous quota of contingent
circumstances, as if in wry acquiescence to their plenitude
and oddity77 (ibid. 2 00) .
Ohmann7s procedure involves moving from the observed
data to the specification of an aspect of Bellow's
novelistic psychology. The move he executes is,
accordingly, an interpretative one: he offers an
interpretation of the particular 'set7 of Bellow's writerly
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mind in light of the data he has marshalled. The point
being enforced here is that every exercise in psychological
stylistics is, ipso facto, an exercise in interpretative
stylistics. It is only logical, then, that in the schema
of the various categories of stylistic investigation
compiled by Peter Cassirer (see insert)4, psychological
stylistics should fall under the heading "Interpretative".
Actually it does not show up under this head (or under any
of the others) in the schema, but in the surrounding
argument of which the chart is but a digest, Cassirer makes
good the omission: "Interpretative stylistics can be one
tool in interpretation," he writes, "a method of
hermeneutics in that certain style-types...can be
4 More recently, thanks to the interest generated by reader-response 
criticism, a new category of stylistics has come into being which does 
not feature on Cassirer's chart. This is 'processing stylistics' the 
object of which is to throw light on the information-processing 
strategies that are in play during the activity of reading. In 
effect, the object is to specify "the mental operations underlying 
reading" {Taylor 100) . In France or Germany this kind of inquiry 
would be thought of as an investigation into the 'phenomenology of 
reading'. What, however, makes 'processing stylistics' a recognizably 
'stylistic' enterprise is its assumption that "the styles of different 
authors may be described in terms of the types of mental operations 
they characteristically make readers perform" (ibid. 99).
A recent issue (vol 22:1-2, Sept. 1993) of Poetics: Journal of 
Empirical Research on Literature the Media and the Arts testifies to 
the topicality of processing stylistics. This issue, a special one, 
is devoted to "Psychological Mechanisms in Literary and Aesthetic 
Comprehension". The Issue Editor's Introduction opens with these 
words: "The articles in this special issue examine the psychological 
representations and processes that occur when individuals comprehend 
literature, art, and media" (Graesser 1) . It is evident from this 
statement that processing stylistics, as currently conceived, does not 
confine itself to literary discourse.
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Figure 3.
GOAL MATERIAL LEVEL
PRESCRIPTIVE sounds, words, 
clauses, sentences, 
text
style-value
style-level
DESCRIPTIVE from sounds to 
things, from punc­
tuation signs to 
the intention of 
the speaker/writer; 
text (s)
style-elements
style
DISTINCTIVE texts style-elements
ARGUMENTATIVE conative 
and arguing 
texts,
pseudo-objective
texts
style-elements 
relevant for the 
special issue
INTERPRETATIVE text(s) the mea­
ning of which is 
not directly 
apparent
style-elements 
contributing to 
the meaning of 
the text or which 
give clues to the 
intention of the 
speaker/writer
QUESTIONS METHODS CONCEPT
does it sound well? 
is it understand­
able?
does it fit to con­
text?
(evaluative
criteria)
how is the content 
of the text com­
municated?
qualitative and
quantitative
analysis
who has written .? 
has X written .. ? 
what differences 
are there between 
text p and q?
is the argumen­
tation correct? 
which is the pur­
pose of the text 
and the intentions 
of the speaker/ 
writer?
what effect does 
the text have?
what does the text 
say and what docs 
it mean?
how is the import 
of the text com­
municated?
comparative 
analysis with aid 
of statistics or 
other quantitative 
methods
semantical and 
logical analysis, 
analysis of 
purpose and effect
’’Style is the way 
in which one sol­
ves the problem of 
giving one’s words 
the intended 
effect”
Style is the aggre­
gate and structure 
of all stylemar- 
kers in a text. 
(What gives a 
text-element the 
status of style- 
marker has to be 
made clear in a 
style theory)
Style is the dif­
ference between 
texts or between a 
text and a norm
Style is the way in 
which a writer/ 
speaker affects 
and/or influences 
the reader/Iistener
Peler C
assirer
hermeneutics, 
semantic context- 
analysis
Style is the way in 
which a content is 
presented
demonstrated to be indicative of■an author's ...psyche"
{"On the Place of Stylistics" in Ringbom 39).
Precisely because psychological stylistics is an
approach predicated upon interpretative moves rather than,
say, merely descriptive ones, it becomes most important to
ensure that one appeals to the right kind of data, the
right kind of evidence - the kind that will support a
defensible interpretation. One cannot assume that any and
every work written by a given author is necessarily
admissible as evidence in psychological stylistics. Where
this approach is concerned, it is a mistake to adopt a 
simple, 'straight-line' form of reasoning, arguing that as
an author's writings bear the imprint of his mind,
therefore an analysis of those writings, if only it is
exhaustive enough, will necessarily open a window on that
mind, regardless of the nature of the evidence appealed to.
In her hefty book, Shakespeare's Imagery and What It Tells
Us, an ambitious and exhaustive exercise in psychological
stylistics, Caroline Spurgeon comes to grief, it seems to
me, precisely for want of paying heed to the imperative
need to consult the right kind of evidence. In the absence
of any but the sparsest biographical data, in the absence
of any documentation other than the plays and poems, she
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rests her whole case on these in her endeavour to throw
light, through a study of their imagery, on "Shakespeare's
personality, temperament and thought" (ix). But what she
seems to forget, or disregard, is the axiom of authorial
'volatilization' or, at any rate, authorial impersonality,
where dramatic writings are concerned. One wouldn't want
to claim as much with regard to the other major Kinds, but
in the case of drama authorial impersonality has to serve
as a 'point-of-departure' postulate. This granted, it
follows that all claims to be able to 'recover' a dramatist
or his thoughts from his plays are simply chimerical. If
this holds true for dramatists in general, it is truer
still of Shakespeare given the sparseness of the
biographical record. So, to be legitimate, one's point-of-
departure pemise would have to be that what Shakespeare put
into his plays, imagery included, was tailored to their
dramatic requirements, to the needs of plot, theme, mood
and characterization, rather than to a desire to project
himself covertly into their fabric. Given this assumption
there is no escaping the corollary that even supposing
Shakespeare's temperament and thoughts really were 'in' his
plays and poems, how could the inquirer ever know it? How
could he know where to look for them? How could he ever
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be sure he had found them5? Yet Spurgeon proceeds as if
she can know, as if she does know, despite a tremor of
doubt that occasionally impedes her forward motion: "But
we cannot always be sure that this view is not just that
of the character speaking..." (151), she admits at one
point. What she should have asked herself, however, is
"Can we ever be sure...?" But she doesn't6, and so,
driving on regardless, she courts trouble and, predictably
enough, finds it - in the form, for example, of this
ludicrously (one could say grotesquely) far-fetched
inference which crops up in the chapter entitled
"Shakespeare's Tastes and Interests (Indoor and other
Interests) " :
By 1599, when he was five and thirty,
Shakespeare has probably experienced heartburn
5 George L Kittredge poses these very questions - within the context, 
interestingly, of a persuasion that Shakespeare is indeed present in 
his plays. The position he upholds is, therefore, that while 
Shakespeare is present in the plays he is at the same time 
unsearchable and 'unextractable'. "Unquestionably the man is there," 
writes Kittredge, "the real Shakspere is somehow latent in his plays: 
but how is one to extract him?...[He] pervades and vivifies the whole 
but eludes analysis and defies extraction..." (47, 51).
One feels that if Spurgeon had suffered herself to be 
restrained by Kittredge's caveats (ventured in 1926, ten years 
before she published her own book), she could have saved herself 
a good deal of embarrassment.
6 One could say that Spurgeon's failure lay in not being sufficiently 
attentive to an important principle of investigative procedure which 
Suzanne Langer has formulated as follows: "The... treatment of a 
problem begins with its first expression as a question. The way in 
which a question is asked limits and disposes the ways in which any 
answer to it - right or wrong - may be given" (1).
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• as the result of acidity, and realises that
musty food needs a good stomach to digest
it...and it is now we get the first indication
of his extreme sensitiveness to nicety and
cleanliness at table and his dislike of food ill
kept and ill served of which we are so conscious
a few years later, especially in Troilus and
Cressida.7 (119)
7 There is an argument to be made for viewing Spurgeon's book 
(published in 1936) as the culmination of a particular strain of 
Shakespearean criticism which may be designated 'bringing to light the 
hidden Shakeseare'. This curious manifestation in the history of 
Shakespearean exegesis was a product of the Romantic ascendancy. As 
I have already noted, one of the major changes wrought by the Romantic 
restructuring of perspective in the first decades of the nineteenth 
century was the shift from outer to inner, and specifically the shift 
from a view of poetry as 'external', as simply "the refined and 
pleasing communication to educated ears of an aspect of civilized and 
generalized humanity" (Daiches IV 856) to an 'inward' view of it as 
the record and expression of the poet's inferiority - his inner self, 
his inner life.
One may theorize that it was but a short step, and one soon 
taken, from the Romantic persuasion of poetry's being revelatory of an 
inner self to a persuasion of its being revelatory of a hidden self, 
a persuasion to which Arnold's poem "The Buried Life" bears witness, 
as does Herder's conception of poetry as "a dangerous betrayer of its 
author" (in Abrams (1953) 236).
It did not take long, it seems, for the Romantic notion of a 
hidden life to be recruited to Shakespearean criticism as an 
interpretative lens through which to view the oeuvre, a development 
invited not just by its richness and suggestiveness but also by the 
absence of any curb (in the form, say, of biographical data) on 
fanciful speculation. The consequence was the periodic appearance 
during the nineteenth century of works of criticism purporting to 
bring to light different hidden facets of the Bard; and the suggestion 
accompanying each such revelation was that its version of the hidden 
Shakespeare was the really authentic one. These curious exercises in 
Shakespearean reclamation may well be regarded as the forebears of 
Spurgeon's very much more sophisticated study. The particular hidden 
facet of the Bard each of them claimed to be retrieving is readily 
enough inferred from the titles they respectively bear; here is a 
sampling:
1828: "Shakespeare a Tory and a Gentleman" (Hartley Coleridge)
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IAvoiding the trap into which Spurgeon stumbled, John
Carey has been altogether more successful, it seems to me,
in his application of the mentalist approach to the oeuvre
of John Donne. His book John Donne: Life, Mind and Art
rests on much solider ground than Spurgeon's on
Shakespeare. He has to hand a fair amount of biographical
data and also enjoys the advantage of having at his
disposal a variety of source materials including sermons,
letters, meditations and the youthful 'evaporations of wit'
in addition to the poetic corpus much of which, for sound
reasons it seems to me, he views as autobiographically
based (certainly, as regards the "Songs and Sonnets" and
the "Elegies", his operative premise clearly is that author
and speaker are one). He is therefore much better placed
than Spurgeon was to arrive at defensible mentalist
conclusions. These conclusions are either 'local', i.e.
grounded in only one or a few items, or 'continental', i.e.
bearing upon the oeuvre as a whole or upon the greater part
of it. An example of the former is this comment: "The
1865: Shakespeare, his Inner Life as Intimated in his Works (J 
A Heraud)
18 71: Was Shakespeare a Lawyer? (H.T.)
1883: Shakespeare as an Angler (H N Ellacombe)
1884: Shakespeare as a Physician (J P Chesney)
1897: Shakespeare an Archer (W L Rushton)
(First item in Abrams (1953) 247; remainder in Butler and Fowler 
519)
42
hard, jubilant .tone of 'A Burnt Ship' corresponds, in fact,
to a pitiless element in Donne's nature..." (95). Of the
latter:
The principle of joined opposites... permeates
Donne's poetry. He works by joining. But
before he could be obsessed by joints he had to
be obsessed by division. The mind which strives
to unite east and west must be unusually
conscious of their separation... Donne's vision
was conjunctive only because it was disjunctive,
and he synthesized only because he was by nature
analytic. He created the fragmentation which he
strove to overcome. (266)
Something that emerges clearly from Carey's study is
a conviction that the stylistic features which most
illuminatingly open a window on "the distinctive structure
of Donne's imagination" (10) are those in which habitual
or involuntary mental operations - in other words, his
unconscious choices - are assumed to have played a
determining role. It is for this reason that in his
interpretation of the evidential record Carey so often has
recourse to the vocabulary of involuntary affective and
mental activity:
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...chance repetitions... the reflex actions of a
mind which spent its whole life making phrases.
(12)
His soul felt impelled to reach for peaks and
zeniths. (100)
The urge to express the inexpressible, and think
the unthinkable... (125)
The imaginative drive towards union... (267)
The impulse to bind opposites... (269)
To a mind possessed by simultaneity... (276)
...habits of mind simultaneously dualistic and
synthesizing... (278)
...examples of his synthesizing instinct...
(279)
Carey's philosophical forebear, whether he realizes
it or not, was Leo Spitzer (1887-1960) who is nowhere 
mentioned in his book. Spitzer ranks as arguably the most
distinguished mentalist critic of this century8. Though
guilty on occasion of allowing his fancy to get the better
a A 'soft' psycholinguist of the hermeneutic persuasion, Spitzer aims 
at a result that is "better or worse"; he is to be distinguished from 
'hard' psycholinguists of the positivist persuasion who, claiming to 
be less impressionistic and more 'scientific' (= more statistical), 
aim at a result that is "right or wrong" (N E Enkvist: lecture, 
University of Natal, Durban, 6 October 1995).
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of his judgment9, Spitzer's investigative methodology,
viewed in the context of his mentalist brief, strikes me
as on the whole responsible; and the investigations
themselves, orchestrated as quests for the "psychological
etymon...the radix in [the] soul" (13) of the chosen
authors, are wonderfully stimulating and suggestive as they
reveal him assembling his "psychogram[s]" (15) bit by bit.
An instance is his essay on Diderot's style where he
focuses on
a rhythmic pattern in which I seemed to hear the
9 One such lapse is noted by Rene Wellek in his essay "Stylistics, 
Poetics, and Criticism". " [0] n very little evidence", writes Wellek 
disapprovingly, "Leo Spitzer considers what he calls 'the f ai t- 
accompli construction in Spanish [to be] a linguistic reflection of 
Spanish Utopianism, of the Spanish plus ultra will'" (in Chatman 66).
In advancing this rather eccentric opinion Spitzer betrays the 
influence of a distinctively German 'slant' in psychological 
stylistics, according to which the linguistic and stylistic traits of 
a language were viewed as expressive of national character, of a 
nation's 'soul', of its peculiar 'genius'. This viewpoint, which is 
now only of historical interest, drew its inspiration mainly from 
19th-century philological investigations, and in particular from 
Wilhelm von Humboldt's extended essay on the philosophy of language 
entitled The Diversity of Human Language-Structure and its Influence 
on the Mental Development of Mankind (published posthumously in 1836) . 
In this treatise von Humboldt propounded the principal philosophical 
bearings of the 'German slant'. The following passage gives the gist 
of his outlook:
The comparative study of languages... loses all higher 
interest if it does not cleave to the point at which 
language is connected with the shaping of the nation's 
mental power. ...Language...is the organ of inner being, 
this being itself, as it successively attains to inner 
knowledge and outward expression. It therefore strikes 
with all the most delicate fibres of its roots into the 
national mentality; and the more aptly the latter reacts 
upon it, the more rich and regular its development. (21) 
[emphasis in original]
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echo of Diderot's speaking voice: a self-
accentuating
'speaker' is
rhythm, suggesting that the
swept away by a wave of passion
which tends to flood all limits. This
pattern...is apt to appear, with varied nuances,
anywhere in Diderot's writings... The conclusion
seemed obvious that this rhythm was conditioned
by a certain nervous temperament which, instead
of being tempered by style, was allowed to
energize style. (135)
However much care the practitioners of psychological
stylistics take to ensure that the evidence they appeal to
is relevant, however responsible they are in the use they
make of it, the approach still has not escaped the charge
that at a fundamental level (as distinct from a merely
procedural one) it is irremediably flawed. This charge has
been energetically voiced by Stanley Fish echoing similar
animadversions expressed earlier, though more decorously,
by, among others, Wellek and Warren10. As a critical
10 In their book Theory of Literature, once a standard reference work, 
Wellek and Warren write:
[H]owever ingenious some of its suggestions may be, 
psychological stylistics seems open to two objections. 
Many relationships professing to be thus established are 
not based on conclusions really drawn from the linguistic 
material but rather start with a psychological and 
ideological analysis and seek for confirmation in the 
language. This would be unexceptionable if in practice
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approach, argues Fish, psychological stylistics is disabled
by a built-in tendency towards arbitrariness lurking in the
"unexamined and highly suspect assumption that one can read
directly from the description of a text...to the shape or
quality of its author's mind". The problem, as he sees it,
is not that this kind of move cannot be executed but, on
the contrary, that it can be executed "all too easily and
in any direction one likes". Consequently, whatever the
interpretation one finally arrives at, it will never be
able to rise above the level of mere assertion; conclusive
demonstration is forever out of reach "because there is
nothing in the machinery [of psychological stylistics] to
authorize the leap from the data to a specification of
their value" ("What is stylistics and why are they saying
such terrible things about it?" in Freeman 55).
In addressing myself to Fish's objections, let me say
at once that I think he is both right and wrong. When he
the linguistic confirmation did not itself seem frequently 
strained or based on very slight evidence. ...Furthermore, 
the assumption of a necessary relationship between certain 
stylistic devices and certain states of mind would appear 
fallacious. For example, in the discussion of the 
Baroque, most German scholars assume an inevitable 
correspondence between dense, obscure, twisted language 
and a turbulent, divided and tormented soul. But an 
obscure, twisted style can certainly be cultivated by 
craftsmen and technicians. The whole relationship between 
psyche and word is looser and more oblique than is usually 
assumed. (187-188)
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complains that reading from a text 'to the shape or quality
of its author's mind' opens the door to arbitrary 
interpretations, he is plainly right. That danger
certainly exists. On the other hand, arbitrariness is a
built-in danger attendant upon any interpretative
undertaking in the human sciences. Do the exigent
interpretative conventions guiding Leavisean-style 'close
reading' render it immune to arbitrary interpretations and
impressionistic curvets and caprioles of all kinds? By no
means. As Rene Wellek correctly observes, "' [c]lose
reading' has led to pedantries and aberrations"; and he
adds, irref ragably, "as have all the other methods of
scholarship" (9).
Taking the argument a step further, I would want to
maintain that arbitrariness is basically a fault of method,
of procedure; Fish however implies that where
psychological stylistics is concerned arbitrariness is
built into its very fabric, into its fundamental structure;
his suggestion is that in its very nature it is an
arbitrary praxis. Here I think he is wrong, and he is
wrong because he mistakes procedural imperfections for
structural ones. Who would deny that a critical approach,
any critical approach, is liable to be disabled by
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arbitrary procedures or by irresponsible methodology. But
that doesn't mean that it is thereby invalidated at the
more basic level of its fundamental assumptions and goals.
In suggesting that such is the case where psychological
stylistics is concerned, Fish errs.
Furthermore, because in those instances where
psychological stylistics does fall short, the reason for
it has to do, in my view, rather with procedural and
methodological deficiencies than with fundamental
structural ones, I cannot agree with Fish that findings in
this domain can never rise above the level of mere
assertion. Given a responsible methodology applied to the
right kind of evidence, it is indeed possible to move
beyond (well beyond) simple assertion. I think, for
example, that E P Thompson succeeds in doing so in his book
on Blake which he describes as "an enquiry into the
structure of Blake's thought and the character of his
sensibility" (xix); and I have no doubt of Carey's success
in the book on Donne; consequently, I would characterize
his findings as educated judgments, not mere assertions.
His study shows that there can be quite a lot in the
'machinery' of psychological stylistics to 'authorize the
leap from the data to a specification of their value'. And
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I am bound to add, with reference to my own inquiry, that
the quantity of evidence pertaining to Johnson's
distinction-making which I have amassed, together with (in
my judgment) its soundness, leads me to believe that there
is in fact much to 'authorize the leap' from the data to
the conclusions I shall be venturing about the build and
quality of his mind; nor, by the way, do I believe it will
be that much of a 'leap'; I see it as being more like a
studied stride. To be sure there is the other side of the
coin too - not a few of Spurgeon's conclusions do turn out
to be mere assertion or fanciful speculation. But her
failure, as I argued above, has more to do with appealing
to the wrong kind of evidence than with choosing a critical
approach that is inherently flawed.
One thing of course is indisputable: psychological
stylistics will never be able to deliver 'watertight'
interpretations revelatory of objective truth. But then
no interpretative model in the human sciences can hope to
attain to objective knowledge. To approach probability is
the best that can be hoped for. Seymour Chatman has
judiciously observed that in interpretative undertakings
"the only criteria are consistency and adequacy, not some
discoverable jewel called truth" (in Ringbom 43). In the
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present inquiry the criteria I shall hope to satisfy will
be precisely those of consistency, adequacy and
probability. I shall not be looking to do more. Fish,
however, appears to suggest that psychological stylistics
is under an obligation to do better than just approach
probability; he seems to want it to provide conclusive
demonstrations. If this sense of his expectations is
correct then Fish himself incurs an obligation - to explain
why he should hold psychological stylistics to standards
more exigent than those that would apply to other
interpretative models, and the more so as this one makes
no claim to offer certain knowledge or conclusive
demonstrations, despite occasional loose talk by some of
its practitioners11. So it seems to me, in sum, that Fish
is blaming the psychocritical approach for not doing what
it neither claims to do nor aims to do. That is manifestly
unfair and points to his having misunderstood its agenda. 11
11 John Carey is guilty of such a lapse at the end of his book on 
Donne. After noting Donne's "lasting sense of isolation from some 
greater whole...his disjunction from the Catholic Church...the long- 
drawn-out failure of his secular career", Carey advances the view that 
Donne's "desire for a church that would swallowup all existing 
churches..., and his wish to be united with 'the body of this world' 
are examples of his synthesizing instinct which obviously relate to 
these biographical concerns" (278-279).
It seems to me that the word 'obviously' is one mentalist 
critics should steer well clear of. It implies a degree of 
irrefutability that is not at all consistent with what the mentalist 
approach is capable of delivering.
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For the most psychological stylistics can hope to do is
suggest; and if it manages to be suggestive in a
persuasive, stimulating and illuminating way it has done
all that can reasonably be asked of it. For that reason
I shall be well content if by the end of this study I shall
have managed to suggest something plausible about the build
and quality of Samuel Johnson's mind12.
Turning now to the objections levelled by Wellek and
Warren: they are clearly correct in alleging that the
possibility exists in psychological stylistics of using the
data simply in order to seek confirmation for a pre-formed
psychological theory. But this is really to misuse the
data and, in so far, to abuse psychological stylistics as
a critical approach. Any critical method after all is open
to abuse of one kind or another ("[W]hat is there which may
not be perverted?" Johnson reminds us: Rambler 85, IV 85),
and to urge the view that the method as such is invalidated
12 In. this endeavour I shall really be doing no more than Johnson 
himself was attempting to do when he composed the biographical- 
critical Prefaces that are now known to us as The Lives of the Poets. 
As Pat Rogers puts it, Johnson, in writing these Prefaces, was 
"seekfing] fundamentally" to assemble "a mental construct of the 
[poet] in question, and events are utilized to build up this portrait, 
rather than to establish a definitive life-history" (93).
Robert Griffin adumbrates a philosophical context for the kind 
of psychologizing project Johnson was engaged in when he wrote the 
Lives: "The delineation of a poetical character is a form of 
reflection equivalent to the argument from design in philosophy. 
Criticism discovers the mind of the author in his works, just as 
philosophy considered the mind of a Creator through His creation. The 
old analogy which made God a poet hovers in the background" (152).
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on that account is surely unreasonable. Relating these
issues to my own encounter
to place it on record
psychological theory about
with Johnson, I ought perhaps
that I had no pre-formed
him13. In the course of some
13 Apropos of pre-formed theories about Johnson, (not necessarily 
psychological ones), consider the following programmatic statement 
taken from a recent (1992) book dealing with the Rambler essays and 
voguishly titled Samuel Johnson after Deconstruction. The author, 
Steven Lynn, makes it sufficiently clear that he not only has a pre­
formed theory about Johnson (in fact, he all but boasts about it), but 
that this theory was framed in order to subserve a pre-formed 
objective:
Motivated by my own desire to salvage and justify some 
sort of belief in a Transcendent Other, I have read that 
interest back into Johnson's Rambler to the exclusion of 
other concerns. I have read The Rambler, which appears to 
be concerned with many things, as a single-minded 
evangelical document, casting Johnson as a lay preacher 
out to win our souls for God. In this reductive 
misreading deconstruction has been conscripted as my 
accomplice, disarming the normative forces of genre and 
history that would otherwise restrict my movements. Able 
to violate these conventions, reading The Rambler 
differently, I have disagreed at/on one point or another 
with virtually every Johnsonian living and dead including 
at times the original Johnsonian himself. (157)
Faced with a statement of this kind one stands bemused. One 
hardly knows how to respond other than to observe that it now seems as 
if any kind of folly is admissible provided only that it is committed 
self-consciously, with eyes fully open. If the position and 
procedures adopted by Lynn are the harvest of post-stucturalism's 
aggrandizement of 'reflexivity' and of 'reading against the text', 
then post-structuralism has quite a bit to answer for.
Lynn may quite possibly believe that in adopting the position he 
does he has won his spurs as an avant-garde member of the 
deconstructive caucus, but in point of fact his proceeding is more 
reminiscent of the interpretative practices of mediaeval biblical 
commentators who, though "well aware that Homer and Vergil had been 
pagans who could not consciously have intended or communicated 
Christian meanings" (Hirsch 77), never let that difficulty stand in 
their way as they continued unperturbed for centuries on end to 
allegorize the ancient pagan texts (notably Vergil's fourth 
'Messianic' eclogue) in palpably anachronistic Christian terms.
As Lynn's study deals with the Rambler essays he must know that 
in number 106 of the series Johnson makes reference to authors who 
"are forgotten because they never deserved to be remembered" (IV 201). 
Before embarking upon the writing of his book he should have taken 
heed of those words.
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quite wide-ranging reading in the Johnsonian corpus I began
to notice his predilection for distinction-making, and then
at a certain point, though I cannot say exactly when, the
idea took shape that this might have to do with the way his
psyche was organized. I would now contend, having the
advantage of hindsight, that the point at which that idea
took shape was the point at which I entered the hermeneutic
circle.
In invoking the concept of the hermeneutic circle, as
elaborated in particular by Martin Heidegger, I am
appealing to a theoretical model which I believe accounts
not only for my own interpretative 'moves' with respect to
Johnson, but for interpretative processes in general. In
terms of this model the processes of understanding and
interpretation always involve a back and forth movement
between the part and the glimpsed (or intuited) whole.
This back and forth movement is ordinarily conceptualized
as a kind of to-and-fro progress through the arc, or
through the whole, of a circle: "in order to understand the
whole, it is necessary to understand the parts, while to
understand the parts it is necessary to have some
comprehension of the whole" (Hoy vii) . Less abstractly
formulated is Ian Maclean's account of the way the
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interpretative circle actually works in practice:
The circle is that movement from a guess at the
'whole' meaning of a work to an analysis of its
parts in relation to the whole, followed by a
return to a modified understanding of the
'whole' of the work. It embodies the belief
that part and whole are interdependent and have
some necessary organic relationship. (in Cuddon
405)
This account describes with a fair degree of accuracy
how my sense of Johnson developed. The evolving outlines
of the 'fuller picture' (what Maclean, using inverted
commas, with good reason, calls the "'whole' meaning") no
doubt involved a number of intuitive leaps, at any rate in
the early stages, and, in so far, enacted the 'divinatory'
aspect of the inquirer's onward movement through the
circle14. * 33
14 The notion of "divination" as a key element in the theory of the 
hermeneutic circle was posited by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768­
1834) who also first propounded the theory itself. (For more on 
Schleiermacher's understanding of 'divination' v. Spitzer op. cit.
33) . No theorist of the hermeneutic circle views its 'divinatory' 
aspect as a licence to launch out on flights of fancy, speculative 
sprees or impressionistic joy-rides. Heidegger, for example, warns 
that "our first, last and constant task is never to allow our fore­
having ["Vorhabe" = 'that which we have in advance' (and which 
provides both the impetus and the context for 'divinatory' 
activity)]...to be presented to us byfancies and popular conceptions" 
(in Mueller-Vollmer 226) . The theory of the hermeneutic circle 
underwrites the notion, one might say, of disciplined divination.
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For Heidegger a 'divination' of the 'whole' occurs as
early as the moment of first encounter with any of its
parts - or, indeed, even earlier since divinatory activity
is already present in the "undiscussed assumption [s]" (in
Mueller-Vollmer 223) of the person who is about to perform
an interpretative act. This standpoint makes it clear why
Heidegger insists, first, that interpretation is always
grounded in an "horizon of preunderstanding" (ibid. 35)
and, second, that, contrary to "the dream of Cartesian
'First Philosophy'", there is no such thing as
"presuppositionless knowledge" (Hoy 3-4). "An
interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending
of something presented to us", is how Heidegger puts it (in
Mueller-Vollmer 223). The principal 'doctrinal' consequent
flowing from Heidegger's theoretical position is embodied
in the following dictum-like statement which contains the
gist of his understanding of the hermeneutic circle: "Any
interpretation which is to contribute understanding must
already have understood what is to be interpreted" (ibid.
225). If by the word "understood" we comprehend something
like 'grasp intuitively', then this statement, viewed
against the backdrop sketched in above, appears
intelligible and consistent, though out of context it may
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well strike one as wilfully paradoxical and perversely
circular. Only too aware of how susceptible his theory was
to the charge of having fallen victim to a 'vicious circle'
logic, Heidegger was at some pains to counter pre-emptively
this imputation:
But if we see this circle as a vicious one and
look out for wavs of avoidincr it, even if we
just 'sense' it as an inevitable imperfection.
then the act of understanding has been
misunderstood from the ground up. . . .What is
decisive is not to get out of the circle but to
come into it in the right way. This circle of
understanding... is not to be reduced to the
level of a vicious circle, or even of a circle
which is merely tolerated. In the circle is
hidden a positive possibility of the most
primordial kind of knowing. (in Mueller-Vollmer
225-226) [emphasis in original]
This 'primordial kind of knowing' has more to do with
intuitive modes of apprehension than with anything
resembling rational inquiry or 'objective' knowledge.
Heidegger was as firm in denying that the hermeneutic
circle could lead to objective knowledge in the human
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sciences as he was in denying that it was merely a 'vicious
circle' manoeuvre "assuming as a premise the conclusion to
be proved" [petitio principii] (Lanham 51). Only given an
inappropriate ideal of knowledge - that of objectivity -
can the hermeneutic circle be viewed as vicious (Hoy 3).
I spoke earlier of one thing being 'indisputable' -
namely, the impossibility of psychological stylistics ever
being able to deliver watertight interpretations reposing
upon objective knowledge. This impossibility can be both
clarified and accounted for in terms of the theory of the
hermeneutic circle. As psychological stylistics is an
interpretative enterprise and as, according to the
hermeneutic viewpoint, both the interpreter and what is to
be interpreted are located within the circle, they are
perforce inscribed within what Hans-Georg Gadamer, at one
time Heidegger's student, terms a "situation"; and, says
Gadamer, " [t]he very idea of a situation means that we are
not standing outside it and hence are unable to have any
objective knowledge of it" (in Mueller-Vollmer 269). In
point of fact, however, the same conclusion can be arrived
at without the interposition of the concept of a
'situation': as long as the interpreter and the object of
interpretation are jointly inscribed within the hermeneutic
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circle, and as long as it remains impossible either to
escape or to transcend it (and for man it does, though not
for God, hence the perfection of divine knowledge), every
interpretation will always to some extent be coloured by
the interpreter's 'undiscussed assumptions' - and as long
as that holds true (and in the human sciences it always
will), the ideal of objective knowledge will never be more
than just a beautiful pipe-dream, always alluring and
always out of reach.
As for myself, I hope that the inquiry which follows
will stay within the boundaries traced by Heidegger: while
I cannot aspire to certainties or conclusive
demonstrations, I may yet hope to avoid the trap of
'vicious circle' reasoning which, in investigations
structured on psychocritical lines, ordinarily manifests
itself as an attempt to explain "a linguistic fact by an
assumed psychological process for which the only evidence
is the fact to be explained" (in Spitzer op. cit. 19) .
There is in the end only one really effective way of
avoiding this pitfall, and that is to adduce many
linguistic facts; in other words, to adduce a great deal
of evidence - enough, at any rate, to put one's
psychological hypothesis pretty much beyond the reach of
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refutation, or of easy refutation, anyhow. My endeavour
to compass this objective is reflected in my leading so
considerable a quantity of evidence in the chapter which
follows; there is enough of it, I believe, to make the
psychological hypothesis I have undertaken to defend in
this study not easily susceptible of refutation. I can
only hope that this is an opinion which other readers will
be able to share.
Drawing now to the end of this chapter, I want to
enlarge its focus somewhat so as bring Johnson himself more
fully into the picture.
Richard Ohmann, in his article "Mentalism in the Study
of Literary Language" (in Zale 188-212) , to which I have
already referred, draws a distinction which has been of
capital importance in clarifying my understanding and
shaping my interpretation of Johnson as a maker of
distinctions. Ohmann distinguishes moves that result in
preferred stylistic formulations from ones that result in
preferred stylistic arrangements (199) [emphasis in
original]. The latter involve "assembling and relating
[chiefly syntactic] structures" (idem), as with Saul
Bellow's idiosyncratic predilection for post-nominal
modifiers (this move corresponding to Milic's "stylistic
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options" which tend to manifest themselves "at
the... syntactic level" - v. supra), whereas the former,
operating at an altogether deeper level, embody "a tendency
to formulate the basic structures of discourse in a certain
manner" (idem). As an example of the former tendency, the
more elemental one, Ohmann calls attention to Edward
Gibbon's striking preference for constructions cast in the
passive voice, a preference he illustrates through analysis
of a passage taken from Chapter 15 of the Decline and Fall.
His conclusion at the end of the analysis is that Gibbon's
"intricate embedding of passives was an unwilled
accomplishment of his stylistic intuition" (195). As for
the larger mental "impulse" (194) of which the historian's
'stylistic intuition' privileging the passive voice is but
the symptom, Ohmann sees that in terms of habits of mind
Gibbon cultivated in response to the particular demands of
his discipline and calling:
...the passive answers well to a preference for
objectivity and distance. By allowing human
agency to recede into an obscure limbo, Gibbon
locates the events of Roman history in a neutral
framework of plain fact, mere occurrence, and
absolves himself from a potentially sentimental
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attachment to the participants. "Just
representations of general nature": the neo­
classical slogan is Johnson's, but the goal
informs the passage at hand, and Gibbon's
history at large, even more pervasively than it
does Johnson's work. The passive voice
implements it here in a rather concrete way.
(194)
It is my contention that Johnson's distinction-making,
which is so pervasive in his discourse both written and
spoken as to bear all the hallmarks of an unconscious and
involuntary activity (an 'unwilled accomplishment', to use
Ohmann's terminology), has to be viewed, like Gibbon's
prepossesssion in favour of passive constructions, as
operating at the level rather of 'preferred formulations'
than of 'preferred arrangements'. Hence, just as Gibbon's
pull towards passives is at once the reflection and
enactment of his historian's mindset, so Johnson's
distinction-making drive is at once the mirror, the
impress, the enactment, the 'staging', indeed, of an
altogether elemental aspect of his psychic constitution,
its analytic, differentiating, bifurcating bent. Simply
put, Johnson had, it seems to me, a distinction-making
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mind; that was its character - or a large part of it. I
visualize it as a kind of distinction-making factory, a
machine programmed to generate distinctions. Whether it
was built like that to begin with or trained to operate
that way, who can say? Perhaps it was these two factors
working in combination that made it what it was. At any
rate, I believe this aspect of his psychic organization was
a good deal more elemental than the aspect (whatever it
was) that generated the stylistic peculiarities - the
inverted periods, the fondness for personification and
parallelism - which have for so long been thought of as
most truly characteristic of the 'Johnsonian' manner. In
my view these 'quintessentially Johnsonian' style-markers
are to be located at the more superficial level of
preferred stylistic and syntactic arrangements rather than
at the more fundamental one of "preferred formulations".
In point of fact, the verbal formations by way of which
Johnson's innumerable distinctions are mediated are
syntactically and stylistically very diverse; the feature
they have in common is that they are all vehicles for
distinction-making - which again suggests that his
distinction-making drive was 'bedrock', the 'bottom line'.
That he may have been momentarily aware of this drive, that
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he may have caught a glimpse of its commanding importance
in the organization of his psyche, is hinted at by these
remarks in the "Preface" to his Dictionary of the English
Language:
The nice and subtle ramifications of meaning
were not easily avoided by a mind intent upon
accuracy, and convinced of the necessity of
disentangling combinations, and separating
similitudes. (in Bronson 253).
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CHAPTER TWO
MINDMAPPING: VIEWS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON'S MIND OVER TWO AND
A HALF CENTURIES
Samuel Johnson died in London on the thirteenth
December 1784. Before the month was out Thomas Tyers had
published his "Biographical Sketch of Dr. Samuel Johnson"
in the Gentleman's Magazine. Tyers was quick off the mark,
and so his piece represented the proemial eddy of what was
soon to become a flood of memoirs, sketches, recollections,
anecdotes and full-dress biographies of the dead Sage. The
public appetite for information about a man who had become
a national institution in his own lifetime seemed to be
insatiable and, indeed, to grow by what it fed on. So
those who sought to satisfy it were, in a sense, 'on to a
good thing': career and commercial motives could never have
been entirely absent from their calculations1.
The legend of Johnson's august presence, commanding
personality and prodigious intellect, of his ordinary 1
1 Of Tyers Boswell rather acidly remarks that he was "one among the 
various persons ambitious of appending their names to that of my 
illustrious friend" (Life 960) .
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humanity conjoined with an extraordinary larger-than-
lifeness were not the only factors prompting such
widespread curiosity about him among the educated
eighteenth-century public. One has also to bring into the
picture the growing interest, observable right through the
century, in psychological speculation, investigation and
analysis. This was a phenomenon that undoubtedly added to
the incentive to 'rubberneck' Johnson, the more so
considering his well-remembered 'oddities'; that is, his
compulsive behaviour as manifested in an entire repertoire
of bizarre tics and gestures. Johnson himself indirectly
calls attention to the epoch's increased interest in
matters psychological when he implicitly installs it as the
standard by which the dearth of psychological understanding
in Shakespeare's day is judged and shown up:
Speculation had not yet attempted to analyse the
mind, to trace the passions to their sources, to
unfold the seminal principles of vice and
virtue, or sound the depths of the heart for the
motives of action. All those enquiries, which
from that time that human nature became the
fashionable study, have been made sometimes with
nice discernment, but often with idle subtilty,
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were yet unattempted. The tales, with which the
infancy of learning was satisfied, exhibited
only the superficial appearances of action,
related the events but omitted the causes, and
were formed for such as delighted in wonders
rather than in truth. Mankind was not then to
be studied in the closet. ("Preface" to
Shakespeare. in Bronson 286)
Taking up the cue, Kenneth MacLean points out that in
Hume's view the "closet study of man and his mind was a
particularly Eighteenth-Century and peculiarly English
investigation, succeeding in point of time the Seventeenth
Century's investigations of the physical world by Bacon and
his contemporaries" (13) .
Given this backdrop, it comes as no surprise to
discover that the eighteenth century is rich in observation
and comment on Johnson's mind and character, some of it
recorded while he was alive and therefore not intended for
publication (not immediate publication, anyhow), some of
it recorded and/or published after his death. Most of the
eighteenth-century comment documents the impressions of
people who actually knew him; of these fewer would have had
a commercial motive for committing their observations to
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writing than would have been prompted by a simple desire
to record an insight or judgment about the build or
workings of a mind by which they had been deeply impressed
(in some cases, overwhelmed). For Boswell, of course, the
recording of such impressions became, in time, part of a
monumental memorializing project.
As one moves towards the nineteenth century, with the
Romantic currents now gaining the ascendancy, the picture
changes, partly because hardly any of the nineteenth-
century commentators actually knew Johnson, and so could
not have been personally awed by him; but mostly because
so much of what Johnson stood for was obnoxious to the
Romantic creed. At the same time, however, he bulked large
- too large to be disregarded or dismissed. He accordingly
represented a major obstacle to the Romantic advance, one
which it would require a concerted effort to clear out of
the way. The major Romantic authors and critics realized,
writes James T Boulton, that Johnson "epitomized supremely
the assumptions about 'man, nature, and human life' which
had to be rejected if their own convictions were to
prevail. ...Johnson provided a sacrificial victim essential
to the success of the literary and moral revolution" (8-9).
So the reception he meets with from the Romantic writers
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and critics is in general a disparaging and hostile one.
But once the campaign of disparagement had done its work,
in other words, once he had been toppled from his pedestal,
the rest of the century was notable for a growing
indifference to him (Boulton 34); his works dropped into
obscurity and he himself survived in a new incarnation as
the 'character' (meaning, the oddity) immortalized by
Boswell in his biography2.
Just as the nineteenth century viewed Johnson through
the lens of its particular prepossessions and aspirations
and, viewing him thus, didn't much like what it saw, so the
twentieth has viewed him through the lens of its particular
interests and 'agenda' and, viewing him thus, has been, in
contrast to the preceding century, more than anything else
intrigued by what has met its gaze. How so? Because the
twentieth century has been the century of psychological and
psychoanalytical ferment and progress, a century of
intensive research, ceaseless experiment, vigorous debate
and endless theorizing; and it is through the lens of those
researches and theories that the great majority of
2 Cf. Thomas Carlyle, writing in 1832: "...already, indeed, they 
[Johnson's writings] are becoming obsolete for this generation; and 
for some future generation may be valuable chiefly as Prolegomena and 
expository Scholia to this Johnsoniad of Boswell [meaning the Life]" 
(in Boulton 432).
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commentators with an interest in saying something about
Johnson's mental (and emotional) character have viewed it.
Many of the psychologizing critics, as one may fairly
describe them, have a wide-ranging and, in some instances,
a professional acquaintance with psychology and
psychoanalysis - if not in all cases with Johnson himself
(meaning his life, opinions, writings and setting - what
I shall frequently be referring to, using a kind of
shorthand, as the 'larger picture'). Upon critics of such
a tendency, even upon those little acquainted with the
'larger picture' (or upon them most of all, perhaps),
Samuel Johnson's mind and personality have exercised an
irresistible fascination as a kind of psychologizer's El
Dorado. Those strange compulsive gestures, the overblown
sense of guilt, the consuming fear of insanity,
solitariness and death - these and other intriguing
characteristics, to be discussed in more detail below, have
beckoned powerfully in our century to commentators of a
psychologizing bent - and of these there have been, and
are, a good number. Thanks to the energy with which they
have responded to the invitation to psychologize or
psychoanalyse Johnson3, any twentieth-century account of
3 My reason for differentiating between 'psychologize' and 
'psychoanalyse' is that the latter term gestures towards psychological
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his mind which, in seeking to explain his fears,
singularities or melancholia, ignores or slights the
psychological 'angle' - as does Christopher Hollis's
judgment (1928) that "[h]is oddities... were caused...by
some physical affliction" (17) - risks looking pitifully
naive and hopelessly out of date.
In taking their 'soundings' of Johnson's mind, the
psychologizing investigators' aim is always to produce an
interpretation. that is, an explanation of his mental
character (or part of it) that is given coherence by being
developed within the context of an organizing concept or
theory. In evolving their interpretations some of the
psychologizing critics allow the data to gesture to the
kind of theory that looks most appropriate; and the theory,
in being brought to bear on them, remains sensitive to
their 'vibrations'; others, however, spurred on by a
psychologizing enthusiasm on the one hand unchecked by good
sense and on the other helped along by their ignorance of
the 'larger picture', force the data to fit the
straitjacket of a pet theory looking for something to
attach itself to. But these critics, no less than their
colleagues in the opposing camp, are intent upon producing
theories of a peculiarly Freudian cast, while the former has a more 
general application.
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an interpretation.
There are a number of reasons for my insisting as I
do on this point of the psychologizing commentators' drive
to generate interpretations. The first is that it is a
tendency which stands in marked contrast to the attitude
and practice of their eighteenth-century predecessors (and,
to a less degree, of their nineteenth-century ones). The
observations of the eighteenth-century commentators on the
quality and workings of Johnson's mind invariably take the
form of detached impressions and isolated insights; their
impulse is rather to remark a given attribute than to seek
to account for it. Nor do they regard it as any part of
their aim to develop interpretations of commanding
explanatory power and inclusive scope. They were, after
all, intelligent laymen whose interest in psychological
questions was no greater than that of the age in general
(though the age in general, as I noted above, manifested
a growing interest in psychological questions). Still, the
eighteenth-century commentators were laymen, unlike their
twentieth-century counterparts of a psychologizing tendency
who are often professional critics with a particular and
sometimes a specialized interest in psychological matters.
A second point is that the psychologizing interpretations
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of our century, whether strong or weak, persuasive or
forced, have yet been numerous enough, and suggestive or
provocative enough, to have contributed not a little, in
my view, to the discernible revival of interest in Johnson
and his writings (as distinct from just his allegedly
'oddball' personality) within the last fifty years or so.
Finally, thanks in no small measure to the interpretative
input of the psychologizing critics of this century, there
exist plausible grounds for advancing the generalization
that while the eighteenth century was concerned chiefly to
exhibit Johnson, and the nineteenth chiefly to dethrone
him, the twentieth has been much more interested in
interpreting him.
In presenting the above synopsis of the ways in which
Johnson's mind has been viewed over two and a half
centuries, and of the forces which have caused those ways
of seeing to change from century to century, my principal
objective has been to construct a backdrop against which
my own view of the 'set' and workings of his mind may be
projected. The sketch given above, and its detailed
fleshing-out which now follows, are intended to provide a
contextual frame into which my own inquiry may be inserted
and with reference to which it may be evaluated. I may add
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that the particular contextualizing paradigm I have chosen
(that is, a critical-historical survey of views of
Johnson's mind over the past 250 years) seems to me to be
by far the most appropriate one among those 'on offer'4, as
bearing most directly upon my own inquiry which likewise
posits a view of Johnson's mind - and which, when projected
against the backdrop I am about to construct, will properly
be perceived as taking its place at, or towards, the end
of a long line of estimates and appraisals of the
Johnsonian psyche.
In trying to deal manageably with the panorama of two
and a half centuries of views and comment on Johnson's
mind, I propose to proceed century by century. This choice
of method is due to the lucky accident that the major
shifts in perspective happened more or less to coincide
with the arrival of the new century, meaning the nineteenth
and then the twentieth. My inquiry begins, however, with
an analysis of eighteenth-century views of Johnson's mind,
all of them dating from its latter half.
4 Other contextualizing paradigms 'on offer' included viewing Johnson 
in relation to the the "cultural politics" of his age (as the 
historian JCD Clark has done in his recent(1994) book), or in relation 
to Enlightenment thought, or in relation to the political currents and 
affiliations of the epoch (as Donald J Greene did more than thirty 
years ago in The Politics of Samuel Johnson). It is, however, obvious 
that none of these contextualizing frames is nearly as relevant to my 
study, given its particular orientation, as the one I have chosen.
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Eighteenth-century appraisals of Johnson's mind sort
themselves out initially into two basic divisions of
unequal size. The larger by far consists of views of
Johnson's psychical make-up that are specific, definite and
informative in character; at issue here is not the
substance (or subject-matter) of the attribute remarked but
simply the degree of specifity and informativeness of the
reference. The other, smaller division is made up of
observations of a general, unspecific cast whose purpose
is less to say something pertinent and informative about
Johnson's psyche than to imply something about the attitude
of the commentator. In other words, what we have to do
with here is a use of language that is not so much
'descriptive' (= informative) as in an indeterminate kind
of way expressive or symptomatic of the user's attitude.
To be sure, the distinction between these two kinds of
language-use is by no means clear-cut; it is much more a
matter of shading and gradation. But, granting that, there
still comes a point at which it is possible to say that the
shading of a given specimen of discourse is predominantly
alternatively,
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descriptive is predominantlyor,
attitudinal'5.
The temptation to make a kind of uninformative noise
simply in order to signal an attitude was one, as we might
expect, that was pretty well confined to those commentators
who were actually acquainted with Johnson, who registered
the impact of the living personality and who witnessed the
majestic intellect in action. It is therefore hardly
surprising that the attitude signalled by them when they
slip into the attitudinal mode is a uniformly admiring one.
But once this generation of commentators dies out, so too
does the phenomenon of a markedly attitudinal use of
language in the characterization of Johnson's mental
attributes. It is accordingly a phenomenon that does not
survive the close of the century. There is no call
5 The distinction I am here venturing more or less corresponds to the 
fundamental distinction linguisticians draw between the 'descriptive' 
(also called the 'referential' or 'propositional') and the 
'attitudinal' (also known as the 'expressive' or 'symptomatic') uses 
of language (v. Lyons 50-52).
The handling of language in such a way as to bring to light an 
attitude (i.e. the 'attitudinal' 'expressive' or 'symptomatic' use of 
language) is placed by R A Waldron under a head to which he gives the 
name 'evaluative': "Tin evaluative criterion is one by which the 
referent is placed on a scale of approval and disapproval" (8 9) . 
Waldron proceeds to exemplify: "The verbs butcher, mutilate... giggle, 
gloat... all imply disapproval of the actions they designate" (idem). 
The point I am concerned to make in this context is that the instances 
of 'evaluative' language-use which I bring forward below have, it 
seems to me, a higher 'attitudinal' colouring and a lower informative- 
propositional one than is true of any of the examples Waldron appeals 
to; in other words, I think 'butcher', 'mutilate', 'giggle' and 
'gloat' all possess a greater 'descriptive' and hence a more 
attenuated 'attitudinal' value than do any of the terms I bring under 
inspection below.
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therefore to divide the views on Johnson's psyche which
date from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries into the
two basic divisions that are indicated for those of the
eighteenth. In the two latter centuries the verdicts
offered, whether favourable or not, at least are not just
attitudinal 'noises'; their thrust is discernibly in the
direction of specificity and informativeness.
It is time to turn from exposition to examples.
Boswell is clearly being 'attitudinal' when he uses,
repeatedly, the notably unspecific epithet "great" to
characterize Johnson's mind: "...a great mind like his..."
(Life 94) ; "...so great a mind as his..." (Hebrides Journal
218) ; "To apply his great mind to minute particulars, is
wrong" (ibid. 239). Situated along the same trajectory,
so to speak, are Mrs Thrale's commendation of the
"uniformly great" character of Johnson's mind (in Ingrams
111), Joseph Towers's reference to his "great intellectual
powers" (in Boulton 379), Dr Brocklesby, Johnson's
physician's, praise for his "extraordinary talents of mind"
(in Waingrow xli), a formulation paralleled by Boswell's
"those extraordinary powers of mind" (Life 34), and by the
'Swan of Lichfield', Anna Seward's allusion to the "great
powers of his mind" (in Boulton 413). Seward, in fact, in
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a kind of 'give-away7, prefaces her mention of those 'great
powers7 with an avowal of her admiration for them.
When we turn to the judgments on Johnson's mind which
are specific in their purport and informative in their
bearings6, we find that the traits singled out for remark
can be grouped into seven categories which, while they are
certainly distinguishable one from the other, are
nonetheless sufficiently inter-related to overlap to a
discernible degree. I shall first designate these
categories by means of brief descriptive titles, after
which I shall proceed to flesh them out by bringing to bear
a rather considerable body of evidence.
The seven categories are these:
1. Johnson's remarkable memory
2. The strength, vigour and power of his intellect and
understanding
3. His logical precision and formidable powers of reasoning
and argument
6 This is not to suggest, of course, that these judgments are not, at 
some level, suggestive of the commentator's attitude (at some level I 
daresay all language-use is suggestive of the user's attitude; even 
the seemingly most 'propositional' specimen of discourse could he said 
to imply an attitude - if it be only that of impersonality) . But the 
point is that they are not primarily attitudinal. Which is to say 
(remembering that in my adaptation of the concept of 'attitudinal' the 
operative yardstick is the degree of specificity and informativeness) 
that the judgments I am about to consider are not vague or 
uninformative enough to be classed as 'primarily attitudinal'.
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4. The facility, readiness and promptitude of his mind; and 
his fertility of fancy (under which head I include the
attributes of imagination and originality)
5. His quickness and brilliancy of wit
6. The comprehensiveness of his mind; the diversity and
breadth of his information and learning
7. His perspicacity, acuteness, and accuracy of discernment
and judgment.
I propose now to consider each of these categories in
turn.
Johnson's memory
All the commentators are at one in giving almost awed
recognition to Johnson's extraordinary powers - and feats -
of memory. As all but one of those whose impressions I
shall be citing were acquainted with him, and so would have
had the opportunity of personally witnessing these feats,
it is hardly surprising that a note of wonderment tinges
some of the accounts: Boswell writes that for "the power
of his memory. . .he was all his life eminent to a degree
almost incredible" (Life 30); Sir John Hawkins affirms that
"whatever he read, became his own forever" (10), and then,
backing up this claim with a personal testimony, he adds:
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"I have heard him repeat, with scarce a mistake of a word,
passages from favourite authors, of three or four octavo
pages in length" (idem). Arthur Murphy declares that
"Wonders are told of his memory, and, indeed, all who knew
him late in life can witness that he retained that faculty
in the greatest vigour" (in Hill I 363). Pitched in a more
sober register are the tributes to Johnson's "remarkably
retentive memory" (Towers in Boulton 380), to his
"uncommonly retentive memory for every thing that appear'd
to him worthy of observation" (Miss Reynolds in Hill II
252) ; and, finally, to a faculty of memory "so
retentive... that he could always recover whatever he lent"
to it (Tyers in Hill II 364).
The strength, vigour and power of Johnson's intellect and
understanding
Mustered under this head are judgments of the
following tenor: Johnson's is "a mind naturally vigorous"
(Murphy in Hill I 375); though in poor health and aged 71,
"his mind has lost nothing of its vigour" (Hannah More in
Hill II 188). For his part, Boswell repeatedly insists on
Johnson's "intellectual vigour" (Life 29) and "vigorous
mind" (ibid. 870) - as he does on his "strength
80
of...understanding" (ibid. 29), "strength of thought"
(Hebrides Journal 365) and "intellectual strength and
dexterity" (Life 14 02)7. Robert Potter commends his
"vigorous and manly understanding" (as a prelude, however,
to animadversions upon his allegedly attenuated
sensibility) (in Boulton 295) ; and Edmond Malone, in a
near-identical formulation, spotlights his "vigorous and
comprehensive understanding" (in Bate (1975) 3 96) . Under
this head may also be included references to his uncommon
inquisitiveness (Life 35), his "ardour of... curiosity"
(ibid. 29) being often expressed as a desire "of seeing
every thing that was extraordinary in art or nature" (Tyers
in Hill II 376) .
Johnson's logical precision and powers of reasoning and
argument
For Arthur Murphy Johnson's powers as a logician were
7 Cognizant of Boswell's numerous references to Johnson's intellectual 
distinction (those given above being but a sampling), Marshall 
Waingrow observes that "No trait of Johnson's receives more emphasis 
in the biography than his intellectual powers...[His] pre-eminence of 
mind is insisted upon throughout" (xlv-xlvi). That such should be the 
case is no accident: in undertaking the writing of the Life. Boswell 
after all gave himself a brief which reflected a new aspiration in 
biographical endeavour - that of "throw[ing] light on the progress of 
his [subject's] mind" (Life 29). His consciousness of attempting 
something new in biographical composition played no small part in 
encouraging him to stick at it and to see the immense project through 
to completion.
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too striking to have been acquired; they had to be innate,
'in the genes': "[He] was born a logician... In consequence
of his skill in that art, he loved argumentation. ...A
fallacy could not stand before him: it was sure to be
refuted by strength of reasoning, and a precision both in
idea and expression almost unequalled" (in Hill I 452) .
Boswell, too, traces a cause-effect relationship between
Johnson's logical powers and his pre-eminence in argument:
"In him were united a most logical head with a most fertile
imagination, which gave him an extraordinary advantage in
arguing: for he could reason close or wide, as he saw best
for the moment" (Life 1402). Hawkins implies a similar
link by placing Johnson's distinction as a logician in
apposition with his argumentative skills: "With respect to
logical precision and strength of argument, [these] tracts
[testifying to his "skill in political controversy"] defy
all comparison" (220) . None of the other commentators,
however, posits a link between Johnson's logical and
argumentative powers; they are noted independently of each
other. So, for example, he is characterized as a "Colossus
in argument" (Anon, in Boulton 23 0) , a tribute the more
telling for being bestowed by a professed opponent to his
views. Another anti-Johnsonian snapper is Horace Walpole
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who pays this cutting backhanded compliment to his 
reasoning abilities: "he is ...a just reasoner - I mean
when Prejudice, bigotry, and arrogance do not cloud or
debase his Logic" (in Boulton 325) . Over against the
barbed comment, one may set a larger number of 'straight7,
unironic ones: "He was very dextrous at argumentation; and,
when his reasonings were not solid, they were at least
artful and plausible" (Towers in Boulton 3 80) . Hawkins
notes Johnson's superior "power of reasoning" (110), and
Boswell his delight in exercising it: "[his] supreme
enjoyment was the exercise of his reason" (Life 49)8.
Given that reason for Johnson was nothing if not an active
8 It bears mentioning that Johnson's reasoning powers, working in 
conjunction with his astounding memory, enabled him to fit together 
whole blocks of argument in his head before setting them down, 
complete and indefectible, on paper. This was not a talent intended 
for display - just something to show off with; rather, it fulfilled a 
necessary pragmatic function because, compensating for his bad 
eyesight, it constituted the key both to his method and his rapidity 
of composition. This was something first remarked by Arthur Murphy in 
his Essay of 1792:
Johnson has observed that there are different methods of 
composition. Virgil was used to pour out a great number 
of verses in the morning, and pass the day in retrenching 
the exuberances, and correcting inaccuracies; and it was 
Pope's custom to write his first thoughts in his first 
words, and gradually to amplify, decorate, rectify, and 
refine them. Others employ at once memory and invention, 
and, with little intermediate use of the pen, form and 
polish large masses by continued meditation, and write 
their productions only, when, in their opinion, they have 
completed them. This last was Johnson's method. He never 
took his pen in hand till he had weighed well his subject, 
and grasped in his mind the sentiments, the train of 
argument, and the arrangement of the whole. ...This may 
account for that rapidity with which, in general, he 
dispatched his sheets to the press, without being at the 
trouble of a fair copy. (in Hill I 425-26)
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force animating the whole fabric of his thinking and
vivifying all his argumentative performances, his
particular use of it provides a paradigmatic illustration
of Ernst Cassirer's theory regarding the changed role and
status of reason in the eighteenth century. Declares
Cassirer:
Here. . .is evident a characteristic change of
meaning in the concept of reason as compared
with seventeenth century usage. In the great
metaphysical systems of that century - those of
Descartes and Malebranche, of Spinoza and
Leibniz - reason is the realm of the "eternal
verities", of those truths held in common by the
human and the divine mind. What we know through
reason, we therefore behold "in God". Every act
of reason means participation in the divine
nature... The eighteenth century takes reason in
a diff erent... sense. It is no longer the sum
total of "innate ideas" given prior to all
experience, which reveal the absolute essence of
things. Reason is now looked upon rather as an
acquisition than as a heritage. It is not the
treasury of the mind in which the truth like a
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minted coin lies stored; it is rather the
original intellectual force which guides the
discovery and determination of truth. ...The
whole eighteenth century understands reason in
this sense; not as a sound body of knowledge,
principles, and truths, but as a kind of energy,
a force which is fully comprehensible only in
its agency and effects. (13)
The facility, readiness and promptitude of Johnson's mind,
including his "fertility of fancy"
What we meet with in this category are observations
such as Richard Cumberland's to the effect that among "the
properties in him which I contemplated with the most
admiration" was "the readiness with which he could turn
to any article that he wanted to make present use of" (in
Hill II 77) . Seconding Cumberland, Sir Joshua Reynolds
declares that "among...the most distinguished" of Johnson's
qualities "was his possessing a mind which was... always
ready for use" (in Hill II 220) . One of the very few
eighteenth-century commentators to annex to his
specification of a Johnsonian mental trait an explanation
for it, Reynolds ventures the opinion that his friend's
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"facility...of mind" was referable to his "living...so much
in company, more perhaps than any other studious man
whatever" (ibid. 221). Moving in the same 'orbit' as the
allusions to Johnson's 'facility' are those to his
'promptitude' of mind. Once again there is the testimony
of Reynolds: "Sir Joshua observed to me the extraordinary
promptitude with which Johnson flew upon an argument" (Life
628). Earlier in the Life Boswell himself spotlights the
same trait: "...by reading and meditation, and a very close
inspection of life, he had accumulated a great fund of
miscellaneous knowledge, which, by a peculiar promptitude
of mind, was ever ready at his call" (145). The Reverend
William Shaw makes reference to Johnson's "promptitude of
invention" (in Sherbo 41) - and this submission serves as
a logical corridor to a miscellany of allusions to the
fertility of his fancy and/or imagination. Both Boswell
and Richard Cumberland employ the identical phrase
"fertility of fancy", Boswell in the Life (155), Cumberland
in his Memoirs. As Cumberland's anecdotal style is so
lively, I judge it permissible (on the grounds of
literature's pleasure-giving function) to cite a bit of the
text on either side of the reference to "fertility of
fancy":
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Anecdotes of times past, scenes of his own life,
and characters of humourists, enthusiasts,
crack-brained projectors and a variety of
strange beings, that he had chanced upon, when
detailed by him at length, and garnished with
those episodical remarks... which he would throw
in with infinite fertility of fancy, were a
treat, which though not always to be purchased
by five and twenty cups of tea [the allusion is
to Johnson's insuperable addiction to tea­
drinking] , I have often had the happiness to
enjoy for less than half the number. (in Hill
II 76)
Going hand in hand with the references to Johnson's
fertility of fancy are those to his imagination and
originality. Towers and Shaw both underline the vigour of
his imagination: "His powers of imagination were vigorous
and active" (Shaw in Sherbo 38) ; "his imagination was
uncommonly vigorous" (Towers in Boulton 3 80) . Sir John
Hawkins, focussing rather on fertility than on vigour,
speaks of "an imagination that was ever teeming with new
ideas" (111) . Then we encounter a cluster of
pronouncements whose modelling mirrors the eighteenth-
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century practice (which really was more like a habit) of
juxtaposing the imagination/fancy (interchangeable terms
until Coleridge decoupled them in the Biographia) with
judgment and/or reason. Here are a couple of examples:
writing in the Gentleman's Magazine, a pseudonymous
'Remembrancer' pays tribute to the pseudonymous 'Rambler'
as a "writer blessed with a vigorous imagination, under the
restraint of a classical judgment" (in Boulton 63). Taking
precisely the opposite view, but still operating within the
imagination-reason paradigm, Thomas Tyers is of the mind
that Johnson's "imagination often appeared to be too mighty
for the control of his reason" (in Hill II 339), echoing
in these words the sentiment voiced by his mouthpiece,
Imlac, in the forty-fourth chapter of Rasselas (the one
entitled "The Dangerous Prevalence of Imagination") to the
effect that "[t]here is no man whose imagination does not
sometimes predominate over his reason" (in Bronson 6 93) .
Mrs Thrale, fashioning a juxtaposition in which Imagination
is played off against Passion, asserts, rather murkily in
my view, that "Johnson was more a Man of Imagination than
Passion" (in Ingrams 103) . Recognizing as we now do the
intimate connection subsisting between the imaginative
faculty and the power of framing poetical images, we must
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give its due to Boswell's perception that his friend's 
"mind was so full of imagery, that he might have been
perpetually a poet" (Life 1401).
A number of commentators remark Johnson's originality.
Murphy writes that "though he was never tainted, like many
modern wits, with the ambition of shining in paradox, he
may be fairly called an ORIGINAL THINKER" (in Hill I 467)
[emphasis in original] . In a more fulsome vein, the
Reverend Shaw (who at other times can be pretty malicious)
observes that the "genius of Johnson... abounded with
originality on every subject which occupied his attention"
(in Sherbo 53), while Joseph Towers notes the "great
originality which sometimes appeared in his conceptions"
(in Boulton 380).
It is doutful that any of these critics can have meant
by 'originality' what the Romantic poets (or, for that
matter, the 'poets of sensibility' of an earlier
generation) understood by the term; namely, an almost
visionary leap of the creative intelligence as it reaches
for 'things never before imagined or thought upon'. (On
the other hand, it is evident from the phrasing of Murphy's
judgment, quoted above, that in 1792, when he published his
Essay, there existed a current of opinion which tended to
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equate originality with the kind of mental agility
productive of those ingenious juxtapositions and verbal
' telescopings' that lie at the heart of the ability to
'shine in paradox'). We approach an understanding of what
'originality' gestured to in Johnson's day - and thus what
the critics cited above meant by the term when using it
with reference to him - by considering Hannah More's
comment that in the Sage's presence one could always bank
on "hearing... old [ideas] expressed in an original manner"
(in Hill II 188-89). Running parallel to More's statement
is that of Tyers who reports that Johnson "said the most
common things in the newest manner" (ibid. 3 66) . It would
seem, therefore, that what those critics who praise Johnson
for his 'originality' had in mind was something very close
to the standpoint enshrined in the celebrated lines of the
Essay on Criticism:
True Wit is Nature to advantage dress'd,
What oft was thought, but ne'er so well express'd;
Something whose truth convinc'd at sight we find,
That gives us back the image of our mind.9
9 The account of 'originality' offered above seems to share a good deal 
of common ground with Johnson's view of Imagination as a faculty that 
"selects ideas from the treasures of remembrance, and produces novelty 
only by varied combinations" (Idler 44, II 13 7) - a view that lies at
some considerable remove from the Romantic conception of Imagination 
as "a source of transcendental knowledge... without recourse to either 
experience or logic" (Krutch 286-87), or as "the unique means by which
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(11. -297-300)
Johnson7s "brilliancy of wit"
Considering the way Pope in the Essay on Criticism
shimmies through at least seven different senses of the
word 'wit' (which he uses no fewer than forty seven times
in the poem - West 48) , one wonders what Johnson's
contemporaries could have had in mind when they praised him
for this quality. Well, the conception of 'wit' which the
citations given below appear to bear out puts a premium on
such attributes as mental agility and liveliness of fancy,
coming to expression not seldom in the form of deft and at
times stinging repartee of the kind Johnson "never, in any
situation, was at a loss for" (Boswell, Hebrides Journal
3 90) . At the same time, though, the examples I bring
forward also glance at two of the truly foundational senses
of the term: namely, wit as "the perception of resemblances
which are neither too obvious nor too recondite" (West 50);
and wit as "that quality of speech or writing which
we can think and grasp as a unity that which is contradictory" (F W 
Schelling in Hirsch (1960) 101). Johnson's understanding of 
Imagination appears in fact to hark back to Locke - to his notion of 
"complex ideas" being simply combinations and/or variations of those 
foundational conceptual building-blocks, originating in sensation or 
reflection, to which he gives the name "simple ideas" (v. An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding. Book II, especially Chapter XII 
entitled "Of Complex Ideas").
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consists in the apt association of thought and expression,
calculated to surprise and delight by its unexpectedness"
(O.E.D).
Turning to the evidence, one may point to Boswell's
affirmation of "that quickness of wit for which [Johnson]
was so remarkable" (Life 277). The following incident, in
bearing out Boswell's verdict, provides an opportunity for 
its documenter, Miss Reynolds, to pay tribute to the "ready
wit" of his 'illustrious friend':
[A] lady, one evening,...was called upon after
supper for her Toast... she was desired to give
the ugliest man she knew; and she immediately
named Dr. Goldsmith. On which a lady on the
other side of the Table rose up and reach'd
across to shake hands with her, expressing some
desire of being better acquainted with her, it
being the first time they had met; on which Dr.
Johnson said, "Thus the Ancients, on the
commencement of their Friendships, used to
sacrifice a Beast betwixt them". (in Hill II
268)
Richard Cumberland speaks of Johnson's "brilliancy
of... wit" (in Hill II 76), and William Shaw, in a
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malicious back-handed compliment (which makes one suspect-
that he had personally experienced the sting of that
'wit'), writes: "To a mind thus manured in learning,
science, and knowledge of the world, Johnson added such
amplitude of wit as answered all the purposes of petulance,
malignity, and amusement" (in Sherbo 54) . On the other
hand, when Lady Knight says admiringly of the Sage that "He
was master of an infinite deal of wit", adding that it
"proceeded from depth of thought" (in Hill II 176), she
would seem to be gesturing towards an archaic sense of the
term signifying "the faculty of thinking and reasoning in
general" (O.E.D); or perhaps even towards an obsolete (or
soon to be obsolete) sense, that of "wisdom, good judgment"
(idem).
The comprehensiveness of Johnson's mind; the diversity and
breadth of his information and learning
Johnson was born into the world with a prodigious
mental capacity. His mind was an immense container waiting
to be filled, and fill it he did - with a vast and diverse
store of information and learning. Richard Cumberland
recalls how profoundly his admiration was stirred by the
"expanse of matter, which Johnson had found room for in his
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intellectual storehouse" (in Hill II 77). The astonishing
feat of engrossment whereby Johnson really did manage to
turn himself into a walking encyclopaedia is what stands
behind the often awed tone informing his contemporaries'
references to the comprehensiveness, reach and sweep of his
mind. "His Mind was so Comprehensive that no Language but
his own could have express'd its Contents", says Mrs Thrale
(in Ingrams 69). Echoing this perception, Boswell writes
that "Johnson's comprehension of mind was the mould for his
language" (Life 158-59). The comprehensiveness of mind,
together with the encyclopaedic learning, had by-products
which did not go unnoticed
commentators. One was the
thoughts from one thing to
accommodating facility" since " [n] o subject ever came amiss
to him" (Tyers in Hill II 365). This aptitude was noticed
by Fanny Burney too; her Diary for the year 1788 contains
the following entry: "I could not help expressing my
amazement [to Mrs Thrale] at his universal readiness upon
all subjects" (15) . A second by-product was the ability
to think both laterally and globally - "to take measure of
every intellectual object, and to see all around it" (Tyers
This insight isin Hill II 371) . echoed by Murphy who
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writes that he "had what Locke calls a round-about view of
his subject" (in Hill I 467) . The Reverend Robert
Burrowes, one of the most perspicacious of the eighteenth-
century commentators, probes a little deeper than Tyers and
Murphy and ventures an explanation of Johnson's ability to
see things 'in the round': with a mind so comprehensive and
so richly stocked, it was only natural that any idea which
came into his head should trail a throng of affiliated
ones: "[His] mind was so comprehensive," says Burrowes,
"that no circumstance occurred to him unaccompanied by many
others similar" (in Boulton 338).
Johnson's comprehensiveness of mind, "variety of
information" (Hebrides Journal 3 07) , and amplitude of
learning evidently made such an impression on those who
were oftenest in his company that they were left groping
for analogies as the only adequate means of conveying their
sense of admiration or, more correctly, awe. The analogy
Boswell lights on is a classical one (which would surely
have pleased its subject) : "His mind resembled the vast
amphitheatre, the Colisaeum at Rome" (Life 427) ; but I
think Johnson would have been even more pleased by Mrs
Thrale's splendid encomium built on a striking extended
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metaphor10;
The mind of Mr Johnson was indeed expanded
beyond the common Limits of human Nature, &
stored with such variety of Knowledge that I
used to think it resembled a Royal Pleasure
Ground, where every Tree of every Name and
Nation, flourished in the full perfection of
their Nature; & where tho' lofty Woods & falling
Cataracts first caught the Eye, & fixed the
Attention of Beholders, yet neither the trim
Parterre, nor the pleasing Shrubbery; nor even
the antiquated Evergreens were denied a Place in
some fit Corner of the happy Valley, (in Ingrams
72)
Johnson's perspicacity, acuteness, and accuracy of
discernment and judgment
Mustered under this head are tributes to Johnson's
"acute discernment" (Murphy in Hill I 452) , "accuracy of
10 In fact, we know that he was pleased by Mrs Thrale's portrait, 
because the day after composing it she showed him what she had written 
and made a note of his response:
When I shewed him his Character next day - for he would 
see it; he said it was a very fine Piece of Writing; and 
that I had improved upon Young who he saw was my Model he 
said; for my Flattery was still stronger than his. & yet 
somehow or other less hyperbolical. (in Ingrams 72) 
[emphasis in original]
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discernment" (Life 29) , and "nicety of discernment" in
which "none... exceeded him" (Burrowes in Boulton 339). Mrs
Thrale's verdict, echoing Burrowes's, is that "no man so
acutely discerned the reason of every fact, the motive of
every action, the end of every design" (in Sherbo 139) .
Then there are the judgments which give pride of place to
Johnson's discriminative powers: Sir Brooke Boothby calls
attention to his "nicety of discrimination" (in Hill II
392), William Shaw to "a penetration... characteristically
...discriminating" (in Sherbo 26), and William Fitzthomas
to his "discriminative judgment" (in Boulton 285).
(Fitzthomas's praise is clearly rhetorical and tactical
since it forms part of a little nosegay of compliments
preceding reproof of Johnson for his allegedly unfair
treatment of Gray in the Lives of the Poets. In 1781, when
Fitzthomas wrote his piece, Johnson's reputation and
authority were far too securely established to admit of
'full-frontal' deprecation, so it was necessary for
Fitzthomas, before embarking on his critique, to pay the
Sage his merited and expected due through the tactical
deployment of a fitting number of lenitive compliments).
Focussing on Johnson's perspicacity are these
pronouncements: "acuteness and penetration" (Hawkins 9),
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"the most penetrating acuteness" (Burrowes in Boulton 332);
and focussing on his nicety of judgment, these: "In
judgment keen..." (Courtenay in Boulton 366), "accuracy
of... judgment" (Steevens in Hill II 329), "penetrating
judgment" (Hawkins 10)11.
So much, then, for the character of Johnson's mind as
perceived by an assortment of eighteenth-century
commentators, the great majority of whom do no more,
really, than single out for attention this or that isolated
“£*
trait; there is very little sense that the attribute
remarked might be linked to others, or might be in fact a
manifestation of some more fundamental underlying
characteristic; in short, there is very little sense that
it might have a place in some larger pattern or form part
of a more inclusive picture (or even, indeed, that there
exists in the first place any such thing as a 'more
inclusive picture'). Boswell, however, in marked contrast * I
11 I find it interesting that not one of these references to Johnson's 
discernment, intellectual penetration or discriminative power is ever 
linked, in a relationship either of cause or of effect, to his 
distinction-making bent or, at least, to his distinction-making 
praxis. The reason is, I suppose, that neither the bent nor the 
praxis ever received 'high-profile' treatment in the eighteenth 
century (or, for that matter, in the succeeding ones).
I may add, by the way, with respect to the question of the 
cause-effect relationship subsisting between Johnson's discriminative 
powers and his distinction-making bent, that in my view the bent has 
primacy, while the legendary powers of discernment and penetration are 
a consequence, as they are a manifestation, of it.
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to almost all of his contemporaries, succeeds in taking
stock of Johnson's mind from a more elevated point of
vantage (undoubtedly a major reason for the superiority of
his Life over the rival biographies it instantly eclipsed),
and this enables him to appraise it in a manner at once
more encompassing and more searching than would have been
possible for them. Boswell's superiority comes out clearly
in the following judgment drawn from the summarizing
overview at the conclusion of the Life:
[H] is superiority over other learned men
consisted chiefly in what may be called the art
of thinking, the art of using his mind; a
certain continual power of seizing the useful
substance of all that he knew, and exhibiting it
in a clear and forcible manner; so that
knowledge, which we often see to be no better
than lumber in men of dull understanding, was,
in him, true, evident, and actual wisdom. (Life
1400-01)
In its combination of inclusiveness and incisiveness
this statement stands unrivalled among eighteenth-century
appraisals of Johnson's mind.
In presenting my survey of those appraisals, I have
99
felt justified in offering as detailed an account as I have
on the grounds that the eighteenth-century views possess
particular interest and authority by reason of being, in
the vast majority of cases, a record of the impressions and
insights of commentators who were actually acquainted with
Johnson, and who therefore would have had the opportunity
of observing his mind in action and, indeed, of being awed,
or provoked, or in some other way personally affected by
its operations.
In surveying the corpus of eighteenth-century opinion
on the character and workngs of the 'Great Cham's' mind,
my modus operandi was dictated by the way in which the data
naturally sorted themselves out into seven categories of
more or less equal size; this made the choice of a
sevenfold method of classification an obvious, indeed, an
inevitable one. When one turns, however, to a
consideration of the nineteenth and twentieth-century data,
it becomes immediately evident that such a method would be
quite out of place, for the following reason: while the
nineteenth and twentieth-century views, when considered
purely from the standpoint of their range. may cover just
about as much ground as do the eighteenth-century ones,
with respect to the number of different characteristics
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reported on, when considered from the standpoint of their
pattern of distribution, the nineteenth and twentieth-
century data do not exhibit anything remotely comparable
to the equality of spread that characterizes the
eighteenth-century picture. In both the nineteenth and the
twentieth centuries, most particularly in the early decades
of the nineteenth and in the early and middle decades of
the twentieth, one 'commanding impulse' quite overshadows
all the others; that being so, it seems to me that no
useful purpose would be served by bringing to bear on the
data of these two epochs the elaborate machinery of a
classificatory and compartmentalizing method. Accordingly,
in my handling of the evidence brought forward from the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, my procedure in each
case will be to document first of all those views not
subsumed under the 'commanding impulse', though without
making any attempt to separate them into categories, and
then to move on to a consideration of those which are. As
for the 'commanding impulses' (as I call them) themselves,
I have already had something to say on the subject in the
synoptic overview presented at the beginning of this
chapter, but it is as well to restate the gist of the
argument: the commanding literary-cultural impulse of the
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early nineteenth century was Romanticism, whose struggle
for supremacy necessitated the clearing away of obstacles;
being a major one, Johnson had perforce to be confronted;
there was no way he could just be sidestepped; put in the
dock, then, charged and tried "under a foreign code of
conscience" (Auden, "In Memory of W. B. Yeats") - though
it would of course be unreasonable to blame his Romantic
detractors for not judging him from a standpoint other than
their own - he was duly found guilty of an assortment of
literary-critical sins of omission and commission: defects
of sympathy, sensibility and taste, as well as errors of
judgment and perception. A commanding impulse of the early
and middle decades of the twentieth century has been the
drive, stimulated by the great advances made in the last
hundred years or so in the areas of psychological and
psychoanalytical theory and practice, to probe and lay bare
the secrets of our psychical and instinctual life - and
then to apply the insights gained to (among other things)
works of literature and their authors. Appraised from the
standpoint of this 'impulse', Johnson, for reasons outlined
in the synoptic sketch given at the beginning of the
chapter, has proved to be a source of inexhaustible
interest, of fascination, indeed, for critics of a
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psychologizing tendency - not to speak of yet others in
whom what he has to offer has planted such a tendency where
none existed before. It is not, I believe, too much to
claim that this century's renewed interest in Johnson is
in no small measure an outcome of the curiosity generated
(and, on occasion, the provocation offered) by the writings
of those critics who have been drawn to inspect, appraise,
interpret (and reinterpret) his mind and personality from
a psychological and/or psychoanalytical standpoint. So
much by way of preamble; I now move on to an analysis of
nineteenth-century views of Johnson's mind.
* ★ *
Observations of the same tenor as those that provision
the seven eighteenth-century categories are certainly to
be found in the nineteenth, though very much more thinly
spread. Thus we meet with the by now familiar tributes to
Johnson's "strength of memory" (Croker's Boswell in Hill
II 405), "breadth of information" (idem), "gigantic mind"
(William Mudford in Boulton 75) and "uncommon penetration"
(idem); there is acknowledgment of, and praise for, the
"vigour and compass of [his] thought" (John Aikin in
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Boulton 49), the "native vigour of [his] mind" (Mudford in
Boulton 79), and the "vigour of his understanding"
(Mackintosh in Boulton 350) 12.
The purely laudatory aspects of the nineteenth-century
tributes to Johnson's mental powers are, however, the least
interesting thing about them; much more so is a new
'strain' which now begins to seep into so many of them;
this new strain is the note of reservation and demur.
Remarkably few of the eighteenth-century tributes were
counterbalanced by reservations or expressions of demur;
they tended to be straightforward, robust declarations
having their roots, for the most part, in an attitude of
candid admiration13. But in the nineteenth century what is
given with the one hand is all too often taken away by the
12 Among Johnson's small band of nineteenth-century partisans, Thomas 
Carlyle stands out for the warmth of his admiration; with respect to 
his estimate of Johnson's mind, his determinations are anything but 
half-hearted: Johnson had "the keenest [eye] for perspicacity and 
minute detail" (in Boulton 447), an "inward eye, all-penetrating, all­
embracing" (ibid.434), a "sun-clear intellect" (444), a "mind earnest, 
deep... humane" (437). In expressing these sentiments is Carlyle in 
some degree simply permitting himself the harmless luxury of praising 
a man who no longer posed a threat to the dominance of the Romantic 
creed (in 1832, when these words were written, Johnson had been long 
dethroned)? Or is he indulging a taste for the heterodox? One never 
knows with Carlyle; there was a part of him that was heterodox on 
principle.
13 The watering-down in the nineteenth century of the eighteenth- 
century commentators' general attitude of frank admiration for 
Johnson's mental endowments shows through tellingly in this passage 
from the pen of Sir James Mackintosh (1811) : "Such is the character 
which may be bestowed on Johnson by those who feel a profound 
reverence for his virtues, and a respect approaching to admiration for 
his intellectual powers..." (in Boulton 354) [my emphasis].
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other: repeatedly one comes upon praise that is immediately
counterbalanced by the entering of a reservation (or
countermanded by an expression of censure); in like manner,
a familiar Johnsonian strength is remarked - but only in
order to enforce the point that behind it there lurks a
disabling, and hitherto unsuspected limitation. These are
instances, then, of the critic's granting that which he is
already preparing to take away (or water down) - and only
because he is preparing so to do. Let me now turn to
examples: the batch below consists of items whose general
pattern is that of praise counterbalanced by reservation;
this pattern takes two particularized forms: in the first
an expression of praise is followed (in a few cases,
preceded) by demur (that is, the registering of a scruple,
a doubt, a mild objection or qualification); in the second
it is followed by the specification of a negative quality
of one kind or another. Of the items which follow, the
first three exemplify demur, the others the noting of a
negative quality:
[Johnson's] remarks on life and manners are just
and weighty, and show a philosophical mind, but
not an original turn of thinking. (Mrs Barbauld
in Boulton 153-54)
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If we do not discover in his essays the genius
which invents, we have a wonderful display of
those powers of mind which... almost instantly
strike conviction. (Alexander Chalmers in
Boulton 84)
The great intellectual powers of Dr. Johnson,
displayed in many of his works...have raised his
reputation to high distinction, and impressed
upon all his opinions a stamp of
authority...without an examination into their
intrinsic value. (Noah Webster in Boulton 126­
27) [emphasis in original]
Johnson had a masculine understanding, clouded
on important subjects by prejudice...
(Mackintosh in Boulton 350)
Dr. Johnson was not an admirer of the simple in
style or minute in description. Still, he was
an acute, strong-minded man, and could see truth
when it was presented to him, even through the
mist of his prejudices and his foibles.
(Hazlitt (1825) 198)
The judgments which Johnson passed on
books...are the judgments of a strong but
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enslaved understanding. (Macaulay II 554)
The characteristic peculiarity of his intellect
was the union of great powers with low
prejudices14. (ibid. 550)
Now a couple of examples in which mention is made of
a Johnsonian strength - but only in order to bring to light
the unsuspected limitation lurking behind it:
He could discern clearly enough the folly and
meanness of all bigotry except his own.
(Macaulay II 552)
It is indeed surprizing, that the perspicuity of
Johnson's mind, which could so readily detect
the deviations of other poets, should have been
incapable of correcting his own. (Mudford in
Boulton 45)
Commenting on Boswell's biographical strategy in the
Life, Marshall Waingrow writes that "Johnson's
weaknesses... are methodically viewed under the aspect of
his strengths (xlviii). Well, the evidence suggests that
the impulse of many a nineteenth-century critic was to
stand that strategy on its head, and methodically to view
14 Macaulay's essay is in fact a reservation-entering mill: he seems to 
be incapable of saying anything positive about Johnson which is not at 
once counterbalanced by something negative.
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Johnson's strengths under the aspect of his (alleged)
weaknesses.
In seeking to ascertain why reservation and demur
increasingly enter into the judgments nineteenth-century
critics offer on Johnson's mind and personality, one would
want to take due account of the fact that hardly any of
them (in marked contrast to their eighteenth-century
predecessors) were personally exposed to his 'spell' or
personally witnessed the force of his intellect in action.
Not that this was necessarily a bad thing: not to have been
overwhelmed by Johnson, to have escaped his spell, could
in principle conduce to greater objectivity, leading in
theory to more reliable, if less flattering, judgments.
Then, too, the potential for arriving at judgments less
flattering than those of the eighteenth-century
commentators was increased by the coming into play of a
further factor of no small importance, the factor of
historical distance. Viewing Johnson at some remove in
time from his own age, the early nineteenth-century critics
were in theory much better placed than their counterparts
of the preceding generation to see him more inclusively,
more 'in the round' - and seeing him thus, to spot failings
and limitations that had escaped their predecessors' notice
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(or had been consciously or unconsciously shut out by
them) . These are arguments whose cogency I do not for a
moment dispute; nevertheless, my own view is that the
increasing frequency of reservation and demur in early
nineteenth-century appreciations of Johnson's mind and
personality (and other aspects of him as well) is referable
less to the critics of this epoch not being subject to his
'spell', less to their possessing the advantage of
(comparative) historical distance, than it is to a
determination (of which perhaps they were barely conscious)
not to be impressed by him and, wherever possible, to
discover shortcomings and limitations in him. This
determination I situate within the context of the mental
structures fostered by the Romantic movement's altogether
understandable need, in its early years especially, to
strike at the foundations of Johnson's prestige and
authority, as a prelude to removing this formidable
obstacle from the path to its own success.
Even so, the increased frequency of reservation and
demur in nineteenth-century comment on Johnson represented
the Romantic offensive against him expressing itself in
only a mild form. Once the offensive grew more intense
there was no longer room for the nicety of actually
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specifying a Johnsonian strength prior to counterbalancing
it with a reservation; and what one was then left with was
fault-finding, detraction and reprehension pure and simple.
The most single-minded of Johnson's Romantic detractors
(chief among whom was William Hazlitt) were not interested
in paying deference to his strengths, even as a tactical
gambit; what interested them was bringing to light and
laying bare his deficiencies, as they saw them, in
preparation for the work of toppling him from his pedestal.
It is to a consideration of the Romantic offensive against
Johnson in its more intense, more accusatory form that I
now turn15; and with this analysis I shall bring the
present section to a close.
The point which needs to be made at the outset is that
the substantial offensive against Johnson mounted, in the
main, during the first two decades of the nineteenth
century was foreshadowed by sporadic sniper-fire in the
last two of the eighteenth. The occasion of the sniping
was his mostly unsympathetic treatment, in the Lives of the
Poets (1779-1781), of, in particular, the productions of
15 This offensive is usefully surveyed by the historian JCD Clark in 
chapter 9 of his recent (1994) book on Johnson and "cultural 
politics". (Chapter 9 is piquantly titled "'Sophistry', 
'Indiscretion', 'Falsehood': the Denigration of Samuel Johnson, 1775­
1832")
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Collins and Gray, 'poets of sensibility7 whose rhapsodical
inclinations, often laboured straining after sublimity,
pursuit of remote and bizarre settings, sentiments and
sensations, affectation, on occasion, of a quivering
hypersensitivity (S H Clark 10) , and tendency to
"linguistic exhibitionism" (ibid. 126) all ran counter to
Johnson's neo-classical prepossessions which set the
highest value on poetic writing characterized by
perspicuity of statement, clarity of purpose and structure,
dignity, propriety and ease, decent restraint and control,
"order and consonance" ("Prior", Lives II 210), a degree
at least of rationality and regularity, attention to
craftsmanship and finish and, above all, truth to 'Nature',
meaning, truth to general human nature and to the common
run of human experience.
The strictures against Gray, in particular, were
uncommonly severe and thorough-going (and, it has to be
admitted, not exempt from nit-picking). But then Gray was
so provoking to Johnson; his poetic bent was, after all
strongly 'Romantic' (as a later age would have styled it
- and with justice, as there are good grounds for regarding
the 'poets of sensibility' as proto-Romantics), and
Johnson, appraising it from the standpoint of his neo­
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classical premises, clearly found a great deal to be
irritated by16; at any rate, there seems to be at work in
the Life of Gray an impulse to 'let rip' that was too
strong to resist; an impulse that comes to expression in
a vocabulary of denigration as extensive as it is forceful.
Thus we meet with epithets such as 'useless', 'puerile',
'obsolete', 'false', 'outrageous'; with references to
'cant', 'puerilities', 'cumbrous splendour'; lines
"unworthy of further notice" and "thoughts that [have]
nothing new" - not to speak of the caustic dismissiveness
of "suicide [as an expedient for ending a poem] is always
to be had, without expence of thought", and of "he that
forsakes the probable may always find the marvellous" (III
434-40) . And then, finally, there is the paragraph
containing Johnson's summarizing verdict on "The Progress
of Poesy" and "The Bard", a paragraph that rises to
enviable heights of depreciative eloquence:
These odes are marked by glittering
accumulations of ungraceful ornaments: they
strike, rather than please; the images are
16 Cf. the following entry in Mrs Thrale's Anecdotes:
He had however no Taste for Modern Poetry - Gray Mason &c. 
- Modern Poetry says he one day at our house, is like 
Modern Gardening, every thing now is raised by a hot bed; 
every thing therefore is forced, & everything tasteless, 
(in Ingrams 46)
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magnified by affectation; the language is
laboured into harshness. The mind of the writer
seems to work with unnatural violence. "Double,
double, toil and trouble" . He has a kind of
strutting dignity, and is tall by walking on
tiptoe. His art and his struggle are too
visible, and there is too little appearance of
ease and nature. (Ill 440)
If ever there was a critique tailor-made for raising
the hackles of late eighteenth-century readers who were
(pardoning the anachronism) 'Romantics at heart7, Johnson's
allergically hostile appraisal of Gray was it. For that
reason it functioned as a well-nigh infallible litmus-test
of where readers7 sympathies truly lay: if a reader found
nothing in it to take exception to, that was a sure sign
that his sensibility was 'tuned7 to the same neo-classical
'wavelength7 as Johnson's; if, on the other hand, a reader
found much in it to take exception to, that was a sure sign
as well - of his 'Romantic7 propensities. Anyway, as I
indicated above, it was the offence given to these
propensities by what was felt to be "our modern
Aristarchus's77 (Fitzthomas in Boulton 286) unjust scourging
of the poets of sensibility in the Lives that triggered
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almost all of -the adverse criticism, some of which stopped
not far short of invective, levelled at Johnson's mind and
judgment in the closing decades of the eighteenth century.
As the hostility to Johnson stemmed from the offence
given to Romantically-complexioned feelings, it is hardly
surprising that these, aroused, imparted to that hostility
a Romantic colouring when finally it came to expression in
the form of the various protests, rejoinders and critiques
mounted by persons anxious to vindicate this or that victim
of his calumnies (as they saw it). What bears noticing,
however, so far as these late eighteenth-century
vindications (or stabs at them) are concerned, is that
their Romantic colouring tends to be rather muted; tends
to be a subsidiary rather than a dominant feature. So (to
change the metaphor), while the Romantic strain is
certainly heard in the orchestration of the whole, it is
heard only subsidiarily, in the second violins; the main
themes, which much overshadow it, are the vindication of
a given poet (in most cases Gray, but Cowper too, and even
Prior), and the reprobation of the calumniator (the latter
of which is, evidently, just the flip side of the former).
The exemplary passages given below will, I think, bear out
this appraisal. It makes for an interesting comparison to
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set those passages alongside a later assessment of the
Lives, written by Sir James Mackintosh in 1811, when the
tide of Romanticism in Britain was already flowing
strongly, if not yet at the full. Like his predecessors,
Sir James adopts a generally disapproving attitude to the
work and, like them, he takes it upon himself to vindicate
Gray and Prior (among others) against Johnson's strictures.
But the significant, and revealing, difference between his
piece and its late eighteenth-century counterparts lies in
the very much altered importance of the Romantic 'strain'.
In Mackintosh's 'scoring' it is no longer subsidiary but
dominant. Indeed, he can be said to have written a kind
of hymn of praise to the Romantic conception of poetic
excellence. Correlative with the increased importance of
the Romantic strain in Mackintosh's text is the decreased
importance of the themes that in the late eighteenth-
century productions enjoyed pride of place; namely, the
vindication of a given poet and the reprehension of his
accuser; these themes are relegated in Mackintosh's reading
to a subsidiary, almost incidental status. How is one to
account for this all but total reversal of proportions?
In my view, there can be little doubt that the dramatically
enhanced importance of the Romantic component in
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Mackintosh's piece reflects not only the strength of the
Romantic currents flowing through Britain in 1811, when he
wrote it, but also the enormous success achieved by the
Romantic movement in transforming the climate of
sensibility within the space of less than a generation
after Johnson's late eighteenth-century detractors had
their say17. The passages which now follow are all, save
for the last, the productions of these detractors; the
excerpt at the end, Mackintosh's performance, is added for
purposes of comparison:
Instances too frequently occur, in which the
Critic's judgment seems altogether under the
dominion of predilection or prejudice. ...Of
this there need no farther proofs than his
almost uniform attempt to depreciate the writers
17 Apropos of the strength of Romanticism in 1811, consider this item 
of information contained in JCD Clark's recent book on Johnson (to 
which I adverted in an earlier footnote):
J.G. Lockhart, writing in Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 
in March 1818, claimed that the decisive shift in cultural 
politics had come in about 1810 when the Edinburgh Review 
decided to become "a despiser of the poetry of Pope", to 
talk up the Elizabethan and Jacobean writers, and so 
implicitly... to open the door to the Romantics. (250)
Turning now to a quite different matter: Mackintosh 
characterizes his evaluation of the Lives as an "impartial estimate" 
(in Boulton 353). Nothing could be further from the truth. It is an 
estimate wholly conditioned by the Romantic optic. But is it not an 
old truth that once our prepossessions are so completely naturalized 
that the conscious eye loses sight of them, it becomes only too easy 
to forget that all views are ideologically conditioned, and hence to 
fancy that one's own are 'impartial'.
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of blank verse, and his rough treatment of Gray.
He observes of Shenstone, that he set little
value upon those parts of knowledge which he had
not cultivated himself; his own taste of poetry
seems in some degree regulated by a similar
standard: method, ratiocination, and argument,
especially if the vehicle be rhyme, oftentimes
obtaining his regard and commendation, while the
bold and enthusiastic, though perhaps irregular,
flights of imagination, are past by with
perverse and obstinate indifference. (1782)
(Edmund Cartwright in Boulton 269)
But what shall we say of his old fusty-rusty
remarks upon [Prior's] Henry and Emma? ...[W]hen
the critic calls it a dull dialogue, who but a
critic will believe him? There are few readers
of poetry of either sex, in this country, who
cannot remember how that enchanting piece has
bewitched them, who do not know, that instead of
finding it tedious, they have been so delighted
with the romantic turn of it, as to have
overlooked all its defects... I wonder almost,
that, as the Bacchanals served Orpheus, the boys
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and girls do not tear this husky, dry
commentator limb from limb, in resentment of
such an injury done to their darling poet. I
admire Johnson as a man of great erudition and
sense; but when he sets himself up for a judge
of writers upon the subject of love, a passion
which I suppose he never felt in his life, he
might as well think himself qualified to
pronounce upon a treatise on horsemanship, or
the art of fortification. (1782) (William Cowper
in Boulton 274)
I cannot quit this subject without taking a
review of the Ode [Gray's "The Bard"] . . . The
wild and romantic scenery, the strength of
conception, the boldness of the figures, the
terrible sublimity, the solemn spirit of
prophecy, and the animated glow of visions of
glory render this "the finest Ode in the world".
...it rises with an elevated dignity along with
the boldest flights of his sublime
imagination... Gray inherited the ample pinion
of the Theban Eagle, and sails with supreme
dominion through the azure deep of air...he
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therefore has a claim to the highest rank in the
realms of Lyric Poetry.
What could induce Dr. Johnson. . . to attack
this excellent person and poet with such outrage
and indecency, we can only conjecture from this
observation, "there must be a certain sympathy
between the book and the reader to create a good
liking". Now it is certain that the Critic has
nothing of this sympathy, no portion nor sense
of that...etherial flame which animates the
poet; he is therefore as little qualified to
judge of these works of imagination, as the
shivering inhabitant of the caverns of the North
to form an idea of the glowing sun that flames
over the plains of Chili. (1783) (Robert Potter
in Boulton 301-02)
Johnson's Lives of the Poets. and all the
records of his own life and conversation, prove
that envy did deeply stain his spirit... which
[is] incompatible with a...noble mind.
To your question, Whom could Johnson envy?
I answer, all his superiors in genius, all his
equals...
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Gray was indolent and wrote but.little; -
yet that little proves him the first Genius of
the period in which he lived. I have been
assured that he had more learning than Johnson,
and he certainly was a very superior poet.
Johnson felt the superiority, and for that he
hated him. It was that consciousness, I verily
believe, which impelled him to speak with such
audacious contempt of the first lyric
compositions the world has seen... Grander in
point of imagery and language no odes can be
than the odes of Gray. (1796) (Anna Seward in
Boulton 413-14)
The time may perhaps now be arrived for an
impartial estimate of its [the Lives'] merits.
Whenever understanding alone is sufficient for
poetical criticism, the decisions of Johnson are
generally right. But the beauties of poetry
must be felt before their causes are
investigated. There is a poetical sensibility
which in the progress of the mind becomes as
distinct a power as a musical ear or a
picturesque eye. Without a considerable degree
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of this sensibility it is as vain for a man of
the greatest understanding to speak of the
higher beauties of poetry, as it is for a blind
man to speak of colours. To adopt the warmest
sentiments of poetry, to realise its boldest
imagery, to yield to every impulse of
enthusiasm, to submit to the illusions of fancy,
to retire with the poet into his ideal worlds,
were dispositions wholly foreign from the
worldly sagacity and stern shrewdness of
Johnson. As in his judgment of life and
character, so in his criticism on poetry, he was
a sort of Freethinker. He suspected the refined
of affectation, he rejected the enthusiastic as
absurd, and he took it for granted that the
mysterious was unintelligible... As he had no
feeling of the lively and graceful, we must not
wonder at his injustice to Prior. . . His
insensibility to the higher poetry, his dislike
of a Whig University, and his scorn of a
fantastic character, combined to produce that
monstrous example of critical injustice which he
entitles the Life of Gray. (1811) (Sir James
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Mackintosh in Boulton 353-54)
Mackintosh's animadversions upon Johnson begin to
sound almost like praise compared to the lengthy, slashing
'bill of indictment' drawn up by William Hazlitt. The
Romantic offensive against Johnson reaches its climax in
Hazlitt's onslaught which is however no mere exercise in
vituperation since he actually is at some pains to
construct a case (of sorts) against him, in contrast to,
say, De Quincey who is content simply to be defamatory18.
Hazlitt's attack consists of two separate broadsides
loosed within a couple of years of each other; one makes
up the bulk of his Preface to Characters of Shakespear's
Plays (1817), the other a substantial section of his essay
"On the Periodical Essayists" in Lectures on the English
Comic Writers (1819). The ostensible aim of the essay on
the periodical writers was to bring about a revision of the
then dominant view that Johnson's Ramblers were much
18 For example:
Into this great che f-d'oeuvre of Milton [De Quincey is 
referring to Johnson's estimate of Paradise Lost in the 
Lives! it was no doubt Johnson's secret determination to 
send a telling shot at parting. He would lodge a little 
gage d'amitie, a farewell pledge of hatred, a trifling 
token...of his eternal malice. Milton's admirers might 
divide it among themselves; and, if it should happen to 
fester and rankle in their hearts, so much the better; 
they were heartily welcome to the poison: not a jot would 
he deduct for himself if a thousand times greater. O Sam! 
kill us not with munificence. (in Boulton 313)
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superior to the Tatlers and Spectators of Addison and
Steele. The ostensible aim of the Preface to Characters
of Shakespear's Plays was to vindicate Shakespeare against
Johnson's estimate of him as expounded in the Preface and
Notes which accompanied his edition, in 1765, of the Plays.
But Hazlitt's real aim, for which the ostensible ones
served as a stalking-horse, was finally to put paid to
Johnson by launching a broad-based attack on his
sensibility, judgment and taste, under cover of rallying
to the defence of particular works. The larger point that
Hazlitt's attack brings into focus is this: that while
Johnson could never have been viewed sympathetically by the
Romantic critics, his being so formidable an adversary, and
one therefore whom it was imperatively necessary to get rid
of, had the effect of transforming want of sympathy into
positive hostility.
To set Hazlitt's two broadsides alongside each other
is to observe that they are not equally antagonistic to
Johnson. The anti-Johnson passages in the piece on the
periodical essayists are more indulgent in their tone, more
elaborate in their syntax and exhibit a prose style more
metaphorically-laden and embellished than is the case in
the Preface where the mood is aggressive, the dominant
123
impulse strongly depreciatory, the syntactic formations
relatively uncomplicated and the prose style uncommonly
forceful and vigorous - thanks not only to its syntactic
directness but also, and even more, to its being energized
by a bounding forward propulsion deriving mainly from the
large number of short, punchy sentences, often following
one upon the tail of the other, the accumulation of which
imparts notable impetus to the movement of the prose. The
exceptional forcefulness (ferocity would not be too strong
a word) of the attack on Johnson in the Preface cannot be
properly understood without an understanding of the impulse
that lay behind its composition. This was the 'gloves off'
impulse of a 'fight to the finish'. That such was the
character of the motivating impulse was due in its turn to
Hazlitt's perceiving his confrontation with Johnson as an
exceptionally high-stakes encounter, one involving nothing
less than the issue of whose view of Shakespeare, his or
Johnson's, would prevail in the estimation of posterity.
That Hazlitt viewed the clash with Johnson in this light
is implicitly avowed by the remark he lets slip at the end
of the Preface where he owns that "If Dr. Johnson's opinion
was right, the following observations on Shakespear's Plays
must be greatly exaggerated, if not ridiculous. If he was
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wrong, what has been said may perhaps account for his being
so... " (xxiii) .
Given the 'gloves off' impulse informing Hazlitt's
attack on Johnson in the Preface, such that he is far more
interested in winning the argument than in being fair to
his adversary, it is hardly to be wondered at that the view
of Johnson which he presents there should turn out to be
so gross a caricature. The picture he sketches of a critic
of shrivelled sensibility, literalistic turn of mind, and
stagnant intelligence permanently imprisoned within the
well-worn groove of its narrow orbit, has nothing in common
with the kind of person (or critic) Johnson really was or
with the kind of intelligence and sensibility he actually
possessed. Furthermore, again in keeping with his aim
(unavowed, to be sure) of dethroning Johnson rather than
being fair to him (and in my view he is less fair to
Johnson than Johnson was to Gray), Hazlitt pronounces him
a stranger to the cardinal positives of the Romantic creed:
imagination, genius and passion. While, therefore, these
watchwords come into play in the passages below always and
only in order to enforce the point that Johnson was
inaccessible to everything they stand for, the simple fact
of their coming into play as they do, and as frequently as
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they do, constitutes a principal means whereby the Romantic
'strain' contained in these texts is enabled to make itself
heard. The passage cited first is taken from the essay on
the periodical writers; then follow substantial sections
from the Preface to Characters of Shakespear's Plays:
The Rambler is a splendid and imposing common­
place book of general topics, and rhetorical
declamation on the conduct and business of human
life. In this sense, there is hardly a
reflection that had been suggested on such
subjects which is not to be found in this
celebrated work, and there is, perhaps, hardly
a reflection to be found in it which had not
been already suggested and developed by some
other author, or in the common course of
conversation. ...I am not here saying that Dr.
Johnson was a man without originality, compared
with the ordinary run of men's minds, but he was
not a man of original thought or genius in the
sense in which Montaigne or Lord Bacon was. He
opened no new vein of precious ore, nor did he
light upon any single pebbles of uncommon size
and unrivalled lustre. We seldom meet with
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anything to 'give us pause'; he does not set us
thinking for the first time. His
reflections ... do not disturb the ordinary march
of our thoughts... but pass on and mingle with
the throng of our impressions. After closing
the volumes of the Rambler, there is nothing
that we remember as a new truth gained to the
mind, nothing indelibly stamped upon the memory;
nor is there any passage that we wish to turn to
as embodying any known principle or observation,
with such force and beauty that justice can only
be done to the idea in the author's own words.
Such, for instance, are many of the passages to
be found in Burke...[where]...the spark of
genius seems to have met with its congenial
matter: the shaft is sped; the forked lightning
dresses up the face of nature in ghastly smiles,
and the loud thunder rolls far away from the
ruin that is made. Dr. Johnson's style, on the
contrary, resembles rather the rumbling of mimic
thunder at one of our theatres. ...What most
distinguishes Dr. Johnson from other writers is
the pomp and uniformity of his style. All his
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periods are cast in the same mould, are of the
same size and shape, and consequently have
little fitness to the variety of things he
professes to treat of. His subjects are
familiar, but the author is always upon stilts.
. . .The monotony of style produces an apparent
monotony of ideas. What is really striking and
valuable, is lost in the vain ostentation and
circumlocution of the expression; for when we
find the same pains and pomp of diction bestowed
upon the most trifling as upon the most
important parts of a sentence or discourse, we
grow tired of distinguishing between pretension
and reality, and are disposed to confound the
tinsel and bombast of the phraseology with want
of weight in the thoughts. (1819:100-101)
We have a high respect for Dr. Johnson's
character and understanding...but he was neither
a poet nor a judge of poetry. He might in one
sense be a judge of poetry as it falls within
the limits and rules of prose, but not as it is
poetry. Least of all was he qualified to be a
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judge of Shakespear, who 'alone is high
fantastical'. ...Nor could it well be otherwise;
Dr. Johnson's general powers of reasoning
overlaid his critical susceptibility. All his
ideas were cast in a given mould, in a set form:
they were made out by rule and system, by
climax, inference, and antithesis:- Shakespear's
were the reverse. Johnson's understanding dealt
only in round numbers: the fractions were lost
upon him. He reduced everything to the common
standard of conventional propriety; and the most
exquisite refinement or sublimity produced an
effect on his mind, only as they could be
translated into the language of measured prose.
To him an excess of beauty was a fault; for it
appeared to him like an excrescence; and his
imagination was dazzled by the blaze of light.
His writings neither shone with the beams of
native genius, nor reflected them. The shifting
shapes of fancy, the rainbow hues of things,
made no impression on him: he seized only on the
permanent and tangible. He had no idea of
natural objects but "such as he could measure
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with a two-foot rule, or tell upon ten fingers": 
he judged of human nature in the same way, by
mood and figure: he saw only the definite, the
positive, and the practical, the average forms
of things, not their striking differences -
their classes, not their degrees. He was a man
of strong common-sense and practical wisdom,
rather than of genius or feeling. He retained
the regular, habitual impressions of actual
objects, but he could not follow the rapid
flights of fancy, or the strong movements of
passion. That is, he was to the poet what the
painter of still life is to the painter of
history. Common sense sympathises with the
impressions of things on ordinary minds in
ordinary circumstances: genius catches the
glancing combinations presented to the eye of
fancy, under the influence of passion. It is
the province of the didactic reasoner to take
cognizance of those results of human nature
which are constantly repeated and always the
same, which follow one onother in regular
succession, which are acted upon by large
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classes of- men, and embodied in received
customs, laws, language, and institutions; and
it was in arranging, comparing, and arguing on
these kind of general results, that Johnson's
excellence lay. But he could not quit his hold
of the common-place and mechanical, and apply
the general rule to the particular exception, or
shew how the nature of man was modified by the
workings of passion, or the infinite
fluctuations of thought and accident. Hence he
could judge neither of the heights nor depths of
poetry. Nor is this all; for being conscious of
great powers in himself, and those powers of an
adverse tendency to those of his author, he
would be for setting up a foreign jurisdiction
over poetry, and making criticism a kind of
Procrustes' bed of genius, where he might cut
down imagination to matter-of-fact, regulate the
passions according to reason, and translate the
whole into logical diagrams and rhetorical
declamation. ...Shakespear's bold and happy
flights of imagination were equally thrown away
upon our author. He was not only without any
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particular fineness of organic sensibility, 
alive to all the "mighty world of ear and eye",
which is necessary to the painter or musician,
but without that intenseness of passion, which,
seeking to exaggerate whatever excites the
feelings of pleasure or power in the mind, and
moulding the impressions of natural objects
according to the impulses of imagination,
produces a genius and a taste for poetry.
(1817:xviii-xx)
If the eighteenth century for the most part admiringly
exhibits the principal characteristics of Johnson's mind,
if the nineteenth, anxious to clear a major obstacle from
its path, strives to depreciate them, the twentieth
endeavours to interpret, explain and contextualize them -
presidingly within a psychological frame of reference.
So in our century Johnson's mind has mostly become an
object of impersonal psychological investigation, grist for
the mill of psychologizing interpretations, in the most
egregious of which his psyche quite disappears behind the
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psychological paradigm foisted upon it by an interpreter
intent only on finding something to attach a pet theory to.
The flip side of the coin is of course the substantial
number of psychological interpretations in which a given
theory is applied responsibly to the data and is guided by
them. These interpretations are, as one would expect, of
varying quality, but the best of them stand out for their
explanatory and elucidatory power.
There is both a negative reason and a positive one for
Johnson's psychologizing commentators (the responsible and
the irresponsible ones alike) finding it not only possible
but natural to pursue their inquiries into his psyche in
a spirit of intellectual detachment. The negative reason
is that the Republic of Letters in the twentieth century
feels 'safe' from Johnson, as the partisans of the new
Romantic ideas in the first two decades of the nineteenth
did not. In our day, and indeed for the past 170 years or
so, Johnson and the neo-classical positions he represents
have posed no threat, have constituted no obstacle to any
new literary, philosophical or cultural theories of
whatever complexion. To find a later twentieth-century
parallel with the kind of obstacle presented to the early
Romantics by Johnson and the doctrine he upheld, one would
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need to think in terms of the obstacle post-structuralism
would represent for the partisans of some brave new
literary creed trying to win a place for itself in the sun.
But Johnson! Can anybody today feel threatened by him or,
more precisely, by the neo-classical positions he
championed? Neo-classicism, as a literary-critical
doctrine capable of exerting real influence, has been dead
these 170 years, at least. It is therefore easy for us at
this remove in time to be detached and dispassionate when
appraising its leading exponent.
The stance of intellectual detachment, in no small
measure a product of historical distance, is at the same
time a means of maximizing its benefits. Herein, it seems
to me, lies its positive appeal to Johnson's twentieth-
century commentators: to be diligent in the cultivation and
care of that intellectual detachment which historical
distance has helped to make possible, is to make possible
the best use of the advantages it confers.
These, deriving mainly from a dramatic elevation of
the coign of vantage, involve the simultaneous deepening
and widening of perspective, so that one sees more, sees
it in a more 'all-around' fashion, and sees it more
complexly. Johnson's psychologizing commentators,
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supplementing the benefits of historical distance with the
insights yielded by sophisticated psychological theories
not known to their predecessors, and bringing to bear in
addition a degree of professional expertise that very few,
if any, of them could possibly have possessed, venture
forth in the conviction (perhaps not avowed but assuredly
operative) that they are particularly well-placed to see
more of the Johnsonian psyche than ever before, to see it
more 'in the round' than ever before, to see it with a
fuller and more complex understanding, and to see it from
an angle capable of producing insights and suggesting
connections that their eighteenth and nineteenth-century
counterparts would not have had access to. The remainder
of this chapter is the record of the psychologizing and
psychoanalysing critics' endeavours to view Johnson's mind
and temperament in a new light, from a new angle, in terms
of a new ordering of possibilities.
But before embarking on an analysis of these new
perspectives, I have to make the point that the cluster of
'high-visibility' mental attributes which made so powerful,
immediate - and enduring - an impression on Johnson's
eighteenth-century commentators (most of whom, of course,
spoke from personal observation) , and which most of the
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nineteenth-century critics remark as well, if only as a 
prelude to juxtaposing them with his perceived limitations,
are given their full due by the twentieth-century critics
as well (despite their generally finding the 'high-
visibility' traits much less interesting, from the
standpoint of their potential for further investigation,
than others, less conspicuous, less commented on, whose
symptomatology appears, however, to hold out the promise
of voyages of exploration and discovery in psychological
waters. But of this, more later) . Thus we find the
twentieth-century commentators, no less than their
counterparts of the two preceding centuries, paying tribute
to Johnson's "uncanny memory" (Bate (1975) 531),
"prodigious memory" (Krutch 400), "intellectual dexterity"
(Clifford (1955) 99), "ready and fertile wit" (Bate (1975)
482), "sweep and readiness of intellect" (ibid. 340),
"powerful inquisitiveness" (Krutch 182), "vigorous mind"
(idem), "powerful critical intelligence" (Clifford (1955)
270), "powerful ratiocinative intellect" (Wain 156),
"intellectual acuteness" (Hovey 325), "penetration" (Bate
(1975) 207), and "formidable intellectual powers" (ibid.
531). Just as there is nothing new about the traits noted,
so there is nothing new about the language they are are
136
noted in; phrased as they are, these characterizations
could as readily have dropped from the pen of any of the
eighteenth or nineteenth-century commentators. On
occasion, however, a twentieth-century critic will
characterize one or other of the standard 'high-visibility'
attributes in such a way as to impart to it an unmistakably
twentieth-century 'personality'. Take, for example, Wain's
description of Johnson's memory as "a matchless retrieval
system" (336), or Clifford's reference to it as
"photographic" (1955:47). The unmistakable twentieth-
century 'timbre' of these characterizations is achieved by
the simple but highly effective device of routing them
through metaphors with the right kinds of associations.
In the present instances the twentieth-century 'vibrations'
arise from the fact that the metaphors appealed to are
technologically complexioned, and then from the further
fact that the technological advances complexioning them are
of comparatively recent date.
Naturally, if the twentieth-century commentators did
nothing better with their time than just look for more
interesting language in which to livery the same familiar
set of mental attributes, they wouldn't be worth our
attention. But that, of course, is not their agenda at
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all. Rather than seeking to dress the familiar
characteristics in unfamiliar language, their endeavour is
to bring to light mental traits not previously discerned,
to spot connections not previously descried; alternatively,
to offer a fresh perspective on the familiar attributes by
'triangulating' them from a new position. Presidingly, the
twentieth-century commentators attempt to realize these
objectives within the context of the psychologizing or
psychoanalysing interpretation. But not exclusively.
Consequently, there is a set of insights and
'triangulations', not overtly psychological in their
colouring, which requires to be taken account of as well.
It is to an analysis of this class of items that I propose
to turn first, leaving until last my inquiry into the
overtly psychologizing readings of Johnson's mind.
Let me begin by glancing at what looks like an
altogether trifling instance of twentieth-century
connection-spotting, John Wain's statement that " [t]he cast
of Johnson's mind was forensic; he liked to make clear
distinctions, and was irritated by confusions" (195).
Slight and unremarkable as this judgment seems, it
nevertheless shows Wain accomplishing - casually, without
fuss or strain - what none of the eighteenth-century
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commentators who remarked Johnson's "acute discernment" or
"nicety of discernment" (v. supra) managed to accomplish:
it shows him spotting, and bringing to notice, the
connection between the forensic cast of Johnson's mind and
his attraction to distinction-making. Now I want to move
on to insights and discoveries that are more substantial.
Walter Jackson Bate zeroes in on a mental trait never
remarked by his predecessors (nor by his contemporaries,
for that matter) when he calls attention to "one of the
dominant qualities of [Johnson's] mind", his "strongly 
anticipative imagination" (1975:107; emphasis in original).
As Bate explains it, this kind of imaginative disposition
involves "the habit of leaping ahead in imagination into
the future and forestalling disappointment and hurt by
anticipating... all that could produce them" (ibid. 373).
It is the treacherous habit of "overprepar[ing] ourselves
for future disasters by refusing to surrender to the
present lest we...be taken unawares" (ibid. 374).
Another twentieth-century perception worth calling
attention to is the by now widespread recognition of
Johnson's "shrewd psychological insights" which, as James
Clifford puts it, make "many passages", particularly in
Rasselas and in the Rambler essays, read "startlingly like
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modern psychiatric analysis" (1979 : 217) 19. Going further 
than Clifford, Bate claims, sweepingly, that Johnson's
"sense of the working of the human imagination probably
provides us with the closest anticipation of Freud to be
found in psychology or moral writing before the twentieth
century" (1955:93). Though the eighteenth-century
commentators have next to nothing to say about Johnson's
psychological penetration (I don't think there is a single
reference to it in any of the seven categories presented
in the first section of the chapter), they certainly would
not have been shut off from the perception of it;
nevertheless, could a perception of that kind have been
registered as complexly in the days before Freud and
'modern psychiatric analysis' as it can be in our day, now
that Freud and psychiatric analysis have become part of the
19 Thus Richard B Hovey on the 'mad astronomer' chapters (chs. 40-47) 
of Rasselas:
Certain features of these chapters... suggest insights into 
neurosis which are comparable to those of modern 
psychiatry: that anxiety is the central symptom of the 
depressed; that the anguish of guilt, the over-laden 
conscience, weighs heavily on the melancholiac; that such 
persons seek ease and expiation by further self­
punishment, i.e. self-aggressions; that they are driven to 
"superstition", i.e. compulsive rituals; that sexual 
disturbances are a contributing factor in melancholia; 
that the symptoms of such illnesses are but exaggerations 
or intensifications of tendencies in the non-neurotic 
personality... (324)
Hovey not only makes his point, he overmakes it. Isn't he 
reading too much 'psychology' into the 'mad astronomer' chapters?
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'mindset' of our culture? This is something that needs to
be borne in mind by twentieth-century readers of, in
particular, Rasselas and the Rambler essays who repeatedly
come upon passages which pinpoint exquisitely the cunning
wiles and stratagems by means of which humankind hastens
to deceive itself (and this is but one among several
psychologically-complexioned themes that come into focus
in these works). If it is a puzzle to such readers that
the manifest psychological penetration of the man who wrote
those passages appears to have escaped the notice of his
contemporaries, it is well to be reminded that we
invariably discover what we have been primed to look for,
and that readers in our century, in which psychological
theorizing has already become part of the general
intellectual climate, are more or less conditioned to look
for psychological cues and clues in the texts they
encounter. So is it any surprise that they find them (even
when there are none to find). Eighteenth-century readers
and observers of mankind were, by contrast, not thus
conditioned; so it is hardly to be wondered at that they
failed to spot things that to us seem to 'stand out a
mile' . The notion that people who have grown up in this
century are in some sort 'primed' to discover psychological
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connections and to make psychological inferences also
accounts, to a degree, anyway, in my opinion, for
Clifford's and Wain's and Bate's alert sensitivity to
Johnson's psychological perceptiveness.
In his biography Bate brings under inspection the
"dialectic and bisociative character of Johnson's mind"
(1975:534). This attribute, "intimately related with the
secret of his genius generally" (ibid.481), involves "a
creative, 'bisociative'20 leap between two or more frames
of reference, or matrices of experience, previously
unconnected and even regarded as incompatible" (idem).
I'm not sure whether Bate is here expressing an insight
that simply could not have occurred to his predecessors,
or whether it is not rather a question of raising to the
level of self-conscious statement, and applying an
explanatory formula to, what they could only have intuited;
however the case may be, certain it is that he makes his
point in a way that simply would not have been possible for
a pre-twentieth-century critic: not only his terminology
but the entire conceptual matrix that stands behind it are
the product of twentieth-century psychological theorizing.
20 Bisociation: "the simultaneous mental association of an idea or 
object with two fields ordinarily not regarded as related" (Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary).
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While, therefore, it is not impossible that the eighteenth-
century commentators who remark Johnson's "amplitude of
wit" or "fertility of fancy" or "promptitude of invention"
might dimly have sensed that what they were gesturing to
was a 'bisociative leap' , it is certain that they could
never have used that kind of language to describe it. What
Bate achieves by bringing to bear on his inquiry into
Johnson's psyche the suggestive, and sophisticated, notion
of the 'bisociative leap' is an enlargement of
understanding, and perhaps an illumination. Here is an
instance, it seems to me, where the application of a
distinctively twentieth-century frame of reference to a
distinctively eighteenth-century mind bears good fruit.
While the eighteenth and nineteenth-century
commentators could not be expected to know anything about
'bisociative leaps', they certainly were fully aware of
Johnson's immense store of information and learning, and
to this awareness they give admiring expression (as
instanced in the earlier pages of the chapter). But they
do so, without exception (Boswell is only a partial one),
in the form of isolated observations which make no attempt
to bring his erudition into relation with anything else.
It awaits the arrival of twentieth-century criticism for
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this to happen: John Wain, surveying the 'scene' from an
elevated coign of vantage that would not have been
available to his eighteenth-century counterparts, a coign
of vantage that enables him to take in a good deal more of
the 'whole picture', perceives Johnson's immense knowledge
not as a discrete attribute, something standing on its own,
but as part of a dyad whose second term is no less
important than the knowledge itself is. Writes Wain:
"Johnson's great gift was not merely that he knew a great
deal but that he had such superb control over what he knew"
(242) .
As there is nothing arcane about this insight and as,
having once been stated, it is indeed seen to correspond
to the actuality of the situation in the Johnsonian record,
both spoken and written, one may be tempted to ask why the
eighteenth and nineteenth-century commentators couldn't
perceive for themselves what Wain perceives - namely, the
relationship subsisting between Johnson's knowledge and his
control of it. After all, they were fully aware of the
former, so why couldn't they see it in relation to the
concept of control? Things aren't that simple, however:
Wain spots the connection because he sees more of the
'larger picture', but seeing the larger picture depends
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upon having possession of a sufficiently elevated viewing-
platform, and in the absence of historical distance no
viewing-platform will ever be elevated enough. The
eighteenth-century commentators, lacking the former,
correspondingly lacked the latter. It is a mistake to
assume that if only they had 'set their minds to it', they
somehow, by dint of effort, could have raised up for
themselves a vantage point as elevated as that which the
historical distance of two hundred years has vouchsafed the
twentieth century. To an extent, certainly, it is possible
to compensate for the lack of historical distance: where
an individual subject is concerned, the perceiver's ability
to unite with the advantages of intimacy a capacity for
detachment, his possession of strong powers of observation
combined with a readiness to reflect upon the observations
gathered and try to discover in them some kind of pattern,
would amount, to be sure, to quite a considerable
compensation. In my opinion, only Boswell, Mrs Thrale and,
to judge from a rather sparse harvest of comments, Sir
Joshua Reynolds, manage to satisfy those criteria; that is
why theirs prove to be the most 'all-around' of the
eighteenth-century views of Johnson's mental character.
In much the same way that, seeing the 'larger
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picture', Wain links his estimate of Johnson's erudition
to the notion of control, so he links his estimate of
Johnson's memory to the notion of intelligence. More
likely than not this connection would have occurred to
Johnson's contemporaries (though I find no mention of it
in the evidential record), but it certainly could not have
occurred to them in the form it does to Wain, for it occurs
to him in a form that plainly reflects the impress of
twentieth-century psychological theorizing:
Sam's mind was the great instrument by which he
conquered the disadvantages of his physical and
emotional constitution. It was, people already
saw, an extraordinary mind, as colossal and in
some ways as odd as its owner. To begin with,
there was that prodigious memory. This, by
itself, is not necessarily a proof of
intelligence. Clinical psychiatry can show us
examples of certain kinds of imbecile who can
memorize a telephone directory. On the other
hand, the hypothetical 'brilliant man with a bad
memory'...clearly belongs to folklore. One
never, in actual life, meets such a man. Every
intelligent person has a more or less powerful
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memory, for the simple reason that the mind
retains what it enjoys and is fed by. (24)
The examples given here of the connections posited by
Wain lead to a more general point - that among the
twentieth-century commentators there is observable a
tendency, little detectable in the two preceding centuries,
to link things up. One outcome of this tendency is a
disposition, manifested on a number of occasions, to view
Johnson's mental traits as joined together (ordinarily in
paired combinations), rather than as standing alone. It
is thus that Boswell views them when he declares that "in
him were united a most logical head with a most fertile
imagination" (Life 1402). But Boswell (strange as it may
seem) stands virtually alone among the eighteenth-century
commentators in being vouchsafed a composite perception.
In the twentieth century, by contrast, it becomes something
of a tendency, referable surely, but not solely, to the
commentators of our day being so much better placed than
were their predecessors (thanks to the advantage of
historical distance) to see things 'in the round'. Here
are some examples of mental attributes perceived in 'hand­
holding mode'; that is, in combinatory formations:
[Johnson's 1745 editorial commentary on Macbeth
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exhibited] a combination of shrewd common sense
and scepticism, overlaid with a passionate
aesthetic appreciation. (Clifford (1955) 270)
So powerful an intelligence, associated with so
intense an interest both in letters and in human
nature, could no more be narrow than shallow.
(F R Leavis (1944) 203)
[T] he principal value of this long gymnastic
feat [Johnson's Parliamentary Debates] was more
general. This came from what it did to develop
that astonishing union of ready fertility with
judicious balance... which... is one of the most
distinctive qualities of Johnson's mind...
(Bate (1975) 207)
But getting at the "quintessence" of
things...was already proving to be
attainable...and was in time to become a
distinguishing feature of his thought and
expression. In fact, in the combination of
exactly this ability with readiness of mind, he
was ultimately to prove unequaled, or at least
unexcelled, not only in his own century but also
in the entire history of verbal intelligence as
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- far as we know it. (ibid. 78)
The larger Johnsonian picture, which the twentieth-
century critics have been so much better placed to bring
within their field of vision than their eighteenth or early
nineteenth-century counterparts, has not only played a role
in generating insights and suggesting connections not
previously registered, but has also served another function
- that of the contextualizing backdrop against which to
project Johnson's mind and sensibility, thereby setting
them off in a new light, and in consequence enlarging our
understanding. Let me turn without further ado to
exemplification. The example I want to bring forward of
the 'larger picture' functioning as a contextualizing frame
is, in my opinion, a particularly revealing one because of
the comparison it invites with Hazlitt's hostile treatment
of Johnson in his Preface to Characters of Shakespear's
Plays. Well, by contrast with Hazlitt, whose method is
that of the bill of indictment in which Johnson's alleged
limitations and faults are set forth one after the other
with hardly any attempt to account for them, F R Leavis
takes it upon himself to contextualize, and thereby to
explain, Johnson's limitations as a critic of Shakespeare.
These limitations he makes no attempt to conceal, but
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instead of just listing them and reprobating Johnson for
them, as Hazlitt does, he makes it his business to situate
them within the context of his training and of the
literary-cultural milieu of which he was the product and
was, in time, to become the defender. Leavis's first step
is to specify the limitations; and these, as spelled out
by him, are, in essence, the same as the ones Hazlitt bears
down on: namely, that Johnson's ear is deaf to
Shakespeare's poetic genius owing to his "inability to
appreciate the more profoundly creative uses of language"
(1965:110); moreover, the "exploratory-creative use of
words upon experience, involving the creation of concepts
in a free play for which the lines and configurations of
the conventionally charted have no finality, is something
[Johnson] has no use for" (ibid. 109)21. The shortcomings
once stated, however, Leavis hastens to contextualize them,
with reference, firstly, to Johnson's training:
When we come to his treatment of Shakespeare,
Johnson's... training gets more radically in the
way of appreciation than where Milton is
concerned. The critic for whom the Augustan use
21 For the purposes of the present argument I shall be conflating two 
essays by Leavis, on the grounds that the later one is a palpable echo 
of the earlier. The essays are "Johnson as Critic" {in Scrutiny 
1944), and "Johnson and Augustanism" (The Common Pursuit 1965)
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of language is the undisputed norm cannot come
to terms with the Shakespearian use. He
understands and he doesn't understand - because
his training opposes. (1944:192; 1965:108)
Next (and finally) , Leavis brings to bear upon
Johnson's failure to respond to Shakespeare's 'creative use
of language' the explanatory frame of the literary-cultural
milieu that shaped him:
Nothing could be more unlike the Shakesperian
use of language than that in which Johnson's
mind and sensibility have been formed. For him,
in this the type Augustan, expression in poetry
as in prose is a matter of stating - of stating
with point, elegance and propriety.
...Shakespeare's 'thoughts' [however]...are apt
to be... highly complex - which is to say,
compressed and licentious in expression.. . The
Augustan cannot conceive the need for such a use
of language. The ideas he wants to express are
adequately provided for - and this is true of
poetry as of prose - in the common currency of
terms, put together according to the conventions
of grammar and logic. He doesn't feel that the
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current concepts of ordinary discourse muffle or
misrepresent anything he has to convey. His
business is, while observing the ordinary rules
in arranging them, to achieve further a formal
pattern of meaning-structure and versification.
He can express himself congenially in modes that
are in such a sense and at such a level social
that this pattern {like Augustan idiom itself)
suggests formal conventions of social manners
and public deportment. It is an age in which
everyone of any cultivation knows so well what
Reason, Truth and Nature, the presiding trinity,
are that no one feels any pressing need of
definitions... It is not an age in which the
poet feels called on to explore further below
the public surface than conventional expression
takes cognizance of, or to push in any way
beyond the frontiers of the charted. He has no
impulse to indulge in licentious linguistic
creation, nor does it occur to him that such
indulgence may ever with any propriety be
countenanced. (1944: 193-94)
In situating Johnson's limitations within an
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explanatory contextualizing .frame, Leavis's aim is to get
the reader to understand them before making a judgment.
By presenting essentially the same limitations as part of
a 'bill of indictment' (or something not much different
from one), Hazlitt's aim, by contrast, is to get the reader
to make a judgment - an adverse one, of course - before,
or in the absence of, understanding - and in consequence
to accept as valid his caricature of Johnson as a critic
of crude, literalistic intelligence, narrow sensibility and
niggardly sympathies. The figure who emerges from Leavis's
explanatory frame is very different: a critic with
limitations, certainly, but ones which were scarcely to be
avoided given his training and his literary-cultural
milieu; in short, a critic with an unavoidable blind spot
among his manifold strengths.
Before embarking on my analysis of the overtly
psychologizing readings of Johnson's mental character, I
want to try to account for the twentieth-century
commentators' fertility in finding new things to say about
it - their bringing to light mental traits not previously
remarked, positing connections not previously descried,
discovering 'angles' not previously detected.
I should want to say, to begin with, that, thanks to
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the advantage of historical distance and to the
availability of the 'larger picture', assembled piece by
piece in two centuries of comment and opinion,
interpretation and reinterpretation, the twentieth-century
commentators enjoy possibilities of detecting 'angles' and
gaining insights that would not have been accessible to
their predecessors - and these possibilities manifestly
have been taken up. A second point is that they have been
often taken up in a particularly profitable way since those
taking them up have been in a position to bring to bear
upon them a professional expertise: most of the twentieth-
century commentators have been (or are) academics (almost
all eminent), the very character of whose training and
occupation is such as to spur them to link things up, look
for connections, discover pattern and coherence in an
amorphous mass of data. Hardly any of the eighteenth and
but few of the nineteenth-century commentators were 'baked'
in this kind of mould: though well-educated and
sufficiently discerning, the eighteenth-century critics
were yet deficient in the trained rigour and
professionalism of most of their twentieth-century
counterparts. They were, after all, men of the world, not
of the Academy; with the exception of Boswell (and, to an
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extent, Mrs Thrale) they lacked the leisure and/or the
incentive to make Johnson a focus of absorbing interest,
still less a focus of intensive study. Nor did they feel
impelled to view him 'in the round', or to frame totalizing
hypotheses about the quality and workings of his psyche.
The testimonies they have left us (which provision the
seven categories presented above) make it clear that what
impressed them about his mind were precisely those 'high-
visibility' , 'high-impact' attributes that impress easily
and immediately. These were the attributes they placed on
record, usually impressionistically and almost always
discretely. The surface was glittering enough for them;
they were not tempted to dig beneath it for buried
treasure. A further point to bear in mind is that a
writer-researcher in the professional, meaning, often, the
academic line has ready access in our day to immense
resources of information, easily tracked down in
efficiently-run libraries; this is an advantage which can
make all the difference when it comes to the essential task
of fleshing out the 'larger picture' (in whatever field of
study), a task whose successful outcome may crucially
depend upon having access to posssibly rare materials which
are only to be found in the major libraries. And in this
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context one needs to call attention to the enormous
difference that has been made to the fleshing-out of the
larger Johnsonian picture by the serendipitous discovery
of the Boswell Papers (now in the library of Yale
University) at Malahide Castle and Fettercairn House in the
earlier decades of the century. This stroke of good
fortune has been productive of a host of new insights into
Johnson, Boswell and the milieu as a whole. Some of the
most interesting of these arise from the discrepancies that
come into view when those of the Papers which stand behind
the Life are placed alongside the published work. The last
point I want to make is this: the leading twentieth-century
contributors to the analysis of Johnson's psychical
constitution - here I have in mind his four major
twentieth-century biographers: Joseph Wood Krutch (1948),
James L Clifford (vol. 1 1955; vol. 2 1979), John Wain
(1974), and Walter Jackson Bate (1975) - have all written
their studies in the shadow of the greatest of all
biographies in English, Boswell's Life. This has placed
them under exceptional pressure, to which they would not
have been have been exposed had their productions been in
competition with a performance less overwhelming than
Boswell's. After the Life, can there be anything
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worthwhile left to say about Johnson? This is a dilemma
to which Bate, in particular, could not but have been
especially sensitive as five years before publishing his
biography of Johnson he wrote an entire book about it, The
Burden of the Past and the English Poet, whose burden is,
precisely, "the intimidating pressures, on the practising
writer, of great models of the past" (56), leading to a
"loss of self-confidence" (ibid. 7)22. Now, when "in the
past so much [has] already been done so well that it
seem[s] impossible to compete in the same way" (ibid. 80),
there obviously exists a strong motive to compete in a
somewhat different way. In the case of the four
biographers referred to above, there is room for the
conjecture that this motive would have been registered
pragmatically as a push to look for, and thereafter to
22 Two hundred years before Bate, in Rambler 86, Johnson comments on 
the same dilemma:
One of the ancients has observed that the burthen of 
government is encreased upon princes by the virtues of
It is, indeed, always 
state of unavoidable 
He that succeeds a
their immediate predecessors. 
dangerous to be placed in 
comparison with excellence., 
celebrated writer, has the same difficulties to encounter;
he stands under the shade of exalted merit, and is 
hindered from rising to his natural height, by the 
interception of those beams which should invigorate and 
quicken him. (IV 87)
Consider also this statement by Krutch in the Foreword to his 
biography: "But the... tremendous reputation of Boswell's Life has 
tended to discourage any attempt in recent times to produce a large 
inclusive book which would serve to give the general reader a running 
account of Johnson's life, character, and work as they appear in the 
light of contemporary knowledge and contemporary judgment" (vii).
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underscore, aspects of the Johnsonian story and psyche
disregarded, or pehaps shunned, or else only glanced at by
Boswell (Johnson's fear of insanity would be an obvious
example) . I am far from wishing to argue that this felt
pressure can account on its own for the new insights,
'angles' and connections which come to the fore with
particular frequency in the works of this quartet of
authors. After all, thanks to the 'larger picture'
vouchsafed the twentieth century, new ideas about Johnson
were already in circulation - there for the taking if
anybody wanted to make use of them; and the four
biographers in question would certainly have been aware
that to do so could only enrich their analyses of Johnson's
psyche. So here was incentive enough already for making
sure that they gained entry into their books. What I am
suggesting, however, is that the four biographers'
consciousness of being in competition with Boswell, and
hence of being under the necessity of giving their
performances a distinct identity that would sharply
differentiate them from his (otherwise what reason would
anybody have for reading their books in preference, or in
addition, to Boswell's?) functioned supplementarily to
strengthen the already existing incentive to find new
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things to say about Johnson. This point, and the three 
which precede it, together provide an explanation, it seems
to me, for the rich harvest, in twentieth-century analyses
of Johnson's mind, of new insights, angles and connections
of the kind documented above.
But the kind documented above tell only half the
story, if that. Why so? Because the main impetus, by a
long way, for new insights into, and angles on, Johnson's
mind and temperament has been the immense body of
psychological and psychoanalytical theorizing whose
unintermitted augmentation since the eighteen-eighties or
thereabouts has been one of the truly striking features of
twentieth-century culture. I wonder whether, in the
absence of this phenomenon, very much would have been
written in our century about Johnson's mental character.
And getting back to the four biographers mentioned above,
in whose books the psychological 'angle' is prominent (in
Bate's very prominent), I wonder whether, if they had not
had this 'angle' at their disposal, they would have thought
it worth their while to write a major work on Johnson at
all, given the intimidating presence of Boswell's Life.
Would there have been enough new and different things to
say about him to justify so laborious an enterprise? In
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that sense, didn't the twentieth-century explosion in
psychological theorizing come providentially to their
rescue23? These are questions that bear asking, though it
is of course impossible for me to know the answers to them.
Anyway, to return to the thread of the argument: the point
I want to enforce is that the really substantial and
interesting (if also, on occasion, far-fetched)
interpretations of Johnson's mind and temperament that have
been ventured in our century, have been ventured within the
23 In my survey of views of Johnson's mind over a period of 250 years, 
I have come across only three statements of an unmistakably 
psychologizing cast that belong to the pre-twentieth-century segment 
of the continuum (that is, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
taken together). These are they:
No one had however higher notions of the hard task of true 
Christianity than Johnson, whose daily terror lest he had 
not done enough, originated in piety, but ended in little 
less than disease. Reasonable with regard to others, he 
had formed vain hopes of performing impossibilities 
himself; and finding his good works ever below his desires 
and intent, filled his imagination with fears that he 
should never obtain forgiveness for omissions of duty and 
criminal waste of time. (1786: Mrs Thrale in Sherbo 97)
His mind, at this time strained and overlaboured by 
constant exertion, called for an interval of repose and 
indolence. But indolence was the time of danger: it was 
then that his spirits, not employed abroad, turned with 
inward hostility against himself. His reflections on his 
own life and conduct were always severe; and, wishing to 
be immaculate, he destroyed his own peace by unnecessary 
scruples. (1792: Arthur Murphy in Hill I 408-09)
From the refinements of abstruse speculation he was 
withheld...by a secret dread that they might disturb those 
prejudices in which his mind had found repose from the 
agitations of doubt. (1811: James Mackintosh in Boulton 
349)
The perceptions contained in these statements are all, in one 
way or another, taken up, and refined upon, by Johnson's 
psychologizing commentators.
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context of psychological and psychoanalytical researches,
theories and findings. It is to a consideration of those
interpretations as developed within that context that I now
turn; and with this analysis I shall bring the chapter to
a close.
The first point to be made is that for critics of a
psychologizing or psychoanalysing disposition Johnson's
mental and emotional character beckons irresistibly as a
kind of Treasure Island or, if one prefers superterranean
riches, as "the fair Hesperian Tree/ Laden with blooming
gold" (Milton, Comus). His "vile melancholy" (Life 27),
two prolonged episodes of psychological breakdown (or near
breakdown), compulsive tics and gestures, hypertrophied
sense of guilt, fear of insanity, dread of death and
solitariness, alternation between spells of indolence and
bursts of feverish activity; his mixture of tenderness and
asperity, his mental rigidities in some areas contrasted
with extraordinary elasticity and openness of mind in
others, come together to produce a psychological profile
whose pathological and aberrant features hold out great
promise, for critics of a psychologizing tendency, of much
happy digging and much diagnostic fun. And dig and
diagnose they certainly do, with notable energy and
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confidence. Their attitude has little in common with the
kind of reticence, stemming perhaps from a finely tuned
feel for eighteenth-century proprieties, which Sir Joshua
Reynolds exhibits in his reply to a correspondent who had
sought information about the 'set' of Johnson's mind: "An
attempt to go deeper [than the surface] , and investigate
the peculiar colouring of his mind as distinguished from
all other minds, nothing but your earnest desire can
excuse" (in Hill II 220) . Well, there is very little of
Sir Joshua's reticence to be found in the writings of the
psychologizing critics of the twentieth century. Confident
that the psychological theories and discoveries of the last
hundred years or so have placed in their possession the key
that will unlock the mysteries of Johnson's psyche, they
stride boldly and energetically forward. Scruple or doubt
are seldom allowed to impede their onward progress24.
A survey of the psychologizing interpretations of
Johnson's mind shows that while a variety of theoretical
24 In a display of diffidence not at all characteristic of the general 
attitude adopted by Johnson's psychologizing critics, Margaret Lane 
declares: "As to Johnson's... psychological peculiarities, it must be 
said at once that it is fairly useless to speculate about them, since 
we have to admit in the end that we cannot know" (22) . [emphasis in 
original]
My purpose, though, in citing Lane's statement is to make the 
point that her diffidence is but short-lived, despite her insistence 
that 'we cannot know'; before long there she is with the best of them, 
putting in her pennyworths of psychological speculation (v. pp. 48, 
49, 56, 143, 200, 201).
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models have been appealed to, none has been appealed to
more often to serve as an interpretative frame than the
Freudian - sometimes with happy results, sometimes with
less than happy ones. With regard to the variety of
theories available to Johnson's psychologizing commentators
to choose from, James L Clifford writes as follows:
Freudians, when they sift the evidence, find an
Oedipus complex, with an unhealthy attachment
for his mother and an unconscious hatred of his
father. One recent writer has hazarded the
guess that because of his mother's early
treatment of him, Sam consciously or
unconsciously "rejected her whom he most wished
to love" and as a result developed a "torturing
sense of guilt and sin". Identifying himself
with his father, he fell heir to his father's
own fear of madness. Others have suggested an
inferiority complex which had its origin in his
physical and social handicaps. Still others
find in him an unresolved conflict between an
uncompromising rationalism and his strong
emotional drives. Each describes the disorder
according to the terminology of his own school
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of thought. (1955:24)
Whatever the theoretical model they choose, when it
comes to their handling of it Johnson's psychologizing
commentators fall into two camps: the 'imposers' and the
'adaptors', if I may so designate them. The 'imposers' are
those who do to Johnson what Hazlitt alleged he did to
Shakespeare: they make a Procrustean bed of their favoured
theoretical paradigm, forcing the data to fit its
dimensions rather than the other way around. The reason
they do this would seem to be that, having spotted a
promising Johnsonian tidbit to which to attach (meaning,
upon which to foist) a pet theory, they go charging ahead
and do just that, regardless of the injury offered to good
sense or to the facts themselves. The upshot is, of
course, a procession of forced and distorted
interpretations. What undoubtedly increases the momentum
of the imposers' descent into interpretative disarray is
the fact, first, that the vehicle (in the shape of the pet
theory) which they think they're driving is in reality
driving them and, second, that it has no brakes - 'brakes'
meaning an acquaintance with more (a good deal more) of the
Johnsonian oeuvre than just that small patch in which the
'juicy morsel' was lighted on; and an acquaintance also
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with some basic biographical information about Johnson. 
Still, for all their misdoings, the imposers appear to 
stand accused rather of error, resulting from theory-
fixation married to ignorance, than of wilful
misrepresentation; as against that, however, it needs to
be remembered that they could have avoided error had they
wanted to, but seem to have had no great desire to do so.
Consequently, have we to do here with willed error? If so,
the imposers are a deal worse off as the dividing line
between willed error and wilful misrepresentation is not
that broad.
The 'adaptors', in contrast to the 'imposers',
invariably set off from a position of knowledge - often
very extensive - of the oeuvre, the milieu and the
Johnsonian psyche. They know enough to know whether or not
a given psychological model is compatible with 'the facts
of the case'; and if it is they adapt it to those 'facts'
(rather than foisting it upon them). So in this case the
favoured theory functions not as a rigid tyrant condemning
the data to a Procrustean fate, but rather as an aid to
interpretation receiving guidance from what the 'facts of
the case' already suggest. It is the readings of Johnson's
psyche which have come about in this way that so impress -
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for their ability to shed light on what previously was
obscure, to spot the importance of what previously seemed
insignificant, and to find pattern and meaning in what
previously looked amorphous. In making this judgment I
have in mind chiefly Bate's illuminating Freudian reading
of Johnson's psychology, but I think Wain's and Clifford's
studies possess comparable virtues, if on a smaller scale.
I don't want to devote much space to the productions
of the imposers; however, for reasons of completeness some
kind of report on their interpretative capers is called
for. Of these Bate offers an amusing digest:
Among recent psychiatric interpretations [Bate
is writing in the early fifties] , the most
convincing is a fragmentary discussion, based on
Carl Jung, which suggests that Johnson's
personal distress can be construed as an
unresolved conflict between an exacting
rationalism and strong emotional drives of a
general sort. Less satisfying is an
interpretation - based largely on the facts that
Johnson drank a lot of tea and sometimes bit his
nails - that deciphers his whole character in
terms of oral eroticism, but without much hint
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how we then distinguish Johnson from innumerable
other mammals. Nor need we take seriously the
belief that Johnson's chronic melancholy was a
result of being sexually impotent because so
much of his libido had been directed toward
intellectual achievement. The principal
evidence used here is Johnson's casual,
pessimistic remark, "I never wished to have a
child". It is construed as an unconscious
rationalization of "I never could have a child".
...Too often, by invoking the quick answer of
sex, we show ourselves children of the later
nineteenth or early twentieth century.
(1955:148)
Hinted at in this statment is the point that some of
the most egregious of the imposers' excesses date from the
twenties, thirties and forties, those decades of particular
ferment and stir in psychological and psychiatric circles
following the irruption into the English-speaking world of
Freud's theories, either through translation of his works
or in more popularized form. The interpretation,
summarized above, which 'deciphers [Johnson's] whole
character in terms of oral eroticism' is a good example of
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how Freudian (or Freud-inspired) theories developed in the
twenties can all too easily become a high road to absurdity
when adopted overhastily and in the absence of a sufficient
(or any) acquaintance with the 'larger Johnsonian picture'.
However, the triumph of psychologizing enthusiasm over good
sense is by no means confined to the first half of the
century. Take, for example, this reading, dating from
1971, which postulates that "Johnson's fears were the most
puissant of the offspring of his repressed mother-hate, and
he needed them to assuage the guilt he felt for hating his
mother" (in Lane 22). The verdict Lane renders on this
interpretation is forthright enough: "great nonsense" she
calls it (idem), and in my opinion she's quite right. I
shall conclude this review of the imposers' trespasses by
bringing forward a more extended example. Richard B Hovey
sets the alarm-bells ringing in the very first paragraph
of his article "Dr. Samuel Johnson, Psychiatrist" when, in
discussing Rasselas. he proposes these arbitrary 
identifications: "For just as Rasselas represents the
seeking Johnson, and as Imlac, the guide and philosopher,
represents him in an ethical sense, so the [mad] astronomer
represents Johnson as a suffering neurotic" (321). But
things start going really wrong when Hovey shifts the focus
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of attention from the tale to the state of its author's
mind at the time he wrote it. For what he does at this
point is to foist upon the facts a despotic theoretical 
model which forces them into its mould and into compliance
with its bearings. In this way he manages to produce an
interpretation wrenched enough to serve as a kind of
paradigm-case of the vice:
The circumstances of the composition of Rasselas
are much to the point here. Writing the book
immediately after the death of his mother (whom
he had not visited for twenty years), Johnson
must have been nearly shattered by grief and a
sense of guilt. The loss of a loved one means,
of course, the breaking of a bond of love. Such
a bond, according to Menninger, has hidden
within it a core of hostility. So, when the
love object was suddenly removed, the bond,
instead of being gradually absorbed and
redirected as in the normal person, snapped back
upon the melancholy Johnson's self and in so
doing broke into its two component parts of love
and hate. In the self-directed hatred which
Johnson probably felt after his mother's death,
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his own conscience doubtless troubled him like
that of his astronomer. And the astronomer's
delusions became, as it were, a transcript of
the dread fantasies poor Johnson was himself
wrestling with at this critical time. Clearly,
both Johnson and his astronomer were troubled in
their erotic lives. Although Johnson does not
explicitly point a connection between the
astronomer's celibacy and his delusion, he has
this character complain, "I have missed the
endearing elegance of female friendship, and the
happy commerce of domestic tenderness". (324)
When we come to consider the performances of the
'adaptors', we find a quite different picture. For a
start, the psychological model appealed to is an aid, not
a Procrustean tyrant. Consequently, in the adaptors'
productions it does not bulk as large in its own right as
it does in, say, Hovey's. It is there, to be sure, but
operating in the background, guiding the interpretation,
not tyrannizing over it. I suspect, however, that the main
reason why the adaptors' performances strike one (me,
anyway) as persuasive and illuminating is that the
psychologizing strand is throughout interwoven with real
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knowledge and understanding of the larger Johnsonian 
picture, a picture it both enriches and is held in check
by. But these claims are better served by the force of
examples which bear them out than by the weight of further
exposition. So to those I now turn. The source of the
first is John Wain's fine biography of Johnson:
In Johnson's case, once he had made up his mind,
at nineteen or twenty, that Christianity was
true, the warring elements in his own mind
proceeded at once to their action stations.
Christianity provided fuel both for the
constructive and the destructive forces in him.
On the constructive side, it directed and
energized his innate benevolence and generosity.
The sheer number of people whom Johnson helped
is astonishing, only less so than the
unbelievable amount of trouble he would take on
their behalf. His capacity for sympathy,
provided the sufferer was really distressed and
not acting a pantomime, was endless.
Destructively, his Christianity helped to bring
out, and to make more vehement, his tendency to
irrational guilt and self-accusation. [Here Wain
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is echoing Mrs Thrale's perception, cited above
in a footnote] The child of ageing parents,
constantly brought out to show his paces, he had
lived out his infancy with a never-ending sense
of being on trial. He had a deep need to give
and receive love, but neither of his parents had
any means of expressing affection; his mother's
way of showing her love for him was to nag him
as she nagged his father, and this had bred in
him a sense of inadequacy, of a continual
failure to come up to the required standard, so
that with one deeply embedded part of his mind
he felt that his existence was one long
betrayal.
Given this pattern, it is understandable
that the features of Christianity on which
Johnson's mind laid its strongest hold were
minatory. He saw God not as a loving father but
as a judge, who had the absolute right to
consign him to an eternity of torment.
Furthermore, being a Protestant, he had no
prescribed set of rules for getting past this
judge. Roman Catholicism provides the believer
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with a guaranteed rule of thumb for getting to
Heaven. The Protestant has to plot his
individual course. It was here that Johnson's
sense of his own intellectual and spiritual
power was a torture to him. For, if much had
been given to him, correspondingly much would be
asked. The parable of the steward who let his
talent lie unused in a napkin was terrible to
him. A standard of behaviour, of piety, of
devotion, that would get most people clear of
the gates of Hell might not be enough for Samuel
Johnson. In childhood, he went to his mother
for love and acceptance, and was met, all too
often, with anxious reproaches; and by the time
he came to accept God as his super-parent the
pattern was fixed. (54-55)
Wain refers in the cited passage to Johnson's
'tendency to irrational guilt'; this is a tendency remarked
by just about all of his psychologizing commentators,
imposers and adaptors alike. But the adaptors, because of
their greater 'all-around' understanding of his mind and
temperament, invariably perceive his feelings of guilt as
operating in inter-relationship with other destructive
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psychical forces; of particular interest in this regard are
the interpretations which portray his guilt-feelings as
both nourishing and feeding off other failings and failures
(which Johnson, on account of the over-exacting standards
he set for himself, was ever prompt to view rather as
derelictions and self-betrayals). These are
interpretations, in other words, which situate his guilt-
feelings within the context of the 'vicious-circle'
paradigm - a context the imposers have little or no access
to: not surprisingly, considering how tenuous is their
grasp of the larger Johnsonian picture. In the two items
which follow, Johnson's guilt-feelings are interpreted
within the framework of 'vicious-circle' theory:
[Johnson's] pervasive sense of guilt grew still
more as a side-result of his own conviction that
the responsibility of an aware and moral being
is to 'put to use' his awareness and moral
sense. It was therefore strongest after the
comparative failure, in his own eyes, of the
most strenuous period of his life, when he had
tried to clarify motives and ideals as fully as
possible and seemed unable to abide by them.
Worst of all, there is now the dread that
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to lose the sense of guilt... might remove an 
incentive necessary to spur one into activity or
'reform'. [Having once got started, a] vicious
circle creates its own by-products. These, in
turn, simply provide further hurdles, which, if
not overcome, harass and complicate the feeling
of inadequacy even more. (Bate (1955) 153-54)
Everywhere through the records of Johnson's
early years runs the theme of procrastination.
The hardest thing he ever had to do was to force
himself to get down to work. . . .One way his
sluggishness showed itself, he thought, was in
his inability to get up at a reasonable hour in
the morning. His later prayers are filled with
resolutions for early rising and with shamefaced
admissions of failure. ...Yet the more he
resolved, the more fixed the difficulty became.
...Every time he reproached himself for what he
thought was a moral weakness, he nourished a
sense of guilt. Yet this same sense of guilt
was at least partly responsible for his
condition. Thus there was a never-ending circle
of tormenting cause and effect. (Clifford
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(1955) 58-59)
The next example, while also a 'vicious-circle'
reading, bears not upon guilt-feelings but upon Johnson's
fear of going mad, one of the most hideous, as well as
disabling spectres by which his mind was haunted:
Because of his initial fear of mental
disintegration, he clung fiercely to the two
strongest things he knew - reason, and obedience
to God. He did not dare let go of either. But
the difficulty of reconciling them brought on
fresh agonies and tensions; his very fear of
madness drove him into a position where madness
often seemed inevitable. (Wain 157)
As the Romantic offensive against Johnson reached its
climax in the two broadsides unleashed by Hazlitt, so the
psychologizing 'strain' in twentieth-century
interpretations of his mental character comes to a
culminating point in Walter Jackson Bate's avowedly
Freudian readings which are comprehensively developed in
the admirable biography of 1975, but are already in
evidence in his earlier work of 1955, The Achievement of
Samuel Johnson.
Bate's Freudian reading of Johnson's psyche takes the
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form, basically, of a three-pronged analysis. What I
propose to do is first offer a summary of each of these
inter-related lines of investigation and then leave it to
Bate to speak in his own voice.
The -first 'prong7 of Bate's analysis develops the
hypothesis that Johnson's mental and emotional conflicts
were the enactment (as well as the outcome) of a collision
between the impossible demands made on him by a hyperactive
and hypercritical superego and his inner resistance to
them, a resistance manifested symptomatically in his
abnormally prolonged spells of lethargy (among other
aberrations). It bears mentioning that when Mrs Thrale in
her Anecdotes speaks of Johnson's feeling under pressure
to "perform impossibilities" (in Sherbo 97), she is
offering an insight that anticipates, in rudimentary
fashion, Bate's sophisticated account of Johnson's
persecution by his superego.
In the second 'prong' of his tripartite probe Bate
argues that Johnson's insistence upon taking responsibility
for himself and his disdain of 'whining' prevented him from
projecting outwards the aggressions and frustrations
attendant upon his inner conflicts; finding no outlet, they
were accordingly directed inwards, against himself; this
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self-aggression served only to intensify his distress of 
mind and spirit. Already in 1792 Arthur Murphy (as Bate
acknowledges) had glimpsed this destructive process of
inward-directed aggression: "...But indolence was the time
of danger: it was then that his spirits, not employed
abroad, turned with inward hostility against himself" (in
Hill I 409).
Finally, with respect to Johnson's compulsive tics and
gestures, Bate advances the hypothesis that they were the
manifestation of a drive to gain relief from psychological
distress by "divid[ing] up" his 'sea of troubles' and so
reducing them to "manageable units" (1975:382).
Now it's time for Bate to speak in his own voice -
though not quite as he does in the biography; for in an
endeavour to give a coherent overview of his position, I
have, in the citations below, stitched together bits and
pieces from different parts of the book. The first of
these composite citations spotlights the first 'prong' of
his analysis:
[T]he cruelest of psychological burdens that he
was to face throughout his life...was the fierce
and exacting sense of self-demand - for which
Freud gave the now-common term "superego" - with
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its remorseles capacity, in some natures, to
punish the self through a crippling sense of
guilt and. through the resulting anxieties,
paralysis, and psychosomatic illness that guilt,
grown habitual and strongly enough felt, begins
to sprout. "The great business of his life",
Johnson told Reynolds, "was to escape from
himself; this disposition he considered as the
disease of his mind" [Bate's emphasis]. The
part of himself from which he needed to escape
was the remorseless pressure of "superego"
demand, of constant self-criticism, and all the
unconscious ruses of insistent self-punishment.
...[His] extraordinary, almost pathological
"indolence"... [m] ore accurately described...was
a powerful inner resistance, even protest,
against the unceasing pressure of strong self­
demand. This at least was its primary element,
before it became complicated by the further
self-conflicts it engendered. (1975:121;34)
The second 'prong' of Bate's reading is developed in
these terms:
[O]ne of the most striking things about
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Johnson's whole psychic nature is the severe
rein he kept on any temptation... to project
outward and to blame external conditions.
Instead his whole procedure... was to meet a
thing head on...and then internalize and contain
it. ...However strong the suppressed anger
against life being what it is - "a state in
which much is to be endured, and little to be
enjoyed" - he would not "whine". Nor would he
blame or project on others, or on society, or
even, beyond a point, on the universe generally
lest it become a charge against God Himself.
. . .With the iron check that he kept on envy -
his scorn of either blaming the system of life
or of resenting the good fortune of others - and
with his tendency to accept self-responsibility,
there was nowhere else for his aggressions to
turn except against himself. ...With the
aggressive hostility turned against
himself... [t]he result...was time and again a
pattern of self self-conflict [and so]...it was
perhaps inevitable that he... developed acute
psychosomatic ills to such a degree that he was
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never entirely to overcome them.
(1975:73;124;376)
Of the third 'prong7 Bate gives the following account:
[The] tics and convulsive movements - often
extreme - were certainly of psycho-neurotic
origin and not, as has sometimes been assumed,
of organic origin. ...[T]he compulsion neurosis
behind them showed a powerful unconscious need
to release nervous tension through order,
pattern, or rhythm and keep it from overwhelming
the psyche - a need to "divide up" the welter of
subjective feeling and reduce [it] to manageable
units, which we also see in his constant resort
to arithmetic and counting. Examples would be
his touching the posts as he passed, and going
back if he missed one; adjusting his steps so
that his foot would touch a threshold at a
particular moment; blowing out his breath loudly
like a whale when he finished a lengthy remark
or a dispute, as if to punctuate it and give it
finality; treading the floor as if measuring it
and also testing its firmness or stability; or
making patterns with his heels and toes..."as if
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. endeavouring to form a triangle or some
geometrical figure". (1975:125;382)
In offering this account of Johnson's oddities, Bate
is the first critic, so far as I am aware, to actually make
sense of them. Almost all of the earlier commentators
remarked his compulsive behaviour, but without trying, or
being able, to make sense of it. Bate, however, armed with
an unrivalled grasp of the larger Johnsonian picture, and
bringing to bear upon the data a hypothesis of impressive
explanatory power, succeeds not only in making sense of
(that is, providing a plausible explanation for) Johnson's
compulsive tics and gestures, but also in showing that they
are all linked up to one another in a coherent pattern; are
all manifestations of a unitary underlying impulse to
"order subjective experience, to divide it up, round it
off", and so make it "manageable" (1975:383) - and that is
to make better sense of them still.
Bringing Johnson's 'oddities' under scrutiny some two
hundred years before Bate, Miss Reynolds (Sir Joshua's
sister) confesses in her "Recollections of Dr. Johnson"
that she is unequal to the task of accounting for them:
"What could have induced him to practise such extraordinary
gestures who can divine!", she exclaims (in Hill II 274).
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Well, the hypothesis Bate advances perhaps returns an
answer to that exclamation. He, perhaps, has indeed
divined the cause.
★ * *
Boswell in the Life records this exchange between
Goldsmith and Johnson:
Dr. Goldsmith said...that he wished for some
additional members to THE LITERARY CLUB, to give
it an agreeable variety; for (said he) there can
now be nothing new among us: we have travelled
over one another's minds. Johnson seemed a
little angry, and said, "Sir, you have not
travelled over my mind, I promise you". (1208)
[emphasis in original]
Can the constellation of opinions, judgments,
interpretations and hypotheses assembled in the pages of
this chapter be said to have 'travelled over' Johnson's
mind. I doubt it. A mind like his, so comprehensive,
complex and majestic, at once so richly assimilative and
so powerfully discriminative, is not to be 'travelled over'
- not completely, anyway; for such a mind will always
183
surpass any attempt to take its measure. While making no
claim, therefore, to have 'travelled over' Johnson's mind
in the foregoing pages, I would yet hope to have given some 
kind of shape and structure to two hundred and fifty years
of observation and insight bearing on the Johnsonian
psyche; and I would hope further that the structure or
'mind map' thus assembled can serve as a backdrop against
which to project my own hypothesis regarding the build and
workings of Johnson's mind; or, putting it another way,
that it can serve as a contextualizing frame into which my
hypothesis may be inserted and with reference to which it
may be evaluated. What I propose to do in the next chapter
is present the evidence which I trust will lend support and
credibility to that hypothesis.
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CHAPTER THREE
SAMUEL JOHNSON, INVETERATE DISTINCTION-MAKER
"The mixture of those things by speech, which by nature
are divided, is the mother of all error: to take away
therefore that error, which confusion breedeth,
distinction is requisite." Richard Hooker.
(Cited by Johnson in his Dictionary to
illustrate sense (7) of "distinction")
The kind of knowledge Dr Johnson valued had its roots
in human experience rather than in theory, which he viewed,
with mistrust, as "inactive speculation" (in Crane 400) .
"Human experience, which is constantly contradicting
theory, is the great test of truth", he declared (Life 320­
21) , a declaration which a few days later found concrete
expression in his celebrated 'refutation' of Bishop
Berkeley's idealistic philosophy:
After we [Johnson and Boswell] came out of the
church, we stood talking for some time together
of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to
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prove the non-existence of matter, and that
everything in the universe is merely ideal. I
observed, that though we are satisfied his
doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute
it. I never shall forget the alacrity with
which Johnson answered, striking his foot with
mighty force against a large stone, till he
rebounded from it, 'I refute it thus'1. (Life
333) [emphasis in original]
So when Boswell observes that "Johnson loved...to have
his wisdom actually operate on real life" (Life 691), there
is no reason to doubt his word.
1 Elsewhere Johnson gives verbal expression to the point which here is 
enforced by way of physical demonstration; Boswell records the 
following statement: "If a man should give me arguments that I do not 
see, though I could not answer them, should I believe that I do not 
see?" (Life 1319)
With regard to the stone-kicking episode itself, H W Liebert has 
made an insightful comment that (rightly, in my opinion) shifts the 
argument away from the narrow, and unproductive, issue of the level of 
Johnson's philosophical sophistication to the broader one of the act's 
more general import as a swipe at the self-gratifying pointlessness of 
metaphysical speculation , a perennial Johnsonian bete-noire (Sachs 
39). Liebert writes:
When Johnson kicked the stone he was not refuting 
Berkeley, in spite of what he said at the moment. He was 
rather attacking the fact which he always greeted with 
impatience: that in a world, in his own phrase, "bursting 
with sin and sorrow", men should wander in the endless 
labyrinths of metaphysics when they might be improving the 
lot of others in this world or their own in the next. As 
a philosophical answer to Berkeley, his gesture is 
meaningless; as an emphatic assertion of the imperative 
reality of a world in which men live and suffer, it is the 
essential statement of Johnson's doctrine. (in Greene 
(1965) 20)
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If Johnson was impatient of theory and theorizing in
life, the same held true for literature. Writing of
Addison he notes that contemporary opinion viewed him as
an 'unscientific' critic prone to "deciding by taste rather
than by principles" ("Addison", Lives II 145). These are
words that come not amiss when applied to Johnson himself;
and not a few twentieth-century commentators tend to view
him in much the same light as 'contemporary opinion' viewed
Addison. Among them is W R Keast:
Certainly no other English critic of equal
reputation has been known as little by his
systematic thought, as contrasted to his
particular judgments on books and writers. In
his critical writings systematic inquiry is
rarely met with and, when present, is introduced
sparingly into discussions prevailingly occupied
with concrete questions of evaluation. Unlike
many of his contemporaries - including several
whose theoretical work he admired - Johnson
composed no treatises... this reluctance to
engage in extended statements of theory reflects
Johnson's profound suspicion of abstract
speculation, a suspicion to which he gave
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repeated expression in his writings...2 (in
Crane 390-91)
Given this backdrop it should come as no surprise that
nowhere in his oeuvre (to my knowledge) does Johnson
formulate a systematic, self-conscious, comprehensive
statement on the subject of distinction-making.
Consequently, trying to arrive at some idea of his thinking
on the question becomes an exercise in piecemeal
reconstruction involving the bringing together of discrete
remarks drawn from a number of scattered sources. Stitched
together they may be able to offer something approaching
a coherent view of his outlook on distinction-making.
Reconstructing a perspective - Johnson's outlook on
distinction-making; contexts and connections
2 Keast is quick (and right) to point out that Johnson's not being a 
systematic literary theorist in no way implies that his engagement 
with literature was a casual, adventitious, catch-as-catch-can affair. 
On the contrary, says Keast, if Johnson "was not a systematic writer, 
[he] had at any rate a systematic mind: the kinds of critical problems 
with which he deals, the particular doctrines and judgments he puts 
forward, the stands he takes on the leading critical issues of his 
day, and the methods of argument he habitually employs can all be 
traced in his criticism, early and late, to a coherent view of 
literature and a coherent body of assumptions concerning both its 
practice and its evaluation. That Johnson distrusted theory there can 
be no question, but such distrust can become...in itself a theoretical 
commitment" (in Crane 391). The greater part of Keast's informative 
essay consists in an exposition of the 'coherent body of assumptions' 
underpinning Johnson's praxis as a literary critic.
Sharing Keast's general outlook is Robert Voitle, who comments: 
"Though Johnson is not at all systematic, his... thought is 
impressively consistent when seen wholly, and in the context of his 
times" (ix).
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At the heart of the distinction-making enterprise is
the act of discrimination, a word whose etymon is the Latin
noun discrimen meaning, literally, "that which separates
or divides". Hence "discrimination" is defined as "A
judgment of difference [my emphasis] between two or more
objects, each of which is discerned from the total context
of experience at the time" (in Baldwin I 284).
The phrase 'a judgment of difference' invites special
notice because it spotlights the role long assigned to
Judgment of descrying differences between things. The
office of discerning similitudes, by contrast, has usually
been assigned to Wit or to Fancy (interchangeable, in the
pre-Coleridgean era, with Imagination) . To this
paradigmatic apportionment of functions Hobbes, for one,
subscribes:
...in this succession of mens thoughts, there is
nothing to observe in the things they think on,
but either in what they be like one another, or
in what they be unlike. . .Those that observe
their similitudes...are sayd to have a Good Wit;
by which, in this occasion, is meant a Good
Fancy. But they that observe their differences,
and dissimilitudes; which is called
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Distinguishing. and Discerning, and Judging
between thing and thing...are said to have a
good Judgement. (Leviathan 33) [emphasis in
original]
Locke regards the operational spheres of Judgment and
Wit in much the way Hobbes does:
Wit 1 [ies] most in the assemblage of Ideas. and
putting those together with quickness and
variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or
congruity, thereby to make up pleasant Pictures,
and agreeable Visions in the Fancy: Judgment.
on the contrary, lies quite on the other side,
in separating carefully, one from another,
Ideas, wherein can be found the least
difference, thereby to avoid being misled by
Similitude, and by affinity to take one thing
for another. (An Essay concerning Human
Understanding 156) [emphasis in original]
In assigning the office of distinction-making to the
faculty of Judgment both Hobbes and Locke do no more really
than restate the received view, so when Johnson makes the
same linkage he too may be following the received view
rather than the lead of Hobbes and/or Locke. Whatever the
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case, .it is evident from a number of his critical
observations that he views Judgment as the 'active
ingredient' of the separating process that lies at the
heart of distinction-making, while assigning, again in
keeping with the received view, a combinative value to
Fancy. Consider the following examples:
When a number of distinct images are collected
by these erratick and hasty surveys [of the
mind], the fancy... combines them into pleasing
pictures... [However, under] the reign of
judgment...we begin to find little pleasure, but
in comparing arguments, stating propositions,
disentangling perplexities, clearing
ambiguities, and deducing consequences.
(Rambler 151, V 39-40)
He [Pope] had Judgement, which selects from life
or nature what the present purpose requires,
and, by separating the essence of things from
its concomitants, often makes the representation
more powerful than the reality. ("Pope", Lives
III 247)
Here [in Paradise Lost] is a full display of the
united force of study and genius; of a great
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accumulation of materials, with judgement to
digest and fancy to combine them. ("Milton",
hives I 183)
Johnson appears to view increasing proficiency in the
making of distinctions (which necessarily implies increased
finesse in the operations of Judgment) as an index not only
of a growth in intellectual sophistication at the
individual level but of civilizational progress as well.
As far as the individual is concerned, he notes in Idler
70 that "he that thinks with more subtilty will seek for
terms of more nice discrimination"3 (II 218) - a remark
that explains his enrolment of "accuracy of distinction"
among the "superiour faculties" (Rambler 77, IV 44). On
the civilizational level the noting of "the differences of
things" constitutes one of the marks of a society's passage
from the stage of mere "convenience" to that of "elegance"
(Idler 63, II 196, 197) . So here we see Johnson
contextualizing distinction-making both culturally and
historically within a broad, though impersonal, frame.
The next step, accordingly, is to turn the spotlight
on to his own distinction-making drive and ask whether
3 Cf. Life of Cowley: "It is with great propriety that subtlety, which 
in its original import means exility of particles, is taken in its 
metaphorical meaning for nicety of distinction" (Lives I 21).
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there are connections to be made that could enlarge our
understanding of it - as well as of what is linked up with
it. Well, I believe there are: Johnson's 'drive to
distinguish' is profitably viewed, it seems to me, in
relation to his permanent aspiration to the greatest
possible precision and clarity of expression and thought4;
the particular relationship in which it stands to this
aspiration is that of prerequisite condition for its
attainment. For insofar as clarity and precision are
contingent upon the separation of things essential from
things adventitious, upon the aptness and distinctness of
the terms being used5, upon argumentative rigour and, in a
4 Among the manifold excellences of Johnson's discourse, one of the 
most striking, for his hearers, interlocutors and readers alike, was 
its extraordinary accuracy and perspicuity. At a number of points in 
the Life. Boswell variously refers to Johnson's "most 
perspicuous... language" (181), to the "extraordinary...precision of 
his conversation" (284), to his "very remarkable... attention to 
precision and clearness in expression" (1212) , and to his "force and 
perspicuity" unequalled by "any English writer" (156). Of the same 
mind as Boswell, William Bowles, another of the Sage's friends, places 
on record the following reminiscence: "He was always most perfectly 
clear and perspicuous; and his language was so accurate, and his 
sentences so neatly constructed, that his conversation might have been 
all printed without any correction. At the same time, it was easy and 
natural; the accuracy of it had no appearance of labour, constraint, 
or stiffness" (ibid. 1246). Echoing Bowles's verdict, William Cooke, 
one of the tribe of Johnsonian biographers destined to be eclipsed by 
Boswell, writes: "He always expressed himself with clearness and 
precision, and seldom made use of an unnecessary word - each had its 
due weight, and stood in its proper place" (in Page 27). Against this 
backdrop the following judgment by W K Wimsatt strikes me as well- 
aimed: "In Johnson's prose the lexicographer joins the stylist in an 
accuracy both of understanding and of imagination" (1948:106-107).
5 An accusation often levelled at Johnson, in his own day and since, 
is that he had a discreditable weakness for 'big words' ; that is, 
learned, long, latinizing, out of the way words. The weakness was
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more general way, upon the dispersal of muddle and
confusion, they are plainly contingent upon acts of
discreditable, so the allegation went (and sometimes goes), because it 
was motivated by a wish to show off, by a proneness to pomposity and 
bombast, and by an urge to be overbearingly intimidating in his 
discourse, whether spoken or written. This is an allegation in two 
parts; the rejoinder likewise is in two parts, each of which 
challenges the factual basis, in each of its parts, of the allegation. 
In the first place, if Johnson's recourse to 'big words' is projected 
against the backdrop of his oeuvre as a whole, it will be seen to be 
nothing like as general as it is often (with the assistance of 
selective quotation) alleged to be. Indeed, writes Paul Fussell, 
"[i]n conversation as well as in writing and reading, one of his 
delights is the significant avoidance of the sesquipedelian" 
(1972:79). Second - and this is much more relevant to the point under 
consideration - while Johnson did perhaps on occasion brandish 'big 
words' to intimidate the opposition, there was no question of his 
using them to gratify a proneness to pomposity or bombast since to 
these failings he was not prone. What really, and over-ridingly, 
determined his recourse, from time to time, to learned, often 
philosophically complexioned, language was a sleepless drive (rather 
than just a desire) to satisfy the most exacting standards of 
precision, clarity and aptness (and elegance as well, wherever 
possible) in his use of the English tongue - in other words, to 
satisfy those desiderata referred to in the discussion above. These 
were for him desiderata of the highest importance and if, in order to 
satisfy them, it was necessary, from time to time, to enlist the help 
of a recondite word or a learned locution, that was a small price to 
pay when set against the prospective gains. That his recourse to 'big 
words' was connected with considerations of the kind urged here we 
have it on Johnson's own authority (which, given his inflexible 
attachment to the truth, must be regarded as above suspicion of taint 
by special pleading) : in the very last of his Ramblers. where he casts 
a retrospective and judgmental eye on his labours of the preceding two 
years, he tells us that "When common words were less pleasing to the 
ear, or less distinct in their signification, I have familiarized the 
terms of philosophy by applying them to popular ideas" (Rambler 208, 
V 319) . The reasons Johnson advances here for making use of 'the 
terms of philosophy' are seconded by the testimony of Mrs Thrale who 
in corroborating them also takes a swipe at the imputation of 
'pomposity' undeservedly though widely levelled against him: he was, 
she declares, "no pompous Converser, & though he was accused of using 
big Words, it was only when little ones would not express his meaning 
as clearly, or when the Elevation of the thought would have been 
disgraced by a Dress less superb" (in Page 79). It seems to me that 
Thomas Woodman strikes an appropriate balance in arguing that when 
Johnson made use of learned words, he did so "not only for the 
authority that they conf er [red] on him but also because they enable [d] 
precise distinctions to be made" (154) - thereby serving the interests 
of precision and clarity.
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discrimination (even while serving, perhaps, to 'fine-tune'
them at the same time) . Rogers speaks of Johnson's
"forensic zeal for precision" (76), but zeal on its own is
not enough to achieve precision, whereas distinction­
making, even in the absence of zeal, is very well able to.
Accordingly, when we come upon Johnson confiding to
Reynolds that he trained himself "by constant practice"
never to "suffer any careless expressions to escape him,
or...to deliver his thoughts without arranging them in the
clearest manner" (Life 145) , it seems to me, though he
nowhere refers to a distinction-making drive, that it was
just this drive, so intuitive as to escape his notice,
which made it possible in the first place for his regime
of training and practice to bear the fruit it did. Had
distinction-making been absent from the picture, would any
amount of practice and training have been enough to bring
precision and clarity within his reach?
It is worth probing a little deeper and asking why
precision and clarity were so important to Johnson.
Certainly he valued them as stylistic desiderata in their
own right - and also as they contributed to other leading
positives in his stylistic scheme of things, positives such
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as forcefulness, vividness and elegance6. I think he
valued them too because they performed an ethical function
by contributing towards "uncover[ing] the underlying 
principles governing moral life, and then... reassert[ing]
these in challenging and effective ways" (Rogers 29). For
a moralist as committed and exigent as Johnson was, it
would have been only natural to set a high value upon a
contribution of this sort. But in my opinion the main
reason he set so much store by clarity and precision was
that he viewed them in some sort as a counter to, more
exactly, perhaps, as a bulwark against, the unavoidable,
but for all that still unwelcome, instability and ambiguity
of language - and, in so far, as a kind of bridge to, as
well as an earnest of, determinate verbal meaning7. As a
6 Cf. Pat Rogers:
To speak broadly, [Johnson's] critical positives include 
freshness, truth to nature, vigour, clarity, energy, 
sharpness of focus, and wit. It is perhaps easier to 
start with defining by negatives. The attributes Johnson 
disliked...included triteness, staleness, affectation, 
over-ingenuity, and perverseness ... He opposes hereditary 
images, inert conventionalities of thought and diction, 
avoidance of the natural...He also has a particular 
objection to archaism...And nothing could compensate for 
a lack of interest; all literary virtues were useless 
without this. 'Tediousness', he observes in the life of 
Prior, 'is the most fatal of all faults...' (93-94)
7 As early as 1786, in his "Essay on the Stile of Doctor Samuel 
Johnson", the Reverend Robert Burrowes, treating of the merits of 
Johnson's prose, posits a link between his drive to determinateness in 
the use of language and his quest for clarity and precision. 
Johnson's words, writes Burrowes, "are forcible and harmonious; but, 
above all, they are determinate. Discriminated from each other, and 
appropriated each to one idea, they convey...the author's... genuine
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way of highlighting what was at stake for-Johnson, let me
turn the preceding statement around and say that for him
to have been unmindful of precision and clarity would have
amounted, in Martin Maner's words, to "surrender [ing] to
unmeaning" (142) . A surrender of this kind would be
unsettling enough for anybody, but for Johnson, having
regard to his preternaturally 'lexicographic' cast of
mind* 8, it would have been unsettling in the highest degree,
a nightmare to be avoided at all costs - or, rather, at the
relatively modest cost of making the distinctions requisite
to the attainment of precision and clarity.
The mention of Johnson's 'lexicographic' cast of mind
calls attention to the fact that the arena in which his
pursuit of determinate verbal meaning works itself out most
fully in a formal way is the Dictionary. The effort - in
sense, without superfluity and without mutilation. ...For thoughts the 
most definite, he has language the most precise; and though his 
meaning may sometimes be obscure, it can never be misunderstood..." 
(in Boulton 333).
8 What I here term the 'lexicographic' cast of Johnson's mind 
constitutes one indication among several that his pursuit of 
determinate verbal meaning formed part of a more general temperamental 
hankering after determinateness, certitude, unambiguity. Lending 
support to this hypothesis are:
- M H Abrams's reference to Johnson's "preference for poems 
which are perfectly unambiguous, to all people, at first sight" 
(in Hilles 178).
- the observation by Walter Jackson Bate, one of Johnson's 
recent, and best, biographers, that "his nature was such that he 
could never remain content with 'mystery'" (450).
- J D Fleeman's perception of "Johnson's personal and emotional 
desire for intellectual and religious certainty and stability" 
(in Wahba 113).
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reality a permanent struggle - to realize that objective
manifests itself, to be sure, in the oft-remarked
incisiveness and precision of his definitions9 (Bate
(1975) 250) , but in my view a yet more noteworthy
manifestation of his attempt to palliate an evil - the
ambiguity of language - that cannot be cured10 (DeMaria in
9 A term with which Johnson himself might have been less than happy - 
consider the following caveat entered by J McLaverty: "Johnson 
consistently avoids the term 'definition' for his dictionary entries, 
using the word 'explanation' (occasionally 'interpretation') instead". 
This proceeding, continues McLaverty, "is... deliberate: it signifies 
the adoption of Locke's theories of knowledge and language in 
preference to those others which exerted so strong an influence on 
Johnson's predecessors and contemporaries" (377).
McLaverty then proceeds to argue the case for Locke's influence 
on Johnson's Dictionary. following which he arrives at this 
conclusion:
[Johnson] agreed with Locke that few things or ideas could 
be adequately defined because human knowledge is too 
limited: simple ideas are irreducible, mixed modes too 
complex, substances essentially unknown. To claim, 
therefore, that real definition in a representative number 
of cases could be easily accomplished was 
mistaken...Similarly, to call explanations of names by 
synonyms, negation of the contrary, or location 
definitions was to misname them and make false claims to 
understanding. Hence the preference for the word 
explanation or interpretation in the Dictionary. (390) 
[emphasis in original]
While Johnson may in theory have agreed with Locke about the 
virtual impossibility of adequate definition (an acquiescence 
signalled by his avoidance of the term 'definition', as noted above by 
McLaverty), in practice that did not deter him from always striving 
for the highest degree of perspicuity and accuracy in everything he 
wrote or said. Consider in this connection the following 
pronouncement in the Life: "Some people... tell you that they let 
themselves down to the capacity of their hearers. I never do that. 
I speak uniformly, in as intelligible a manner as I can" (598).
10 That language, far from being a transparent medium, was inherently 
ambiguous and inexact, was an eighteenth-century philosophical theme 
(and philosophical plaint). Germane in this connection are Carey 
McIntosh's remarks:
Some writers questioned whether language was capable 
of genuine clarity. Three substantial chapters of book 3 
of the Essay concerning Human Understanding are devoted to
198
Korshin 165) is his endeavour, as a matter of lexicographic
policy, to discriminate, more systematically and more
fastidiously than ever before, the various senses of a
single signifier; and, as a parallel undertaking, to tease
out the fine differences between separate signifiers
commonly thought to be synonymous, or nearly so11.
To give effect to the objective of discriminating the
various senses of a particular word as systematically and
as fastidiously as possible, Johnson has recourse to the
method of "divided and classified definitions"11 2, as Sledd
the "Imperfections of Words," which by their "very nature" 
are often "doubtful and uncertain in their significations" 
(2:104) . Locke's warnings were echoed through the 
eighteenth century, not only by poets and novelists but 
also by some of the grammarians and philosophers who were 
most publicly committed to the value of precise thinking. 
(40)
11 In addition to this dual undertaking, he is also at pains to 
distinguish obsolete from current words, and polite usage from vulgar. 
So here is yet another distinction-making axis built into the design 
of the Dictionary - and it is one that particularly caught the eye, 
and earned the praise, of the noted German lexicographer, Johann 
Christoph Adelung who, writing in 1798, comments as follows:
It is well known, that all the words of a language do not 
possess an equal value or degree of currency: some of them 
are entirely obsolete... others are peculiar to poetical 
language; again, others are current only in certain 
provinces, or in particular situations of life; and still 
others are vulgar, and exploded from the more dignified 
written style, as well as from the polite circles of 
conversation. It is one of Johnson's great merits, that 
he has carefully attended to this distinction. (in 
Boulton 121)
12 While it is true, as Sledd and Kolb point out (43), that this method 
was not of Johnson's invention, it is as true that the use he makes of 
it as an instrument for partitioning and delimiting the shades of 
verbal meaning is sophisticated, sensitive and thorough-going in a 
way, and to a degree, that none of the English lexicographers who 
preceded him came near to equalling. So it seems to me that Kathleen
199
and Kolb term it (44). Under this method, which is built
into the design of the Dictionary, is carried out
consistently through the full extent of the work, and was
refined upon in successive editions (DeMaria 159), a
separate semantic domain is staked out for each of a word's
different senses. To each several sense is then subjoined
a full apparatus of illustrative citations (see the
exemplary insert on "Wit"). In effect this comes down to
treating each separate sense like a separate word. For
DeMaria Johnson's going to such "overexacting" lengths is
evidence of a hyper-fastidiousness that requires to be
explained, and he explains it by placing it in the context
(rightly, I think) of the lexicographer's indefatigable (or 
is it compulsive?) quest for determinate verbal meaning.
Thus, writes DeMaria, Johnson's semantic categorizations
are "more orderly, logical and distinct than the language
they record", and these "overexacting divisions of words 
into senses amount to a wish that each word become so many
distinct unambiguously referential words" (in Korshin 165,
166) . Of this wish, delusive or not, and of the method
adopted to give effect to it the outcome is an
Wales is not overvaluing Johnson's contribution when she claims that 
his lexicographic "work was the first which provided overall a 
comprehensive, and sensitive, treatment of semantic distinctions" 
(27) .
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i. The powers of the mind; the mental faculties; the intellects. 
This is the original signification.
Who would set his wit to so foolish a bird ?
Shakespeare
The king your father was reputed for
A prince most prudent, of an excellent
And unmatch’d wit and judgment. Shakespeare
Will puts in practice what the wit deviseth:
Will ever acts, and wit contemplates still:
And as from wit the power of wisdom riseth;
All other virtues daughters are of will.
Will is the prince, and wit the counsellor,
Which doth for common good in council sit;
And when wit is resolv’d, will lends her power,
To execute what is advis’d by wit. Davies
For wit and power, their last endeavours bend 
T’outshine each other. Dryden
2. Imagination; quickness of fancy.
They never meet but there’s a skirmish of wit between them. - 
Alas, in our last conflict four of his five wits went halting off, 
and now is the whole man govern’d by one. Shakespeare
Lewd, shallow, hair-brain’d huffs, make atheism and contempt 
of religion, the only badge and character of wit. South
And though a tun in thy large bulk be writ,
Yet thou art but a kilderkin of wit. Dryden
Wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those 
together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any 
resemblance, or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures 
in the fancy. Judgement on the contrary, lies in separating 
carefully one from another, ideas, wherein can be found the least 
difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude. Locke
Could any but a knowing prudent cause 
Beget such motions, and assign such laws ?
If the great mind had form’d a different frame,
Might not your wanton wit the system blame ?
Blackmore
3. Sentiments produced by quickness of fancy.
All sorts of men take a pleasure to gird at me. The brain of this 
foolish compounded clay, man, is not able to invent any thing that 
tends more to laughter, than what I invent, and is invented on me. 
I am not only witty in myself, but the cause that wit is in other 
men. Shakespeare
extraordinary sharpness of differentiation - and therefore
distinctness of individual outline - among the various
senses of a word. Under the method of 'divided and
classified definitions', as used by Johnson, the interests
of definiteness of signification, that is, determinateness
of verbal meaning, are about as well served as they can be
by means simply of the plan on which the linguistic items
are arranged, as distinct from the degree of accuracy with
which they are defined or (mindful of McLaverty) explained.
Given Johnson's tireless push in the Dictionary to
distinguish amongst the various senses of a single word
and, in parallel with that, his push (discussed immediately
below) to lay bare and 'nail down' the subtle shades of
difference between separate words mistakenly supposed to
be synonymous, it evidently follows that the Dictionary
brings into sharper focus than does anything else in his
oeuvre the capital role played by distinction-making in his
persistent quest for determinateness of signification13.
13 The essence of Johnson's position in this matter is compactly 
expressed by the novelist Evelyn Waugh in these terms: "Words have 
basic inalienable meanings, departure from which is either conscious 
metaphor or inexcusable vulgarity" (in Aitchison 39).
Johnson's quest for determinateness of signification was less an 
occupational phenomenon, it seems to me, than one rooted in the build 
and workings of his mind. What I mean to suggest by this statement is 
the following: that it was not so much a question of his craving 
determinateness of signification because he found himself a 
lexicographer as of his finding himself a lexicographer because he had 
the kind of mind that craved determinateness of signification. As I
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As I have just intimated, another 'high-profile' role
performed by distinction-making in the Dictionary is that
of pointing up the fine differences between signifiers
commonly thought to be synonymous and hence taken to be
interchangeable in usage. Johnson's opinion was that in
principle no language in the putatively 'pure' state of its
inchoation had, or needed to have, synonyms14. These were
aberrations spawned by a 'defilement' of the originary
purity; in other words, by sloppiness, confusion,
misapplication, poetic licence, and the like. The
following exchange in the Life brings Johnson's position
see it, the hints dropped by the following passage from the "Preface" 
to the Dictionary (a passage already cited, though less fully, at the 
end of Chapter 1) lend support to this hypothesis:
The nice and subtle ramifications of meaning were not 
easily avoided by a mind intent upon accuracy, and 
convinced of the necessity of disentangling combinations, 
and separating similitudes. Many of the distinctions 
which to common readers appear useless and idle, will be 
found real and important by men versed in the school 
philosophy, without which no dictionary shall ever be 
accurately compiled, or skilfully examined. {in Bronson 
253)
I may add, as a pendant to the above observations, that Johnson 
strikes me as a prime exemplar of logocentric Western Man (as Derrida 
constructs, and then deconstructs, him) in his pursuit of stable (if 
not eternally fixed) and determinate verbal meaning. But in this 
particular Johnson's outlook simply reflects that of his age, the Age 
of Enlightenment - as it also reflects (and must reflect) that of all 
dictionary-makers of all ages.
14 It is worth remarking, in this connection, that the effect of some 
recent trends in linguistic theory is to give backing to Johnson's 
contention that, in principle, there is no genuine synonymy in 
language. The trends referred to advance the hypothesis that while 
there may be 'equivalence of reference' between allegedly synonymous 
verbal collocations, there cannot be 'equivalence of meaning' (v. 
Coseriu in Ringbom 41).
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into focus:
WALKER: Do you think, Sir, that there are any
perfect synonimes in any language? JOHNSON:
Originally there were not; but by using words
negligently, or in poetry, one word comes to be
confounded with another. (1225)
Projected against this backdrop the brief Johnson
gives himself of teasing out the fine differences between
words wrongly taken to be synonymous15 can be seen for what
in fact it is - essentially a labour of recuperation. By
stripping away the accretions of misapplication and
confusion responsible for occulting original
significations, and thus also the differences between them,
he hopes to bring once-existing distinctions back into
view16, and in so doing both serve the interests of
15 The whole of Idler 100 is really an ironically melancholy gloss on 
the mischief which ensues from a failure to distinguish as one should 
between terms supposedly equivalent. The rueful last paragraph reads:
This, Mr Idler, I have found by long experience to be the 
character of a good sort of woman, which I have sent you 
for the information of those by whom "a good sort of 
woman" and "a good woman" may happen to be used as 
equivalent terms, and who may suffer by the mistake (II 
308)
16 This ambition was remarked as long ago as 1786 by the Reverend 
Robert Burrowes in his "Essay on the Stile of Doctor Samuel Johnson" 
(already adverted to in a previous footnote) which must still rank as 
one of the most incisive treatments of the subject. Burrowes writes:
Possessed of the most penetrating acuteness and resolute 
precision of thought, he delights to employ himself in 
discriminating what common inaccuracy had confounded, and 
of separating what the grossness of vulgar conception had 
united. (in Boulton 332)
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Johnson is however too much the realist to cherish the hope of 
recovering, or restoring, an uncorrupted, linguistically univocal age 
innocent of semantic confusion and uncertainty, an age in which "there 
would scarce be any mistake" because "one single word... express[ed] 
but one simple idea, and nothing else" (Isaac Watts in Korshin 165; 
Johnson uses Watts's remark to illustrate sense (2) of "single" in the 
Dictionary). In the "Preface" to this work he gives expression, in a 
ruefully undeceived way, to the recognition that the recovery of 
linguistic purity or the installation of a virtually lexicographic 
standard of fixity in language is a mere pipedream:
I am not yet so lost in lexicography, as to forget that 
words are the daughters of earth [and therefore subject to 
misuse, corruption, change], and that things are the sons 
of heaven. Language is only the instrument of science 
[i.e. scientia, knowledge], and words are but the signs of 
ideas: I wish, however, that the instrument might be less 
apt to decay, and that signs might be permanent, like the 
things which they denote. (in Bronson 238)
Despite this rational, clear-sighted perception that language, 
by reason simply of its being 'in the mouths of men', is fated to 
become irremediably 'contaminated', it appears nonetheless that 
Johnson's yearning for an originary purity died hard, for he does, in 
a sense, venture some way towards attempting its recovery; the sense 
in which he does this, as James Gray points out, is through a 
"tendency to restore words to their etymological meaning" (213) (v. 
also Hardy 118-19), a tendency whose ultimate source is doubtless a 
yearning for the perfectly denotative, flawlessly transparent language 
of Man's unfallen state in the Garden of Eden where, according to the 
myth, "one word conveyed the root meaning of one thing without the 
possibility of confusion", where the language Adam spoke was 
infallibly semiotic, "penetrat[ing] the surfaces of 
things ... and...mov[ing] directly,...like an arrow, to inner natures, 
illuminating them instantly and once and for all... [a] plenary 
instrument of communication...necessarily transparent... [and] not 
pestered, like our own partial instrument of speaking and writing, 
with ambiguity or distracting connotations" (Fraser ix).
Johnson's 'tendency to restore words to their etymological 
meaning' , as Gray phrases it, answers, in the Dictionary, to the 
established lexicographic principle of furnishing etymologies; 
upholding this principle, he accordingly declares, in the "Preface", 
that the "original sense of words...must be inserted for the sake of 
a regular origination." "Thus I know not", he continues, "whether 
ardour is used for material heat, or whether flagrant, in English, 
ever signifies the same with burning; yet such are the primitive ideas 
of these words, which are therefore set first, though without 
examples..." (in Bronson 247).
More interesting to observe, however, is the way in which 
Johnson's impulse to cleave to the "original and etymological sense" 
of words (Plan of a Dictionary of the English Language, in Wilson 132) 
manifests itself outside the formal lexicographic terrain of the 
Dictionary, showing through, for example, in the rap over the knuckles 
he administers to Boswell for his "impropriety" in befriending the 
phrase 'to make money': "Don't you see...the impropriety of it? To
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semantic determinateness and, at a more practical level,
provide a reliable guide to correct usage. As an example
of his practice, consider his handling of the word
"adhesion" (sense 1):
The act or state of sticking to something.
Adhesion is generally used in the natural, and
adherence in the metaphorical sense: as, the
adhesion of iron to the magnet; and adherence of
a client to his patron. (in Wimsatt (1948) 45)
As early as 1747, with the Dictionary barely beyond
the stage of inception, Johnson had already set himself the
objective of disentangling, and thereafter distinguishing
between, supposedly equivalent terms* 17. In his Plan for
the Dictionary, a prospectus addressed to the Earl of
make money is to coin it: you should say get money" (Life 872) 
[emphasis in original].
17 It is necessary to add, in the interests of presenting a balanced 
picture, that this objective is referable not just to his distinction­
making drive expressing itself as a zest for bringing to light 
differences between supposedly synonymous words, but also to 
eighteenth-century lexicographic trends, as compared to those that 
were normative during the Renaissance, and later. This is a point 
made by Sledd and Kolb: "...synonymies of the later eighteenth century 
were concerned to distinguish words which had been linked in 
dictionary definitions since the Renaissance; but the eighteenth 
century was a discriminating age, and when the time and the man came 
together, Johnson did the work which someone was destined to do" (44).
Given the position I am defending in this study, I cannot let 
Sledd and Kolb's statement pass without the following gloss: that it 
was not just any adventitious 'someone' but Johnson specifically who 
was 'destined', because of his distinction-making mindset (and, 
naturally, other qualifications as well), to do the work of showing up 
differences between supposedly synonymous terms.
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Chesterfield which dates from that year, this objective is
clearly spelled out:
The difference of signification in words
generally accounted synonimous, ought to be
carefully observed; as in pride, haughtiness.
arrogance; and the strict and critical meaning
ought to be distinguished from that which is
loose and popular; as in the word perfection,
which...is...so much degraded from its original
signification... (in Wilson 133-34)
What this statement amounts to is a programmatic
declaration of intent, and Johnson's self-consciously
methodical manner of carrying it into effect in the
Dictionary turns his objective of discriminating
differences between supposedly equivalent terms into a
high-visibility, full-dress project. But in the rest of
the oeuvre the same objective is no less present and no
less operative, only, since Johnson is under no comparable
necessity there of satisfying the requirements of a
preannounced agenda, it is carried into effect in an
unofficial, and consequently much less schematic, much less
obtrusive, manner, being expressed for the most part as a
silent, though pervasive, tendency to highlight differences
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rather than similarities between 'equivalent' or near­
equivalent terms. In the course of the ensuing study I
shall be bringing forward a whole category of examples
illustrative of this tendency (which in my view, to be
sure, represents just one more manifestation of Johnson's
imperative psychological 'drive to distinguish') whose
evidential weight will, I believe, serve to bear out
Kathleen Wales's seemingly paradoxical judgment (in which
I concur) that the function of 'synonymy' in Johnson's
oeuvre is, overall, "to show distinction rather than
similarity" (26).
I hope that in the foregoing reconstruction I have
managed to offer a plausible sketch of the nature and scope
of Johnson's outlook on distinction-making; and, more to
the point, that I have managed to suggest its importance
to him by showing how it ministers to, or intersects with,
some of his other pre-eminent concerns and assumptions.
I should like to think that distinction-making was
important to him for the reasons I have ventured, but in
this matter certain knowledge is not to be hoped for
because Johnson, being no systematic theoretician (as I
indicated at the beginning of this chapter), never spelled
them out. On the other hand, of his persuasion of the
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necessity and importance of distinction-making (as distinct
from his reasons for being so persuaded) there is no doubt.
In this matter he makes his position sufficiently clear on
a number of occasions, both in his conversation and in his
writings.
In bringing forward evidence to support this claim,
I have chosen as my examples passages that bear upon the
two paramount, most searchingly explored areas of concern
in Johnson's thinking and life-experience alike, the areas
of morality and literature- Some of the examples fall more
naturally into the domain of moral concerns, others more
naturally into the domain of literary ones, and in a couple
of instances the two domains overlap in a way that cogently
dramatizes Johnson's conviction of literature's
inseparableness from morality. The following three
passages appear to have a predominantly literary bearing,
though in the last a moral strand is woven into the
literary skein:
It is...the task of criticism to... distinguish
those means of pleasing which depend upon known
causes and rational deduction, from the nameless
and inexplicable elegancies which appeal wholly
to the fancy... (Rambler 92, IV 122)
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The care of the critic should be to distinguish
error from inability, faults of inexperience
from defects of nature. (Idler 25, II 79)
It ought to be the first endeavour of a writer
to distinguish nature from custom, or that which
is established because it is right, from that
which is right only because it is established.
(Rambler 156, V 70)
In the ensuing examples a chiefly moral context is
posited for distinction-making whose importance is enforced
by means of negative reference - that is, the obliteration
or confounding of necessary moral distinctions is viewed
as criminal:
There are, indeed, many among the poetical
flatterers...whom we must confess to have
deserted the cause of virtue for pay: they have
committed, against full conviction, the crime of
obliterating the distinctions between good and
evil... (Rambler 104, IV 194)
They who allow their passions to confound the
distinctions between right and wrong, are
criminal. (Life 749)
The final passage represents a particularly striking
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instance of the overlap and interpenetration of literary
and moral concerns:
It is justly considered as the greatest
excellency of art, to imitate nature; but it is
necessary to distinguish those parts of nature,
which are most proper for imitation: greater
care is still required in representing life,
which is so often discoloured by passion, or
deformed by wickedness. If the world be
promiscuously described, I cannot see of what
use it can be to read the account; or why it may
not be as safe to turn the eye immediately upon
mankind, as upon a mirror which shows all that
presents itself without discrimination. ...
Some have advanced...[the] notion that
certain virtues have their correspondent faults,
and therefore that to exhibit either apart is to
deviate from probability. ...
It is of the utmost importance to mankind,
that positions of this tendency should be laid
open and confuted; for while men consider good
and evil as springing from the same root, they
will spare the one for the sake of the other,
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and in judging, if not of others at least of
themselves, will be apt to estimate their
virtues by their vices. To this fatal error all
those will contribute, who confound the colours
of right and wrong, and instead of helping to
settle their boundaries, mix them with so much
art, that no common mind is able to disunite
them. (Rambler 4, III 22, 23, 24)
It is evident from the foregoing pronouncements that
Johnson could never be imagined as concurring in
Wordsworth's disparaging estimate of the distinction-making
faculty as nothing more than a "false secondary power" (The
Prelude II 221). In this imagined contrariety of
viewpoints with respect to the role and importance of
distinction-making lies not a little of the difference, it
seems to me, between Johnson and his age and Wordsworth and
his.
•k -k -k
"He was fond of discrimination". So said Sir Joshua
Reynolds of Johnson (Life 585). Though one of his closest
friends, Reynolds in this judgment strikes me as having
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somewhat missed the mark. For Johnson was not so much fond
of discrimination, it seems to me, as addicted to it - not
morbidly but compulsively. It is for this reason that the
title of this study alludes to his drive to distinguish,
a claim which I hope the weight of evidence presented in
the following pages will bear out.
Apropos of my contention that there is something
compulsive about Johnson's distinction-making, it bears
pointing out that one of the noteworthy aspects of the
critics' treatment of him is the regularity with which
features of his thought and conduct are viewed as
compulsive or instinctive. Lord Macaulay, writing in 1831,
spotlights his (superstitious?) compulsion to touch every
streetpost he passed (II 543), while among twentieth-
century critics W K Wimsatt notes a "mental... drive to
assimilate ideas" (1941, viii), J P Hardy speaks of an
"inner compulsion" to pursue hopes and desires despite a
recognition of the vanity of all human wishes (61), Paul
Fussell refers to his "instinct for genre and literary
conventions" (1972:80) and to his "instinctive
skepticism...of 'systems' and unambiguous positions"
(1972:171), and Walter Jackson Bate remarks his
"compulsive... drive to distil experience into the most
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condensed generalization possible... into a final maxim..."
(1955:22-23). Bate then is postulating the operation of 
a synthesizing, nucleating impulse in Johnson's mental
make-up; the way I see it, his 'drive to distinguish'
represents a kind of counterpoise to that: an equal,
opposing and yet complementary impulse, as much analytical
and bifurcating in its tendency as the other is combinative
and incorporative18.
18 To argue along these lines is to place Johnson in a Socratic 
context. I am thinking here of a passage in the Phaedrus where 
Socrates describes himself as "a lover of... divisions and collections" 
thanks to which he "gain[s] the power to speak and to think".
What are 'divisions' and 'collections'? The earlier part of the 
exchange tells us:
SOCRATES: [W] e... allude [d] to a certain pair of 
procedures, and it would be very agreeable if we could 
seize their significance in a scientific fashion. 
PHAEDRUS: What procedures do you mean? SOCRATES: The 
first is that in which we bring a dispersed plurality 
under a single form, seeing it all together...PHAEDRUS: 
And what is the second procedure you speak of, Socrates? 
SOCRATES: The reverse of the other, whereby we are enabled 
to divide into forms...and continue to make divisions... 
(132-34)
The first-mentioned procedure is the one Socrates labels 
'collection' (svnacroge. "a bringing together"; in Jowett's translation 
(4th edn., III 174) rendered as "generalization"), the other is 
'division' (diaeresis. partitio: "analysis", "logical division into 
parts"). Together these two procedures constitute the pillars upon 
which Socratic dialectic rests.
Now to project against this backdrop Johnson's complementary 
drives to synthesize and to separate is to bring immediately into view 
their resemblance to Socrates' 'collections' and 'divisions'. So 
there is certainly justification for situating him within a Socratic 
frame of reference, for seeing him in some wise as enrolled in a 
Socratic fraternity of 'lovers of divisions and collections'. In the 
present study it is of course exclusively Johnson's love of 
'divisions' that comes under investigation.
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Johnson, as a virtuoso of genre-awareness and genre-
discrimination
In seeking to track through Johnson's oeuvre the
visible spoor left by the analytical and bifurcating
impulse mentioned above, I want to begin by considering his
extraordinary sensitivity to, and feel for, genre and
genre-distinctions (or, to use Fussell's terminology, his
"instinct for genre") . After that I shall move on to
examine other manifestations of his distinction-making bent
as they are expressed in the areas of ethics, ideas,
verbal collocations, rhetorical figurations, philosophical
schemata, and more.
In speaking of Johnson's sensitivity to, and feel for,
genre, what I have in mind is his uncannily accurate and
secure sense of the distinctive characteristics and
conventions specific to an incredibly large number of
literary Kinds. Of this sense the necessary corollary is
an equally secure and finely-tuned feel for the differences
between them19, for how and where the generic lines of
19 Another way of stating this point is to say that one knows what any 
particular genre is only by virtue of having a very distinct feel for 
all the genres it is not. As Ralph Cohen puts it: "A genre cannot be 
defined by its own terms. It needs at least one other genre from 
which it can be distinguished" (in Perkins 97). There is a vivacious 
exchange in the Life which gestures towards this issue:
GARRICK: What! eh! is Strahan a good judge of an Epigram? 
Is not he rather an obtuse man, eh? JOHNSON: Why, Sir, he 
may not be a judge of an Epigram: but you see he is a
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separation run20. The underlying logic here is axiomatic -
having a clear idea of the distinctive internal
characteristics of discrete items necessarily means having
a clear idea of how and where they differ from one another.
When we consider how many genres there were to keep
track of, let alone master, in Johnson's day21
(incomparably more than in our own which has witnessed the
extinction, more or less, of genre-consciousness), and when
judge of what is not an Epigram. (922) [emphasis in 
original]
The points at issue here bear upon, as they bear out, the 
Saussurian position that all meaning is comparative and differential - 
illustrative of which is this observation by Enkvist: "To feel the 
characteristically Shakespearean texture of a poetic passage we must 
have experienced both characteristically Shakespearean and 
characteristically non-Shakespearean poems. Otherwise how could we 
spot what makes Shakespeare stand out as Shakespeare?" (in Van Peer 
127) . In his "Preface to Shakespeare" Johnson makes the same point: 
"As among the works of nature no man can properly call a river deep or 
a mountain high, without the knowledge of many mountains and many 
rivers; so in the productions of genius, nothing can be stiled 
excellent till it has been compared with other works of the same kind" 
(in Bronson 262).
20 To be sure, a crucial enabling condition permitting Johnson and his 
contemporaries (no less than his predecessors) to feel secure about 
their 'feel' for generic difference was the virtually universal 
assumption, scarcely questioned from the Renaissance until towards the 
end of the eighteenth century, of generic fixity. As M H Abrams puts 
it: "Through the Renaissance and much of the eighteenth century, the 
recognized genres... were widely thought to be fixed literary types, 
somewhat like species in the biological order of nature" (1993:76).
21 Johnson's activity as a writer "took place in the midst of a heady 
profusion and variety of genres. Indeed, to think of what an open, 
'free' literary world would be like, a world where the available forms 
are almost numberless and infinitely variegated, is to imagine oneself 
in something like Johnson's literary circumstances" (Fussell (1972) 
38) . Later in his book Fussell offers this striking insight: 
"[Johnson's] literary character was made by the prevailing genres and 
by the accident that an age recognizing an abundance of genres brought 
forth a man who could work in an immense variety of almost 
ventriloquial stances and voices" (1972:88-89).
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we consider in how many of them he excelled22, it is not
difficult to understand why he impresses as a kind of
virtuoso of genre-awareness and genre-discrimination when
viewed from the vantage point of our own age. Paul Pussell
has been pre-eminent among critics in calling attention to
the virtuoso, bravura aspect of Johnson's handling of the
literary Kinds: "[Johnson] exercised himself, often
anonymously, in more of the various literary 'kinds' than
perhaps any other writer has ever done", he observes; and
then he goes on to amplify this judgment circumstantially:
Consider: he worked in tragedy, biography, the
periodical essay, the oriental tale, the travel
book, the political tract, the critical essay,
and the book review; in the oration, the sermon,
22 Not only, to be sure, because his acquaintance with the generic 
choices and opportunities on offer in his day was so comprehensive, 
and his feel for so many of the Kinds so secure and finely tuned, but 
also because his literary sensibility was so multiform, his literary 
interests so varied and his literary activity, over a long career, so 
diversified. Of the range of Johnson's literary interests Robert 
Folkenflik remarks
that it is "one of the things that makes [him] most humanly admirable" 
(in Grundy (1984) 31-32).
Something that should not be lost sight of, when mention is made 
of the number of genres in which Johnson excelled, is that this 
applies not only to written forms but also to his conversation for, as 
Fussell points out, "[e]ven various kinds of conversations are genres, 
and in them as well as in written occasions [Johnson] senses the 
necessity of literary conventions" (1972:80) . In an earlier footnote 
I cited Johnson's claim to always speak uniformly by endeavouring on 
every occasion to be as intelligible as possible (Life 598). But it 
is perfectly possible to be intelligible in a variety of styles, 
depending upon one's sense of occasion and audience. Such was the 
case with Johnson, no less in his conversation than in his writings: 
always intelligible, but in a variety of styles.
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the letter23, the prayer, the dedication, the
23 This genre is further differentiated in Johnson's practice into a 
number of sub-Kinds - business letters, letters of recommendation, 
petitionary letters written on behalf of an odd assortment of hard- 
luck cases, formal, stately letters addressed to the great, purely 
informative missives, circumstantial letters consisting of ephemera, 
and yet others. But with one or two celebrated exceptions (such as 
the famous letter to Lord Chesterfield), 'Johnson's Letters' mean, for 
most readers, his familiar letters, of which he wrote a great number, 
many no longer extant. With respect to these a few observations are 
in order.
There are essentially two ways, different but not contradictory, 
of looking at the familiar letters. Depending upon one's point of 
view, they may be visualized either en bloc, as a single entity, or, 
alternatively, as an assemblage of numerous finely discriminated 
strands. What the first perspective throws into relief is a gathering 
tendency, affecting the familiar correspondence as a whole, towards a 
more informal, spontaneous and intimate epistolary style. An aspect 
of, as it is a reason for, this increasing informality of style, is 
Johnson's achievement of "a feat of valediction that Pope and 
Chesterfield almost never attempt: shedding the obtrusive I am of the 
standard formula and incorporating the subscription, the noun phrase 
'your humble servant/Sam. Johnson', into a sentence that performs some 
other function than valediction" (McIntosh 141). The tendency towards 
greater epistolary informality and spontaneity started coming into its 
own, argues Isobel Grundy ("Johnson's Developing Epistolary Style", in 
Korshin 216-17), in the mid-1750s; and it had the effect, over time, 
of accentuating the differences between Johnson's epistolary manner 
and all his others (Grundy, ibid. 217). So under this perspective the 
familiar correspondence, conceived of corporately, as a unit, is 
brought into juxtaposition with the rest of the Johnsonian oeuvre. 
Under the alternative perspective it is considered with reference to 
itself alone; and, thus considered, comes into view as an assemblage 
of many rather finely discriminated 'strands', each of which 
represents a different letter-style adopted by Johnson
in response to perceived differences of aptitude and sensibility among 
his principal addressees. What he contrives to do, in other words, is 
to fashion for each of them a customized sub-sub-genre of the familiar 
letter in accordance with his estimate of individual capacity and 
personality. The upshot of this is of course a very high degree of 
epistolary differentiation, a fact noted, with the prominence it 
deserves, by the editor of Johnson's Letters, R W Chapman:
The extant letters... complement Johnson's published 
writings and his oral wisdom. His success in 
accommodating their matter and their manner to the 
character and abilities of his correspondents displays his 
versatility and the subtlety of his sympathies. The most 
interesting of his letters are, I think, those to Boswell 
[for Grundy the most interesting are the letters to Mrs 
Thrale - in Korshin 222]...The letters to Mrs Thrale are 
on a different plane...The letters to Queeny Thrale are 
just what an old man's letters should be, when he writes 
to a child or a growing girl.
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preface, the legal brief, and the petition to
royalty; in the poetic satire, the Horatian ode,
the elegy, the theatrical prologue and epilogue,
the song, the Anacreontic lyric, the epigram,
and the epitaph. He was a master even of the
advertisement* 24, the political handbill, and the
medical prescription. ...The only consequential
The ladies at Lichfield are nicely discriminated. 
To Lucy Porter Johnson is affectionate, but somewhat 
dictatorial; that 'peremptory maiden' had to be kept in 
her place. Miss Aston he treats as his intellectual 
equal. At the bottom of the scale comes John Taylor. If 
Johnson's letters to him are sometimes didactic to the 
point of dullness, that is as it should be; for Taylor was 
a slow-witted man, dull in himself and the cause of 
dullness in others. (I xix-xx)
The way Johnson handles his familiar correspondence certainly 
lends support to Voitle's contention that "he was always aware of the 
occasion, of his purposes, and of the nature of his audience" (ix) . 
Mentioned here are three of the five conditions necessary for a high 
degree of genre-consciousness; they may be thought of as 'extrinsic' 
conditions. The 'intrinsic' ones are: a sure feel for the 
characteristics and conventions specific to the manifold literary 
Kinds, and its corollary, a sure feel for the differences between 
them. Johnson's proficiency in all five of these departments was 
total; hence his total mastery of genre.
24 Fussell presumably is alluding to the literary advertisement; if so, 
it bears pointing out that Johnson was master not only of the literary 
advertisement but of the commercial advertisement too. Conceiving of 
it as a genre in its own right, he naturally viewed it as possessed of 
a body of rules specific to itself; some of these find quasi-ironic 
expression in an Idler essay (# 40) :
Promise, large promise, is the soul of an advertisement.
. . .But as every art ought to be exercised in due 
subordination to the publick good, I cannot but propose it 
as a moral question to these masters of the publick ear, 
whether they do not sometimes play too wantonly with our 
passions...
In an advertisement it is allowed to every man to 
speak well of himself, but I know not why he should assume 
the privilege of censuring his neighbour. He may proclaim 
his own virtue or skill, but ought not to exclude others 
from the same pretensions. (II 125, 127)
218
contemporary categories to which he never turned
his hand were the novel, stage comedy, the
Pindaric ode, and the pastoral. (1972:38-39)
A few examples will suffice to bring into focus the
sureness and accuracy with which Johnson lays hold of what
is essential and defining in some of the Kinds mentioned
above (and also some not mentioned because, owing to
reservations of one kind or another on his part, but
certainly not because his acquaintance with their operative
characteristics and conventions was anything less than
complete, they were left unattempted) . Take satire to
begin with:
[Johnson] repeated Pope's verses, in which
'Macedonia's madman' is introduced, and the
conclusion is "Yet ne'er looks forward farther
than his nose". I objected to the last phrase,
as being low. JOHNSON: Sir, it is intended to
be low: it is satire. The expression is
debased, to debase the character. (Hebrides
Journal 201)
Located at the opposite extreme from lowly satire in
the eighteenth-century hierarchy of genres is exalted
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epic25, in treating of which Johnson's manner, reflecting
the difference between conversational and written
discourse, 'changes gear', becoming perceptibly more
weighty and deliberate:
By the general consent of criticks the first
praise of genius is due to the writer of an
epick poem, as it requires an assemblage of all
the powers which are singly sufficient for other
compositions. Poetry is the art of uniting
pleasure with truth, by calling imagination to
the help of reason. Epick poetry undertakes to
teach the most important truths by the most
pleasing precepts, and therefore narrates some
great event in the most affecting manner.
History must supply the writer with the
rudiments of narration, which he must improve
and exalt by a nobler art, must animate by
dramatick energy, and diversify by retrospection
and anticipation... ("Milton", Lives I 170)
In Rambler 37, where Johnson brings pastoral poetry
under scrutiny, his proceeding, moving as it does towards
25 "[T]he traditional hierarchy [ran] from epic at the top, through 
stage tragedy and comedy, to pastoral, elegy, 'lyric' - that is, 
Horatian and Pindaric odes - and, at the bottom, satire" (Tillotson et 
al. 11) .
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a formal definition of the genre, is perhaps even more
deliberate than in the passage from "Milton" cited above.
What also bears noticing is the way in which he explicitly
and expressly draws attention to what is excluded by his
definition of pastoral. All definitions, to be sure, as
they stake out the ambit of their application, necessarily
exclude what lies beyond it, but what is thus excluded is
ordinarily left implicit, not, as in this case,
deliberately underlined. Johnson's motive in being so
explicit is to highlight the divergence between his view
of pastoral and the one generally subscribed to in his day.
Wishing to present the gist of the essay's argument, I
have decided to slightly rearrange the order of its points
for the purposes of this citation:
In writing or judging of pastoral poetry,
neither the authors nor criticks of latter times
seem to have paid sufficient regard to the
originals left us by antiquity, but have
entangled themselves with unnecessary
difficulties, by advancing principles, which,
having no foundation in the nature of things,
are wholly to be rejected from a species of
composition in which, above all others, mere
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nature is to be regarded.
It is, therefore, necessary to enquire
after some more distinct and exact idea of this
kind of writing. This may, I think, be easily
found in the pastorals of Virgil...If we search
the writings of Virgil, for the true definition
of a pastoral, it will be found "a poem in which
any action or passion is represented by its
effects upon a country life." Whatsoever
therefore may, according to the common course of
things, happen in the country, may afford a
subject for a pastoral poet. ... Pastoral... has
nothing peculiar but its confinement to rural
imagery, without which it ceases to be pastoral.
This is its true characteristick, and this it
cannot lose by any dignity of sentiment, or
beauty of diction.
In this definition, it will immediately
occur to those who are versed in the writings of
the modern criticks, that there is no mention of
the golden age. I cannot indeed easily discover
why it is thought necessary to refer
descriptions of a rural state to remote times,
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nor can I perceive that any writer has
consistently preserved the Arcadian manners and
sentiments... (Ill 200, 201, 204)
Now for three quite different Kinds - dedications,
epitaphs and compliments. I group them together because
they have in common the characteristic that allowance has
to be made, by convention, for encomiastical hyperbole26:
by 'the rules of the game', "'hyperbolic effusions' [are]
expected of a dedicator" (Folkenflik in Grundy 31) . In
short, where these Kinds are concerned, no author is to be
thought of as being under oath. Here are some examples of
the way Johnson views them:
Captain M'Lean censured Burnet, for his high
praise of Lauderdale in a dedication, when he
shews him in his history to have been so bad a
man. JOHNSON: I do not myself think that a man
should say in a dedication what he could not say
in a history. However, allowance should be
made; for there is a great difference. The
known style of a dedication is flattery: it
professes to flatter. (Hebrides Journal 333)
26 Just as, by convention, "[s]ome enlargement may be allowed to 
declamation, and some exaggeration to burlesque" (Rambler 208, V 320) .
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Agreed - but if the 'known style7 , that is, the
conventions, of this Kind makes allowance for flattery, it
does so only up to a certain limit. Johnson's sense of
where that limit lies is unfailingly secure27, and those
who overstep it are therefore not long in being called to
account for their trangression. One such transgressor is
Richard Savage of whose Miscellany Johnson notes that
The Dedication is addressed to the Lady Mary
Wortley Montague, whom he flatters without
reserve, and, to confess the truth, with very
little art. The same observation may be
extended to all his Dedications; his compliments
are constrained [= strained, unnatural] and
violent, heaped together without the grace of
order, or the decency of introduction.
("Savage", Lives II 343)
As for the epitaph, "it is indeed commonly
panegyrical, because we are seldom distinguished with a
stone but by our friends; but...it ought not to be longer
than common beholders may be expected to have leisure and
27 For that reason he is able to denounce as "indecent and promiscuous"
(Rambler 136, IV 356) dedications that are disfigured by a level of 
flattery going beyond the limits of acceptability sanctioned by the 
conventions of the genre. Knowing whether and when flattery oversteps 
permissible limits and becomes 'indecent and promiscuous' depends, as 
a precondition, upon knowing that there are limits, and knowing also 
where they lie.
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patience to peruse" ("Pope", Lives III 254) . With regard
to the object of the beholder's perusal - the inscription
itself - the convention, of which nobody was expected to
be ignorant, stipulated that
The writer of an epitaph should not be
considered as saying nothing but what is
strictly true. Allowance must be made for some
degree of exaggerated praise. In lapidary
inscriptions a man is not upon oath. (Life 662)
No more is he when it comes to the compliment, a genre
which extends to the reader or listener a formulaic,
conventional invitation, just as the dedication and the
epitaph do, to make due allowance for hyperbolical
commendation - as Johnson, dissenting from Goldsmith's
opinion, points out:
Goldsmith [had] said that Garrick's compliment
to the Queen, which he introduced into the play
of The Chances...was mean and gross flattery.
JOHNSON: Why, Sir, I would not write, I would
not give solemnly under my hand, a character
beyond what I thought really true; but a speech
on the stage, let it flatter ever so
extravagantly, is formular. It has always been
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formular- to flatter Kings and Queens28. (Life
20 From one point of view there is nothing at all surprising about 
Johnson's insistence that in dedications, epitaphs and compliments one 
should neither expect nor demand the kind of scrupulous adherence to 
the truth that in real life one would feel justified in requiring as 
a matter of course. This kind of attitude seems to be entirely 
consistent with what one might expect from somebody as profoundly 
conscious as Johnson was of the claims, character and conventions of 
genre in general and of individual genres in particular. Still, from 
another point of view, there is something rather surprising, something 
not entirely in line with expectation, about Johnson's asking us to 
say amen to deviations from strict truthfulness - or, to put it 
bluntly, prevarication - in the three Kinds mentioned above. The 
occasion of surprise is the fact, attested from many quarters, that 
when it came to respect for the truth nobody was more exigent than 
Johnson in the demands he made both of himself and of others. A 
representative judgment in this connection is that of Arthur Murphy, 
a friend of the Sage and the author of a Johnsonian memoir published 
in 1792. In this work Murphy relates that Johnson regarded
A strict adherence to the truth...as a sacred obligation 
insomuch that in relating the most minute anecdote he 
would not allow himself the smallest addition to embellish 
his story. The late Mr Tyers who knew Johnson intimately 
observed, "that he always talked as if he was talking on 
oath." (in Hill, I 458) [v. also Life 686, 900; likewise 
Rambler 136: "...no private views or personal regard can 
discharge any man from his general obligations to virtue 
and to truth" (IV 359)]
Given a dedication to truthfulness as single-minded and 
fastidious as this, there is indeed occasion for some surprise at 
Johnson's willingness to let dedications, epitaphs and literary 
compliments live by their own generic law (that is, be self­
referential) instead of requiring them to conform to extrinsic 
standards of truthfulness brought to bear from the arena of real life. 
How are we to account for such forbearance (for forbearance it seems 
to be)?
There are certainly grounds for hypothesizing that Johnson, as 
the first genuine English man of letters, had the interests of 
literature (subsumed under which are those of genre) too much at heart 
to permit norms applicable to the conduct of life, including that of 
truthfulness, to be indiscriminately foisted upon it. Keeping 
literature and life apart, he rendered to each its due. Accordingly, 
if he concedes to dedications, epitaphs and literary compliments the 
right to live by their own essentially prevaricating generic law, he 
does so on the clear understanding that in the conduct of life an 
altogether more exigent code of truthfulness holds sway. But this 
hypothesis, even if there is any merit in it, cannot amount to 
anything more than a very partial explanation. For given Johnson's 
over-riding concern with the moral dimension of existence, he cannot 
easily be imagined as willing to let the three Kinds under discussion 
live by their own canting law if he were not confident that not only 
he but anyone having to do with them could be relied upon to perceive 
that they were convention-governed, to know by which conventions they
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were governed, hence to read the conventional cues aright, and as a 
result be trusted not to view the liberties taken with the truth in 
the Kinds under discussion as an invitation and encouragement to do 
the same thing in life. In a word, what we are talking about is 
genre-literacy, and in the eighteenth century it was possible, to a 
degree not to be contemplated in our own, to feel confident that any 
likely reader of dedications, epitaphs and literary compliments would 
be sufficiently genre-literate to construe them correctly and so avoid 
placing his moral being in jeopardy by permitting a carry-over from 
literature into life. If Johnson had not felt confident about the 
genre-competence of those of his contemporaries who were likely to 
come within range of these three Kinds, he would not have been 
willing, despite his respect for the claims of genre, to be as 
forbearing towards them as he was; under those circumstances he would 
probably have demanded from them standards of truthfulness 
approximating those applicable in real life. All this is just another 
way of saying that his moral concerns would have been in the end the 
determining factor, over-riding all competing considerations.
Lending support to the argumentative position I am developing is 
this fact: when it comes to the novel and the stage drama Johnson 
displays nothing like the forbearance that characterizes his attitude 
towards the three Kinds mentioned above. He adopts instead a 
prescriptive, stipulative, interventionist stance: refusing to concede 
to the novel and the stage drama the right of self-referentiality, he 
requires them instead to discharge an instrumental role as agents of 
moral improvement. The question to which this contrast in attitudes 
gives rise is the obvious one: how are we to account for it? In 
seeking to do so, I propose to focus on two factors which strike me as 
being of decisive importance. The first concerns the status of the 
novel and the stage drama in the eighteenth-century, the second their 
habitual mode of operation. With regard to the first factor the 
essential point is this - that the novel and the stage drama were in 
the eighteenth century what they are today - 'mass' genres, though 
comparatively less so then than now. What this state of affairs, as 
seen from Johnson's point of view, would have implied was an 
alarmingly high rate of genre-illiteracy among the audiences to which 
novels and plays appealed. And once it was no longer possible to 
entertain, with any confidence, an assumption of genre-literacy, once 
novel-readers and theatregoers could not be relied upon to know the 
conventions of these Kinds, and thus construe correctly the 
conventional cues, it followed that they could not be relied upon to 
know how to protect themselves against the dangers - chiefly moral - 
of a carry-over from literature into life. So (trying here to 
reconstruct Johnson's probable perception of the situation), we have 
on the one hand audiences that are susceptible, suggestible and 
defenceless. On the other, working in conjunction with this first 
factor and magnifying its potential for harm, was a second - the fact 
that by 'the rules of the game' novels and plays are in the business 
of representing the fictive 'worlds' they construct as authentic 
projections of the real one. Because these projections are often very 
realistic and because fictive and dramatic strategies are often highly 
manipulative, it follows that these two Kinds have at their command a 
power to persuade, indeed, to seduce, that no dedication, epitaph, or
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literary compliment can even remotely be imagined as exerting, even 
upon an audience ignorant of the 'rules of the game' . If to the 
foregoing factors we add another - Johnson's conviction that the 
persuasive powers of novels and plays were as often mobilized for 
wicked ends as for good - the picture that emerges is of susceptible, 
suggestible, defenceless 'receptors' (to use a current 'term of art') 
at the mercy of powerfully persuasive, even powerfully seductive, 
texts, not a few with a corrupting tendency. If we bear in mind how 
alarming, from a moral standpoint, this state of affairs must have 
seemed to Johnson, is it any wonder, given the primacy of moral 
concerns in his outlook, that his attitude to plays and novels should 
have turned out to be as morally prescriptive and morally 
interventionist as it did? There would be cause for wonder, indeed, 
only if matters had fallen out differently, if he had adopted an 
attitude much (or even not much) different from the one he in fact did 
adopt.
As far as the stage drama is concerned, the best-known example 
of Johnson's moral prescriptiveness is his censure of Shakespeare for 
a want of moral purpose, moral firmness and moral clarity in his plays 
- in a word, a want of moral commitment:
His first defect is that to which may be imputed most of 
the evil in books or in men. He sacrifices virtue to 
convenience, and is so much more careful to please than to 
instruct, that he seems to write without any moral 
purpose. From his writings indeed a system of social duty 
may be selected...but his precepts and axioms drop 
casually from him; he makes no just distribution of good 
or evil, nor is always careful to show in the virtuous a 
disapprobation of the wicked; he carries his persons 
indifferently through right and wrong, and at the close 
dismisses them without further care, and leaves their 
examples to operate by chance. This fault the barbarity 
of his age cannot extenuate; for it is always a writer's 
duty to make the world better, and justice is a virtue 
independent on time or place. ("Preface to Shakespeare" 
in Bronson 271)
At the end of the passage Johnson adopts an explicitly 
prescriptive posture; prior to that it is only implicitly so. But the 
positive stipulation lying behind his mainly negative observations is 
not difficult to descry: the clear suggestion is that Shakespeare 
ought to have recognized an obligation in his oeuvre to take an 
unambiguous stand in support of virtue.
A parallel inference may be drawn from his censure of Congreve's 
plays, "the general tenour and tendency of [which] must always be 
condemned." For
It is acknowledged with universal conviction that the 
perusal of his works will make no man better; and that 
their ultimate effect is to represent pleasure in alliance 
with vice, and to relax those obligations by which life 
ought to be regulated. ("Congreve", Lives II 222)
The locus classicus for Johnson's standpoint on the moral 
responsibilities - almost, one could say, the moral calling - of 
fiction is a celebrated Rambler essay (# 4) whose argumentative mode
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is forcefully and unapologetically prescriptive and stipulative. 
Fiction, argues Johnson, is under a clear obligation to discharge a 
double-sided moral task (to judge from the tone of his writing, it 
could with equal propriety be designated a moral trust): on the one 
hand there is a negative requirement to satisfy, that of being careful 
to give no aid or comfort to evil by, for example, painting it in 
attractive colours; on the other, there is also a positive 
responsibility laid upon the author of fiction, that of actively 
ranging himself on the side of good. What follows, by way of 
evidential support for the preceding assertions, is a mosaic of 
excerpts culled from Rambler 4 (I hope the thrust of Johnson's 
argument survives the need for abridgment):
These books [the fiction of Johnson's day] are written 
chiefly to the young, the ignorant and the idle, to whom 
they serve as lectures of conduct, and introductions into 
life. They are the entertainment of minds unfurnished 
with ideas, and therefore easily susceptible of 
impressions; not fixed by principles, and therefore 
easily following the current of fancy; not informed by 
experience, and consequently open to every false 
suggestion and partial account. ...The purpose of these 
writings is surely not only to show mankind, but to 
provide that they may be seen hereafter with less hazard; 
to teach the means of avoiding the snares which are laid 
by Treachery for Innocence... to give the power of 
counteracting fraud, without the temptation to practise 
it; to initiate youth by mock encounters in the art of 
necessary defence, and to increase prudence without 
impairing virtue. ...Vice, for vice is necessary to be 
shewn, should always disgust; nor should the graces of 
gaiety, or the dignity of courage, be so united with it, 
as to reconcile it to the mind. Wherever it appears, it 
should raise hatred by the malignity of its practices, and 
contempt by the meanness of its stratagems. ... It is 
therefore to be steadily inculcated, that virtue is the 
highest proof of understanding, and the only solid basis 
of greatness; and that vice is the natural consequence of 
narrow thoughts, that it begins in mistake, and ends in 
ignominy. (I 21, 22-23, 24, 25)
Relying on little or no evidence beyond the "Preface to 
Shakespeare" and the Rambler essay cited above, critics have come to 
view Johnson's treatment of genre as little more than a 
straightforward exercise in moral prescriptivism and interventionism: 
subjecting the Kinds to an extrinsic law, he assigns to them an 
instrumental role as agents of moral betterment. In undertaking the 
lengthy argument elaborated above, my purpose has been to suggest that 
this very widespread perception is unsound and superficial. The truth 
is that Johnson's position is a good deal more complex than it has 
anywhere previously (to my knowledge) been given credit for. I have 
endeavoured to bring that complexity into view by showing that the 
stance he adopts towards genres like the dedication, the epitaph and 
the literary compliment (whose evidential value has up to.now been 
ignored) is quite different from the stance adopted towards the novel
229
526) [emphasis in original] -
That Johnson has so firm, distinct and exact a sense
of what is defining and essential in a very large number
of genres necessarily implies, as I argued above, as firm
and exact a sense of the differences between them; and this
in turn involves an exceptionally precise feel for just
those crucial traits that are determinative in genre
differentiation29, in particular differentiation between
genres 'near allied'. The examples which follow testify
and the stage drama. I have sought to account for the difference in 
attitude by advancing the hypothesis that the different kinds of 
audience Johnson envisioned for the different genre-clusters 
authorized, if they did not indeed dictate, an assumption of divergent 
levels of genre-competence; and that this assumption of unequal 
competence in its turn dictated differing attitudes to, and different 
destinies for, the different genres - dictated, in other words, a 
differential 'genre policy'. Hence, where Johnson felt able to assume 
an adequate level of genre-competence, he felt correspondingly able to 
indulge an attitude of forbearance, allowing the Kinds in question to 
live by their own law. Where, however, as in the case of fiction and 
drama, he felt he could not make any such assumption, it was only 
natural (meaning, only logical) that he should then feel constrained 
to adopt an interventionist and prescriptive stance, denying autonomy 
and self-referentiality to novels and plays and requiring them instead 
to perform an instrumental office within the moral domain. Why the 
moral domain? Because the assumptions and determinations Johnson 
makes in the area of 'genre policy' , as in every area that has a 
bearing upon his system of beliefs, have to be viewed as functioning 
within the context of, indeed, as controlled by, one great fundamental 
given - the centrality and primacy of his moral preoccupations. With 
respect to which nothing he said or wrote is as impressive, or moving, 
as the final lines of the final Rambler:
I shall never envy the honours which wit and learning 
obtain in any other cause, if I can be numbered among the 
writers who have given ardour to virtue, and confidence to 
truth. (V 320)
29 In other words - those of the vocabulary of formal logic - what 
Johnson lays hold of is the "differentia", that is, "the attribute by 
which a species is distinguished from all other species of the same 
genus; a distinguishing mark or characteristic" (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2nd edn.).
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to his aptitude for homing in on traits of determinative
importance as a basis for distinguishing between genres.
Consider, for a start, the following instance in which he
differentiates between comedy and farce:
BOSWELL: Foote [the comic actor] ...has a
singular talent of exhibiting character.
JOHNSON: Sir, it is not a talent; it is a vice;
it is what others abstain from. It is not
comedy, which exhibits the character of a
species, as that of a miser gathered from many
misers: it is farce, which exhibits individuals.
(Life 417)
With the same proficiency he lays hold of the
essential difference between epitaph and elegy:
In writing epitaphs, one circumstance is to be
considered, which affects no other composition;
the place in which they are now commonly found
restrains them to a particular air of solemnity,
and debars them from the admission of all
lighter or gayer ornaments. In this it is, that
the style of an epitaph necessarily differs from
that of an elegy. . . .All allusions to the
heathen mythology are, therefore, absurd. (in
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Grundy (1984) 187) •
In the following judgment bearing upon Akenside's
poetical productions, Johnson pinpoints precisely those
characteristics that crucially differentiate the lighter
from the grander ode:
It is not easy to guess why he addicted himself
so diligently to lyrick poetry, having neither
the ease and airiness of the lighter, nor the
vehemence and elevation of the grander ode.
{"Akenside", hives III 419)
As Johnson tilts at Dr William Robertson's History of
Scotland, his censure evolves into a distinction between
history and romance based precisely on the trait that is
determinative in keeping these two Kinds separate from each
other:
JOHNSON: ...doubtless, Goldsmith's History is
better than the verbiage of Robertson, or the
foppery of Dalrymple. BOSWELL: Will you not
admit the superiority of Robertson, in whose
History we find such penetration - such
painting? JOHNSON: Sir, you must consider how
that penetration and that painting are employed.
It is not history, it is imagination. He who
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describes what he never saw, draws from fancy.
Robertson paints minds as Sir Joshua paints
faces in a history-piece: he imagines an heroic
countenance. You must look upon Robertson's
work as romance, and try it by that standard.
History it is not30. (Life 527-28) [emphasis in
original]
Distinguishing between encomiastic and biographical
writing, Johnson highlights considerations that somewhat
intersect with the concerns of the passage cited just
above, while at the same time recalling his 'angle' on
Dedications:
The Life of Cowley. . .has been written by Dr
Sprat, an author whose... zeal of friendship, or
ambition of eloquence, has produced a funeral
oration rather than a history: he has given the
character, not the life of Cowley; for he writes
30 Cf. Johnson's letter to Boswell dated 9 September 1769:
Dear Sir
Why do you charge me with unkindness? I have 
omitted nothing that could do you good, or give you 
pleasure, unless it be that I have forborne to tell you my 
opinion of your account of Corsica. ...Your History [a 
projected History of Corsica! is like other histories, but 
your Journal [the Account of Corsica! is in a very high 
degree curious and delightful. There is between the 
history and the journal that difference which there will 
always be found between notions borrowed from without, and 
notions generated within. Your history was copied from 
books; your journal rose out of your own experience and 
observation. (in Chapman I 230)
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with so little detail that scarcely any thing is
distinctly known, but all is shown confused and
enlarged through the mist of panegyrick.
("Cowley", Lives I 1)
And, on the same theme, a passage from the Life:
...I well remember that Dr. Johnson maintained
that 'If a man is to write A Panegyrick, he may
keep vices out of sight; but if he professes to
write A Life, he must represent it really as it
was' : and when I objected to the danger of
telling that Parnell drank to excess, he said
that 'it would produce an instructive caution to
avoid drinking, when it was seen, that even the
learning and genius of Parnell could be debased
by it'. (840) [emphasis in original]
My final example exhibits Johnson as a real virtuoso
of genre-discrimination: using three-way differentiation,
followed by analogical demonstration, he undertakes to
rescue the genre of the Pamphlet from misconception and
misconstruction; in doing which he places the Pamphlet in
its proper relation to both poetry and prose:
I happened, I know not how, to say that a
pamphlet meant a prose piece. JOHNSON: No, Sir.
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A few sheets- of poetry unbound are a pamphlet,
as much as a few sheets of prose31. MUSGRAVE: A
pamphlet may be understood to mean a poetical
piece in Westminster-Hall, that is, in formal
language; but in common language it is
understood to mean prose. JOHNSON: (and here
was one of the many instances of his knowing
clearly and telling exactly how a thing is) A
pamphlet is understood in common language to
mean prose, only from this, that there is so
much more prose written than poetry; as when we
say a book. prose is understood for the same
31 In his Dictionary Johnson defines "pamphlet" as "A small book; 
properly a book sold unbound and only stitched". In his own practice, 
needless to say, he used this word with lexicographic exactitude and 
correctness - decades before becoming a lexicographer. In an early 
poem, dating from 1729 (when he was only twenty) , Johnson presents a 
sketch of an aspiring young author impetuously - and ill-fatedly - 
pursuing the will-o'-the-wisp of literary renown. Entitled "The Young 
Author", the poem contains these lines:
This thought [of fame] once form'd, all counsel comes too 
late,
He plies the press,and hurries on his fate;
Swiftly he sees the imagin'd laurels spread,
He feels th'unfading wreath surround his head;
The pamphlet spreads, incessant hisses rise,
To some retreat the baffled writer flies...
(Poems VI 73) [my
emphasis]
As Johnson here uses the word "pamphlet" in its precise and 
punctual sense (a sense according with the later Dictionary 
definition), there is (quite properly) no way of knowing whether what 
it contains is prose or poetry; it could be either. As it is a 
'pamphlet', what is at issue is not its content but its format.
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reason, though a book may as well be in poetry
as in prose. We understand what is most
general, and we name what is less frequent.
(Life 968) [emphasis in original]
* *
Johnson as a maker of distinctions in a variety of domains:
ethical, philosophical, conceptual, verbal, rhetorical,
functional, pictorial.
In the pages that follow I propose to take stock of
Dr Johnson as the begetter of no fewer than seventeen
identifiably different types of distinction, each of which
serves as the organizing principle for a separate category
of distinction-making. When I say that each distinction-
type serves as an 'organizing principle' , I mean by this
that it assembles items on the basis of a given attribute
shared in common by all of them (to exemplify: one of my
categories consists of items unified by the attribute I
have labelled 'Distinctions by appeal to Analogy'; another
is unified by the trait 'Distinctions by way of
Denial/Exclusion followed by Affirmation', and so forth).
The upshot of this mode of organization has been the
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emergence of seventeen separate .categories, each consisting
of items unified by a shared attribute - a condition that
satisfies the first fundamental law of all classification,
the law, as Richardson formulates it, of the "putting
together of like things"(1). Since, however, the seventeen
organizing traits all differ among themselves, it follows
that even as each unifies the items within its own
category, it simultaneously differentiates them from those
in every other. Thus it is that the categories themselves,
in their ensemble, come to be differentiated one from
another and each from all; and the dynamic as a whole, the
full picture, in its interplay of likeness within, and
unlikeness between, categories satisfies the second
fundamental law of classification which states that
"Classification assembles things according to their degrees
of likeness and separates them according to their degrees
of unlikeness" (Sayers 20). So in theory, at any rate, my
scheme of categorization appears to satisfy two of the
principal requirements of sound classification.
With a view to facilitating the organizational
coherence and clarity of the ensuing analysis, I have
decided to sort the seventeen separate categories (which
as they stand are already differentially tagged by means
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of brief descriptive titles) into
seven larger 'thematic7 groupings or clusters. (To two of
these, the ones I have labelled 'Ethical7 and 'Pictorial7,
only one category has been assigned, so that in these two
instances grouping and category are coterminous). The
names I have chosen for the larger groupings appear in the
title-heading of this section. Having constituted the
larger clusters, I shall consider each in turn in the
discussion that follows.
Before doing so, however, I need to enter a number of
caveats. To begin with, it bears pointing out that a
sizable number of individual items (that is, individual
instances of distinction-making) manifest category-
straddle, and so their allocation to the category they are
in rather than to another may seem something of a puzzle.
The difficulty here arises in the main from this
circumstance: that as the various categories evolved and
sorted themselves out, they did so to a not inconsiderable
degree with reference to whether a prospective item was
distinguished more by its subject-matter (content) or by
its structure (form) - a circumstance reflected in the
decidedly subject-matter-based character of some categories
and, by contrast, the decidedly structure-based character
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of others32. In a significant number of cases, however, it
was a real question whether a prospective item stood out
more by reason of its subject-matter or more by reason of
its structure, and it was therefore very much of a toss-up
which category had the best claim to it33. Most of the
difficult decisions about how and where to allocate arose,
not surprisingly, in relation to these equivocal or, to use
an alternative term, 'hermaphroditic' items. Nevertheless,
as choices had to be made one way or the other, I made
them, and allocated accordingly, though such choices, in
the very nature of the case, were incapable of actually
'settling' anything, since whatever decision one made,
32 To exemplify: 'Distinctions of Ideas' is, for the most part, a 
subject-matter-based category; by contrast, 'Distinctions by way of 
Offering Alternatives' (modelled often on the schema 
"...either...or...") is, for the most part, a structure-based one.
It is necessary to add that two categories are made up of items 
in which neither subject-matter nor structure stands out as 
prominently as function. These, then, are the function-based 
categories and they are mustered under the 'thematic' head I have 
labelled 'Functional'.
33 Consider, as an example, the following item: "Great numbers who 
quarrel with their condition. . .have never contemplated the difference 
between good and evil sufficiently to quicken aversion, or invigorate 
desire" (Rambler 178, V 176).
Though this statement brings into focus an ethical distinction 
between good and evil, it does so on the basis of a recognizably 
philosophical configuration, that of the schema 'attraction vs. 
repulsion' (itself a permutation of the positive< >negative 
opposition, which may be thought of as an organizing, or 'master' , 
schema) . So this is an item which in principle could be assigned, 
with equal justification, either to the subject-matter-based category 
designated 'Distinctions Bearing on Moral Concerns' or to the 
structure-based one designated 'Distinctions Modelled on Philosophical 
Schemata'. In the end I decided to allocate it to the former, though, 
truth to tell, it had originally been assigned to the latter - which 
only serves to dramatize its ambivalent quality.
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meaning, whatever category one eventually decided on for
an equivocal item, the result was the same: category-over­
reach and category-straddle, so far as that item was
concerned. The best I could do, under the circumstances,
was to try to palliate an 'unavoidable evil' by assigning
a problematic item to the category which (in my judgment)
it over-reached the least. However, as determinations made
under conditions of near-undecidability are liable to be
both fuzzy and disputable, it is hardly to be wondered at
that to a different pair of eyes some of my category-
choices may appear to be puzzling indeed. Nevertheless,
in light of the backdrop I have adumbrated, it is not
unreasonable to hope (I hope), that where puzzling category
allocations are met with, they will at least not be
ascribed to inattention or caprice: my category
determinations were thought through; that much at any rate
I can claim for them. At the same time of course I fully
recognize that someone else appraising the same data as I
did might think things through in a different way and so
decide on a different pattern of allocation.
Second: in much the same way as some individual items
straddle categories, so some individual categories straddle
some of the larger groupings, and their being assigned to
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one rather than to another may be a cause of puzzlement
similar to that occasioned by some of my category
determinations for individual items. As far as the
interplay between the individual categories and the larger
groupings is concerned, much of the uncertainty about which
grouping to assign a given category to is attributable to
the fact that the lines of division between some of the
larger groupings (and also, for that matter, between some
of the individual categories) are themselves somewhat
uncertain, somewhat blurred. Take, for example, the
partition I erect between the groupings I have labelled
'Conceptual' and 'Verbal': in a sense this is a purely
artificial division since it is a real question whether
there can be anything 'conceptual' which is not at the same
time 'verbal'. Similarly, can there be anything
'philosophical' which is not at the same time 'conceptual'?
So what justification is there for positing two separate
groupings bearing the designations 'Conceptual' and
'Philosophical'? Though these are hard questions, I
believe nevertheless that there do exist differences (to
be outlined at the appropriate juncture) between the larger
groupings (at any rate, as I make use of them in this
inquiry) that both explain and justify the determinations
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I have made as to where and how the lines of partition
should be drawn. When all is said and done, though, what
is at stake here - that is, the question of where the lines
of partition among the larger groupings are drawn and
whether they are drawn distinctly enough - is not really
an issue of decisive importance since the sorting of the
individual categories into larger clusters is, to begin
with, just an aid to intelligible organization, not a
precondition for it. For the purposes of the present
inquiry it is sufficient if the grounds of differentiation
among the seventeen separate categories stand out with
reasonable clarity; if those among the seven larger
groupings do too, that's by way of being a bonus.
The problem of the lines of separation between the
larger groupings (and, if and where this applies, between
the individual categories as well) not standing out as
distinctly as they might, is also, to a degree, a problem
of naming - of finding, for groupings and categories
alike, designations sufficiently exact and sufficiently
informative not only to convey an idea of the character of
the items mustered under each but also to bring into view
those essential grounds of difference between them (that
is, between the categories among themselves, and between
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the larger groupings, also among themselves) in virtue of
which after all they assert their claim, in the first
place, to subsist as separate, independent entities. Given
the necessity for the briefest of descriptive tags to
characterize my seven 'thematic' groupings, the problem I
ran into was that I just could not come up with
designations more denotative than the ones I eventually
settled on, fully aware though I was of their inadequacy
to the task of bringing out clearly those significant
differences upon which their claim to independent status
ultimately rests. The descriptive tags affixed to the
seventeen individual categories are, by contrast, longer
and more cumbersome but for that very reason more
informative and thus better able to bring into focus the
differences that vindicate their claim to separate status.
Carlyle was no doubt right in affirming that "knowledge
consists in the giving of right names to things" (in Sayers
6). On this criterion I have reason to wonder by how much
I have advanced the cause of knowledge through the names
I have given my categories and groupings; another
intelligence might consider that cause better served by
different names. So in the end I may have to rely on my
examples to do the work that my names perhaps don't - that
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is, bring into view the differences responsible for
producing separate categories and separate groupings of
categories. In other words, I may find myself having to
proceed by the ostensive method34. If this proceeding is
something of a second-best choice, at least I have good
warrant for falling back on it - Dr Johnson's own practice:
for when, as sometimes happens in the Dictionary, he finds
himself at his wits' end about how to define a word, he is
driven, in the absence of any alternative, to proceed
ostensively - that is, to rely on examples to perform the
office of elucidation that definition is no longer equal
to35.
34 "ostensive definition: the explanation of a word by pointing at...or 
by presenting, one or more objects to which it applies" (Oxford 
English Dictionary, 2nd edition).
35 In this connection the following remarks by DeMaria are germane:
In a few cases, Johnson gives up and resorts to foreign 
languages to get around the problem of definition. ...More 
often, however, [he] depends upon his examples to take 
care of hard definitions, and he has a predilection for 
examples that point out the complexity of a word and the 
resultant difficulty for the lexicographer. Under the 
first sense of "to bear", for instance, Johnson says 
simply, "This is a word used with such latitude, that it 
is not easily explained," and he cites Watts: "We say to 
bear a burden, to bear sorrow or reproach, to bear a name, 
to bear a grudge, to bear fruit, or to bear children. The 
word bear is used in very different senses". (in Korshin 
167-68) [emphasis in original]
In his "Preface" to the Dictionary Johnson is in fact perfectly 
frank in acknowledging that where his explanations fail to shed as 
much light as they should, the only available remedy for the 
deficiency is the ostensive one of turning to examples for help. He 
writes: "The solution of all difficulties, and the supply of all 
defects, must be sought in the examples, subjoined to the various 
senses of each word" (in Bronson 248).
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Third: in a few of my categories, it may appear that
the requirement of 'likeness', with respect to the items
of which they are made up, has been rather laxly complied
with. For example, the category I designate 'Distinctions
of Ideas' assembles a congeries of quite disparate classes
of ideas - moral, religious, literary, social, scientific
and political (among others). In this connection, however,
what needs to be borne in mind is that the theory of
classification does not demand mathematical standards of
likeness. Likeness is not sameness; insofar as likeness
implies identity, it is "identity in kind...not in
substance" (Richardson 3). Accordingly, the requirements
of 'likeness' are complied with when items in a category
are similar in kind, as mine are in being all 'distinctions
of ideas', regardless of the various classes of ideas
involved. It is indeed a matter of some importance that
'likeness' implies identity in kind and not in substance
for it is this that creates enough 'room for manoeuvre' to
permit the third fundamental law of classification to take
its place alongside the other two. This law states that
in any grouping of items, the purpose for which the
grouping is intended should be determinative (Sayers 17,
29) . Well, as my purpose in the category labelled
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'Distinctions of Ideas' (to go back to that example) is,
first and foremost, to demonstrate the fact, the activity,
of Johnson's distinction-making mindset rather than to
exhibit the various classes of ideas to which it gives
rise, it follows that it would be perfectly pointless, in
light of that objective, to undertake any further sub­
categorization by class of the ideas there represented.
In sum, the construction of an efficacious, serviceable
scheme of classification involves not just putting in place
that structure of likeness within, and unlikeness between,
categories, indispensable though it be, but doing so with
reference to a specific guiding purpose. It is on this
basis that I have endeavoured to frame the classificatory
scheme underpinning the remainder of this inquiry.
With the preliminaries out of the way, it is time to
move on to a consideration of the seventeen categories of
distinction-making as arranged under their respective
'thematic' heads. The one I propose to examine first bears
the designation 'Ethical'.
Ethical Distinction-making
Subsumed under this head is the category I have
christened 'Distinctions Bearing on Moral Concerns'. The
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'moral concerns' informing the distinctions on which this
category is structured are those of good and evil, virtue
and vice, right and wrong, justice and injustice, and sins
and faults of omission or commission.
But before I bring forward the hard evidence - the
actual instances - of Johnson's ethical distinction-making,
it is well to call attention to the importance he attached
to the necessity, the obligation, indeed, to be at all
times heedful of moral distinctions, and in particular the
distinction between good and evil. He ordinarily draws
attention to this obligation by implicit means, in the main
using the technique of negative reference to enforce his
point - that is to say, the technique of highlighting the
culpability of those who are disregardful of their
obligation36:
To scatter praise or blame without regard to
justice, is to destroy the distinction of good
and evil. ...It is therefore not only necessary
[if the distinction is to be rehabilitated] that
wickedness... be denied applause, but that
goodness be commended only in proportion to its
3(3 An instance of Johnson's using the method of positive reference 
crops up in the Life of Collins who earns praise for having "never 
confounded" the "distinctions of right and wrong" (Lives III 338).
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degree... (Rambler 136, IV 355-56)
If in the passage above it is culpability that Johnson
focuses on, elsewhere he views disregard for the
'distinction of good and evil' as a species of criminality:
They who allow their passions to confound the
distinctions between right and wrong, are
criminal. (Life 749)
There are, indeed, many among the poetical
flatterers...whom we must confess to have
deserted the cause of virtue for pay: they have
committed, against full conviction, the crime of
obliterating the distinctions between good and
evil...37 (Rambler 104, IV 194)
That Johnson is prepared to use terms as stigmatizing
as 'criminal' and 'crime' to characterize disregard of 'the
distinctions between good and evil' testifies to the depth
and strength of his belief in the importance of being
heedful of them, however great the provocation, or
temptation, to dereliction. This is so much the case,
indeed, that he is brought, by logical necessity, to affirm
37 This citation and the preceding one featured earlier in this chapter 
where they formed part of the evidence supporting the larger point of 
Johnson's perception of distinction-making as a generally important 
human activity exercising itself in a variety of domains, not just the 
moral one.
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that "it is better to suffer wrong than to do it, and
happier to be sometimes cheated than not to trust" (Rambler
79, IV 55) .
Moving on now to Johnson's ethical distinction-making
as such, I want to begin by drawing attention to a schema,
or formula, for distinguishing between good and evil to
which he appears to be especially partial. Under this
schema good and evil are discriminated by being played off
against each other in terms of an implicit opposition
between positive good (i.e. the active pusuit of good) and
'negative good' (i.e. resistance to, or avoidance, or
prevention of, evil). Here are some examples:
All severity that does not tend to increase
good, or prevent evil, is idle. (Life 687)
Almighty God... enlighten my understanding with
knowledge of right...that I may always endeavour
to do good, and to hinder evil. (Prayers I 98)
It is reasonable to suppose that Addison
counteracted, as far as he was able, the
malignant and blasting influence of the
Lieutenant, and that at least by his
intervention some good was done, and some
mischief prevented. ("Addison" . Lives II 90)
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Poverty takes away so many means of doing good,
and produces so much inability to resist
evil... that it is by all virtuous means to be
avoided. Consider a man whose fortune is very
narrow...what good can he do? Or what evil can
he prevent? (Life 1185)
In later ages, the conviction of the danger to
which virtue is exposed while the mind continues
open to the influence of riches, has determined
many to vows of perpetual poverty; they have
suppressed desire by cutting off the possibility
of gratification...But by debarring themselves
from evil, they have rescinded many
opportunities of good... (Rambler 131, IV 335)
[So - to play off the preceding citation against
this one - if ordinary poverty is granted few
opportunities of resisting evil, monastic
poverty is granted few of performing it (while
at the same time, like ordinary poverty, being
granted few of doing good)]
Great numbers who quarrel with their
condition... have never contemplated the
difference between good and evil sufficiently to
250
quicken aversion, or invigorate desire.
(Rambler 178, V 176) [This item is
simultaneously an instance of a distinction
modelled on a philosophical schema: v. footnote
31 above 3
Now destroying the authority of the [Highland]
chiefs set the people loose. It did not pretend
to bring any positive good, but only to cure
some evil. (Hebrides Journal 260)
...but the innovators whom I oppose are turning
off attention from life to nature. They seem to
think that we are placed here to watch the
growth of plants, or the motions of the stars.
Socrates was rather of opinion that what we had
to learn was, how to do good, and avoid evil.
("Milton", hives I 100)
This last example is of particular interest because
its pivotal words 'how to do good and avoid evil" are not
the ones Johnson originally set down on his page. We know
from Boswell's lists of "Vari[ant] Readings" included in
the Life that the words which originally filled the place
now occupied by 'do good and avoid evil' were "obtain and
communicate happiness" (1097). The change Johnson made to
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his text strikes me ■ as significant and revealing -
revealing of a dual impulse: first, to prefer the forceful
distinction to alternative locutions and, second, to
formulate it in unmistakably moral terms.
A refinement on the distinction between good and evil
is the distinction between the proportions, or comparative
degrees, of good and ill, as in the following examples:
Dr Johnson never went to see Dr Dodd [in
prison]. He said to me, 'it would have done him
more harm, than good to Dodd. . . ' (Life 832)
[emphasis in original]
Talking of biography, I said, in writing a life,
a man's peculiarities should be mentioned...
JOHNSON: Sir, there is no doubt as to
peculiarities: the question is, whether a man's
vices should be mentioned; for instance, whether
it should be mentioned that Addison and Parnell
drank too freely: for people will probably more
easily indulge in drinking from knowing this; so
that more ill may be done by the example than
good by telling the whole truth. (Life 839-40)
Highlighting the distinction between sins of omission
and commission are these words, spoken by Rasselas:
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"Surely", said the prince, "my father must be
negligent of his charge, if any man in his
dominions dares take that which belongs to
another. Does he not know that kings are
accountable for injustice permitted as well as
done?" (in Bronson 622)
Given that one is apt to become particularly conscious
of wrongs of omission and commission when casting up a
reckoning of one's life, and considering that Johnson
accorded himself exceptional scope for soul-searchings and
self-reckonings through his habit of prayer, and more
particularly through his practice of composing prayers and
meditations at specific times of the year (among others,
Easter Day and his birthday), it comes as no surprise to
discover among his numerous productions in this line not
a few in which he records perceived wrongs of omission and
commission, and plays them off against each other. Here
are a couple of examples:
Almighty and most merciful Father... have mercy
upon me. I have committed many crimes. I have
neglected many duties. I have done what Thou
hast forbidden, and left undone what thou hast
commanded... (Prayers I 139)
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Jan. 23. 1759. The day on which my dear Mother
was buried...
Almighty God, merciful Father, in whose
hands are life and death... Forgive me whatever
I have done unkindly to my Mother, and whatever
I have omitted to do kindly... (Prayers I 66)
Playing off virtue against vice, Johnson brings into
focus some important differences between them:
...though there are few who will practise a
laborious virtue, there will never be wanting
multitudes that will indulge an easy vice.
("Savage", Lives II 374)
... it seldom happens that we can contain
ourselves long in a neutral state, or forbear to
sink into vice, when we are no longer soaring
towards virtue. (Rambler 103, IV 187)
Johnson's manner, as he draws the lines of distinction
between right and wrong, acquires, it seems to me, a
particularly clear-cut and emphatic quality:
"While they [the Scots] confine their
benevolence... exclusively to those of their own
country, they expect to share in the good
offices of other people. Now (said Johnson)
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this principle is either right or wrong; if
right, we should do well to imitate such
conduct; if wrong, we cannot too much detest
it." (Life 439)
But truth, when it is reduced to practice,
easily becomes subject to caprice and
imagination, and many particular acts will be
wrong, though their general principle be right.
(Idler 52, II 162) [Modelled as it is on the
schema 'General vs. Particular', this item could
be assigned as readily to the category
'Distinctions Modelled on Philosophical
Schemata' as to this one]
...the truth is that the knowledge of external
nature, and the sciences which that knowledge
requires or includes, are not the great or the
frequent business of the human mind. Whether we
provide for action or conversation, whether we
wish to be useful or pleasing, the first
requisite is the religious and moral knowledge
of right and wrong. ("Milton", Lives I 99)
This last citation opens a window, it seems to me, on
to that which is truly central both in Johnson's view of
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humankind and in his value-system.
Philosophical Distinction-making
In his setpiece character sketch at the end of the
Life. Boswell picks out for special mention two hallmark
features of Johnson's psychic makeup, his "most logical
head" and "most fertile imagination" (1402). If, insofar
as distinction-making is concerned, Johnson's 'most fertile
imagination' comes most visibly into its own in the realm
of 'Distinctions by appeal to Analogy' , then his 'most
logical head' makes its influence felt more conspicuously
and more emphatically in the domain I have labelled
'Philosophical' than it does anywhere else; and if, in this
domain, the driving force behind his distinction-making was
his 'logical head', its efforts were certainly befriended
and seconded by his predilections: at Oxford, "the study
of which he was the most fond," Boswell tells us, "was
Metaphysicks" (Life 52); and, in general, "he delighted to
express familiar thoughts in philosophical language"38
(ibid. 156). Here is an example of that:
Of charity it is superfluous to observe, that it
38 Apposite in this connection is W K Wimsatt's judgment: "It would be 
inept... to speak of anything like a Ruling Passion. Yet Johnson's 
bent for philosophic imagery and diction was among the most permanent 
attachments of his mind..." (1948:69).
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• could have no place if there were no want; for
of a virtue which could not be practised, the
omission could not be culpable. Evil [here the
evil of want] is not only the occasional but the
efficient cause of charity; we are incited to
the relief of misery by the consciousness that
we have the same nature with the sufferer, that
we are in danger of the same distresses, and may
sometime implore the same assistance. (Idler
89, II 277)
The philosophical gusto of this passage is
unmistakable: as if it were not enough to employ (in the
first three or four lines) a mode of reasoning that is, in
its logical schematism, already most strenuously
philosophical, there is still the appeal to the
'certifiably' philosophical distinction between occasional
(i.e. subsidiary) and efficient (i.e. primary) causes39.
So what is on display here is distinction-making of a
formally, indeed, ceremoniously philosophical character.
Baked in the same mould, as it were, are these examples:
But though where there is vice there must be
39 occasional cause: "a secondary cause whereby or whereupon the 
primary or efficient cause comes into operation" (Oxford English 
Dictionary 2nd edition).
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want of reverence, it is not reciprocally true,
that where there is want of reverence there is
always vice. (Idler 51, II 159) [this is an
instance of denial of the contrary]
"Why", said the prince, "did thy father desire
the increase of his wealth, when it was already
greater than he durst discover or enjoy? I am
unwilling to doubt thy veracity, yet
inconsistencies cannot both be true."
"Inconsistencies", answered Imlac, "cannot
be right, but, imputed to man, they may both be
true." (Rasselas. in Bronson 623) [here we have
an instance of the subtle philosophical
(casuistical?) distinction between what is
(logically) right and what is true]
The great majority of Johnson's 'philosophical'
distinctions are not, however, of this strenuously and
explicitly philosophical stamp. They are, rather,
implicitly philosophical, being modelled, in an unassertive
but for all that unmistakable fashion, on a variety of
schematic formations all of a recognizably philosophical
cast. But before getting down to an analysis of these
schematically structured distinctions, I have to face up
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to a question- I raised, earlier in the chapter because if
I don't I court the imputation of barking up the wrong tree
to begin with. The question to be confronted is that of
the justification for having two separate groupings
labelled 'Conceptual' and 'Philosophical': is not this an
artificial division? What after all is the difference
between them? Are they not really just one and the same
thing under different names? In answer to these questions,
I would say, yes, in one sense they are: inasmuch as the
items in the two categories making up the genus
'Philosophical' all mediate concepts of one kind or
another, they are indeed justifiably regarded as
'conceptual'40, but - and this is the crucial point - what
is really distinctive about them is not so much their
conceptual content as their configuration, their formal
organization - and this is of an unmistakably philosophical
cast. In short, all these items are modelled on
recognizably philosophical schemata41 of one type or
another. This was a feature that came into view already
in the initial stages of my research, so the pattern early
40 The reverse, however, does not necessarily hold true: not everything 
'conceptual' is of necessity at the same time 'philosophical'.
41 By 'philosophical schemata' I mean the formal, almost diagrammatic, 
structures of reasoning, argument and analysis characteristic of 
philosophical discourse.
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began to emerge of a growing number of items all sharing
the attribute of philosophical modelling; that being so,
it seemed to me not just desirable but necessary, indeed
obligatory, to bring them together and constitute them as
an independent category on the basis of the shared
attribute. In the event, there seemed to be good reason
for establishing not one but two categories structured on
philosophical schemata; together they make up one of my
more populous aggregations.
Of the two, one is a good deal larger than the other:
designated 'Distinctions Modelled on Philosophical
Schemata', it contains a large number of items dispersed
among a sizable number of schematic formations. The
smaller category, titled 'Things in Themselves
Distinguished from their Effects' consists, self-evidently,
of fewer items, and all of them are modelled on just one
schema. I propose to consider the larger category first.
Distinctions Modelled on Philosophical Schemata
The schemata comprehended by this category fall
naturally into two groups. The organizing formulae of the
first group are these:
Positive vs. negative
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Active vs. passive (and its sibling, action vs.
abstention)
Commission (of an act) vs. omission
Exemption from something vs. positive possession
of something
Attraction vs. repulsion
The organizing formulae of the second group are:
Particular vs. General
Kind vs. degree
Extent vs. degree
Gradations/Comparisons of degree
What vs. How
What vs. When
The basis of distinction between these two groups is
that all the formations of the first are really just
permutations of the positive< >negative antithesis, which
may accordingly be viewed as a 'master' schema, a
'genotype' (to borrow a term from biology). By contrast,
the formations of the second group owe nothing to the
positive< >negative schema nor, indeed, to any master-type
at all; they are not permutations; each of them is rather
a type unto itself.
Because the 'master' schema of the first group - the
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positive< >negative antithesis - is structured on so
emphatic an opposition, the distinctions modelled on it,
or on its permutations, tend in their turn to take shape
as strongly contrasted oppositions - as antitheses, in
other words. Some of the most antithetically complexioned
of all Johnson's distinctions are those modelled on the
positive< >negative opposition. As this is the
foundational schema, it seems proper to consider it first.
When one considers how wide-ranging and variegated is
Johnson's interrogation of the 'text' of men, manners and
morals, it is worthy of remark that he is minded as often
as he is to 'read' it in terms of the workings of the
positive< >negative contrast. Here is a sampling of that
'reading':
[W]e know rather what he [Milton] was not, than
what he was. He was not of the church of Rome;
he was not of the church of England. ("Milton",
Lives I 155)
This, and this only, is told by Pope, who is
more willing...to shew what his father was not,
than what he was. ("Pope", Lives III 83)
[Collins] affected the obsolete when it was not
worthy of revival; and he puts his words out of
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the common order, seeming to think, with some
later candidates for fame, that not to write
prose is certainly.to write poetry. ("Collins",
Lives III 341) [Defining poetry negatively as
'not prose', Collins's error, then, is to
mistake negative for positive]
There is a certain piquancy in playing off the censure
of Collins against the following exchange:
BOSWELL: Then, Sir, what is poetry? JOHNSON:
Why, Sir, it is much easier to say what it is
not. We all know what light is; but it is not
easy to tell what it is. (Life 744) [emphasis
in original] [This item is simultaneously an
instance of 'Distinction by appeal to Analogy']
Every man ought to endeavour at eminence, not by
pulling others down, but by raising himself...
(Rambler 9, III 50)
Prudence... rather prevents loss than procures
advantages... (Idler 57, II 177-78) [negative
gains distinguished from positive]
Likewise:
Rules may obviate faults, but can never confer
beauties. (ibid. 178)
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...judgement in the operations of intellect can
hinder faults, but not produce excellence.
("Prior", Lives II 208)
[T] he Persians always conceived an invincible
contempt of a man, who had violated the laws of
secrecy; for they thought, that, however he
might be deficient in the qualities requisite to
actual excellence, the negative virtues at least
were in his power, and though he perhaps could
not speak well if he was to try, it was still
easy for him not to speak. (Rambler 13, III 68)
Of these recluses [the members of monastic
orders] it may. . .be affirmed, that they have
secured their innocence, by the loss of their
virtue...and that lest they should do what they
ought not to do, they leave much undone, which
they ought to do. (Sermons XIV 33) [emphasis in
original] [This item is also an instance of
'Distinction between Near-Synonyms' :
innocence/virtue]
The next three examples show Johnson distinguishing
positive virtues from negative with reference to a realm -
that of social conduct - whose importance to him as an
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object of perpetual curiosity and of unremitting critical
scrutiny was second only to its importance in his actual
life-experience. The modus operandi of the positive<
>negative polarity on which the distinctions are modelled
involves in each instance playing off the positive social
virtue of giving pleasure/delight against the negative one
of forbearing to give offence/pain. In the first of the
passages, Johnson's "happy discriminative...portrait of the
late Mr Fitzherbert of Derbyshire", the positive< >negative
antithesis is expressly pointed up; in the other two
exemplification supplies the place of explicit mention:
"There was...no sparkle, no brilliancy in
Fitzherbert; but I never knew a man who was so
generally acceptable. ...He was an instance of
the truth of the observation, that a man will
please more upon the whole by negative qualities
than by positive; by never offending than by
giving a great deal of delight. (Life 835-36)
Gayety seldom fails to give some pain; the
hearers either strain their faculties to
accompany its towerings, or are left behind in
envy and despair. Good humour [by
contrast]...pleases principally by not
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offending. (Rambler 72, IV 14)
. . .though it be the privilege of a very small
number to ravish and to charm, every man may
hope by rules and caution not to give pain, and
may, therefore, by the help of good-breeding,
enjoy the kindness of mankind, though he should
have no claim to higher distinctions. (Rambler
98, IV 161-62)
Now I want to bring forward examples of
discriminations modelled on those schematic matrices that
are really just permutations of the positive< >negative
'genotype':
We talked of the Roman Catholick religion.
JOHNSON: In the barbarous ages, Sir, priests and
people were equally deceived; but afterwards
there were gross corruptions introduced by the
clergy, such as indulgencies to priests to have
concubines, and the worship of images, not,
indeed, inculcated, but knowingly permitted.
(Life 729) [active vs. passive]
[Milton] did not refuse admission to the
thoughts or images of his predecessors, but he
did not seek them. ("Milton", Lives I 194)
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[active vs. passive]
Yet they [contemporary stage tragedies] may at
least claim this commendation, that they avoid
gross faults, and that if they cannot often move
terror or pity, they are always careful not to
provoke laughter. (Rambler 125, IV 305) [action
vs. abstention]
...but a letter is addressed to a single mind,
of which the prejudices and partialities are
known; and must therefore please, if not by
favouring them, by forbearing to oppose them.
("Pope", Lives III 207) [action vs. abstention]
[T]hey [the monastic orders] have too often sunk
into inactivity and uselessness; and though they
have forborn to injure society, have not fully
paid their contributions to its happiness.
(Rambler 131, IV 335) [action vs. abstention]
In the next three examples Johnson's moral and social
perspectives intersect: the distinctions here turn on
intentional lying (an act of commission) being played off
against negligence to ascertain the truth (an act of
omission):
He [Johnson] said, "Burnet's History of his own
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times is very entertaining. The style, indeed,
is mere chit-chat. I do not believe that Burnet
intentionally lyed; but he was so much
prejudiced, that he took no pains to find out
the truth..." (Life 510)
...when I rose to go to church in the afternoon,
I was informed there had been an earthquake, of
which, it seems, the shock had been felt, in
some degree, at Ashbourne. JOHNSON: Sir, it
will be much exaggerated in popular talk: for,
in the first place, the common people do not
accurately adapt their thoughts to the objects;
nor, secondly, do they accurately adapt their
words to their thoughts: they do not mean to
lie; but, taking no pains to be exact, they give
you very false accounts. (Life 825) [this item
is simultaneously an instance of 'Distinction­
making by way of Enumeration/Hierarchical
Ordering' : "in the first place" >>
"... secondly"]
...Our lively hostess [Mrs Thrale]...ventured to
say [that] little variations in narrative must
happen a thousand times a day, if one [were] not
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perpetually watching. JOHNSON: Well, Madam, and
you ought to be perpetually watching. It is
more from carelessness about truth than from
intentional lying, that there is so much
falsehood in the world. (Life 899) [emphasis
in original]
The schema underpinning the following examples is
configured on the contrast between exemption from something
unwelcome and undesirable (a negative condition) and the
possession, either enjoyed or envisaged, of something
welcome and desirable (a positive condition). So, for
example, in the first item below, the negative is exemption
from reproach (a "negative recompense", as Johnson calls
it), and the contrasted positive, the (hoped-for)
possession of praise:
Every other authour may aspire to praise; the
lexicographer can only hope to escape reproach,
and even this negative recompense has been yet
granted to very few. ("Preface" to the
Dictionary, in Bronson 234)
That such authors [literary scribblers] are not
to be rewarded with praise is evident... but
surely though they cannot aspire to honour, they
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may be exempted from ignominy, and adopted into
that order of men which deserves our kindness
though not our reverence. (Rambler 145, V 11)
There are others [among the 'admirers of
solitude'] of minds more delicate and
tender... Such men are in haste to retire from
grossness, falsehood and brutality; and hope to
find in private habitations at least a negative
felicity, and exemption from the shocks and
perturbations with which public scenes are
continually distressing them. (Adventurer 126,
II 472) [This is a truncated distinction: the
normal binary structure of distinction-making
remains incomplete here because 'positive
felicity' does not actually feature in the
statement; it is only implied]
Prudence.. .often escapes miscarriages, but
seldom reaches either power or honour. (Idler
57, II 177-78) The gratification of curiosity
rather frees us from uneasiness than confers
pleasure. (Rambler 103, IV 186)
Finally (as far as permutations of the positive<
>negative 'genotype' are concerned) I want to look at
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distinctions modelled on the attraction vs. repulsion
antithesis:
It is to be suspected that his [Milton's]
predominant desire was to destroy rather than
establish, and that he felt not so much the love
of liberty as repugnance to authority.
("Milton", Lives I 157)
They who have already enjoyed the crouds and
noise of the great city, know that their desire
to return is little more than the restlessness
of a vacant mind, that they are not so much led
by hope as driven by disgust, and wish rather to
leave the country than to see the town. (Idler
80, II 250)
So much, then, for examples of Johnson's recourse to
the positive< >negative schema as a matrix for distinction­
making. I could have brought forward twice as many were
I so minded, but obviously there has to be a cap on
'exuberance of exemplification'. Even so, arguing just
from the evidence proffered (and also, I should add, from
subjective impressions gained in the course of my transit
through the Johnsonian oeuvre), I would say there exist
grounds enough for hypothesizing that the positive<
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>negative paradigm was woven into the very warp and woof
of Johnson's psychic constitution42, importantly shaping
42 I would claim, furthermore, that it was the negative pole of the 
positive< >negative dyad with which Johnson's psyche was instinctively 
more in tune. The general complexion of the numerous positive< 
>negative items cited above, together with the particular detail of 
many of them (". . .he was not of the church of Rome; he was not of the 
church of England"; "There was...no sparkle, no brilliancy in 
Fitzherbert; but...", etc., etc.), underlines, it seems to me, how 
sensitive Johnson was to negative states, negative qualities and the 
'negative virtues' (as he describes them in one of the exemplary 
passages quoted above). Reinforcing the impression produced by the 
examples already brought forward is evidence coming from another 
quarter, the Dictionary. What specifically is of interest here is the 
frequency with which Johnson has recourse in the Dictionary to 
definition by negatives or by contraries.
The predicament that drives lexicographers to fall back on the 
pis aller of definition by contraries or by negatives is an altogether 
unavoidable one. Sooner or later every lexicographer comes up against 
the problem that Johnson, who was only too aware of it, describes as 
follows: "To explain, requires the use of terms less abstruse than 
that which is to be explained, and such terms cannot always be found 
("Preface" to the Dictionary, in Bronson 245). In this kind of 
situation (very much of the catch-22 type), where 'terms less 
abstruse' (than, ordinarily, the commonest and most simple words of a 
language, and typically its adjectives) simply cannot be found, the 
only way of breaking out of what would otherwise be a closed circle is 
by resorting to the lexicographically invidious but unavoidable 
expedient of definition by contraries or by negatives (e.g. "open - 
not impeding or preventing passage; not shut up; not covered over; not 
clogged" (Webster)).
This dilemma, as I have said, is one that all lexicographers 
sooner or later come up against and must somehow cope with, but the 
particular point of interest in the present context is that in dealing 
with this difficulty Johnson appears to have been especially prone to 
enlisting the help of negatives and contraries in his definitions of 
problematical words. This is the thesis advanced by Isobel Grundy 
from whose exposition the following citation is drawn:
[Johnson] often defines by... contraries (as his first 
meaning for fat is 'the contrary to lean'), especially in 
explanation of those words which are 'too much known, to 
be happily illustrated'. Being more aware than his 
predecessors that 'nothing can be defined but by the use 
of words too plain to admit a definition', he makes more 
use of contraries than they do...He defines many pairs of 
words (light and heavy, thick and thin, lean and fat, long 
and short) each in terms of its opposite. Long is 'not 
short' and short, contrariwise, 'not long'. He uses these 
contraries even more profusely when defining conditions 
which indicate a lack of something: little, low, small and 
dark are defined more in terms of contraries than 
light/heavy, and so on...Of Johnson's five definitions of
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little, three employ 'not'. His first definition of small 
includes 'not great' and his last 'not strong' ... For the 
adjective low, nine of the sixteen definitions begin with 
'not' . . . 'Not' or its equivalent appears in each of 
Johnson's seven definitions of the adjective dark... 
(1986:13-14)
Assuming the case Grundy constructs is well founded - and I 
believe it is - then it is clearly one that lends support to my 
contention that Johnson's mind, in its encounter with the positive< 
>negative antithesis, manifests an exceptional degree of 
responsiveness to - indeed, an instinctive affinity for - the negative 
polarity.
Continuing her argument, Grundy remarks that "little, low, 
small, petty and dark...which invite definition by negatives, differ 
from their opposites... in carrying a sense of privation. Johnson 
defines privativeness as 'Notation of absence of something that should 
be present'. ...The Dictionary explains the several senses of pretty 
in terms of deprivation, in a manner increasingly derogatory: '1. 
Neat; elegant; pleasing without surprise or elevation. 2. Beautiful 
without grandeur or dignity. 3. It is used in a kind of diminutive 
contempt in poetry, and in conversation...'" (14). Grundy's 
perception of Johnson's uncommon responsiveness to the privative 
dimension of words (that is, to the way in which, in words with a 
privative resonance, meaning is defined less with reference to stated 
attributes than with reference to the missing or excluded ones they 
strongly evoke) is more suggestive than she realizes. For there is, 
as I see it, an unmistakable connection (not remarked by Grundy) 
between Johnson's highly-developed 'feel' for linguistic 
'privativeness' and yet another of those strongly marked traits of his 
mindset - a profound consciousness of, and sensitivity to, the 
absences and 'vacuities' in human existence and experience. These 
"vacuities of life", as he calls them (v. Idler 73, II 228; Adventurer 
128, II 476), which are registered symptomatically as a sense of 
perpetual disappointment, frustration and dissatisfaction, and of 
radical personal unfulfilment, are the outgrowth of a felt shortfall, 
gap or void at the centre of being. Perhaps only dimly descried, 
though painfully experienced as a sensation of radical unfulfilment, 
this void is in its turn an outgrowth of the fact (as Johnson saw it) 
that human cravings always outstrip the capacity of anything to 
gratify them ("It is impossible to supply wants as fast as an idle 
imagination may be able to form them" Rambler 128, IV 319; cf. Bate 
(1955) Ch. 2, "The Hunger of Imagination"). This fact he viewed as an 
existential 'given', an inescapable concomitant of the human 
condition. Profoundly - and poignantly - conscious as he was of this 
'given' , he was more profoundly and poignantly conscious still of the 
psychological bind to which it gives rise: the incessant, restless 
pursuit of pleasure, novelty, worldly success and riches aimed at 
filling the void at the centre of existence, and their predestined 
failure, because of the unbridgeable gulf between desire and 
gratification, to secure this objective - and then, at the symptomatic 
level, the registration of that failure as sensations of perpetual 
frustration, disappointment and unfulfilment. When, in Rambler 32, 
Johnson speaks of "Infelicity [as] involved in corporeal nature, and
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some of his basic thought patterns, which his distinction­
making drive enlisted for its own uses as occasion arose43.
interwoven with our being" (III 175) , he is, as much as anything, 
gesturing precisely towards this inescapable, incommutable 'sentence' 
of radical human unfulfilment. The definitive statement, though, of 
his sense of life's vacuity is put in the mouth of Imlac, his 
philosopher-spokesman in Rasselas (a paradigm case, if ever there was 
one, of the motif of the frustrated, disappointed quest). Speaking 
through Imlac, Johnson offers an incisive analysis of the 
psychological distortions that both accompany and result from the 
imperative need to propitiate, through a resort to expedients 
increasingly extravagant and redundant, the voracious cravings of the 
void within. The occasion of Imlac's disquisition is a visit with his 
three companions to the pyramids, the sight of which elicits the 
following reflection:
Of the wall [the Great Wall of China] it is very easy to 
assign the motives. It secured a wealthy and timorous 
nation from the incursions of Barbarians...
But for the pyramids no reason has ever been given 
adequate to the cost and labour of the work. The 
narrowness of the chambers proves that it could afford no 
retreat from enemies, and treasures might have been 
reposited at far less expence with equal security. It 
seems to have been erected only in compliance with that 
hunger of imagination which preys incessantly upon life, 
and must be always appeased by some employment. Those who 
have already all that they can enjoy, must enlarge their 
desires. He that has built for use, till use is supplied, 
must begin to build for vanity, and extend his plan to the 
utmost power of human performance, that he may not be soon 
reduced to form another wish.
I consider this mighty structure as a monument of 
the insufficiency of human enjoyments. A king, whose 
power is unlimited, and whose treasures surmount all real 
and imaginary wants, is compelled to solace, by the 
erection of a pyramid, the satiety of dominion and 
tastelessness of pleasures, and to amuse the tediousness 
of declining life, by seeing thousands labouring without 
end, and one stone, for no purpose, laid upon another. 
Whoever thou art, that, not content with a moderate 
condition, imaginest happiness in royal magnificence, and 
dreamest that command or riches can feed the appetite of 
novelty with perpetual gratifications, survey the 
pyramids, and confess thy folly! (in Bronson 671-72)
43 It appears, indeed, that not only Johnson's distinction-making drive 
but other of his dualizing mental operations as well were modelled on, 
or, at least, were strongly influenced by, the positive< >negative 
antithesis. Consider, for example, Walter Jackson Bate's contention 
that
Much of Johnson's greater writing on human nature and
274
Now I want to move on to consider the varieties of
philosophical distinction-making modelled on those schemata
which have been grouped together on the purely exclusionary
basis of not falling within the purview of the positive<
>negative master-type. To begin with, here are some
examples of distinctions modelled on the contrast between
Particular and General; the first is probably the most
celebrated of its kind in the entire Johnsonian canon:
"The business of a poet", said Imlac, "is to
examine not the individual, but the species; to
remark general properties and large appearances:
he does not number the streaks of the
tulip...and must neglect the minuter
discriminations... for those characteristicks
which are alike obvious to vigilance and
carelessness". (Rasselas in Bronson 628-29)
human life falls into a distinctive literary type, 
eminently characteristic of him, that we might call 
"satire manque" or "satire foiled". It involves a kind of 
double action in which a strong satiric blow is about to 
strike home unerringly when another arm at once reaches 
out and deflects or rather lifts it. (1975: 493-94)
To me this reads like nothing so much as a description of the 
positive< >negative schema manifesting itself through an alternating 
permutation which one could perhaps characterize as 'propulsion and 
recoil'. Considering the claim I advance regarding the 
'embeddedness' of the positive< >negative antithesis in Johnson's 
mental make-up, I find it significant that Bate, referring to his bent 
for 'satire manque', represents it "as a habit of thought... so deeply 
ingrained...that we see it throughout the whole course of his adult 
life" (ibid. 494). [my emphasis]
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The resemblance of poetick numbers to the
subject which they mention or describe, may be
considered as general or particular; as
consisting in the flow and structure of a whole
passage taken together, or as comprised in the
sound of some emphatical and descriptive words,
or in the cadence and harmony of single verses.
(Rambler 94, IV 135)
[Dryden's] criticism may be considered as
general or occasional. In his general
precepts... he may doubtless be safely
recommended to the confidence of the reader; but
his occasional and particular positions were
sometimes interested, sometimes negligent, and
sometimes capricious. ("Dryden", Lives I 413)
Whoever commits a fraud is guilty not only of
the particular injury to him whom he deceives,
but of the diminution of that confidence which
constitutes not only the ease but the existence
of society. (Rambler 79, IV 55) [In this
instance the dimension of generality - the
general ease and existence of society - is
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implied rather than stated]
The philosophical schema on which the following items
are modelled is that of Kind vs. Degree:
Every man is prompted by the love of himself to
imagine, that he possesses some qualities,
superior, either in kind or in degree, to those
which he sees allotted to the rest of the world.
(Rambler 21, III 115)
...I think the strictest moralists allow forms
of address to be used without much regard to
their literal acceptation, when either respect
or tenderness requires them, because they are
universally known to denote not the degree but
the species of our sentiments. (Idler 50, II
158)
Next we have distinctions modelled on the contrast -
a quite subtle one - between degree and extent (or scope):
Mankind are universally corrupt, but corrupt in
different degrees; as they are universally
ignorant, yet with greater or less irradiations
of knowledge. (Adventurer 137, II 489)
Infelicity is involved in corporeal nature, and
interwoven with our being; all attempts
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therefore to decline it wholly are useless and
vain: the armies of pain send their arrows
against us on every side, the choice is only
between those which are more or less sharp, or
tinged with poison of greater or less
malignity... (Rambler 32, III 175-76)
I believe every reader will agree that in all
those passages [from Paradise Lostl, though not
equally in all, the music is injured. . .
(Rambler 88, IV 103)
To love all men is our duty. . .but to love all
equally is impossible... (Rambler 99, IV 166)
Here are some distinctions modelled on gradations
and/or comparisons of degree:
Lord Lyttelton' s poems ...have nothing to be
despised, and little to be admired.
("Lvttelton". Lives III
It is dangerous for
456)
mortal beauty... to be
examined by too strong a light . The torch of
truth shows much that we cannot, and all that we
would not see. (Rambler 10, III 53)
But it must be at least confessed that to
embellish the form of nature is an innocent
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amusement, and some praise must be allowed by
the most supercilious observer to him [here
Shenstone, who had taken to being an 'improver7]
who does best what such multitudes are
contending to do well. ("Shenstone", Lives III
351)
It is sufficient for Watts [in his devotional
verse] to have done better than others what no
man has done well. ("Watts", Lives III 310)
JOHNSON [speaking of the actresses Mrs Porter
and Mrs Clive]: Mrs. Porter in the vehemence of
rage, and Mrs. Clive in the sprightliness of
humour, I have never seen equalled. What Clive
did best, she did better than Garrick; but could
not do half so many things well. (Life 1252)
[This is a three-way distinction: well< >better<
>best; it also throws into relief the contrast
between extent and degree: '...could not do half
so many things well7]
"Dryden has written prologues superiour to any
that David Garrick has written; but David
Garrick has written more good prologues than
Dryden has done." (Life 598-99)
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One of the more frequently enlisted of the
philosophical schemata is the formation What vs. How (i.e.
a fact, act, event or condition as such distinguished from
the manner of its occurrence, performance or expression).
Here is a quintet of distinctions modelled on this
formation:
...the dart of death indeed falls from heaven,
but we poison it by our own misconduct; to die
is the fate of man, but to die with lingering
anguish is generally his folly. (Rambler 85, IV
83)
We talked of Pope. JOHNSON: He wrote his
Duneiad for fame. That was his primary motive.
. . .He delighted to vex them [the dunces] , no
doubt; but he had more delight in seeing how
well he could vex them. (Life 606)
"...though I hold the Irish to be rebels, I dont
think they have been so very wrong, but you know
that you compelled our Parliament... to pass an
act in your favour. That, I call rebellion."
"But Doctor," said I [the Reverend Thomas
Campbell], "did the Irish claim anything that
ought not to have been granted...?" "Sir, I
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•wont dispute that matter with you, but what I
insist upon is that the mode of requisition was
rebellious." (in Hill II 56)
I related a dispute between Goldsmith and Mr.
Robert Dodsley...Goldsmith asserted, that there
was no poetry produced in this age.
Dodsley...maintained that though you could not
find a palace like Dryden's Ode on St. Cecilia's
Day, you had villages composed of very pretty
houses... JOHNSON: I think Dodsley gave up the
question. He and Goldsmith said the same thing;
only he said it in a softer manner than
Goldsmith did; for he acknowledged that there
was no poetry, nothing that towered above the
common mark. (Life 743)
JOHNSON: Sir, he [the poet Thomas Gray] was dull
in company, dull in his closet, dull every
where. He was dull in a new way, and that made
many people think him GREAT. (Life 600)
[emphasis in original]
Finally, to round off this section, here is a
distinction modelled on the schema What vs. When (an act
distinguished from its timing):
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I will not say that what they [the recently
dissolved Ministry] did was always wrong; but it
was always done at a wrong time. (Life 1174)
I propose now to examine the smaller of the categories
in the grouping labelled 'Philosophical'; to this category
I have assigned the descriptive title 'Things in Themselves
Distinguished from their Effects'.
Things in Themselves Distinguished from their Effects
I could in principle have considered this category
under the same head as the formations I have just been
examining - that is, formations not of the positive<
>negative type; as it is technically not of this type
either, it could readily enough have been bracketed with
the other schemata unified on the exclusionary basis of not
falling within the scope of the positive< >negative
'genotype'. Given, however, that the schema 'Things in
Themselves as Distinct from their Effects' is so basic, so
ancient and so prominent in philosophical discourse - it
has its roots after all in Aristotle's distinction between
'substance' and 'accident', and is itself a 'genotype' for
all distinctions between 'inalienable' and 'alienable'
properties - I felt its special importance required to be
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recognized and signalled. As this purpose manifestly would
not have been served by simply lumping it together with the
other six schemata not of the positive< >negative type (for
that would have been to suggest that in point of importance
there was nothing to choose between it and them) , there
seemed to be solid grounds for constituting it as a
separate category in its own right. Here is a sampling of
the items it contains:
"The liberty of using harmless pleasures",
proceeded Imlac, "will not be disputed; but it
is still to be examined what pleasures are
harmless. The evil of any pleasure that Nekayah
can image is not in the act itself, but in its
consequences. Pleasure, in itself harmless, may
become mischievous, by endearing us to a state
which we know to be transient and probatory..."
(Rasselas. in Bronson 704)
Many enjoyments, innocent in themselves, may
become dangerous by too much frequency; publick
spectacles, convivial entertainments, domestick
games, sports of the field, or gay or ludicrous
conversation, all of them harmless, and some of
them useful, while they are regulated by
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religious prudence, may yet become pernicious,
when they pass their bounds, and usurp too much
of that time which is given us... (Sermons XIV
37)
I mentioned a club in London...the members of
which all assume Shakespeare's characters.
. . .JOHNSON: Don't be of it, sir. Now that you
have a name, you must be careful to avoid many
things, not bad in themselves, but which will
lessen your character. (Hebrides Journal 307)
...some solemn music being played on French
horns, he [Johnson] said, "This is the first
time that I have ever been affected by musical
sounds;" adding, "that the impression made upon
him was of a melancholy kind." Mr. Langton
saying, that this effect was a fine one
JOHNSON: Yes, if it softens the mind, so as to
prepare it for the reception of salutary
feelings, it may be good: but inasmuch as it is
melancholy per se, it is bad." (Life 1080-81)
...upon practice, not upon opinion, depends the
happiness of mankind; and controversies, merely
speculative, are of small importance in
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themselves, however they may have sometimes
heated a disputant, or provoked a faction.
(Rambler 81, IV 61)
The great hardships of poverty were to Savage
not the want of lodging or of food, but the
neglect and contempt which it drew upon him.
("Savage", Lives II 402-03)
All the interpretations of words [in the
Dictionary] are not written with same skill, or
the same happiness: things equally easy in
themselves, are not all equally easy to any
single mind. ("Preface" to the Dictionary, in
Bronson 247)
I have sought to show, under the 'thematic' head of
'Philosophical Distinction-making', how Dr Johnson's 'drive
to distinguish' expresses itself through a constellation
of discriminative formations, all of them of a recognizably
philosophical cast. Moving on, I now aim to show how this
same drive manifests itself in the domain of 'Conceptual
Distinction-making'.
Conceptual Distinction-making
This grouping consists of two categories, the larger
285
one by far bearing by far the shorter designation -
'Distinctions of Ideas' - while the smaller is encumbered
with the title 'A Specific Instance Expressly Distinguished
from a more or less Undifferentiated Backdrop'. In terms
of the number of individual items they contain, these two
categories together make up one of the more populous of my
groupings. I propose to deal first with the larger of the
two.
Distinctions of Ideas
If we think of ideas as being surrounded by 'fields'
of signification and implication, then these 'fields', in
their disposition relative to one another, may lie far
apart, or close by, or may even overlap. When they lie far
apart from one another that means that the ideas at their
centre belong to realms so different that there appears to
be no occasion for distinguishing between them - nor any
point in doing so. To exemplify: ideas about politics and
navigation belong to realms so self-evidently unrelated,
so 'other', that there exists no basis on which they 'ask'
to be distinguished from one another; and if it occurs to
anybody to do so, that would simply be using distinction­
making to state the obvious and to pay court to the
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pointless. When the 'fields of signification' lie close
to one another, the implication is that the points of
difference between the concepts they encompass will need
to be actually pointed up in order to be clearly descried.
So this is a case where distinction-making is clearly
called for; there is both occasion and reason for it; the
context is one in which it is apposite to speak of an
'invitation' being extended to distinction-making. When
the 'fields of signification' actually overlap, rendering
the differences between the concepts (or words) at their
centre obscure, if not imperceptible, to ordinary
understanding, then (to press into service the argument a
fortiori) the invitation to - and the need for -
distinction-making to bring those shadowy differences into
view is more clear-cut still. Of the three scenarios
outlined here, the one that applies to 'Distinctions of
Ideas', the category under discussion, is the middle case,
in which the 'fields of signification' lie close, possibly
adjacent, to one another; the third-mentioned scenario,
which posits a situation of actual 'field-overlap', applies
to the category I have styled 'Shades of Verbal Meaning:
Distinctions between Near-Synonyms' , a category I shall be
examining in the next section under the head of 'Verbal
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Distinction-making' . But it is as well to point out at
this juncture that the essential principle of
differentiation not only between the category under
discussion and the one labelled 'Distinctions between Near­
Synonyms' , but also between the groupings designated
'Conceptual' and 'Verbal', is precisely this question of
how and where the 'fields of signification and implication'
are disposed relative to one another. Since in the latter
case they actually overlap, distinction-making necessarily
becomes in that situation a business of "separating
similitudes" ("Preface" to the Dictionary, in Bronson 253).
In the former case, by contrast, where the 'fields' do no
more than lie close to one another, distinction-making
turns out to be much more a matter of pointing up
differences between concepts belonging to related, possibly
adjacent, domains - concepts manifesting liaison rather
than similitude. If the argument I am making here seems
overly abstract, I must hope that the examples I shall be
bringing forward will serve to clarify the picture.
The first of them is an exceedingly long one, but
amplitude of citation is, I believe, justified in this
instance not only because the passage in question so fully
and vividly sets the scene for the numerous examples that
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come after but also - and equally importantly - because it
communicates with such liveliness and fidelity the
authentic 'feel' of the distinction-making 'milieu' that
Johnson and his circle at one and the same time engendered
and inhabited. When they got together, they summoned into
existence, quite naturally, quite spontaneously, it would
seem, a kind of academy of distinction-making; actually,
it was more like a hothouse, though when Johnson came to
the fore, which he seldom failed to do, it began turning
into a theatre of distinction-making. As the Drury-lane
playhouse provided a stage for Garrick's exceptional
talents, so a gathering of Johnson and his friends provided
a stage for his. This was the world he 'bestrid' with
effortless pre-eminence44; this was the arena in which he
"exult [ed] ...in his powers"45 (Life 1402), and particularly
(from the standpoint of the present inquiry) his powers as
a maker of distinctions. In discharging this role he could
usually be relied on to turn in a bravura performance: the
air of 'performance', indeed, clings heavily (perhaps
44 Cf. Sir John Hawkins: "...as Alexander and Caesar were born for 
conquest, so was Johnson for the office of a symposiarch, to preside 
in all conversations; and I never yet saw the man who would venture to 
contest his right" (110).
45 Clingham offers, to my mind, an accurate insight into the importance 
conversation had for Johnson when he writes that "conversation was to 
Johnson a mode of being and action that entailed a moral engagement 
with others, with the world, with self and even with God" (46).
289
headily) to his distinction-making style - and so what 
catches the eye is not only the address with which he
seizes upon just the ideas and topics that lend themselves
with particular readiness to distinction-making, nor only
the precision, skill and flair with which he generates
important and illuminating distinctions as he trains upon
the issues under consideration the laser-like beam of his
probing and disentangling intellect, but also the gusto
with which he does all this; and not seldom one gets the
feeling that there's quite a bit of glee mixed in with the
gusto (it is at these points of course that the sense of
Johnson's 'exulting in his powers' comes through most
strongly) . In the extended passage from the Life which
follows, all these features are on display; it seems to me
indeed that in the scene here recorded Johnson could be
described as getting almost drunk on distinction-making.
The topic under discussion - that of toleration - is after
all an important as well as complex one, thus inviting the
framing of important distinctions, and this circumstance
perhaps roused his distinction-making drive to a
particularly intense pitch of activity; but even where the
topic is slight and nothing important is at stake, there
too his" drive to distinguish is ever at the ready, needing
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no second invitation to click into action46. So much then
for my 'prologue'; now comes the 'swelling act' of my
citation:
I introduced the subject of toleration.
JOHNSON: Every society has the right to preserve
publick peace and order, and therefore has a
good right to prohibit the propagation of
opinions which have a dangerous tendency. To
say the magistrate has this right, is using an
inadequate word: it is the society for which the
magistrate is agent. He may be morally or
theologically wrong in restraining the
propagation of opinions which he thinks
dangerous, but he is politically right. MAYO:
I am of opinion, Sir, that every man is entitled
to liberty of conscience in religion; and that
the magistrate cannot restrain that right.
46 Here is an example:
Talking of shaving the other night at Dr. Taylor's, Dr. 
Johnson said, "Sir, of a thousand shavers, two do not 
shave so much alike as not to be distinguished." I 
thought this not possible, till he specified so many of 
the varieties in shaving - holding the razor more or less 
perpendicular; drawing long or short strokes; beginning at 
the upper part of the face, or the under; at the right 
side or the left side. Indeed, when one considers what 
variety of sounds can be uttered by the windpipe, in the 
compass of a very small aperture, we may be convinced how 
many degrees of difference there may be in the application 
of a razor. (Life 846)
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JOHNSON: Sir, I agree with you. Every man has
a right to liberty of conscience, and with that
the magistrate cannot interfere. People
confound liberty of thinking with liberty of
talking; nay, with liberty of preaching. Every
man has a physical right to think as he pleases;
for it cannot be discovered how he thinks. He
has not a moral right; for he ought to inform
himself, and think justly. But, Sir, no member
of a society has a right to teach any doctrine
contrary to what that society holds to be true.
The magistrate, I say, may be wrong in what he
thinks: but, while he thinks himself right, he
may and ought to enforce what he thinks. MAYO:
Then, Sir, we are to remain always in errour,
and truth never can prevail; and the magistrate
was right in persecuting the first Christians.
JOHNSON: Sir, the only method by which religious
truth can be established is by martyrdom. The
magistrate has a right to enforce what he
thinks; and he who is conscious of the truth has
a right to suffer. I am afraid there is no
other way of ascertaining the truth, but by
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persecution on the one hand and enduring it on
the other. GOLDSMITH: But how is a man to act,
Sir? Though firmly convinced of the truth of
his doctrine, may he not think it wrong to
expose himself to persecution? Has he a right
to do so? Is it not, as it were, committing
voluntary suicide? ...JOHNSON: ...Sir, if a man
is in doubt whether it would be better to expose
himself to martyrdom or not, he should not do
it. He must be convinced that he has a
delegation from heaven. GOLDSMITH: I would
consider whether there is a greater chance of
good or evil upon the whole. If I see a man who
had fallen into a well, I would wish to help him
out; but if there is a greater probability that
he shall pull me in, than that I shall pull him
out, I would not attempt it. ...JOHNSON: Sir,
you must consider that we have perfect and
imperfect obligations. Perfect obligations,
which are generally not to do something, are
clear and positive; as, "thou shalt not kill".
But charity, for instance, is not definable by
limits. It is a duty to give to the poor; but
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no man can say how much another should give to
the poor, or when a man has given too little to
save his soul. In the same manner, it is a duty
to instruct the ignorant, and of consequence to
convert infidels to Christianity; but no man in
the common course of things is obliged to carry
this to such a degree as to incur the danger of
martyrdom... I have said that a man must be
persuaded that he has a particular delegation
from heaven. GOLDSMITH: How is this to be known?
Our first reformers, who were burnt for not
believing bread and wine to be CHRIST - JOHNSON
(interrupting him): Sir, they were not burnt for
not believing bread and wine to be CHRIST, but
for insulting those who did believe it. And,
Sir, when the first reformers began, they did
not intend to be martyred: as many of them ran
away as could. . . .MAYO: But, Sir, is it not
very hard that I should not be allowed to teach
my children what I really believe to be the
truth? JOHNSON: Why, Sir, you might contrive to
teach your children extra scandalum: but, Sir,
the magistrate, if he knows it, has a right to
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restrain you. Suppose you teach your children
to be thieves? MAYO: This is making a joke of
the subject. JOHNSON: Nay, Sir, take it thus: -
that you teach them the community of goods; for
which there are as many plausible arguments as
for most erroneous doctrines. You teach them
that all things at first were in common, and
that no man had a right to any thing but as he
laid his hands upon it; and that this still is,
or ought to be, the rule amongst mankind. Here,
Sir, you sap a great principle in society -
property. And don't you think the magistrate
would have a right to prevent you? . . .MAYO: I
think the magistrate has no right to interfere
till there is some overt act. BOSWELL: So, Sir,
though he sees an enemy to the state charging a
blunderbuss, he is not to interfere till it is
fired off? MAYO: He must be sure of its
direction against the state. JOHNSON: The
magistrate is to judge of that. - He has no
right to restrain your thinking, because the
evil centers in yourself. If a man were sitting
at this table, and chopping off his fingers, the
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magistrate, as guardian of the community, has no
authority to restrain him, however he might do
it from kindness as a parent. ...If I think it
right to steal Mr Dilly's plate, I am a bad man;
but he can say nothing to me. If I make an open
declaration that I think so, he will keep me out
of his house. If I put forth my hand, I shall
be sent to Newgate. This is the gradation of
thinking, preaching and acting: if a man thinks
erroneously, he may keep his thoughts to
himself, and nobody will trouble him; if he
preaches erroneous doctrine, society may expel
him; if he acts in consequence of it, the law
takes place, and he is hanged. MAYO: But, Sir,
ought not Christians to have liberty of
conscience? JOHNSON: I have already told you
so, Sir. You are coming back to where you were.
...Sir, it is no matter, politically, whether
the magistrate be right or wrong. ...Old Baxter,
I remember, maintains, that the magistrate
should "tolerate all things that are tolerable."
This is no good definition of toleration upon
any principle; but it shews that he thought some
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things were not tolerable. TOPLADY: Sir, you
have untwisted this difficult subject with great
dexterity. ...
A gentleman present ventured to ask Dr.
Johnson if there was not a material difference
as to toleration of opinions which lead to
action, and opinions merely speculative; for
instance, would it be wrong in the magistrate to
tolerate those who preach against the doctrine
of the TRINITY? ...JOHNSON: Why...Sir, I think
that permitting men to preach any opinion
contrary to the doctrine of the established
church tends, in a certain degree, to lessen the
authority of the church, and, consequently, to
lessen the influence of religion. "It may be
considered (said the gentleman) whether it would
not be politick to tolerate in such a case."
JOHNSON: Sir, we have been talking of right:
this is another question. X think it is not
politick to tolerate in such a case. (Life 538­
42, 543) [emphases in original]
While this episode from the Life undoubtedly succeeds
in capturing the flavour and 'feel' of a Johnsonian
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'symposium' (using the word in its original Greek sense of
a banquet characterized by the free interchange of ideas),
it as importantly prepares the way for the analysis which
follows by bringing into view well-defined examples of each
of the configurations into which the category 'Distinctions
of Ideas' naturally divides itself. It is to a discussion
of these two configurations or paradigms that I now turn.
The items in the category 'Distinctions of Ideas',
like those in the category 'Distinctions Modelled on
Philosophical Schemata', fall naturally into two groups,
the principle of differentiation between them being this:
the one group consists of items in which two (or more)
separate ideas/topics are distinguished from one another;
the other consists of items in which two (or more)
different aspects or attributes of one and the same idea
or topic are distinguished from one another. As I have
indicated, both these configurations are exemplified in the
long passage above: at the end of the citation Johnson
distinguishes what is right from what is 'politick': this
is an example (one of many in the passage) of separate,
though not unrelated, ideas being differentiated from each
other. At an earlier point in the extract he calls on
Goldsmith to "consider that we have perfect and imperfect
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obligations." Here there is but one foundational idea in
play, that of 'obligations', but this idea undergoes
Internal differentiation (bifurcation, in fact) as a pair
of contrasting attributes - perfect/imperfect - is brought
to bear on it. As it happens, these attributes are sharply
contrasted (they fall not far short of being antithetical);
consequently, the differentiation of the root idea
necessarily takes shape as a sharply contrasted opposition;
but this is an exceptional occurrence: in none of the
examples cited below will we find quite such antithetically
complexioned internal differentiation as we do here. In
any case, the degree of contrast informing the internal
differentiation is in no way relevant to the organizing
principle on which this sub-group is configured, a
principle which requires only (though uniformly) that the
distinctions drawn bring to light, and play off against one
another, different (how much or how little different is of
no consequence) aspects, 'angles' or 'shadings' of a single
idea or topic. I propose, then, to begin my examination
of 'Distinctions of Ideas' by turning the spotlight on to
this sub-group in which a single concept or topic undergoes
internal differentiation.
As the operative paradigm here is one in which a
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single entity (the - idea or topic) is subject to internal
differentiation, its schematic enactment always takes the
form of two (or more) entities (the aspects, 'angles', or
'shadings') being brought to bear on the one at the centre.
Manifested at the level of grammatical patterning, this
scheme presents a variety of configurations: the most
common by far is that in which two (or more) verbs bear
upon a single substantive; the rarer configurations present
a substantive qualified by two adjectives and a verb
modified by two adverbs. This feature of differential
grammatical patterning offers me a serviceable principle
of arrangement for the presentation of my examples which
are, accordingly, mustered under three heads; the items
collected under the first of these all involve two (or
more) verbs bearing on a single substantive:
The dictates of Zeno, who commands us to look
with indifference on external things, may
dispose us to conceal our sorrow, but cannot
assuage it. (Idler 41, II 131) [the root
concept 'sorrow' is internally differentiated
into 'sorrow concealed' vs. 'sorrow assuaged';
the other examples are all configured on the
same principle]
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...the difference between approving laws, and
obeying them, is frequently forgotten...
(Rambler 76, IV 34)
...the flying vapours of incipient madness,
which from time to time cloud reason without
eclipsing it... ("Addison", Lives II 97)
A few years af terwards. . . by the death of his
father, he [Lyttelton] inherited a baronet's
title with a large estate, which, though perhaps
he did not augment, he was careful to adorn...
("Lyttelton", Lives III 450)
The utmost that we can threaten to one another
is that death, which, indeed, we may
precipitate, but cannot retard... (Rambler 17,
III 95-96)
Many indeed...are not at fifty what they were at
thirty, but they commonly... followed the train
of external causes, and rather suffered
reformation than made it. (Idler 27, II 85)
It is, surely, less foolish and less criminal to
permit inaction than compel it... (Idler 38, II
120) [This item is simultaneously an example of
'Distinctions Modelled on Philosophical
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Schemata' (active vs. passive)] ■
He [Pope] laboured his works first to gain
reputation, and afterwards to keep it. ("Pope",
hives III 218)
...the pleasure of expecting enjoyment, is often
greater than that of obtaining it. . . (Rambler
71, IV 9)
This passion for the honour of a profession,
like that for the grandeur of our own country,
is to be regulated not extinguished. (Rambler
9, III 50)
[Savage] sometimes forgot that he gave others
pain to avoid it himself. ("Savage", Lives II
430-31)
...Besides, many particular motives influence a
writer, known only to himself... and it may be
justly concluded, that, not all letters which
are postponed are rejected, nor all that are
rejected, critically condemned. (Rambler 10,
III 51) [In this instance we find three verbs
converging on a single substantive which in
consequence is discriminated internally on a
three-fold basis: letters postponed vs. letters
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rejected vs. letters condemned]
I move on now to consider the items mustered under my
second head. The grammatical configuration at work here
is one in which a single substantive containing the root
idea undergoes conceptual differentiation as it registers
the modifying impress, so to speak, of two adjectives of
differing import. Here are a few examples:
The benevolence of Thomson was fervid but not
active. ("Thomson", Lives III 297)
...prudence keeps life safe, but does not often
make it happy. (Idler 57, II 17 8)
...the man of affectation may, perhaps, be
reclaimed, by finding...how much more securely
he might make his way to esteem, by cultivating
real, than displaying counterfeit qualities.
(Rambler 20, III 113-14)
He [Prior] has many vigorous but few happy
lines; he has every thing by purchase, and
nothing by gift... ("Prior", Lives II 209) [This
item is deserving of special comment; it is
nothing if not a teeming womb of distinction­
making: in the compass of no more than two lines
four quite distinct differentiations are
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spawned: many/few; vigorous/happy;
everything/nothing; purchase/gi ft]
The configuration under consideration, somewhat
embroidered, yields the permutation of two adjectives + two
adverbs qualifying a single substantive, as in this item:
His [Addison's] poetry is polished and pure: the
product of a mind too judicious to commit
faults, but not sufficiently vigorous to attain
excellence. ("Addison", Lives II 145)
The third type of grammatical formation is that in
which the modifying action of two adverbs differentially
complexions a single verb:
He [Addison] thinks justly; but he thinks
faintly. ("Addison", Lives II 127)
A feature not less curious than striking about this
paradigm of a single idea undergoing internal
differentiation is that it appears to be confined to
Johnson's written discourse. At any rate I was unable to
harvest any examples from his conversation, though some,
I have no doubt, there must be, which had I been more alert
I should have detected. But even allowing for lapses on
my part, it still appears that this paradigm is essentially
a writerly one in Johnson's practice. The locutions
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characteristic of it are notable for their concision and
formal balance - "cloud reason without eclipsing it" ;
"rather suffered reformation than made it" etc. - and these
qualities perhaps led him to feel that it was a formation
better suited to the written than to the conversational
mode. But against this conjecture we have to set the
testimony of Johnson's numerous auditors and interlocutors,
and that testimony is uniformly to the effect that whenever
he wanted to he was effortlessly able to 'change gears' and
impart to his spoken discourse the same formal balance,
stateliness, correctness, structural cohesiveness,
syntactical complexity and rhetorical resonance that
distinguish his written47. So in the end I am left
47 Here is a sampling of this testimony:
* Fanny Burney: "[Johnson] had a facility so complete, 
that to speak or write produced immediately the same clear 
and sagacious effect. His pen was as luminous as his 
tongue, and his tongue was as correct as his pen" (in 
Rogers 74).
* Sir Brooke Boothby: "Johnson spoke as he wrote. He 
would take up a topic, and utter upon it a number of the 
Rambler" (in Hill II 391).
* Ozias Humphrey: "Everything he [Johnson] says is as 
correct as a second edition" (in Hill II 401).
* Sir John Hawkins: "As he [Johnson] professed always to 
speak in the best and most correct phrase, rejecting 
all...common and vulgar combinations of speech...his 
conversation style bore a great resemblance to that of his 
writings, so that, in his common discourse, he might seem 
to incur the censure...of being too eloquent" (163).
* Boswell: "He [Johnson] seemed to take a pleasure in 
speaking in his own style; for when hehad carelessly 
missed it, he would repeat the thought translated into it. 
Talking of the Comedy of The Rehearsal, he said, 'It has 
not wit enough to keep it sweet.' This was easy; he 
therefore caught himself, and pronounced a more rounded
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documenting a fact that I cannot explain; I cannot account
for the apparently exclusive appropriation to Johnson's
written discourse of the paradigm of 'internal
differentiation'.
By contrast, the other paradigm of this category, that
in which two (or more) separate ideas are distinguished
sentence: 'It has not vitality enough to preserve it from 
putrefaction'" (Life 1312).
In an essay entitled "Observations on Conversational Style" (in 
Middendorf 273-87), Louis T Milic argues that 'conversational style', 
properly so described, presents a profile so dislocated and 
unstructured (when recorded, say, as a verbatim transcript) as to 
suggest that an unbridgeable gulf exists between the spoken and the 
written word, such that, in principle, it should be beyond anybody's 
capacity to speak, under impromptu conditions, as he writes (since, in 
Milic's view, the difference between impromptu talk and writing is a 
difference rather of kind than of degree, it is not simply a matter of 
not being able to speak 'as well as' one writes). Milic then goes on 
to give, in verbatim transcript, a slice of impromptu talk by an 
educated speaker; and there is no gainsaying its dislocated and 
unstructured character. After this citation he continues as follows:
Though it may be believed that conversation has 
degenerated in our time...and that this is the reason why 
educated people seem, when we read their transcribed 
remarks, to sound like mental defectives, it would be a 
serious misconception to suppose that Johnson did not 
sound somewhat like that [i.e. like the speaker in the 
verbatim transcript] when he talked. (in Middendorf 280)
It is here that I wish to take issue with Milic (although I also 
have serious doubts about how well advised he is to postulate so 
radical a cleavage between written and spoken discourse). All the 
available evidence suggests that Milic's judgment needs to be set on 
its head, and that it would come a good deal nearer the truth of the 
the matter were it to read "...it would be a serious misconception to 
suppose that Johnson did sound somewhat like that when he talked." 
Realizing perhaps that he has put his head on the block, Milic 
backpedals a little in his next remark; he concedes: "And if Johnson 
was the exception, he must have been the solitary one in the history 
of the language" (idem). Well, I don't know about Johnson's being the 
'solitary [exception] in the history of the language', but that he was 
an exception to the thesis advanced by Milic is certainly beyond 
doubt. If Milic had formulated his thesis in terms less extreme, it 
would have been possible so far to agree with him as to grant that 
Johnson was the exception who proved the rule; but I am afraid that to 
the 'rule', as enunciated by Milic, there are many exceptions.
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from each other, occurs with more or less equal frequency
in both segments of the Johnsonian record, the spoken and
the written alike. As this paradigm is so amply
exemplified, it became important, in the management of my
examples, to avoid presenting them as a shapeless,
undifferentiated mass. Casting about, then, for a
principle of arrangement that would be both coherent and
'readable', I eventually decided on a three-fold division.
The first grouping consists of distinctions (alternatively,
of ideas and topics available as 'grist' for distinction­
making) which were familiar enough in Johnson's day to be
regarded as belonging to the 'public domain', as being, in
some sort, 'public intellectual property'. In other words,
the 'Distinctions of Ideas' in this group are structured
on concepts often brought conjointly into play for the sole
purpose, really, of being distinguished from one another.
The second grouping is made up of distinctions which, in
my judgment, were not quite so familiar, not quite so
obviously 'public intellectual property' in Johnson's day.
These distinctions I have sought to rank in a way that
shows up what seems to me to be a gradual modulation in
their character: while the earlier items still bear a
recognizably 'public' stamp, the later ones, it seems to
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me, bear the more individualized cachet of Johnson's own
sensibility and 'perspective on things' . To the third
grouping I have given the name 'Special Formations', a
designation that will be clarified when the grouping itself
comes to be dealt with.
To begin, then, with the first grouping -
'Distinctions of Ideas' which may be regarded as belonging
in the 'public domain'. The first item brings forward an
especially familiar distinction, at any rate in the
eighteenth century - that between physical and moral truth.
Johnson chooses to impart to his formulation of it a
signally formal, even ceremonious, character. The remainder
of the examples, which embody distinctions as, or almost
as, well-known as this first one, he handles in nowhere
near so formal a manner.
[Johnson] thus defined the difference between
physical and moral truth: "Physical truth, is,
when you tell a thing as it actually is. Moral
truth, is, when you tell a thing sincerely and
precisely as it appears to you. I say such a
one walked across the street; if he really did
so, I told a physical truth. If I thought so,
though I should have been mistaken, I told a
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moral truth." (Life 1069) [this item is
simultaneously an instance of 'Distinction by
appeal to Analogy' ]
Urging one day the well known hypothesis of
Happiness being placed in hope rather than
possession; "This", said the Doctor, "is more
subtle than true: we talk of the pleasures of
hope, we feel those of possession; and no man in
his senses would change the last for the
first..." (Mrs Thrale, Anecdotes of Dr Johnson
64-65)
Nature makes us poor only when we want
necessaries, but custom gives the name of
poverty to the want of superfluities. (Idler
37, II 116) [Here we have a double distinction:
nature< >custom; necessaries< superfluities]
BOSWELL: I believe natural affection, of which
we hear so much, is very small. JOHNSON: Sir,
natural affection is nothing: but affection from
principle and established duty is sometimes
wonderfully strong. (Life 1227)
...a discussion took place, whether the present
Earl of Buchan, when Lord Cardross, did right to
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refuse to go Secretary of the Embassy to Spain,
when Sir James Gray, a man of inferiour rank,
went Ambassadour. Dr. Johnson said, that
perhaps in point of interest he did wrong; but
in point of dignity he did well. ..."Sir, had he
gone Secretary while his inferiour was
Ambassadour, he would have been a traitor to his
rank and family." (Life 481-82)
[Johnson] thus discoursed upon supposed
obligations in settling estates: "Where a man
gets the unlimited property of an estate, there
is no obligation upon him in justice to leave it
to one person rather than to another. There is
a motive of preference from kindness. and this
kindness is generally entertained for the
nearest relation." (Life 684) [emphasis in
original]
I here suggested something favourable of the
Roman Catholicks. TOPLADY: Does not their
invocation of saints suppose omnipresence in the
saints? JOHNSON: No, Sir, it supposes only
pluri-presence... (Life 544)
Foote and Garrick were next compar'd as Mimicks,
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they [are]...says Johnson...as distinct in their
powers of Mimickry, as Swift and Addison in
their powers of humour. Swift could draw a
prominent Character, & Foote can imitate to
equal perfection the Tricks & Contorsions of
some particular Man: Foote for Example can
personate Langford, he can not exhibit the
general Idea of an Auctioneer. (Mrs Thrale, in
Ingrams 83)
BOSWELL: Is not the expression in the Burial-
service, "in the sure and certain hope of a
blessed resurrection" too strong to be used
indiscriminately, and, indeed, sometimes when
those over whose bodies it is said, have been
notoriously profane? JOHNSON: It is sure and
certain hope. Sir; not belief. (Life 1229)
[emphasis in original]
We talked tonight of Luther's allowing the
Landgrave of Hesse two wives, and that it was
with the consent of the wife to whom he was
first married. JOHNSON: There was no harm in
this, so far as she was only concerned, because
volenti non fit injuria ['If you wish the injury
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you are not injured'] . But it was an offence
against the general order of society, and
against the law of the Gospel, by which one man
and one woman are to be united. (Hebrides
Journal 288)
I mentioned to him a dispute between a friend of
mine and his lady, concerning conjugal
infidelity, which my friend had maintained was
by no means so bad in the husband, as in the
wife. JOHNSON: Your friend was in the right,
Sir. Between a man and his Maker it is a
different question: but between a man and his
wife, a husband's infidelity is nothing...Wise
married women don't trouble themselves about
infidelity in their husbands. BOSWELL: To be
sure there is a great difference between the
offence of infidelity in a man and that of his
wife. JOHNSON: The difference is boundless.
The man imposes no bastards upon his wife.
(Life 1035) [Quite so - he imposes bastards
upon somebody else's wife]
A gentleman was mentioning...that he never knew
but one person that was completely wicked.
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JOHNSON: Sir, I don't know what you mean by a
person completely wicked. GENTLEMAN: Why, any
one that has entirely got rid of all shame.
JOHNSON: How is he, then, completely wicked? He
must get rid, too, of all conscience.
GENTLEMAN: I think conscience and shame the same
thing. JOHNSON: I am surprised to hear you say
so; they spring from two different sources, and
are distinct perceptions: one respects this
world, the other the next. (in Hill II 288)
...Johnson could suppress his indignation no
longer. "Sir", said he, "you...have the
brutality to insult me with what is not my
fault, but my misfortune." (The Reverend
William Shaw, Memoirs of the Life and Writings
of the Late Dr. Samuel Johnson, in Sherbo 55)
JOHNSON: "...It requires no extraordinary
talents to lie and deceive." This led us to
consider whether it did not require great
abilities to be very wicked. JOHNSON: It
requires great abilities to have the power of
being very wicked; but not to be very wicked.
...Consider only what act of wickedness requires
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great abilities to commit it, when once the
person who is to do it has the power; for there
is the distinction. It requires great abilities
to conquer an army, but none to massacre it
after it is conquered. (Hebrides Journal 288)
[emphasis in original] [this item is
simultaneously an instance of 'Distinction by
appeal to Analogy7]
. . .Johnson ran eagerly to one side of [Mr
Cambridge's library], intent on poring over the
backs of the books. ...Mr. Cambridge, upon this,
politely said, "Dr. Johnson...it seems odd that
one should have such a desire to look at the
backs of books.77 Johnson, ever ready for
contest, instantly started from his reverie,
wheeled about, and answered, "Sir, the reason is
very plain. Knowledge is of two kinds. We know
a subject ourselves, or we know where we can
find information upon it." (Life 627)
JOHNSON; ...Gravina, an Italian critick,
observes, that every man desires to see that of
which he has read; but no man desires to read an
account of what he has seen: so much does
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description fall short of reality. Description
only excites curiosity: seeing satisfies it.
(Life 1218)
". . .You are much surer that you are doing good
when you pay money to those who work, as the
recompence of their labour, than when you .give
money merely in charity.. // (Life 756)
[emphasis in original]
If the changes that we fear be thus
irresistible, what remains but to acquiesce with
silence, as in the other insurmountable
distresses of humanity? It remains that we
retard what we cannot repel, that we palliate
what we cannot cure. ("Preface" to the
Dictionary, in Bronson 258)
Patience and submission are very carefully to be
distinguished from cowardice and indolence. We
are not to repine, but we may lawfully
struggle... (Rambler 32, III 177)
What cannot fail to catch the eye in the portfolio of
examples presented above is how many of them are drawn from
Johnson's conversation. That, however, is hardly to be
wondered at: I have already noted that these distinctions
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formed part of the 'public intellectual property" of the
day, and so it would be perfectly natural for them to
surface in the talk of the intellectual elite (of which
Johnson and his circle were undoubtedly one of the
ornaments).
I now want to move on to my second grouping whose
items, to my way of thinking (or should I say, to my way
of feeling?), reflect, over their range, changes in shading
or complexion. Whereas the earlier-placed 'Distinctions
of Ideas" in this grouping are still tuned (to change the
metaphor) to a recognizably public 'frequency", though a
decidedly fuzzier one than in the group above, those lower
down in the ranking appear to manifest a more personalized
Johnsonian 'timbre". Here are my examples:
For surely, nothing can so much...perplex the
intellects of man, as the disruption [through
death] of his union with visible nature. . .a
change not only of the place, but the manner of
his being; an entrance into a state not simply
which he knows not, but which perhaps he has not
faculties to know... (Rambler 78, IV 47)
But these [hopes, "pleasures borrowed from
futurity""] , like all other cordials, though they
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may invigorate in a small quantity, intoxicate
in a greater... (Adventurer 69, II 394)
RAMSAY: ...[Pope's] poetry was highly admired in
his life-time, more a great deal than after his
death. JOHNSON: Sir, it has not been less
admired since his death... it has only not been
as much talked of, but that is owing to its
being now more distant, and people having other
writings to talk of. Virgil is less talked of
than Pope, and Homer is less talked of than
Virgil; but they are not less admired. (Life
979)
In the perusal of [Cowley's] Davideis... we are
sometimes surprised, but never delighted, and
find much to admire, but little to approve.
("Cowley", Lives I 55)
...instead of wasting more of my life in vain
endeavours... I shall confine my care to those
higher excellencies which are in every man's
power; and though I cannot enchant affection by
elegance and ease, hope to secure esteem by
honesty and truth. (Rambler 123, IV 295)
"You may deny me to accompany you [says
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Nekayah], but cannot hinder me from following."
(Rasselas. in Bronson 638) [there is, in this
short sentence, a pair of 'Distinctions of
Ideas': deny< >hinder; accompany< >follow]
I repeated a sentence of Lord Mansfield's
speech... "My Lords, severity is not the way to
govern either boys or men." "Nay, (said
Johnson) it is the way to govern them. I know
not whether it be the way to mend them." (Life
489-90) [emphasis in original]
It is not difficult to conceive, however, that
for many reasons a man writes much better than
he lives. For, without entering into refined
speculations, it may be shown much easier to
design than to perform. (Rambler 14, III 75)
JOHNSON: ...As to the American war, the sense of
the nation is with the ministry. The majority
of those who can understand is with it; the
majority of those who can only hear is against
it. (Life 1129) [emphasis in original]
I urged him to take a little wine, he replied,
"I can't drink a little, child, therefore I
never touch it. Abstinence is as easy to me, as
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temperance would be difficult."48 (in Hill II
197) [emphasis in original]
JOHNSON: ...Wine makes a man better pleased with
himself. I do not say that it makes him more
pleasing to others. (Life 974)
...to sooth the mind to tranquillity by
hope...may be sometimes useful; but to lull our
faculties in a lethargy, is poor and despicable.
(Adventurer 69, II 394)
[Johnson] said, "Mrs. Montagu has dropt me.
Now, Sir, there are people whom one should like
very well to drop, but would not wish to be
dropped by." (Life 1122)
BOSWELL: Should you not like to see Dublin, Sir?
JOHNSON: No, Sir! Dublin is only a worse
capital. BOSWELL: Is not the Giant' s-Causeway
worth seeing? JOHNSON: Worth seeing? yes; but
48 Cf. Boswell in the Life:
When at table...his looks seemed rivetted to his plate; 
nor would he...say one word...till he had satisfied his 
appetite, which was so fierce...that while in the act of 
eating, the veins of his forehead swelled... To those 
whose sensations were delicate, this could not but be 
disgusting; and it was doubtless not very suitable to the 
character of a philosopher, who should be distinguished by 
self-command. But it must be owned, that Johnson, though 
he could be rigidly abstemious. was not a temperate man 
either in eating or drinking. He could refrain, but he 
could not use moderately. (331) [emphasis in original]
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not worth going to see. (Life 1038)
I come now to the compartment I have labelled 'Special
Formations' . The items mustered under this head are as
much 'Distinctions of Ideas' as any of the others and would
not have been out of place in either of the preceding
groupings; however, over and above their obvious character
as 'Distinctions of Ideas', they exhibit other features
which, while far from distinctive or significant enough to
base a separate category on, are yet sufficiently
conspicuous to justify their disengagement from the main
body of examples and their organization as a separate
subgroup. The distinguishing features referred to are of
several kinds. The most prominent is a stylistic one: here
the conceptual distinction is 'baked in the mould', so to
speak, of a particular verbal-stylistic schema or
formation. I shall be drawing attention to two such
formations: 'rather X than Y' and its sibling, 'not so much
X as Y'. To another distinguishing trait I have given the
name 'grammatical variation': the distinctions to which
this label applies are wholly built on, and mediated
through, grammatical nuancing. Finally, under this head,
I shall be bringing forward a couple of examples in which
ideas are discriminated not in terms of the clear-cut
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contrasts characterizing the items in the two preceding
groupings (those involving distinctions of either a more
public or a more personalized cast), but rather in terms
of degrees of differentiation plotted along an imaginary
continuum, so to speak. (It bears pointing out that in the
two 'sibling' verbal-stylistic formations adumbrated above,
the notion of differentiation in terms of degree, in terms,
that is, of a scale of relative rather than absolute
contrasts, is also a powerfully operative one) . These
kindred formations provide my first set of examples; I
begin with 'Distinctions of Ideas' 'baked in the mould' of
the schema 'rather X than Y' (or its variant 'X rather than
Y' ) :
...my purpose [in the Ramblers is] to consider
the moral discipline of the mind, and to promote
the increase of virtue rather than of learning.
(Rambler 8, III 42)
But I considered such acts of beneficence [by
patrons] as prodigies, recorded rather to raise
wonder than expectation. ("Plan" of the
Dictionary, in Wilson 122)
[Virgil] employed his powers rather in
improving, than inventing... (Rambler 37, III
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200-01)
[Savage was] formed rather to bear misery with
fortitude than enjoy prosperity with moderation.
("Savage", Lives II 376)
He that changes his party by his humour is not
more virtuous than he that changes it by his
interest; he loves himself rather than truth.
("Milton", Lives I 106)
...yet like other heroes he [Milton] is to be
admired rather than imitated. (ibid. 194)
The sentiments [of Smith's play Phaedra] thus
remote from life are removed yet further by the
diction, which is too luxuriant and splendid for
dialogue, and envelopes [sic] the thoughts
rather than displays them. ("Smith", Lives II
16)
His [Congreve's] comedies... surprise rather than
divert... ("Congreve", Lives II 228)
These odes [of Gray] are marked by glittering
accumulations of ungraceful ornaments: they
strike, rather than please... ("Gray", Lives
III 440)
The power that predominated in his [Dryden's]
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intellectual operations was rather strong reason
than quick sensibility. Upon all occasions that
were presented he studied rather than felt, and
produced sentiments not such as Nature enforces,
but meditation supplies. ("Dryden", Lives I
457)
I find it interesting that so many of the examples
built on the 'rather X than Y' schema are furnished by the
Lives of the Poets. Is this perhaps evidence of a
conscious effort on Johnson's part, when writing the Lives,
to formulate (or at any rate give the appearance of
formulating) qualified and temperate rather than
categorical judgments? Next follow conceptual distinctions
built on the sibling schema of 'not so much X as Y':
"I live in the crowds of jollity [complains
Rasselas] , not so much to enjoy company as to
shun myself..." (Rasselas, in Bronson 642)
I have, therefore, prefixed a motto [to the
essay], which characterises this passion
[petulant rage] , not so much by the mischief
that it causes, as by the noise that it utters.
(Rambler 11, III 57)
The reigning error of his [Savage's] life was,
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that he mistook the love for the practice of
virtue, and was indeed not so much a good man as
the friend of goodness. ("Savage", hives II
380)
The 'Special Formation' which follows presents the
interesting phenomenon of conceptual distinctions being
mediated entirely through grammatical variation. In the
first of my two examples, the ideas of aspiration and
achievability are played off against each other solely
through the counterpointing of the subjunctive and
indicative moods of the verbal auxiliaries pressed into
service; in the second, where the same principle of
organization applies, the idea of the volitional is played
off against the idea of the imperative through the modal
auxiliary (and subjunctive equivalent) 'may' being played
off against the auxiliary of predication 'must':
To a study [literary criticism] at once so easy
and so reputable, so malicious and so harmless,
it cannot be necessary to invite my readers by
a long or laboured exhortation; it is
sufficient, since all would be critics if they
could, to shew by one eminent example that all
can be critics if they will. (Idler 60, II 185)
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After dinner Dr. Johnson wrote a letter to Mrs.
Thrale on the death of her son. I said it would
be very distressing to Thrale, but she would
soon forget it, as she had so many things to
think of. JOHNSON: No, Sir, Thrale will forget
it first. She has many things that she may
think of. He has many things that he must think
of- (Life 713) [emphasis in original]
In the preceding two subdivisions (those made up of
'publicly' and 'personally' complexioned distinctions),
ideas tend to be discriminated in terms of clear-cut
differences and strong contrasts; differentiation occurs,
one might say, on the basis of kind and quality rather than
of degree. But in the two examples which follow, the basis
of distinction is that of degree, with the ideas in play
being perceived essentially as gradations of each other.
So the principle of differentiation at work here involves
shifts along a continuum (meaning a scale of gradual,
progressive contrasts) rather than the counterpointing of
fixed and clear-cut oppositions. These are the examples:
Wisdom and virtue are by no means sufficient
without the supplemental laws of good-breeding
to secure freedom from degenerating into
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rudeness, or self-esteem from swelling into
insolence... (Rambler 98, IV 161)
The necessity of doing something, and the fear
of undertaking much, sinks the historian to a
genealogist, the philosopher to a journalist of
the weather, and the mathematician to a
constructor of dials. (Rambler 103, IV 187)
Looking at the first of the examples given above, we
observe that the contrasting ideas brought into play - the
ideas of freedom (of bearing) and rudeness, of self-esteem
and insolence - which Johnson, had he been so minded, could
very readily have represented as qualitatively different
(and which in that case would have found a natural home in
either of the preceding subdivisions), are viewed instead
in a relative light as really just gradations of each
other, such that rudeness is portrayed as a debased form
of 'freedom' and insolence as an overfed form of self­
esteem. Similarly, in the second example, the paired
occupations of historian and genealogist, philosopher and
journalist, mathematician and dial-maker, which, again,
could have been viewed as sharply distinct from, if not
opposed to, each other, are seen instead as occupying
relative, and not very widely separated, positions along
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a continuum: thus, the historian, rather than being
contrasted with the genealogist, is dwindled to one;
likewise, the philosopher is dwindled to a journalist of
the weather and the mathematician to a dial-maker. Now
this method of differentiating ideas in terms of movements
along a continuum is not much met with in the Johnsonian
oeuvre: why, then, am I expatiating upon it at such length?
Precisely because it is the exception that throws into
relief Johnson's preference for strong, forceful
differentiations, with the ideas in play being contrasted
in a decisive, clear-cut manner. When his object is to
suggest notions of degree, relativeness or progressivity,
he ordinarily finds ways of doing so other than by
portraying ideas as gradations of each other; often he
avails himself of the 'rather X than Y' schema noticed
above.
With these remarks I bring my examination of the
category 'Distinctions of Ideas' to a close - almost.
There are two further points which bear mention. First:
this category is by some considerable way the most
abundantly stocked of the seventeen, and the reason for
that, I suspect, is that as Johnson loved sparring with
ideas, and as he had a distinction-making mill of a mind,
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it was only natural that many of them should end up
becoming 'grist7 for it. To do justice, therefore, to this
capital manifestation of his distinction-making drive, and
at the same time to the profusion of items with which its
activity has stocked this category, I have thought it
allowable, in leading my evidence, to err on the side of
copiousness. The second point is this: the vast majority
of the distinctions Johnson frames are in fact, in one way
or another, 'distinctions of ideas'. The category actually
bearing this designation is made up of distinctions of
ideas which are very conspicuously that: one might think
of them as 'official', 'certifiable' distinctions of ideas.
But the illustrative items provisioning most of the other
categories also manifest, at one level or another,
'distinctions of ideas'. This is, in a sense, unavoidable,
in the 'nature of things' : these items after all are
composed of words, and many words, most perhaps, gesture
towards ideas. So expressing 'distinctions of ideas' at
some level or other is something they (the items) can
hardly avoid doing. The crucial point is, though, at what
level? That was the point I had to bear in mind all the
while when it came time to classify my examples.
Accordingly, the items that came to be allocated to the
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categories other than 'Distinctions of Ideas' came to be
so allocated because, taken overall, they mostly stood out
(in my judgment) for features other than their purely
conceptual content; and it therefore seemed proper to
constitute them as distinct and independent categories on
the basis of their most conspicuous attribute. In other
words, there was something about these items that counted
for more than their registering a distinction of ideas.
Nevertheless, such a distinction will still, at whatever
level, have been registered, unavoidably so; there is no
getting away from the fact. Consequently, it cannot be
denied that at a rudimentary level the great majority of
my categories perforce involve 'distinctions of ideas7 -
but as an attribute of only subsidiary importance; what
they are chiefly conspicuous for is something else.
A Specific Instance Expressly Distinguished from a more or
less Undifferentiated Backdrop
This long title is a leash with only a slim category
at the end of it. The items of which it consists, despite
their relative scarcity in the Johnsonian oeuvre, yet
seemed to me to reflect a mode of distinction-making
sufficiently different from all the others to warrant their
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being brought together under a separate head as an
independent category. Johnson's distinction-making
procedure in this category is basically the following:
starting off with a more or less undifferentiated backdrop
whose subject matter could be just about anything, he then
trains a spotlight, so to speak, on a particular feature
in it, or aspect of it, thereby isolating, that is to say,
differentiating, the feature or aspect from whatever else
the backdrop contains. In a few instances his choice of
what to single out for special attention has the appearance
of being idiosyncratic. I mean by this that given the
range of options available to him, it is not easily seen
(not by the ordinary understanding, anyhow) why he should
fix on the one he does. In this connection the first
example given below furnishes a paradigm-case: having
sketched in, by way of backdrop, a gallery of villains,
including a rapist (probably), a robber and a cut-throat,
in addition to a liar, Johnson then singles out the liar
for special condemnation. But to the ordinary
understanding it is far from clear why the liar should be
picked on in this way; to the ordinary understanding he is
not 'obviously' worse than the other blackguards alluded
to. So if he is portrayed as worse, is this not owing
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simply to idiosyncrasy on Johnson's part49?
In the passage dealing with the liar, Johnson's
proceeding in making him stand out from the backdrop is
particularly emphatic and clear-cut. It is not quite as
clear-cut in the remainder of the examples but is still
sufficiently well defined. Deserving of notice is the
occurrence in most of the items below of a qualifying
'but'; this 'but' marks the point at which the process of
'spotlighting' or singling-out begins. Here follow the
examples:
Almost every other vice that disgraces human
nature, may be kept in countenance by applause
and association: the corrupter of virgin
innocence sees himself envied by the men, and at
least not detested by the women: the drunkard
may easily unite with beings, devoted like
himself to noisy merriment or silent
insensibility... even the robber and the cut­
throat have their followers, who admire their
address and intrepidity, their stratagems of
rapine, and their fidelity to the gang.
49 Only on the face of it. In fact, what undoubtedly accounts for the 
special mauling he reserves for the liar in this passage is his 
uncompromising insistence upon, and lifelong devotion to, truthfulness 
(v. also infra).
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The liar, and only the liar, is invariably
and universally despised, abandoned, and
disowned; he has no domestic consolations, which
he can oppose to the censure of mankind; he can
retire to no fraternity where his crimes may
stand in the place of virtues; but is given up
to the hisses of the multitude, without friend
and without apologist. It is the peculiar
condition of falsehood, to be equally detested
by the good and bad. (Adventurer 50, II 362)
At all other assemblies, he that comes to
receive delight, will be expected to give it;
but in the theatre, nothing is necessary to the
amusement of two hours, but to sit down and be
willing to be pleased. (Idler 25, II 77)
Yet versification... is indispensably necessary
to a poet. Every other power by which the
understanding is enlightened, or the imagination
enchanted, may be exercised in prose. But the
poet has this peculiar superiority, that to all
the powers which the perfection of every other
composition can require, he adds the faculty of
joining musick with reason, and of acting at
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once upon the senses and the passions. (Rambler
86, IV 89)
Other men receive dignity from dress, but my
booby looks always more meanly for his finery.
(Idler 95, II 295)
Every other kind of [literary] adulteration,
however shameful, however mischievous, is less
detestable than the crime of counterfeiting
characters [that is, imparting a false lustre to
persons actually worthless and corrupt by
recourse to "the practice of indecent and
promiscuous dedication"], and fixing the stamp
of literary sanction upon the dross and refuse
of the world. (Rambler 136, IV 356)
Bossu is of opinion that the poet's first work
is to find a moral. which his fable is
afterwards to illustrate and establish. This
seems to have been the process only of Milton:
the moral of other poems is incidental and
consequent; in Milton's only it is essential and
intrinsick. ("Milton", Lives I 171) [emphasis
in original]
These examples bring to a conclusion my analysis of
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Johnson's distinction-making drive as it expresses itself
in the domain of 'Conceptual Distinction-making'. I
propose now to inquire into the way it expresses itself in
the realm of 'Verbal Distinction-making'.
Verbal Distinction-making
This grouping consists of two categories of unequal
size. To the smaller I have assigned the name 'Distinctions
to Clarify a Word's Signification or Usage', to the larger
'Shades of Verbal Meaning: Distinctions between Near­
Synonyms' . I propose to examine the smaller category
first.
Distinctions to Clarify a Word7s Signification or Usage
Outside the Dictionary. Johnson's distinction-making
bent nowhere advertises itself in so emphatically
'lexicographic' a manner as it does in this category.
Indeed, a few of the items below actually replicate the
formality and deliberateness of procedure that characterize
his practice in the Dictionary. What further aligns these
few instances with his formal lexicographic practice is the
strict and precise manner in which they specify verbal
meaning, here the meaning of the words earmarked for
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clarification. However, most of the items in this category
are held to a less demanding standard, lexicographically
speaking. Rather than formulating precisely demarcated,
narrowly bounded definitions and clarifications, Johnson,
adopting a more indulgent attitude, prefers in the majority
of instances to trace out what may be described as a
'circumference' or 'horizon' of usage or signification -
at any rate, something less formally precise, less
circumscribed, more commodious. The first two of the
examples given below are clearly cast in the mould of a
formal dictionary definition; their specification of
meaning therefore bears the stamp of 'official'
lexicographic procedure: it is strict and punctilious. The
remaining items are treated more permissively, with only
a general 'circumference of specification' being aimed at.
In sum, the distinctions Johnson formulates in this
category, while certainly bearing witness to his
'lexicographic turn of mind', are not themselves 'turned',
in the majority of cases, in an overtly or punctiliously
lexicographic manner. I now propose to lead my evidence
in support of these submissions:
The habitations of men in the Hebrides may be
distinguished into huts and houses. By a house,
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I mean a building with one story over another;
by a hut, a dwelling with only one floor50.
(Journey to the Western Islands 105)
Under the denomination of highlander are
comprehended in Scotland all that now speak the
Erse language, or retain the primitive manners,
whether they live among the mountains or in the
islands; and in that sense I use the name, when
there is not some apparent reason for making a
distinction. (Journey 68) [Here Johnson
distinguishes between mountain-dwellers and
50 Johnson's definitions of 'house' and 'hut' in this passage are nonce 
definitions expressly tailored to the specifically north-west Scottish 
setting and context of the Journey to the Western Islands. The same 
holds true for his definition of 'highlander' in the citation 
immediately following. In the Dictionary, where Johnson's 
explanations obviously reflect general usage and acceptation rather 
than local, "highlander" is defined simply as "an inhabitant of 
mountains" and "hut" as "a poor cottage", while none of the several 
senses given for "house" (as referring to a dwelling) makes mention of 
a second storey as a distinguishing characteristic. If, from a 
referential standpoint, Johnson's definitions in these first two 
examples are too specialized, too context-specific to have any useful 
role to play in a general dictionary, from the standpoint of structure 
and method their place is, as I argue above, very much in the 
lexicographic 'mainstream'. Indeed, if we take a closer look at his 
nonce definition concerning the 'habitations of men in the Hebrides', 
we shall see that it is modelled on a principle of organization that 
governs the framing of a large number of definitions in the 
Dictionary, the principle of per genus et differentiam (v. McLaverty 
381, 388-89). In definitions proceeding per genus et differentiam, 
the term given first is always the most general and inclusive; this 
term is then further discriminated into its differentiae, its sub­
categories or particularized expressions. It is immediately evident 
how exactly Johnson's nonce definition conforms to this pattern: first 
in order of placement comes the inclusive term 'habitations', 
discriminated forthwith into the differentiae 'huts' and 'houses', 
these particularizations being then defined in turn.
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island-dwellers only in order to affirm that
from the standpoint of 'the denomination of
highlander' this is a distinction without a
difference]
[Cowley's] ode on Wit is almost without a rival.
It was about the time of Cowley that Wit, which
had been till then used for Intellection in
contradistinction to Will. took the meaning
whatever it be which it now bears. ("Cowley",
Lives I 36) [emphasis in original]
[Johnson] found fault with me for using the
phrase to make money. "Don't you see (said he)
the impropriety of it? To make money is to coin
it: you should say get money"51. (Life 872)
51 In the matter of usage, as we see from this item, Johnson's 
'lexicographic turn of mind' expressed itself as a vigilant 
fastidiousness, even finicalness. This very example, indeed, 
furnishes Boswell with an opportunity for descanting upon it:
Johnson was at all times jealous of infractions upon the 
genuine English language, and prompt to repress colloquial 
barbarisms; such as, pledging myself, for undertaking 
line, for department or branch, as, the civil line, the 
banking line. He was particularly indignant against the 
almost universal use of the word idea in the sense of 
notion or opinion, when it is clear that idea can only 
signify something of which an image can be formed in the 
mind. We may have an idea or image of a mountain, a tree, 
a building; but we cannot surely have an idea or image of 
an argument or proposition. Yet we hear the sages of the 
law "delivering their ideas upon the question under 
consideration"; and the first speakers in parliament 
"entirely coinciding in the idea which has been ably 
stated by an honourable member" - or "reprobating an idea 
unconstitutional, and fraught with the most dangerous 
consequences to a great and free country". Johnson called
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[emphasis in original]
One day Mrs Gastrel set a little girl to repeat
to him Cato's soliloquy, which she went through
very correctly. The Doctor, after a pause,
asked the child, "What was to bring Cato to an
end?" She said, it was a knife. "No, my dear,
it was not so." "My aunt Polly said it was a
knife." "Why, aunt Polly's knife mav do. but it
was a dacrcrer, my dear." (in Hill II 415)
[emphasis in original]
Mrs THRALE: And "sins of moment" [in a line by
Pope] is a faulty expression; for its true
import is momentous, which cannot be intended.
JOHNSON: It must have been written "of moments."
Of moment. is momentous; of moments,
momentary... (Life 990) [emphasis in original]
BOSWELL: I think, Sir, you once said to me, that
not to drink wine was a great deduction from
life. JOHNSON: It is a diminution of pleasure,
to be sure, but I do not say a diminution of
happiness. There is more happiness in being
rational. ...BOSWELL: I allow there may be
this "modern cant". (Life 873) [emphasis in original]
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greater pleasure than from wine. I have had
more pleasure from your conversation, I have
indeed; I assure you I have. JOHNSON: When we
talk of pleasure, we mean sensual pleasure.
When a man says, he had pleasure with a woman,
he does not mean conversation, but something of
a very different nature. (Life 911-12) [This
item is also an instance - in terms of an
Enlightenment 'perspective on things', a near­
classic one - of a distinction of ideas:
pleasure vs. happiness]
By advice I would not be understood to mean, the
everlasting and unvariable principles of moral
and religious truth, from which no change of
external circumstances can justify any
deviation; but such directions as respect merely
the prudential part of conduct, and which may be
followed or neglected without any violation of
essential duties. (Adventurer 74, II 396)
I.. .maintained that [fornication] did not
deserve that epithet [of heinousness] , in as
much as it was not one of those sins which argue
very great depravity of heart... JOHNSON: No,
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Sir, it is not a heinous sin. A heinous sin is
that for which a man is punished with death or
banishment. BOSWELL: But, Sir, after I had
argued that it was not a heinous sin, an old
clergyman rose up, and repeating the text of
scripture denouncing judgement against
whoremongers, asked, whether, considering this,
there could be any doubt of fornication being a
heinous sin. JOHNSON: Why, Sir, observe the
word whoremonger. Every sin, if persisted in,
will become heinous. Whoremonger is a dealer in
whores, as ironmonger is a dealer in iron. But
as you don't call a man an ironmonger for buying
and selling a penknife; so you don't call a man
a whoremonger for getting one wench with child.
(Life 479) [emphasis in original] [This item is
simultaneously an instance of 'Distinction by
appeal to Analogy']
Good humour may be defined [as] a...state
between gayety and unconcern... (Rambler 72, IV
13)
Johnson had accustomed himself to use the word
lie. to express a mistake or an errour in
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relation; in short, when the thing was not so as
told, though the relator did not mean to
deceive. When he thought there was intentional
falsehood in the relator, his expression was,
"He lies, and he knows he lies"52. (Life 1101)
52 Two points need to be made about this eccentric distinction between 
error and falsehood in terms of gradations of mendacity. First, it 
plainly answers not to any general acceptation or understanding of the 
word "lie" - the proof of which is that in the Dictionary, whose 
definitions (barring a handful of notorious exceptions) certainly 
reflect general acceptation so far as verbal meaning is concerned, the 
noun "lie" is defined as "a criminal falsehood" - but rather to a 
private and quirky Johnsonian one. (For an example of Johnson's 
quirkiness in action, consider the following anecdote by Mr Wickins, 
a draper of Lichfield, upon whom Johnson used to call during visits to 
his native town: "Walking one day with him in my garden at Lichfield, 
we entered a small meandering shrubbery... I observed, that he might 
perhaps conceive that he was entering an extensive labyrinth, but that 
it would prove a deception, though I hoped not an unpardonable one. 
'Sir,' said he, 'don't tell me of deception; a lie, Sir, is a lie, 
whether it be a lie to the eye or a lie to the ear.'" In Hill II 427­
28)
In speculating about the reason for Johnson's quirky use of 
"lie", one is led yet again to the conjecture that at the bottom of it 
all lies his ardent and inflexible dedication to truthfulness, such 
that deviations even in error from strict accuracy in relation still 
count in his eyes as sufficiently discreditable to qualify as 'lying'. 
In terms of this hypothesis, one would then characterize his peculiar 
use of "lie" as a kind of reflex grounded in visceral reactions. But 
in a different mood, or a different role, Johnson is capable of 
upholding not merely a different, but a quite opposite, viewpoint. 
When he dons the mantle of the ratiocinative, detached Sage 
pronouncing professorially ex cathedra, as it were, he speaks not only 
in different tones, he also speaks different things. And the cleavage 
between his 'visceral' voice and his 'professorial' one is nowhere 
more strikingly dramatized than precisely in this domain of what 
counts as 'lying' - which brings us to the second, and related, point: 
for the very thing that Johnson in the citation above categorizes as 
'lying' (i.e. an error in relation), he elsewhere (in a passage 
already quoted) categorizes as "moral truth". These are his words: 
"Moral truth, is, when you tell a thing sincerely and precisely as it 
appears to you. I say such a one walked across the street; if he 
really did so, I told a physical truth. If I thought so, though I 
should have been mistaken, I told a moral truth" (Life 106 9) . The 
contradiction between what he says here and what is recorded in the 
citation above is total: here an error in relation counts as 'moral 
truth'; in the citation above it counts as 'lying'. But to note the 
contradiction is less important than to try to account for it; and in
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[emphasis in original]
To end this muster of examples on a more diverting
note, let me offer what amounts to a parody of 'official7
lexicographic procedure; I don't quite know how to
characterize this item - shall we call it an example of
'cultural' lexicography?
TO THE IDLER
SIR,
I have a wife that keeps good company. You
know that the word good varies its meaning
this connection the point to bear in mind is the context of the 
statement on 'moral truth' : it is a notably formal one in which 
Johnson, wearing the mantle of the Sage, pronounces authoritatively, 
even donnishly, from the Dais of Learning. (One is reminded here of 
Mrs Thrale's observation that Johnson "did not wish to confound, but 
to inform his auditors... he always wished to retain authority, and 
leave his company impressed with the idea, that it was his to teach in 
this world, and theirs to learn." In Sherbo 120).
The conclusion to which I am led by the line of argument I have 
been following is this: when Johnson calls an error in relation 'moral 
truth', it is his head which speaks, when he calls it 'lying', it is 
his heart speaking. To my mind, not only the contradiction brought to 
light here, but quite a number of others as well are traceable to, and 
should be viewed in the context of, the strife between Johnson's head 
and heart, from which he never really gained relief as long as he 
lived. Paul Fussell's verdict is germane in this connection: "Of all 
the Augustan humanists Johnson remains for us as for his 
contemporaries the prime exemplar of a splendid human inconsistency.
...Reynolds noticed that 'From passion, from the prevalence of his 
disposition for the minute, he was continually acting contrary to his 
reason...'" (1965:124). (For more on the 'inner war' between 
Johnson's head and heart, as viewed mostly from the biographical and 
temperamental standpoints, see B H Bronson's essays "Johnson 
Agonistes" and "The Double Tradition of Dr Johnson" (1965) ; also 
Stuart Gerry Brown's essay "Dr Johnson and the Old Order" (in Greene 
158-171); as viewed mostly from the literary standpoint, see Fussell 
(1972) Chapter 2, "The Facts of Writing and the Johnsonian Senses of 
Literature")
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according to the value set upon different
qualities in different places. To be a good man
in a college, is to be learned; in a camp to be
brave; and in the city to be rich. By good
company in the place which I have the misfortune
to inhabit, we understand not always those from
whom any good can be learned, whether wisdom or
virtue; or by whom any good can be conferred,
whether profit or reputation. Good company is
the company of those whose birth is high, and
whose riches are great, or of those whom the the
rich and noble admit to familiarity. (Idler 53,
II 164-65)
Well, so much for this, the most conspicuously
'lexicographic' of all the categories in the present study.
To the larger of the categories in this grouping of 'Verbal
Distinction-making' I have assigned the name 'Shades of
Verbal Meaning: Distinctions between Near-Synonyms' . It
is to this topic that I now turn.
Shades of Verbal Meaning: Distinctions between Near­
Synonyms
In my remarks prefatory to the discussion of
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'Distinctions of Ideas', I argued that the crucial
difference between that category and the one I am about to
analyse bears upon how and where the 'fields of
signification' surrounding words (or ideas) are disposed
relative to one another. Whereas these 'fields' lie close
by in the case of 'Distinctions of Ideas', they actually
overlap, to a greater or less degree (though never
completely), where 'Distinctions between Near-Synonyms' are
concerned - this being the reason, of course, for the
occurrence in the first place of the phenomenon of near­
synonymy .
One has to be careful in the present context to speak
of 'near-synonyms' (that is, words 'near-allied', situated
within the same 'semantic field'), and not of 'synonyms' -
and this for two reasons: first, if one's conceptual point
of departure is the notion of 'true' synonymy (assuming
such a thing exists), it follows that distinction-making
can have no role to play since in 'true' synonymy there
exist no differences to be distinguished; second: Johnson
held the view that in any case language does not in
principle admit 'true' synonymy since it has no need, in
principle, of more than one word to denote one thing53.
53 Consider this passage from the "Preface" to the Dictionary: "Words 
are seldom exactly synonimous; a new term was not introduced, but
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How then have words universally taken to be synonymous (and
often referred to as 'equivalent terms') come into being?
Through various forms of linguistic sloppiness and
dereliction, in Johnson's view (v. Life 1225, a passage I
have already cited within the frame of my discussion early
in this chapter of Johnson's quest for determinate verbal
meaning). But since, as he fully realized, a living
language's 'sack of accumulated linguistic sin' cannot just
be wished away, it becomes necesary to deal with language
as it is, not as it might be or ought to be, while yet
striving to counteract, and if possible to correct, the
grosser consequences of past linguistic malpractice. Of
these 'grosser consequences', one would certainly be the
widespread tendency among users of a language to regard as
synonyms, and hence to employ interchangeably, words that
because the former was thought inadequate: names, therefore, have 
often many ideas, but few ideas have many names" (in Bronson 246) . 
This view finds an echo in the theories of twentieth- century 
linguists "like Ogden and Richards and Lyons [who] ... argue that 
absolute or true synonymy is rare in natural languages: that we 
ordinarily make do with mere 'similarity' of meaning, rather than 
'sameness'" (Wales 27). By way of underlining the modernity of 
Johnson's viewpoint on synonymy, let me cite a judgment formulated in 
1960 by the eminent philosopher of language, Willard Quine; I don't 
believe Johnson would have found much to quarrel with in it as it is, 
in essentials, a reflection of his own position. Quine writes:
...there are some [paraphrases], of course, that prove 
pretty regularly to work out all right... In them, one may 
in a non-technical spirit speak fairly enough of synonymy, 
if the claim is recognized as a vague one and a matter of 
degree. But in the pattest of paraphrasing one courts 
confusion and obscurity by imagining some absolute 
synonymy as goal. (161)
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are not synonymous- at all, though they may be 'near­
allied' . It is with an eye to correcting, or at least
curbing, this abuse of language that in his Plan for the
Dictionary (1747) Johnson insists that the "difference of
signification in words generally accounted synonimous,
ought to be carefully observed" (in Wilson 133-34) . When
it comes to the practicalities of actually bringing into
view these differences commonly occulted and unremarked,
he has recourse to basically two methods, this duality of
procedure furnishing the organizing principle for the
presentation of my evidence.
Casting about for brief tags by means of which to
label his alternative methods of "separating similitudes"
(Bronson (1971) 253), I finally decided to characterize the
one as ' structural' or 'architectural7 and the other as
'explicatory7. When Johnson is being 'structural7 about
distinguishing between near-synonyms, what he does is to
contrive locutions in which they are brought into
juxtaposition specifically for the purpose of being played
off against each other; so here it is the juxtaposition as
such, that is, the very architecture of the collocation,
that functions to bring to the fore the fact that the
supposedly equivalent terms are in truth not equivalent at
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all, that they gesture towards different things. But in
what precisely the difference consists, that Johnson does
not spell out; the structure and organization of the
locution having brought to the reader's notice the certain
fact of a difference of signification between terms
supposedly equivalent, he is then left to figure out the
substance of the difference for himself (in practice, once
the fact of a distinction between terms 'near-allied' has
been pointed up, it is then not that difficult to deduce
its substance) . In the hope of rendering these rather
theoretical remarks more intelligible I hasten to
exemplify: in the "Preface" to the Dictionary Johnson
writes:
I then contracted my design, determining to
confide in myself, and no longer to solicit
auxiliaries... by this I obtained at least one
advantage, that I set limits to my work, which
would in time be ended, though not completed.
(in Bronson 253)
As we observe, the near-synonyms 'ended' and
'completed' are brought into juxtaposition in order to be
played off against each other (in this instance through
elegant counterpoise on either side of the adversative
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locution "though not"), and it is through this device
alone, an exclusively structural one, that Johnson
contrives to make it absolutely clear that whatever it is
they signify they at least cannot signify the same thing;
he makes it clear, in other words, that though they may be
widely regarded as 'equivalent terms', if they are, they
are mistakenly and misguidedly so regarded. Since
Johnson's method here is 'structural', he forbears to give
any indication of that in which the difference between the
two signifiers consists; he leaves it to the reader to work
that out54. There are however times when he offers a hint;
but provided it is feeble enough not to alter the basically
'structural' character of the locution it appears in, I
have thought the locution best left under the
'structural/architectural' head; where the hint is
sufficiently broad, I have grouped the item in question
54 It is also possible, in some cases, though not, to my mind, in the 
case of 'ended< >completed', that the points of difference between 
near-synonyms may be so fine as actually to defy explanation or 
specification. In these circumstances, the best one could do would be 
to bring them into juxtaposition in the hope that their being thus 
played off against each other would force into the open, or at least 
to the threshold of cognition, or even just of intuition, differences 
that would otherwise elude ordinary human intelligence - "distinctions 
too subtle for common eyes", in Johnson's phrase (Idler 3, II 10) . It 
would appear that he has in mind a situation of just this kind, as 
well as a solution (or, more exactly, an expedient) along the lines 
suggested above, when, in the "Preface" to the Dictionary, he refers 
to "Ideas of the same race, [which] though not exactly alike, are 
sometimes so little different, that no words can express the 
dissimilitude, though the mind easily perceives it, when they are 
exhibited together" (in Bronson 247).
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with those illustrative of Johnson's 'explicatory' method.
When is a hint 'sufficiently feeble' or 'sufficiently
broad'? This is of course almost wholly a matter of one's
subjective judgment but (to clarify the complexion of mine
through an example) it seems to me that the item
Without intelligence man is not social, he is
only gregarious... (Journey 132)
is still substantially a 'structurally' based collocation,
like 'ended< >completed' above; what most distinguishes it,
to my mind, is the playing-off against each other, through
juxtaposition, of the near-synonyms 'social' and
'gregarious' ; that being so, it is rather the fact of a
distinction between these words 'near-allied' that the
collocation brings to the fore than the substance of that
distinction. As I see it, what the initial phrase "Without
intelligence" contributes is too little to tip the balance:
it offers the hint that intelligence has something to do
with the distinction between sociableness and mere
gregariousness, but that is as far as it goes; set against
the comparative density of specification that characterizes
Johnson's 'explicatory' method, this hint has to count as
a 'feeble' one - too feeble to alter the essentially
'structural' character of the collocation taken as a whole.
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Viewing this item and those like it, then, as exemplars of
Johnson's 'structural' method, I have accordingly billetted
them under that head.
The argument presented above has perhaps already
brought into view the essential characteristic of the
'explicatory' method which, to state it formally, entails
Johnson's actually fleshing out and in some way or other
clarifying the points of difference (fine ones, as often
as not) on which the distinctions between the near-synonyms
turn; in other words, under this method it is not merely
the fact of a distinction between near-synonyms that is
registered, the actual substance of the distinction is
specified as well. This specification takes a number of
forms: sometimes Johnson offers a rather full explanation,
more often an elaboration that falls short of real
explanation, sometimes only a gloss; alternatively, he may
furnish an elucidatory context or perhaps subjoin
illustrative instances; or he may make use of an analogy,
or, again, rely on the elucidatory capacity of other parts
of speech, ordinarily adjectives and nouns, with which the
near-synonyms are concatenated, in order to bring out the
points of difference between them. Rather than
individually tagging the items I shall be citing with
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reference to one or other of the procedures noted here, I
prefer to exhibit in a more general way how Johnson's
'explicatory' method works by adducing and glossing at this
juncture a couple of illustrative instances. It seems to
me that once the general principle of operation is grasped,
it will not be difficult to label correctly its
particularized manifestations. So, then, to fall to
examples: in a letter to Boswell, Johnson thus
characterizes the addressee's father, recently deceased:
"...his disposition towards you was undoubtedly that of a
kind, though not of a fond father". And then, immediately
after this statement, an elaboration is framed which
spotlights one of the essential points of difference
between 'kind' and 'fond', words that are near neighbours
within their shared semantic field: "Kindness, at least
actual, is in our power, but fondness is not; and if by
negligence or imprudence you had extinguished his fondness,
he could not at will rekindle it" (Life 1187). In the next
example it is the adjectives, to which the near-allied
nouns 'hilarity' and 'merriment' are 'tethered', that
function to bring out some of the key differences between
them:
[Sir Joshua REYNOLDS] : ... I am sure that
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moderate drinking makes people talk better.
JOHNSON: No, Sir; wine gives not light, gay,
ideal hilarity; but tumultuous, noisy, clamorous
merriment. (Life 746)
From the examples here furnished, few though they be,
of Johnson's two methods of distinguishing between near­
synonyms, it is observable that each contains its own
balance-sheet of losses and gains. What the 'structural'
method gains in tautness, sharpness of outline and, at
times, almost epigrammatic concentration, thanks to the
architectural clarity and verbal spareness of its
juxtapositions, it loses in informativeness because the
actual substance of the distinctions between the near­
synonyms is not, or is barely, specified. Conversely, what
the 'explicatory' method gains in informativeness through
the specification of points of difference between the near­
synonyms it not seldom loses in tightness and trenchancy.
With these remarks the preliminaries are concluded; it is
now time to present the evidence. I begin with examples
illustrative of Johnson's 'structural' method.
A short residence at London entitles a man...to
a despotick and dictatorial power of prescribing
to the rude multitude... (Rambler 61, III 326)
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An even and unvaried tenour of life always hides
from our apprehension the approach of its end.
(Idler 103, II 315)
The plot [of Measure for Measurel is rather
intricate than artful. (Johnson on Shakespeare
VII 216)
The "strength of Denham" . . . is to
which..
be found in
.exhibit themany lines and couplets,
sentiment with more weight than bulk.
("Denham", Lives I 79-80)
Most of these petty faults are in his [Denham7s]
first productions, when he was less skilful or,
at least, less dexterous in the use of words...
(ibid. 82)
"Sir," says he gravely..."what you say is true,
the times are altered, for power is now nowhere,
we live under a government of influence, not of
power..." (in Hill II 55)
The art is, to fill the day with petty
business... and keep the mind in a state of
action, but not of labour. (Idler 31, II 97)
. . .of those with whom interest or opinion united
him he [Addison] had not only the esteem, but
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the kindness; and of others, whom the violence -
of opposition drove against him, though he might
lose the love, he retained the reverence.
("Addison", Lives II 125)
All power of fancy over reason is a degree of
insanity; but while this power is such as we can
controul and repress, it is not visible to
others... (Rasselas. in Bronson 693)
"His [Goldsmith's] genius is great, but his
knowledge is small". (Life 495)
The consequence of a bad season is here [in the
Hebrides] not scarcity, but emptiness. (Journey
133)
Raleigh is deservedly celebrated for the labour
of his researches... but he has endeavoured to
exert his judgment more than his genius...and
has produced an historical dissertation, but
seldom risen to the majesty of history.
(Rambler 122, IV 289) [The word 'majesty' which
Johnson here recruits presumably for the purpose
of bringing into focus essential points of
difference between a 'historical dissertation'
and a 'history' is, to my mind, deficient in
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that very department. Too unspecific to lay
hold of what crucially differentiates these
terms/concepts 'near-allied', it has accordingly
to be classed as a 'feeble hint' (v. supra) -
too feeble to impart an 'explicatory' quality
the collocation it features in. As a result,
the 'structural' character of the collocation
remains dominant; that being so, its proper home
is the present grouping]
The following item, characterized by multiple near­
synonymy, is a hybrid in which 'structural' components
(baffle< >perplex; confines< Enclosures) are conjoined
with 'explicatory' ones ('licentious', elucidated as
'unsusceptible of limitations'; 'vagrant', elucidated as
'impatient of restraint'):
Imagination, a licentious and vagrant faculty,
unsusceptible of limitations, and impatient of
restraint, has always endeavoured to baffle the
logician, to perplex the confines of
distinction, and burst the inclosures of
regularity. (Rambler 125, IV 300)
Johnson must have felt confident that his public
sufficiently understood the difference between a poet and
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a versifier (alternatively, between a poet and a
rhymester), as he repeatedly plays these near-synonyms off
against each other without further comment:
This play [Dryden's Aureng Zebel is addressed to
the earl of Mulgrave... himself, if not a poet,
yet a writer of verses... ("Dryden", Lives I
361)
His [Addison's] next paper of verses
[was] ... inscribed to Henry Sacheverell, who was
then, if not a poet, a writer of verses. . .
("Addison", Lives II 83)
His [Milton's] character of Dryden, who
sometimes visited him, was that he was a good
rhymist, but no poet. ("Milton", Lives I 154)
I have come across only one instance in which Johnson
undertakes actually to elucidate, through the provision of
further information, the distinction between a poet and a
versifier. With this item I accordingly initiate my
schedule of examples illustrative of his 'explicatory'
method:
Of Broome, though it cannot be said that he was
a great poet, it would be unjust to deny that he
was an excellent versifyer; his lines are smooth
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and sonorous, and his diction is select and
elegant. ("Broome", Lives III 80)
[Prior's] numbers are such as mere diligence may
attain; they seldom offend the ear, and seldom
sooth it... what is smooth is not soft. His
verses always roll, but they seldom flow.
("Prior", Lives II 210)
Though his usual phrase for conversation was
talk, yet he made a distinction; for when he
once told me that he dined the day before at a
friend's house...and I asked him if there was
good conversation, he answered, "No, Sir; we had
talk enough, but no conversation; there was
nothing discussed." (Life 1210) [emphasis in
original]
If the Commons have only the power of dismissing
for a few days the man whom his constituents can
immediately send back, if they can expel but
cannot exclude, they have nothing more than
nominal authority, to which perhaps obedience
never may be paid. ("The False Alarm", X 325)
[Johnson on Soame Jennings's describing as a
'contradiction in terms' Pascal's reference to
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'infinite number']: "I think...we must settle
the matter thus: numeration is certainly
infinite, for eternity might be employed in
adding unit to unit; but every number is in
itself finite, as the possibility of doubling it
easily proves..." (Mrs Thrale, Anecdotes of Dr
Johnson in Sherbo 87)
But Falstaff unimitated, unimitable Falstaff,
how shall I describe thee? Thou compound of
sense and vice; of sense which may be admired,
but not esteemed, of vice which may be despised,
but hardly detested. Falstaff is a character
loaded with faults, and with those faults which
naturally produce contempt. ...Yet the man thus
corrupt, thus despicable, makes himself
necessary to the prince that despises him, by
the most pleasing of all qualities, perpetual
gaiety...[and] easy escapes and sallies of
levity, which make sport but raise no envy.
(Johnson on Shakespeare, VII 523)
...he who differs from us, does not always
contradict us; he has one view of an object, and
we have another; each describes what he sees
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with equal fidelity, and each regulates his
steps by his own eyes: one man. . . looks on
celibacy as a state of gloomy solitude... the
other considers it...as a state free from
incumbrances, in which a man is at liberty to
chuse his own gratifications... (Adventurer
107, II 445)
BEAUCLERK [speaking of George Steevens]: He is
very malignant. JOHNSON: No, Sir; he is not
malignant. He is mischievous, if you will. He
would do no man an essential injury; he may,
indeed, love to make sport of people by vexing
their vanity. (Life 939) [The dextrous
distinction Johnson frames here elicits from
Boswell the comment that his friend "delighted
in discrimination of character" (ibid. 939-40)]
The allegation of resemblance between authors is
indisputably true; but the charge of plagiarism,
which is raised upon it, is not to be allowed
with equal readiness. A coincidence of
sentiment may easily happen without any
communication, since there are many occasions in
which all reasonable men will nearly think
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alike. (Adventurer 95, II 425)
The reigning philosophy informs us, that the
vast bodies which constitute the universe, are
regulated in their progress through the etherial
spaces, by the perpetual agency of contrary
forces...
The same contrariety of impulse may be
perhaps discovered in the motions of men: we are
formed for society, not for combination; we are
equally unqualified to live in a close
connection with our fellow beings, and in total
separation from them. (Adventurer 45, II 359­
60) [this item is simultaneously - and
ceremoniously - an instance of 'Distinction by
appeal to Analogy']
I presumed to animadvert on his eulogy on
Garrick, in his Lives of the Poets ["Smith", II
21] . "You say, Sir, his death eclipsed the
gaiety of nations." JOHNSON: I could not have
said more nor less. It is the truth; eclipsed.
not extinguished; and his death did eclipse; it
was like a storm. (Life 1021) [emphasis in
original]
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...of Cato it has been not unj ustly • determined
that it is rather a poem in dialogue than a
drama, rather a succession of just sentiments in
elegant language than a representation of
natural affections... ("Addison", Lives II 132)
The foresight of the [Hebridean] seers is not
always prescience: they are impressed with
images, of which the event only shews them the
meaning. (Journey 112)
I wish you had staid longer in Spain, for no
country is less known to the rest of Europe; but
the quickness of your discernment must make
amends for the celerity of your motions. He
that knows which way to direct his view, sees
much in a little time. (Letter to Joseph
Baretti: Letters I 135)
[Imprisoned in Newgate, Savage] now found that
his friends were only companions, who were
willing to share his gaiety, but not to partake
of his misfortunes... ("Savage", Lives II 422)
We talked of Mr Burke. Dr Johnson said, he had
great variety of knowledge, store of imagery,
copiousness of language. ROBERTSON: He has wit
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too. JOHNSON: No, sir; he never succeeds there.
'Tis low; 'tis conceit. (Hebrides Journal 172)
Vanity, the most innocent species of pride...
("Savage", Lives II 432)
The category 'Distinctions between Near-Synonyms'
contains a formation that lays claim to special notice.
This is the schema 'X without Y' , as articulated, for
example, in the collocations "motion without progress",
"bustle without business". The principal reason for this
locution's asserting a claim to special attention is that
its use signals, indeed occasions, a confluence of the
'structural' and the 'explicatory' methods. This
confluence takes the form of 'explicatory' discourse
(informative and elucidatory in its tendency) either
surrounding or leading up to the 'X without Y' formation
whose aphoristic concentration and schematic modelling mark
it out as unmistakably a 'structural' one. Where this
formation (which, with respect to its differentiating
function, works in exactly the same way as the schema 'X
but not Y'55) appears in the middle of a passage of
55 To set these two formations over against each other is to bring 
clearly into focus how much of an advantage 'X without Y' enjoys over 
'X but not Y' in point of elegance and epigrammatic concision, 
although in point of signifying and differentiating power there is 
nothing to choose between them.
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'explicatory' matter, it serves as its 'fulcrum', its
'centre of gravity', so to speak; when it appears at the
end, it then becomes that passage's terminus, the point
upon which its 'lines of force' converge. Once the items
exhibiting the 'X without Y' formation in a terminal
position are brought together in a muster of their own,
however, what leaps to notice is the fact that the
formation is in every case doubled through recourse to the
technique of parallel construction, although it is also
noteworthy that invariably only one of the doubled
collocations presents a distinction structured on elements
genuinely near-allied. The reason for the doubling is
traceable to Johnson's belief that the terminus of a prose
passage (be it the end of a sentence or of a paragraph) is
a site particularly well adapted to the enforcement of
emphasis both rhetorical and rhythmical. Underpinning this
belief are two others: first, his subscribing to a
"principle of 'cadence' in prose style, which required the
placing of the emphasis at the end"56 (Gray 204) and,
56 Germane in this connection is the following passage from the Life:
JOHNSON: Sir William Temple was the first writer who gave 
cadence to English prose. Before his time they were 
careless of arrangement, and did not mind whether a 
sentence ended with an important word or an insignificant 
word, or with what part of speech it was concluded. (921)
As for Johnson's own partiality to 'cadence', this is a trait 
incisively commented on by William Hazlitt who, rightly, it seems to 
me, discerned in it a compulsive element: "Johnson wrote a kind of
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second, his persuasion that the inner 'lines of force',
both rhetorical and architectonic, of a prose writing
ordinarily and naturally (meaning not only where the 'X
without Y' formula comes into the picture) converge upon
its point of closure, making that the proper place for the
play of emphasis57. It follows, then, with reference to
rhyming prose, in which he was as much compelled to finish the 
different clauses of his sentences, and to balance one period against 
another, as the writer of heroic verse is to keep to lines of ten 
syllables with similar terminations" (Preface to Characters of 
Shakespear's Plays xxii). Hazlitt elsewhere observes, in similar 
vein, that in the structure of Johnson's sentences "one clause answers 
to another in measure and quantity... the close of the period follows 
as mechanically as the oscillation of a pendulum, the sense is 
balanced with the sound; each sentence... is contained within itself 
like a couplet, and each paragraph forms itself into a stanza" 
(Lectures on the English Comic Writers 102).
The Reverend Robert Burrowes, in his perspicacious "Essay on the 
Stile of Doctor Samuel Johnson" (1786), argues that Johnson's "desire 
of harmony" (in Boulton 340), which would appear to be simply his 
predilection for cadence by another name, was such as to prompt him to 
press into service even the "minute ornament of alliteration" which, 
he continues, "is so often casual... that it is difficult to charge it 
on an author's intentions. But Johnson employs it so frequently, and 
continues it through so many words... that when we consider too how 
nearly allied it is as an ornament to parallelism, we have I think 
sufficient grounds to determine it as not involuntary" (idem).
57 In this connection the following remarks by Wimsatt are pertinent. 
I cite first his sketch of the state of psychological conditioning 
that leads readers to expect, and to welcome, emphatic accentuation at 
the end of a prose 'curve':
On the expectation that the end of a period will say 
something important... the mind...is satisfied to find at 
the end of a period a word emphatic (or important) in 
sense and supported by an emphasis or weight of sound. 
This is a rule of emphasis which Johnson himself hardly 
ever disregards. (1941:156)
I turn the spotlight next on to Wimsatt's account of the way in 
which Johnson actually gives effect to the 'rule' of terminal 
emphasis; seeking to make Johnson's method stand out, he contrasts it 
with Hazlitt's:
Early in Hazlitt's sentence come two triplets...partly 
sensory, asyndetic, hurried; they provide a momentary 
emphasis, after which the sentence rushes on 
antithetically... leaving the triplets back by the way...
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the second set of examples given below, that the doubling
of the 'X without Y' schema at the end of the prose 'curve'
reflects the dictates (as Johnson understood them) of
'cadence' and of an inner thrust towards terminal emphasis.
That these impulsions, these dynamic forces at work within
prose discourse should so often in the oeuvre come to
expression in the form of the parallel construction, as
they do not only in the second batch of items but also in
a very large number of instances that owe nothing whatever
to the 'X without Y' schema, is no surprise and no
accident, seeing that this is a construction which so
admirably harmonizes the claims of cadence and of
emphasis58 (and which for that very reason proved to be one
Johnson does the opposite. He begins slowly, building up 
through couplets... until he makes a climax of his two 
deliberate triplets, smashingly, one upon the other. And 
so with many a doublet; where it is jammed into the rush 
and preparation of the early part of one of Hazlitt's 
sentences... it is by Johnson saved till the end, the 
weightiest motive of the whole, toward which the whole 
labors up and having reached which, has accomplished its 
destination. (ibid. 37)
58 The species of emphasis alluded to here involves structural 
duplication through parallelism, but not duplication of meaning (a 
point underscored by the fact, noted above, that invariably only one 
of the doubled 'X without Y' locutions contains a distinction built on 
terms genuinely near-allied). This mode of emphasis is therefore not 
to be confounded with the kind of 'emphasis' Wimsatt has in mind when 
he accuses Johnson of sometimes 'multiplying words' for the sake of 
'emphasis' alone (v. infra); the two types of emphasis are quite 
distinct from each other, Wimsatt's having reference to the 
duplication of meaning, not of structure. He himself calls attention 
to this very point, declaring, "I mean emphasis absolutely. . .not what 
might be called balance...of emphasis, an effect common to all strong 
writing and achievable in various ways according to the tendencies of
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of Johnson's favourite rhetorical devices). So much for
exposition, now let the examples speak for themselves; in
the batch which follows, the 'X without Y' formation
occupies a 'fulcrum' position in the middle of the passage:
A new paper lies under the same disadvantages as
a new play. There is danger lest it be new
without novelty. My earlier predecessors [in
the line of periodical journalism] had their
choice of vices and follies... they had the
whole field of life before them, untrodden and
unsurveyed...They that follow are forced to peep
into neglected corners... and to recommend
themselves by minute industry... (Idler 3, II
9-10) [The 'new paper' referred to was the
Universal Chronicle in which the Idler series
was published]
The opinions prevalent in one age, as truths
above the reach of controversy, are confuted and
rejected in another, and rise again to reception
in remoter times. Thus the human mind is kept
the author. Johnson, for example, having used an adjective and noun 
at the beginning of a sentence or clause, will often find it necessary 
to use another adjective and noun... at the end. ...It is to be 
observed that [such] constructions though parallel in form are not 
parallel in substance..." (1941:32-33 [footnote 70]).
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in motion without progress. Thus sometimes
truth and errour, and sometimes contrarieties of
errour, take each other's place by reciprocal
invasion. ("Preface" to Shakespeare, in Bronson
295)
This profession [literary criticism] has one
recommendation peculiar to itself, that it gives
vent to malignity without real mischief. No
genius was ever blasted by the breath of
critics. (Idler 60, II 185)
Yet as much...of the pleasure which our
condition allows, must be produced by giving
elegance to trifles, it is necessary to learn
how to become little without becoming mean, to
maintain the necessary intercourse of civility,
and fill up the vacuities of action by agreeable
appearances. (Rambler 152, V 44)
In the following set of items the 'X without Y' schema
occupies a terminal position:
I passed some years in the most contemptible of
all human stations, that of a soldier in time of
peace. . .Wherever I came I was for a time a
stranger without curiosity, and afterwards an
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acquaintance without friendship. (Idler 21, II
66)
...Gelaleddin...a young man...of quick
apprehension and tenacious memory, accurate
without narrowness, and eager for novelty
without inconstancy. (Idler 75, II 232)
...those whom Otway frequented had no purpose of
doing more for him than to pay his reckoning.
They desired only to drink and laugh; their
fondness was without benevolence, and their
familiarity without friendship. ("Otway", Lives
I 243)
[Addison's] prose is the model of the middle
style; on grave subjects not formal, on light
occasions not groveling; pure without
scrupulosity, and exact without apparent
elaboration. ("Addison", Lives II 149)
[Dryden's] account of Shakespeare may stand as
a perpetual model of encomiastick criticism;
exact without minuteness, and lofty without
exaggeration. ("Dryden", Lives I 412)
If we consider it [the ideal community] with
368
regard to publick happiness, it would be opulent
without luxury, and powerful without faction.
(Sermons. XIV 60)
Many...find quiet shameful, and business
dangerous, and therefore pass their lives
between them, in bustle without business, and in
negligence without quiet. (Idler 19, II 60)
Finally, a densely-packed specimen in which the 'X
without Y' schema appears both in the middle of the
statement, where it is doubled, and at the end, where it
is trebled59:
59 Not a few critics have been struck by Johnson's predilection for 
triadic constructions, a predilection which, while making itself felt 
often enough in the oeuvre, appears to have no special connection with 
his distinction-making bent. Here follows a sampling of critical 
opinion, all of it by eighteenth-century commentators whose remarks on 
this subject strike me as more piquant and lively than the judgments 
of later critics:
* [Johnson] illustrates till he fatigues... he is so apt to 
explain the same thought by three different sets of 
phrases heaped on each other, that if I did not condemn 
his laboured coinage of words, I would call his threefold 
inundation of parallel expressions Triptology. (Horace 
Walpole (c. 1779) in Boulton 325)
*An ingenious essayist says, that in the Rambler "the 
constant recurrence of sentences in the form of what have 
been called triplets, is disgusting to all readers". The 
recurrence is indeed very frequent; but it certainly is 
not constant, nor we hope always disgusting: and as what 
he calls the triplet is unquestionably the most energetic 
form of which an English sentence is susceptible, we 
cannot help thinking, that it should frequently recur in 
detached essays, of which the object is to inculcate moral 
truths. (George Gleig (1797) in Boulton 73) [emphasis in 
original]
*Johnson's triods occur so frequently, that I find myself 
always led aside to wonder, that all the effects from the 
same cause should be so often discovered reducible to the 
mystical number three: I torment myself to find a reason
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[Goldsmith was a writer] who had the art of
being minute without tediousness, and general
without confusion; whose language was copious
without exuberance, exact without constraint,
and easy without weakness. ("Parnell", hives II
49)
The examples, both 'structural' and 'explicatory',
presented above constitute a body of evidence which
demonstrably bears out Kathleen Wales's at-first-sight
paradoxical judgment that the function of near-synonyms in
Johnson's oeuvre is "to show distinction, rather than
similarity" (26). In advancing this view Wales comes into
collision with W K Wimsatt who, in his The Prose Style of
Samuel Johnson, submits that some at least of Johnson's
nearly-synonymous collocations are framed not so much with
the intention of pointing up differences of signification
as with the intention simply of achieving rhetorical
"emphasis" through the "multiplication" of words (21, 22,
99, 101), the result of this being a needless duplication
of meaning. Wimsatt's submission, while not quite
for that particular order in which the effects are 
recited, and I am involuntarily delayed to consider, 
whether some are not omitted which have a right to be 
inserted, or some enumerated which due discretion would 
have suppressed. (The Reverend Robert Burrowes (1786) in 
Boulton 340)
370
amounting to an allegation that Johnson was sometimes
guilty of using words as mere 'verbal filler'60, has the
effect however of bracketing him with those writers who
believe (mistakenly, Wimsatt implies) that "a
multiplication of notions about one thing is not a
repetition of one meaning" (ibid. 102). Wimsatt's
criticism of Johnson on the score of "multiplication for
emphasis" (ibid. 99) obviously does not appertain to cases
in which an intention to distinguish is clearly signalled,
ordinarily through recourse to conjunctions denotative of
contrast, qualification or concession (conjunctions like
'but', 'yet', 'although'), but rather to cases in which the
60 This is, of course, precisely Macaulay's allegation, part of his 
notorious attack, in the essay of 1831, on the "characteristic faults 
of [Johnson's] style". Macaulay indeed accuses Johnson of being often 
guilty of using words as mere 'verbal filler', referring to " [h]is 
constant practice of padding out a sentence with useless epithets, 
till it became as stiff as the bust of an exquisite" (II 560) . 
Responding to this allegation, Donald J Greene retorts that "no 
English prose writer is less given than Johnson to 'padding out' 
sentences with 'useless epithets'. Every word counts" ("Johnson and 
Imagery", in Lascelles 143). I think Greene is right on target here. 
A moment's reflection will make it clear, moreover, that in insisting 
that in Johnson's discourse 'every word counts', Greene is defending 
a standpoint with which Wales's, formulated twenty years later, 
plainly has a great deal in common: for her critique of Wimsatt's 
contention that Johnson sometimes 'multiplies words' for the sake of 
rhetorical 'emphasis' alone must ensue from an outlook akin to 
Greene's, that is, from a conviction that in Johnson's discourse 
'every word counts' in its own right, meaning that every word traces 
out an 'horizon of signification' peculiar to itself - and therefore 
that it neither duplicates, nor is duplicated by, the 'horizons' of 
any of the words collocated with it. Given the congruence between 
Wales's and Greene's standpoints, it follows in logic that I cannot 
believe Greene to be right over against Macaulay without believing the 
same to be true of Wales in relation to Wimsatt. That I judge her to 
have the better of the argument is indeed sufficiently clear from the 
exposition above.
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occurrence of near-synonyms on either side of the co­
ordinating conjunction 'and' appears to give countenance
to the supposition that what is being striven for is not
so much the pointing up of semantic difference as the
accretion of 'equivalent terms' simply for the sake of
rhetorical emphasis - for the sake of a rhetorical
'flourish'. Wimsatt offers quite a number of examples of
locutions built on the schema 'X and Y' which, he
maintains, are illustrative of 'multiplication for [simple]
emphasis'; here is a sampling: "the constituent and
fundamental principle" (21) ; . "troubles and commotions"
(22) ; "activity and sprightliness" (22) ; "a sedate and
quiescent quality" (35); "readiness and dexterity" (36);
"vehement and rapid" (36) .
Wales's method of confuting Wimsatt is to bring
forward word-pairs of the 'X and Y' type consisting of
elements that manifest a degree of 'semantic overlap' as
great as, or even greater than, that found in the examples
adduced by Wimsatt, and then to demonstrate that Johnson's
purpose, far from being the rhetorical one of multiplying
supposedly 'equivalent terms' simply for the sake of
emphasis, is rather, in her phrase, "to show distinction"
(26) ; that is, to bring into view the admittedly fine but
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nonetheless important differences of signification between
words commonly taken to be synonymous. At this point I
propose to offer a digest of Wales's analysis which
recruits some of the same items as are adduced in the
'structural' listing given above.
Bringing under scrutiny the sentence from Rasselas
...while this power [of fancy] is such as we can
controul and repress. . . [see listing above;
Wales's emphasis]
Wales, basing herself on the definitions of these verbs in
the Dictionary, points out that 'control' "suggests the
checking of a wandering, restless entity" whereas 'repress'
"suggests the crushing of a powerful force" (29) [my
emphasis]. Appealing once again to the Dictionary, she
spotlights the difference of signification between the
adjectives 'even' and 'unvaried' which occur as a word-pair
in Idler 103 (see listing above):
An even and unvaried tenour of life always hides
from our apprehension the approach of its end.
[Wales's emphasis]
What 'even' connotes in the given context, she observes,
is "a life that has no ups and downs" - which is by no
means the same as 'unvaried' , whose connotation is "not
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diversified" (30) . The adjectives 'despotick and
dictatorial' exhibit an exceptionally high degree of
semantic overlap; they crop up in tandem in Rambler 61:
A short residence at London entitles a man
to...a despotick and dictatorial power of
prescribing to the rude multitude... [Wales's
emphasis]
Notwithstanding the high degree of semantic overlap, these
words are still not 'equivalent terms', as the Dictionary
entries make clear: 'despotick' stresses the (essentially
political) notion of 'absoluteness of power' while
'dictatorial' bears the more general sense of
"authoritative; confident; dogmatical; overbearing" (28).
Wales's analysis sufficiently demonstrates, it seems to me,
that Johnson's handling of near-synonyms, far from
manifesting 'multiplication for emphasis' , in fact bears
the stamp of juxtaposition for contrast.
The three examples cited in the digest above are, like
almost all the others Wales brings forward, illustrative
of Johnson's 'structural' method, as I call it. While she
does not catch sight of this method qua method, she does
notice, with respect to the items she adduces, that Johnson
forbears to amplify, leaving it to the reader to work out
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for himself the gist of the distinctions gestured to. She
discerns in this manner of proceeding an educative motive
on his part:
When words in collocation seem very similar in
meaning, it is easy for the reader to assume
that "sameness" is what is important, and that
multiplication is for emphasis. But Johnson
wants us to work harder, to appreciate by our
own process of understanding those subtle, yet
significant discriminations of meaning of which
he himself was aware, and which make up the
texture of his mind and work. (31)
I find myself concurring fully with Wales on this
point. Defending a position very similar to Wales's,
George Fraser argues that "one's attention in reading
Johnson. . .should not be on a core of similar meaning in
successive words, but on sharp differences at the edge of
that core" (in Wharton 42). But these twentieth-century
judgments were anticipated long ago by one of the most
insightful of Johnson's early commentators, the Reverend
Robert Burrowes, who as far back as 1787, in his "Essay on
the Stile of Doctor Samuel Johnson", made the observation
that "[t]he distinctions of words esteemed synonimous,
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might from his writings be accurately collected" (in
Boulton 333).
Whether expressed through the 'structural' method or
through the 'explicatory', whether exhibited in the
Dictionary or elsewhere in the oeuvre, Johnson's unflagging
endeavour to bring into view differences of signification
between words 'esteemed synonimous' - that is, his
endeavour to point up the non-equivalence and non­
interchangeability of terms widely, but erroneously,
regarded as equivalent and widely, but mistakenly, used
interchangeably - not only bears witness to his 'drive to
distinguish' as such, and to its vitality, but also brings
into focus the specific linguistic objectives to which this
drive ministers, namely, precision and clarity of
expression, and distinctness and definiteness of
signification; in other words, determinateness of verbal
meaning. But in his scheme of things these objectives are
less ends in themselves than means to a greater - the
"revelation of truth" (Wales 26) , in particular, moral
truth. For Johnson the goal of revealing and, beyond that,
of enshrining truth61 represented the grand challenge, the
61 Mrs Thrale speaks movingly of Johnson's having "a soul...acute to 
discern the truth, vigorous to embrace, and powerful to retain it..." 
(in Sherbo 158).
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ultimate objective. In the quest to realize it not only
his drive to distinguish but all his powers were enlisted.
These remarks bring to a conclusion my discussion of
'Verbal Distinction-making7. The grouping I propose to
consider next is 'Rhetorical Distinction-making'.
Rhetorical Distinction-making
This grouping, the largest, by some way, of my seven,
contains seven separate categories to which I have affixed
the following designations: 'Distinctions by appeal to
Analogy', 'Distinction-making within the Frame of the
Contrastive Set-piece', 'Distinctions by way of
Alternatives', 'Distinctions by way of Denial/Exclusion
followed by Affirmation', 'Distinctions by way of
Antimetabole (or Chiasmus)', 'Distinguishing the "Truth of
the Matter" from Commonly Held Beliefs', 'Distinction­
making by way of Enumeration/Hierarchical Ordering'. I
propose to examine these categories in the order here
stated.
Distinctions by appeal to Analogy
Boswell tells us, at the end of the Life. that "in
[Johnson] were united a most logical head with a most
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fertile imagination" (1402). As the process lying at the
heart of analogical thinking is a metaphor-forming one,
originating in that 'leap' of the mind which 'in wondrous
wise' connects things apparently quite dissimilar, and as
the gift of metaphorical invention has been long esteemed
a sign, if not perhaps a proof, of 'fertility of
imagination'62, it follows that this category of
'Distinctions by appeal to Analogy' , more conspicuously
than any of the others surveyed in the present study, is
referable to, and expressive of, Johnson's 'most fertile
imagination' - even as his 'philosophical' distinction­
making is most conspicuously expressive of his 'logical
head' . Moreover, since metaphor is probably the most
notable of all the rhetorical tropes, it seemed to me
proper that the present category, so obviously configured
on the appeal to metaphor, be classified under the head of
'Rhetorical Distinction-making'.
62 One can trace the connection between the gift of metaphor and 
'fertility of imagination' at least as far back as Aristotle's 
Poetics:
It is a great thing, indeed, to make a proper use of these 
poetical forms [the ones Aristotle has just been 
discussing] . . .But the greatest thing by far is to be a 
master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be 
learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius 
[frequently identified with 'fertility of imagination', 
even in the supposedly hyper-rationalistic eighteenth 
century] , since a good metaphor implies an intuitive 
perception of the similarity in dissimilars. (71)
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Donald J Greene describes the function of analogy (for
which he takes 'imagery' to be an equivalent term63) as
follows:
What the writer who uses imagery is trying to do
is to take a notion which is nebulous in the
reader's mind (the 'tenor' of the metaphor, in
[I A] Richards's terminology) and cause the
reader to apprehend it more vividly by
associating it with something of which a clear
sense impression can be obtained by the mind
(the 'vehicle'). ("Johnson and Imagery" in
63 Though this is seldom Johnson's own practice - in which 
connection these remarks by Jean H Hagstrum are germane:
Our present conception of imagery includes but does not 
always distinguish two functions of language, that of 
introducing sensuous concreteness and that of making 
comparisons. Dr Johnson recognized both but carefully 
distinguished them. His definition of imagery does not 
include comparison. (114)
Although for Johnson, continues Hagstrum, imagery "included the 
sensuous, [it] was...not exclusively confined to it" since "an idea 
was defined as a 'mental image'". In sum, his notion of 'imagery' 
probably boiled down to something like "mental pictures of reality, 
both phenomenal and intellectual" (idem). Hagstrum's conclusion is 
certainly consistent with the Dictionary's definition of 'imagery' as 
"such descriptions as force the image of the thing described upon the 
mind" (sense 4).
In my view Hagstrum is in general correct in maintaining that 
Johnson's "definition of imagery does not include comparison" (and 
technically he is of course wholly correct since the Dictionary's 
definition of 'imagery' demonstrably does not include the notion of 
comparison). In practice, however, Johnson was not quite so 
punctilious, and provided the analogy was itself structured on a 
'mental picture of reality', he was not above referring to it as an 
'image', as he does when summoning to his aid "a beautiful image [my 
emphasis] in Bacon upon this subject" (of the difference between 
'argument' and 'testimony': Life 1283; this item will be found, cited 
in full, among the examples listed below).
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Lascelles 138)
In Greene's view, then, the function of analogy is
basically that of sensuous (and, in particular, visual)
'heightening', the object being to invest notions with
greater 'vividness' for the reader64. But this is in fact
a very inadequate characterization of the way in which
Johnson handles analogy. Very few of the comparisons he
presses into service have as their objective the attainment
of mere 'vividness'; though they may well be vivid by the
way, they are presidingly enlisted (as I believe the
examples cited below make sufficiently clear) with an eye
64 Because Greene views Johnson's metaphor-making as 'vivid', 
'concrete', strongly 'sensuous' and highly 'visual', he tends to speak 
of the 'richness' of his imagery: "To Johnson's contemporaries it 
would have seemed a superfluous undertaking to call attention to the 
richness of imagery in his use of language" (op. cit. 138). Elsewhere 
he asserts that "even the reader who knows Johnson only from Boswell 
must marvel at the visual imagination which makes Johnson's best-known 
quips so effective" (Editor's Introduction, Samuel Johnson [Twentieth 
Century Views] 4). At virtually the opposite pole we find Wimsatt 
taking the view that
If Johnson's writing may be said to contain imagery, we 
must understand the term in another sense, that of simply 
non-literal expression. If it be remembered that not all 
nonliteral expression, that is, not all metaphor, need be 
highly sensory, it can be admitted that in some sense 
Johnson's writing contains imagery. (1941:65)
Can these two critics be talking about one and the same author? 
What they are in such radical disagreement about does not after all 
relate to matters merely speculative: there exists a sizable body of 
evidence that may be appealed to which, if it cannot settle the issue 
conclusively, can at least furnish some plausible pointers. What the 
evidence points to, in my view, is that the 'truth of the matter' lies 
somewhere between the positions adopted by Greene, on the one side, 
and Wimsatt, on the other: Johnson's handling of metaphor, when seen 
'in the round' (at any rate, as far as I am able to do so) , is not 
nearly as sensuously 'vivid' as Greene claims it is; at the same time 
it is not nearly as non-sensory as Wimsatt would have us believe.
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to their explanatory, illustrative or argumentative utility
(by 'argumentative' I mean that an analogy is employed in
order to clinch a point). In short, Johnson's handling of
analogy65 is informed rather by pragmatic and elucidatory
considerations66 than by considerations of sensuous
richness, vividness or poetical 'heightening'.
In his handling of analogy for distinction-making
purposes, Johnson has recourse to two identifiably
different methods. The one that he uses somewhat more
frequently entails first laying out, with varying degrees
of fulness, the substance of the distinction, after which67
65 In the present study I bring under scrutiny only those 
analogies - a sizable number, to be sure - that are formulated within 
the context of Johnson's distinction-making praxis. But it is well to 
bear in mind that the oeuvre contains a probably even larger number of 
analogies whose formulation is unconnected with distinction-making but 
arises simply from a perceived need to elucidate, illustrate or clinch 
a point, of whatever kind. With reference to the analogies framed 
within the context of Johnson's distinction-making praxis, I may add 
that their plentifulness is witnessed to not only by the abundance of 
examples furnished below, but also by the considerable number of 
exemplifications surfacing in other categories (to which the items in 
question were allocated owing to their standing out more 
conspicuously, in my judgment, for some quality other than the 
analogical) and there glossed as being "simultaneously instances of 
'Distinction by appeal to Analogy'".
66 What this also implies is that he is not given to using 
analogy redundantly or pointlessly; that is, when there is nothing 
positive to be gained by its deployment. Consider in this connection 
the following statement from the Life of Pope: "In their similes the 
greatest writers have sometimes failed: ...when Apollo running after 
Daphne is likened to a greyhound chasing a hare, there is nothing 
gained; the ideas of pursuit and flight are too plain to be made 
plainer [through analogy]" (Lives III 230).
67 Sometimes, strangely enough, 'before which' - meaning that the 
analogy precedes the distinction to which it pertains. This appears 
at first sight to be an odd way of going about things, but it works
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he deploys his analogy as an explanatory, illustrative or
argumentative aid. So by the time the analogy is enlisted
the distinction has already been made. In this case,
therefore, the analogy functions essentially as an
augmentative device - meaning, that if it were withdrawn,
though the distinction would lose something - some of its
forcefulness, probably; perhaps some of its clarity - its
substance would survive unimpaired and intact. In the
alternative method, by contrast, the analogy is no mere
supplementary apparatus; it is instead the very warp and
woof of the distinction; it is the distinction.
Consequently, erasing the analogy would mean erasing the
distinction at the same time. So the second method is
really more aptly denominated 'Distinction as Analogy' than
'Distinction by appeal to Analogy'. The difference between
the two techniques is comparable in a way to that between
metaphor and simile: the second works somewhat like
metaphor, only one term of the dyad, the 'vehicle' (to
recur to Richards's terminology), being given; the first
functions more like simile as both 'vehicle' and 'tenor'
are equally in the picture. I think, however, that in
well enough in practice, it seems to me. The instances in which the 
comparisons precede the subjects they refer to are brought together in 
a muster of their own in the listings below.
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trying to pinpoint the difference between the two
techniques I am better served by examples than by
comparisons, seeing that I am lucky enough to have at my
disposal a pair of items exceptionally well adapted to
bringing it out. The reason for this is that while each
exemplifies a different method they both happen to be
composed of virtually the same analogical 'raw materials';
the effect therefore of playing them off against each other
is to throw the differences between the two methods into
particularly sharp relief. The first item, it will be
observed, plainly presents an instance of 'Distinction by
appeal to Analogy' as the analogy is called upon only after
the distinction has already been formulated; the second no
less plainly exemplifies 'Distinction as Analogy' since the
analogical materials brought to bear, though virtually the
same as those summoned into service in the first case, in
this one, by contrast, constitute the very fabric of the
distinction, such that apart from them it has no existence.
Here is my pair of examples:
Books are faithful repositories, which may be a
while neglected or forgotten; but when they are
opened again, will again impart their
instruction: memory, once interrupted, is not to
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be recalled. Written learning is a fixed
luminary, which, after the cloud that had hidden
it has past away, is again bright in its proper
station. Tradition is but a meteor, which, if
once it falls, cannot be rekindled. (Journey
113)
If, instead of wandering after the meteors of
philosophy which fill the world with splendour
for a while, and then sink and are forgotten,
the candidates of learning fixed their eyes upon
the permanent lustre of moral and religious
truth, they would find a more certain direction
to happiness. (Rambler 180, V 186)
My prefatory remarks concluded, I propose now to lead
my evidence, the presentation of which is ordered on the
basis of Johnson's twofold method of handling analogy. I
begin with examples illustrative of 'Distinctions as
Analogy':
The author of these memoirs [the Irishman Arthur
Murphy] well remembers, that Johnson one day
asked him, "Have you observed the difference
between your own country impudence and Scottish
impudence?" The answer being in the negative:
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"Then- I will tell you," said Johnson. "The
impudence of an Irishman is the impudence of a
fly, that buzzes about you...and flutters and
teazes you. The impudence of a Scotsman is the
impudence of a leech, that fixes and sucks your
blood." (in Hill I 427)
Independent and unconnected sentiments flashing
upon the mind in quick succession, may, for a
time, delight by their novelty, but they differ
from systematical reasoning, as single notes
from harmony, as glances of lightening [sic]
from the radiance of the sun. (Rambler 158, V
78)
A transition from an author's books to his
conversation, is too often like an entrance into
a large city, after a distant prospect.
Remotely, we see nothing but spires of temples,
and turrets of palaces, and imagine it the
residence of splendor, grandeur, and
magnificence; but, when we have passed the
gates, we find it perplexed with narrow
passages, disgraced with despicable cottages,
embarrassed with obstructions, and clouded with
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smoke. (Rambler 14, III 79-80)
"The difference between coarse and refined abuse
is as the difference between being bruised by a
club, and wounded by a poisoned arrow." (Life
1295)
The state of the possessor of humble virtues, to
the affecter of great excellencies, is that of
a small cottage of stone, to the palace raised
with ice by the Empress of Russia; it was for a
time splendid and luminous, but the first
sunshine melted it to nothing. (Rambler 20, III
115)
When I survey the Plan [of the Dictionary! which
I have laid before you, I cannot, my Lord [the
reference is to Lord Chesterfield], but confess,
that I am frighted at its extent. . .But I hope,
that though I should not complete the conquest,
I shall at least discover the coast...and make
it easy for some other adventurer to proceed
farther... (Plan of a Dictionary of the English
Language. in Wilson 138)
Mrs. Kennicot related...a lively saying of Dr.
Johnson to Miss Hannah More, who had expressed
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a wonder that the poet who had written Paradise
Lost should write such poor Sonnets: "Milton,
Madam, was a genius that could cut a Colossus
from a rock; but could not carve heads upon
cherry-stones." (Life 1301)
I told him that Voltaire, in a conversation with
me, had distinguished Pope and Dryden thus:
"Pope drives a handsome chariot, with a couple
of neat trim nags; Dryden a coach, and six
stately horses." JOHNSON: Why, Sir, the truth
is, they both drive coaches and six; but
Dryden's horses are either galloping or
stumbling: Pope's go at a steady even trot.
(Life 355)
The spangles of wit which [Prior] could afford
he knew how to polish; but he wanted the bullion
of his master. Butler pours out a negligent
profusion, certain of the weight, but careless
of the stamp. Prior has comparatively little,
but with that little he makes a fine shew.
("Prior", Lives II 205) [This item is
simultaneously an instance, in miniature, of the
'Contrastive Set-piece']
387
They were talking of Burke & Fox: "The first has
more bullion", says Mr Johnson, "but the other
coins faster." (Mrs Thrale, Anecdotes of Dr
Johnson 117)
"Pray, Doctor," said a gentleman to him, "is Mr.
Thrale a man of conversation, or is he only wise
and silent?" "Why, Sir, his conversation does
not show the minute hand; but he strikes the
hour very correctly." (in Hill II 169)
To neglect at any time preparation for death, is
to sleep on our post at a siege, but to omit it
in old age, is to sleep at an attack. (Rambler
78, IV 49)
The stream of time, which is continually washing
the dissoluble fabricks of other poets, passes
without injury by the adamant of Shakespeare.
("Preface" to Shakespeare. in Bronson 270)
...when talked to one day concerning a
comparison to be drawn between Shakespeare and
Corneille, he said "Corneille is to Shakespeare
as a clipped hedge to a forest." (Mrs Thrale,
Anecdotes of Dr Johnson 12)
[To differentiate Edward Young from Dryden and
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Shakespeare, Johnson recruits the following
analogy]: "Young froths, and foams, and bubbles
sometimes very vigorously; but we must not
compare the noise made by your tea-kettle... with
the roaring of the ocean." (Thrale in Sherbo
79)
It has been generally objected to The
Wanderer...that the whole performance is not so
much a regular fabrick as a heap of shining
materials thrown together by accident, which
strikes rather with the solemn magnificence of
a stupendous ruin than the elegant grandeur of
a finished pile. ("Savage", Lives II 365)
The listing which now follows is made up of examples
illustrative of 'Distinctions by appeal to Analogy'. I
present first a grouping of three items in which the normal
conventions of analogical 'protocol' are reversed, such
that the analogy precedes the subject it refers to; or, in
'Richards-speak', the 'vehicle' precedes its 'tenor'. The
first of these items is a genuinely bravura performance,
a tour de force, in which Johnson discriminates the several
"qualities requisite to conversation" with reference to the
ingredients of a beverage, punch. Despite his strictures
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against the Metaphysical poets, he in this piece exhausts
the potential of his chosen metaphor (the "bowl of punch")
with a completeness, ingenuity and brio quite equal to
those of this reprovable "race of authors" ("Cowley", Lives
I 22) at their most showy. I shall begin the citation some
way before the introduction of the analogy itself as
Johnson's initial comments on the the utility of the
analogical method are of some interest:
To illustrate one thing by its resemblance to
another has been always the most popular and
efficacious art of instruction. There is indeed
no other method of teaching that of which any
one is ignorant but by means of something
already known; and a mind so enlarged by
contemplation and enquiry, that it has always
many objects within its view, will seldom be
long without some near and familiar image thro'
which an easy transition may be made to truths
more distant and obscure.
Of the parallels which have been drawn by
wit and curiosity, some are literal and real, as
between poetry and painting...
Other parallels are fortuitous and
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fanciful, yet these have sometimes been extended
to many particulars of resemblance by a lucky
concurrence of diligence and chance. ...
Of this [latter kind of parallel] is a
curious speculation frequently indulged by a
philosopher of my acquaintance, who had
discovered that the qualities requisite to
conversation are very exactly represented by a
bowl of punch.
Punch, says this profound investigator, is
a liquor compounded of spirit and acid juices,
sugar and water. The spirit volatile and fiery,
is the proper emblem of vivacity and wit, the
acidity of the lemon will very aptly figure
pungency of raillery, and acrimony of censure;
sugar is the natural representative of luscious
adulation and gentle complaisance; and water is
the proper hieroglyphick of easy prattle,
innocent and tasteless.
Spirit alone is too powerful for use. It
will produce madness rather than merriment; and
instead of quenching thirst will inflame the
blood. Thus wit too copiously poured out
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agitates the hearer with emotions rather violent
than pleasing; every one shrinks from the force
of its oppression...
The acid juices give this genial liquor all
its power of stimulating the palate.
Conversation would become dull and vapid, if
negligence were not sometimes roused, and
sluggishness quickened, by due severity of
reprehension. But acids unmixt will distort the
face and torture the palate; and he that has no
other qualities than penetration and
asperity...will soon be dreaded, hated, and
avoided.
The taste of sugar is generally pleasing,
but it cannot long be eaten by itself. Thus
meekness and courtesy will always recommend the
first address, but soon pall and nauseate,
unless they are associated with more spritely
qualities. ...
Water is the universal vehicle by which are
conveyed the particles necessary to sustenance
and growth, by which thirst is quenched, and all
the wants of life and nature are supplied. Thus
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all the business of the world is transacted by
artless and easy talk, neither sublimed by
fancy, nor discoloured by affectation... Water
is the only ingredient of punch which can be
used alone, and with which man is content till
fancy has framed an artificial want. ...
He only will please long, who, by tempering
the acid of satire with the sugar of civility,
and allaying the heat of wit with the frigidity
of humble chat, can make the true punch of
conversation... (Idler 34, 106-108)
Cunning differs from wisdom as twilight from
open day. He that walks in the sunshine goes
boldly forward by the nearest way; he sees that
where the path is streight and even he may
proceed in security, and where it is rough and
crooked he easily complies with the turns and
avoids the obstructions. But the traveller in
the dusk fears more as he sees less;
he... suspects that he is never safe, tries every
step before he fixes his foot, and shrinks at
every noise... Wisdom comprehends at once the
end and the means, estimates easiness or
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. difficulty, and is cautious or confident in due
proportion. Cunning discovers little at a time,
and has no other means of certainty than
multiplication of stratagems and superfluity of
suspicion. The man of cunning always considers
that he can never be too safe, and therefore
always keeps himself enveloped in a mist,
impenetrable, as he hopes, to the eye of rivalry
or curiosity68. (Idler 92, 284-85)
...as the industry of observation has divided
the most miscellaneous and confused assemblages
into proper classes, and ranged the insects of
the summer, that torment us with their drones or
stings, by their several tribes; the persecutors
of merit...may likewise be commodiously
distinguished into Roarers, Whisperers, and
Moderators. (Rambler 144, V 5)
In the examples now to be presented, the usual order
of analogical 'protocol' is observed; that is to say, the
distinction is laid out first, followed by the appeal to
68 The device of the personified abstraction ('personification'), 
the use of which is so conspicuous in this passage, is a recurrent, 
though not, as has been sometimes alleged, habitual feature of 
Johnson's discourse (of his written discourse, that is; it rarely if 
ever figures in his spoken) . But in his recourse to personification, 
Johnson was simply following the practice of the age.
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analogy:
No passage in [Addison's heroic poem] The
Campaign has been more often mentioned than the
simile of the Angel... Let it be first enquired
whether it be a simile. A poetical simile is
the discovery of likeness between two actions in
their general nature dissimilar, or of causes
terminating by different operations in some
resemblance of effect. But the mention of
another like consequence from a like cause, or
of a like performance by a like agency, is not
a simile, but an exemplification. ...A simile
may be compared to lines converging at a point
and is more excellent as the lines approach from
greater distance: an exemplification may be
considered as two parallel lines which run on
together without approximation, never far
separated, and never joined. ("Addison", Lives
II 129-130)
So different are the colours of life...that the
conversation of the old and young ends generally
with contempt or pity on either side... Thus one
generation is always the scorn and wonder of the
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other,, and the notions of the old and young are
like liquors of different gravity and texture
which never can unite. (Rambler 69, III 365)
If praise be. . .a blessing which no man can
promise himself from the most conspicuous
merit...how faint must be the hope of gaining
it, when the uncertainty is multiplied by the
weakness of the pretensions! He that persues
fame with just claims, trusts his happiness to
the winds; but he that endeavours after it, by
false merit, has to fear, not only the violence
of the storm, but the leaks of his vessel.
(Rambler 20, III 114)
"Sir", (continued [Johnson]), "there is all the
difference in the world between characters of
nature and characters of manners; and there is
the difference between the characters of
Fielding and those of Richardson. Characters of
manners are very entertaining; but they are to
be understood by a more superficial observer
than characters of nature, where a man must dive
into the recesses of the human heart. ...There
[is] as great a difference between them
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[Richardson and Fielding] as between a man who
[knows] how a watch [is] made, and a man who
[can] tell the hour by looking on the dial-
plate." This was a short and figurative state
of his distincton between drawing characters of
nature and characters only of manners. (Life
389) [emphasis in original]
That there is something in advice very useful
and salutary, seems to be equally confessed on
all hands; since even those that reject it,
allow for the most part that rejection to be
wrong, but charge the fault upon the unskilful
manner in which it is given; they admit the
efficacy of the medicine, but abhor the
nauseousness of the vehicle. (Adventurer 74, II
395)
I talked of the recent expulsion of six students
from the University of Oxford, who were
methodists, and would not desist from publickly
praying and exhorting. JOHNSON: Sir, that
expulsion was extremely just and proper. What
have they to do at an University who are not
willing to be taught, but will presume to teach?
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...BOSWELL: But, was it not hard, Sir, to expel
them, for I am told they were good beings?
JOHNSON: Sir, I believe they might be good
beings; but they were not fit to be in the
University of Oxford. A cow is a very good
animal in the field; but we turn her out of a
garden. (Life 490)
[Bishop] PERCY: He [Thomas Pennant, author of A
Tour in Scotland (1771)] pretends to give the
natural history of Northumberland, and yet takes
no notice of the immense number of trees planted
there of late. JOHNSON: That, Sir, has nothing
to do with the natural history; that is civil
history. A man who gives the natural history of
the oak, is not to tell how many oaks have been
planted in this place or that. A man who gives
the natural history of the cow, is not to tell
how many cows are milked at Islington. The
animal is the same, whether milked in the Park
or at Islington. (Life 932) [emphasis in
original]
Sir James Johnston happened to say, that he paid
no regard to the arguments of counsel at the bar
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of the House of Commons, because they were paid
for speaking. JOHNSON: Nay, Sir, argument is
argument. You cannot help paying regard to
their arguments, if they are good. If it were
testimony, you might disregard it, if you knew
that it were purchased. There is a beautiful
image in Bacon upon this subject: testimony is
like an arrow shot from a long bow; the force of
it depends on the strength of the hand that
draws it. Argument is like an arrow from a
cross-bow, which has equal force though shot by
a child. (Life 1283)
Sir Joshua Reynolds praised Mudge's Sermons.
JOHNSON: Mudge's Sermons are good, but not
practical. He grasps more sense than he can
hold; he takes more corn than he can make into
meal; he opens a wide prospect, but it is so
distant, it is indistinct. (Life 1140)
...the conversation having turned upon Edwards's
book (Canons of Criticism! , the gentleman
praised it much, and Johnson allowed its merit.
But when they went farther, and appeared to put
that authour upon a level with Warburton, "Nay,
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(said Johnson), he has given him some smart hits
to be sure; but there is no proportion between
the two men; they must not be named together.
A fly, Sir, may sting a stately horse and make
him wince; but one is but an insect, and the
other is a horse still." (Life 186 [footnote
2] )
Of his fellow-collegian, the celebrated Mr
George Whitefield [the Methodist revivalist
preacher], he said, "Whitefield never drew as
much attention as a mountebank does; he did not
draw attention by doing better than others, but
by doing what was strange. Were Astley to
preach a sermon standing upon his head on a
horse's back, he would collect a multitude to
hear him; but no wise man would say he had made
a better sermon for that". (Life 1037)
There is...a common stock of images, a settled
mode of arrangement, and a beaten track of
transition, which all authors suppose themselves
at liberty to use... So...the author who
imitates his predecessors only, by furnishing
himself with thoughts and elegancies out of the
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same general magazine of literature, can with
little more propriety be reproached as a
plagiary, than the architect can be censured as
a mean copier of Angelo or Wren, because he digs
his marble from the same quarry, squares his
stones by the same art, and unites them in
columns of the same orders. (Rambler 143, IV
394-95)
That the evidence of Johnson's use of analogy within
the context of distinction-making is so copious (though for
all that, as I indicated earlier, probably less copious
than the evidence of his use of it in contexts unconnected
with distinction-making) proves one thing at least, if it
proves nothing else: it proves how wrongheaded are the
allegations, heard even in our own day, of his 'dry
intellectualism', his 'arid abstractness'. As an example
of this viewpoint Greene cites a judgment pronounced in the
1950s by a Canadian academic "of some prominence": "More
than half-deaf, and more than half-blind, [Johnson's]
response [was] limited almost entirely to the conceptual
aspects of poetry" (Editor's Introduction, Samuel Johnson:
A Collection of Critical Essays 4) . Greene uses the
epithet "benighted" to characterize this outlook - not too
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strong a term in my opinion. But even Wimsatt's much
better informed, and more temperately phrased comments
regarding Johnson's proneness to 'abstraction'69 also
strike me as on the whole ill-aimed when seen in the light
69 For example:
Johnson's terms tend to be non-sensory, his meaning to be 
general and abstract. (1941:65)
We may call Hazlitt's words sensory and specific, 
Johnson's non-sensory and general, (ibid. 55)
...the two traits of generalization and abstraction lead 
Johnson to a third...the use of general or abstract words 
which have a scientific or philosophic flavor, (ibid. 59)
Arguing along the same lines, Sherburn and Bond state that "[b]y 
habit [Johnson] writes in abstract terms, and such terms tend to seem 
Latin even when they are not" (1003).
The debate about the 'abstractness', or otherwise, of Johnson's 
discourse is usefully viewed within the frame of Greene's submission 
that
there has... existed a 'double tradition' of Johnson the 
writer - two quite contradictory ways of reading the words 
on a Johnsonian page. The one sees it as exuberant with 
concrete and vivid imagery; the other finds only a drear 
waste of 'abstraction' and inflated, pompous verbosity. 
The one sees Johnson the critic as highly concerned to 
promote the use of effective imagery as an indispensable 
quality of the highest poetry; the other finds him 
suspicious, even fearful of it. (in Lascelles 156)
Greene is here pitting polar positions against each other, to 
the exclusion of a middle ground which is where I believe the 'truth 
of the matter' really lies (as I have indicated in an earlier 
footnote) . It seems to me that F R Leavis stakes out a position more 
or less on the middle ground which Greene disregards: criticizing 
Joseph Wood Krutch for claiming that "Johnson did not merely write 
abstractly; he thought abstractly", Leavis for his part contends that 
To call Johnson's style 'abstract' is misleading if you 
don't go on at once to explain that abstractness here 
doesn't exclude concreteness, or (since these words, at
any rate as used
by literary critics, are not very determinate in force) to insist that 
the style is remarkable for body. It is a generalizing style; its 
extraordinary weight is a generalizing weight; and the literary critic 
should be occupied with analysing this, and with explaining how 
Johnson's generalities come to be so different in effect from ordinary 
abstractness. ...Johnson's abstractions and generalities are not mere 
empty explicitnesses substituting for the concrete; they focus a wide 
range of profoundly representative experience - experience felt by the 
reader as movingly present. (101-102)
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of the evidence marshalled above. Most particularly when
they are set against Johnson's conversational use of
analogy do complaints about his 'dryness', 'abstractness'
or 'pomposity' strike me as wrongheaded and misapplied.
For the items in the listings above which are drawn from
the conversational record reveal a handling of analogy
remarkable in my view for its vigorous 'down-to-earthness'
(consider how large a number of his analogies are drawn
from the realm of everyday experience) , verve and 'edge'
(and also for its ability to convey something of the
flavour of his "bow-wow way" (Life 599)). The handling of
analogy in the writings, though admirable, is by comparison
less piquant70, more studiedly wrought; nor does it bear to
anything like the same degree the impress of Johnson's
inimitable personality. But from an activity which,
compared to conversation, is so much more deliberate, more
premeditated, it would be unreasonable to expect anything
very different to ensue. Proceeding now with my analysis,
the category I want to examine next is 'Distinction-making
within the Frame of the Contrastive Set-piece'.
Distinction-making within the Frame of the Contrastive Set-
70 The tour de force of the 'bowl of punch' in Idler 34 (cited 
above) is to my mind the exception that proves the rule.
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piece
In employing the contrastive set-piece as an
instrument of critical evaluation/ Johnson inserts himself
into a rhetorical tradition of long standing; his use of
this form looks back to "a long line of precedents, ranging
from Longinus's comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero,
through Dryden's comparison of Shakespeare and Jonson, to
Pope's comparison of Homer and Virgil in his preface to the
Iliad" (Maner 125). Maner however omits to mention the
most notable of all Johnson's precedents, Plutarch's
Parallel Lives, composed in all likelihood sometime between
100 and 116 (Hamilton xv, xxxvii). This work, certainly
well known to Johnson (Life 1365) , as it was to all
educated Europeans of his day, bears the name it does
because of the singular, though not unique (Russell (1972)
109) principle of biographical pairing upon which it is
constructed: the biography of a distinguished Greek is
paired with that of a Roman counterpart. At the end of
each pair of biographies (save four, out of a total of
twenty-three), its subjects are set over against each other
in a formal, rhetorically-conditioned71 comparison called
71 "They [the formal comparisons] are, as it were, model answers 
for a rhetorical exercise: you have heard the two stories, what points 
of similarity and difference can you see? Such things were of course 
practised in the schools [of rhetoric]. Quintilian (2.4.21) gives two
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the synkrisis which, as Hamilton notes, "serves especially
to set out the differences between the heroes" (xxxiv;
emphasis in original). Johnson's practice is modelled in
this particular on the Plutarchian formula: his contrastive
set-pieces aim to point up differences rather than
similarities.
Dryden's comparison of Shakespeare and Ben Jonson is
singled out by Maner as another of Johnson's precedents.
This is no doubt the case, but to point to just this
comparison as a probable influence upon Johnson's practice
is to slight Dryden who, while he framed comparisons
between persons (invariably writers) on the Plutarchian
model, though in nowhere near so systematic a fashion, also
travelled some distance beyond Plutarch in applying the
contrastive method to other subjects as well. Thus we find
him setting up dialectical contrasts between genres (Comedy
and Farce) or between mental faculties (Wit and Fancy)72.
advanced exercises which can be used to stimulate progress when simple 
narratio has been mastered. One consists of encomium and invective... 
The other exercise is comparison - 'Which is the better man and which 
the worse?' This gives double the amount of material to handle and 
deals not only with the nature of virtues and vices but with the 
degree (modus) in which they are present. Plutarch's sunkriseis are 
specimens of this kind of work" (Russell (1972) 110) . Similarly, 
though in a somewhat looser sense, Johnson's contrastive set-pieces 
are specimens of Plutarchian synkrisis. It is for this reason that it 
seemed to me proper to locate the present category under the head of 
'Rhetorical Distinction-making'.
72 A useful sampling of Dryden's contrastive pieces is given in 
The Oxford Anthology of English Literature, vol. 1 (Ed. Kermode, F et
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As much as Johnson follows Plutarch's lead in constructing
his set-pieces on the principle of bringing differences to
the fore, so he follows Dryden's as regards range of
subject matter. Certainly he composes set-pieces in which
persons (invariably, as with Dryden, these are authors) and
their relative merits and demerits form the subject of the
juxtaposition-for-contrast, but he composes a greater
number which point up differences of other kinds: between,
for example, Shakespeare's comic style and his tragic, or
between works of the same genre (even the same theme)
written by different authors (Pope's Ode for St Cecilia's
Day vs. Dryden's), or between conditions of life (old age
vs. youth), or political temperaments (Tory vs. Whig), or
journalistic leanings (Monthly reviewers vs. Critical
reviewers), or human acquirements (Wit vs. Learning), or
objects of human aspiration (Power vs. Wealth).
Johnson's most extended use of the contrastive set-
al.), 1660-68. In the headnote prefatory to this miscellany, Dryden's 
predilection for the contrastive method is referred to the attraction 
exerted upon his particular cast of mind by the "balancing of 
contraries and opposites" (1660). It is very probable that the same 
factor presidingly accounts for Johnson's predilection, no less marked 
than Dryden's, for this same method. Implicit in this supposition is 
the hypothesis that, in one area at least, the build of Johnson's mind 
differed little from that of Dryden's. However that may be, it is not 
difficult to see that to a mind like Johnson's the prospect of 
'balancing contraries and opposites' could not but have been 
congenial, not only because 'contraries and opposites' are the product 
of distinction-making but because the balancing of them has everything 
to do with those shapely symmetries of antithetical equipoise and 
parallel construction to which he was so conspicuously drawn.
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piece as a vehicle of critical evaluation is the lengthy
svnkrisis he frames in the Life of Pope in which this poet
and Dryden are set up as foils to each other. In his
management of the comparison Johnson's aim is not just to
differentiate them but to make the traits on the basis of
which they are differentiated bring into focus - and into
the sharpest focus at that - what is essential and
distinctive in the poetical style and manner of each. This
is no easy aim; it involves turning a far from simple
trick. Johnson is however equal to the challenge, not only
'turning his trick' but doing so with great address73. His
success in this department is, it seems to me, what mainly
accounts for the Pope/Dryden set-piece standing out not
only as one of the finest things in the Life of Pope (which
is full of fine things), but as one of the finest in the
Lives as a whole. There are other reasons as well for its
distinction - Johnson's eloquence, breadth of vision, and
critical incisiveness, the subtlety and deftness of his
expository procedures (analysed in some detail by Maner,
73 He is helped, to be sure, by his choice of authors. 
Relatively few pairings of writers lend themselves to the kind of 
differentiation that also serves to bring out what is essential and 
distinctive in the work of each. As these pairings are few, so they 
tend to be standardized: apart from Pope and Dryden, one thinks, among 
others (relatively few others), of Virgil and Homer, Horace and 
Juvenal, Shakespeare and Jonson, Corneille and Racine, Voltaire and 
Rousseau, Tolstoy and Dostoievsky.
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124-26), and his telling, at times inspired, use of
analogy. In short, Johnson pulls off a tour de force
without the least appearance of labour or strain. In the
citation which follows the greater part of the comparison
is given:
...Dryden never desired to apply all the
judgement that he had. He wrote, and professed
to write, merely for the people; and when he
pleased others, he contented himself. He spent
no time in struggles to rouse latent powers; he
never attempted to make that better which was
already good, nor often to mend what he must
have known to be faulty. ...
Pope was not content to satisfy; he desired
to excel, and therefore always endeavoured to do
his best: he did not court the candour, but
dared the judgement of his reader, and,
• expecting no indulgence from others, he shewed
none to himself. He examined lines and words
with minute and punctilious observation, and
retouched every part with indefatigable
diligence, till he had left nothing to be
forgiven. ...
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...Pope had perhaps the judgement of Dryden; but
Dryden certainly wanted the diligence of Pope.
In acquired knowledge the superiority must
be allowed to Dryden, whose education was more
scholastick... His mind has a larger range, and
he collects his images and illustrations from a
more extensive circumference of science. Dryden
knew more of man in his general nature, and Pope
in his local manners. The notions of Dryden
were formed by comprehensive speculation, and
those of Pope by minute attention. There is
more dignity in the knowledge of Dryden, and
more certainty in that of Pope.
...The style of Dryden is capricious and varied,
that of Pope is cautious and uniform; Dryden
obeys the motions of his own mind, Pope
constrains his mind to his own rules of
composition. Dryden is sometimes vehement and
rapid; Pope is always smooth, uniform, and
gentle. Dryden's page is a natural field,
rising into inequalities, and diversified by the
varied exuberance of abundant vegetation; Pope's
is a velvet lawn, shaven by the scythe, and
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levelled by the roller.
Of genius, that power which constitutes a
poet; that quality without which judgement is
cold and knowledge is inert; that energy which
collects, combines, amplifies and animates - the
superiority must, with some hesitation, be
allowed to Dryden. It is not to be inferred
that of this poetical vigour Pope had only a
little, because Dryden had more, for every other
writer since Milton must give place to Pope; and
even of Dryden it must be said that if he has
brighter paragraphs, he has not better poems.
Dryden's performances were always hasty...he
composed without consideration, and published
without correction...The dilatory caution of
Pope enabled him to condense his sentiments, to
multiply his images, and to accumulate all that
study might produce, or chance might supply. If
the flights of Dryden therefore are higher, Pope
continues longer on the wing. If of Dryden's
fire the blaze is brighter, of Pope's the heat
is more regular and constant. Dryden often
surpasses expectation, and Pope never falls
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below it. Dryden is read with frequent
astonishment, and Pope with perpetual delight.
("Pope", Lives III 220-23)
For the Teutonick etymologies, I am commonly
indebted to Junius and Skinner... Of
these...Junius appears to have excelled in
extent of learning, and Skinner in rectitude of
understanding. Junius was accurately skilled in
all the northern languages, Skinner probably
examined the ancient and remoter dialects only
by occasional inspection into dictionaries; but
the learning of Junius is often of no other use
than to show him a track by which he may deviate
from his purpose, to which Skinner always
presses forward by the shortest way. Skinner is
often ignorant, but never ridiculous: Junius is
always full of knowledge; but his variety
distracts his judgment, and his learning is very
frequently disgraced by his absurdities.
("Preface" to the Dictionary, in Bronson 240)
[emphasis in original]
The different manner and effect with which
critical knowledge may be conveyed was perhaps
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never more clearly exemplified than in the
performances of Rymer and Dryden. It was said
of a dispute between two mathematicians... that
"it was more eligible to go wrong with one than
right with the other." A tendency of the same
kind every mind must feel at the perusal of
Dryden's prefaces and Rymer's discourses. With
Dryden we are wandering in quest of Truth, whom
we find, if we find her at all, drest in the
graces of elegance; and if we miss her, the
labour of the pursuit rewards itself: we are led
only through fragrance and flowers. Rymer,
without taking a nearer, takes a rougher way;
every step is to be made through thorns and
brambles, and Truth, if we meet her, appears
repulsive by her mien and ungraceful by her
habit. Dryden's criticism has the majesty of a
queen; Rymer's has the ferocity of a tyrant.
("Dryden", Lives I 412-13)
Johnson's use of the set-piece in the items which
follow bears upon a range of subjects other than authors
or critics. In the first passage cited, where Wit and
Learning are played off against each other, these two
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adversaries seem to function as personified abstractions;
in fact,
central
invented
they are mythological incarnations, being the
characters of a mythological fable expressly
by Johnson to supply the matter of Rambler 22:
It was observable, that at the beginning of
every debate, the advantage was on the side of
Wit [the offspring of Apollo by Euphrosyne],- and
that, at the first sallies, the whole assembly
sparkled, according to Homer's expression, with
unextinguishable merriment. But Learning [the
offspring of Apollo by Sophia] would reserve her
strength till the burst of applause was over...
She then attempted her defence, and, by
comparing one part of her antagonist's
objections with another, commonly made him
confute himself... The audience began gradually
to lay aside their prepossessions, and rose, at
last, with great veneration for Learning, but
with greater kindness for Wit.
Their conduct was, whenever they desired to
recommend themselves to distinction, entirely
opposite. Wit was daring and adventurous;
Learning cautious and deliberate. Wit thought
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nothing reproachful but dulness; Learning was
afraid of no imputation, but that of error. Wit
answered before he understood, lest his
quickness of apprehension should be questioned;
Learning paused, where there was no difficulty,
lest any insidious sophism should lie
undiscovered. Wit perplexed every debate by
rapidity and confusion; Learning tired the
hearers with endless distinctions, and prolonged
the discussion without advantage, by proving
that which never was denied. Wit, in hopes of
shining, would venture to produce what he had
not considered, and often succeeded beyond his
own expectation, by following the train of a
lucky thought; Learning would reject every new
notion, for fear of being intangled in
consequences which she could not foresee...
Both had prejudices, which in some degree
hindered their progress towards perfection, and
left them open to attacks. Novelty was the
darling of Wit, and antiquity of Learning. To
Wit, all that was new was specious; to Learning,
whatever was antient, was venerable. Wit,
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however, seldom failed to divert those whom he
could not convince, and to convince was not
often his ambition; Learning always supported
her opinion with so many collateral truths,
that, when the cause was decided against her,
her arguments were remembered with admiration.
Nothing was more common, on either side,
than to quit their proper characters, and to
hope for a compleat conquest by the use of the
weapons which had been employed against them.
Wit would sometimes labour a syllogism, and
Learning distort her features with a jest; but
they always suffered by the experiment... The
seriousness of Wit was without dignity, and the
merriment of Learning without vivacity. (Ill
122-23) [At the end of the fable, by the way,
Wit and Learning are reconciled: they "were so
endeared to each other, that they lived
afterwards in perpetual concord. Wit persuaded
Learning to converse with the Graces, and
Learning engaged Wit in the service of the
Virtues" (ibid. 125)]
"The opinions of children and parents [declares
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Nekayah], of the young and the old, are
naturally opposite, by the contrary effects of
hope and despondence, of expectation and
experience...
"Few parents act in such a manner as much
to enforce their maxims by the credit of their
lives. The old man trusts wholly to slow
contrivance and gradual progression: the youth
expects to force his way by genius, vigour, and
precipitance. The old man pays regard to
riches, and the youth reverences virtue. The
old man deifies prudence: the youth commits
himself to magnanimity and chance. The young
man, who intends no ill, believes that none is
intended, and therefore acts with openness and
candour: but his father, having suffered the
injuries of fraud, is impelled to suspect, and
too often allured to practise it. Age looks
with anger on the temerity of youth, and youth
with contempt on the scrupulosity of age. Thus
parents and children, for the greatest part,
live on to love less and less..." (Rasellas, in
Bronson 658)
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When the power of birth and' station ceases, no
hope remains but from the prevalence [ =
ascendancy] of money. Power and wealth supply
the place of each other. Power confers the
ability of gratifying our desire without the
consent of others. Wealth enables us to obtain
the consent of others to our gratification.
Power, simply considered, whatever it confers on
one, must take from another. Wealth enables its
owner to give to others, by taking only from
himself. Power pleases the violent and proud:
wealth delights the placid and the timorous.
Youth therefore flies at power, and age grovels
after riches. (Journey 100-101)
A wise Tory and a wise Whig, I believe, will
agree. Their principles are the same, though
their modes of thinking are different. A high
Tory makes government unintelligible: it is lost
in the clouds. A violent Whig makes it
impracticable: he is for allowing so much
liberty to every man, that there is not power
enough to govern any man. The prejudice of the
Tory is for establishment; the prejudice of the
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Whig is for innovation. A Tory does not wish to
give more real power to Government; but that
Government should have more reverence. Then
they differ as to the Church. The Tory is not
for giving more legal power to the Clergy, but
wishes they should have a considerable
influence, founded on the opinion of mankind;
the Whig is for limiting and watching them with
a narrow jealousy. (Life 1154-55) [It is well
to remember that this fully-formed, elaborately
counterpointed disquisition belongs to the
spoken record, not the written! Boswell is
quite explicit on this point. In fact, he was,
as he tells us, so impressed with Johnson's
eloquence the first time round that he asked him
to repeat what he had said in order to make a
verbatim transcript of it (v. Appendix A and
Life 1154). This no doubt is the reason for the
exceptional 'all-of-a-pieceness' of the
utterance as recorded. What it very clearly
demonstrates is Johnson's gift for speaking, 'at
the drop of a hat' , just as correctly and as
plangently as he wrote. This is a talent I have
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already adverted to, relying for support on the
testimony of Johnson's contemporaries. One of
them, the painter Ozias Humphrey, remarked that
everything he said was "as correct as a second
edition" (in Hill II 401). We see the proof of
that in this passage]
Talking of the Reviews [the Monthly Review and
the Critical Review] , Johnson said..."The
Monthly Reviewers... are not Deists; but they are
Christians with as little Christianity as may
be; and are for pulling down all establishments.
The Critical Reviewers are for supporting the
constitution, both in church and state. The
Critical Reviewers, I believe, often review
without reading the books through; but lay hold
of a topic, and write chiefly from their minds.
The Monthly Reviewers are duller men, and are
glad to read the books through." (Life 740)
The Ode for St. Cecilia's Day was undertaken at
the desire of Steele: in this the author is
generally confessed to have miscarried, yet he
miscarried only as compared with Dryden; for he
has far outgone other competitors. Dryden's
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plan is better chosen; history will always take
stronger hold of the attention than fable: the
passions excited by Dryden are the pleasures and
pains of real life, the scene of Pope is laid in
imaginary existence. Pope is read with calm
acquiescence, Dryden with turbulent delight;
Pope hangs upon the ear, and Dryden finds the
passes of the mind. ("Pope", Lives III 226-27)
Shakespeare engaged in dramatick poetry with the
world open before him; the rules of the ancients
were yet known to few; the publick judgment was
unformed... He therefore indulged his natural
disposition, and his disposition, as Rhymer has
remarked, led him to comedy. In tragedy he
often writes with great appearance of toil and
study, what is written at last with little
felicity; but in his comick scenes,.he seems to
produce without labour, what no labour can
improve. In tragedy he is always struggling
after some occasion to be comic, but in comedy
he seems to repose, or to luxuriate, as in a
mode of thinking congenial to his nature. In
his tragick scenes there is always something
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wanting, but his comedy often surpasses
expectation or desire. His comedy pleases by
the thoughts and the language, and his tragedy
for the greater part by incident and action.
His tragedy seems to be skill, his comedy to be
instinct. ("Preface" to Shakespeare. in Bronson
269) [emphasis in original]
Surveying with a general gaze Johnson's handling of
the contrastive set-piece, as instanced in the passages
assembled above, I am led to proffer three summarizing
observations by way of concluding comment.
First: Johnson's dialectical back-and-forth movement
between the contraries on which the set-pieces are
structured exemplifies in a clear-cut and striking fashion
what Bate calls the "active balance of his thought"
(1955:171), a trait that contributes decisively to his
prose style being "the most symmetrical as well as one of
the most vigorous... in English" (idem). "The union of
vigor and order", concludes Bate, "is significant" (ibid.
172) . This is a remark that may with particular aptness
be applied to Johnson's praxis in the set-pieces: the play
between, and balancing of, contraries, which are its hall­
marks, are well characterized as a 'union of vigor and
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order'.
Second (this point and the next shift the spotlight
on to the issue of Johnson's 'vigour'): his handling of the
contrastive set-piece brings into prominence two
significant sources of that vigour of style and expression
so widely noted, and commended, both by his contemporaries
and by succeeding generations of readers and critics. One
such source which the set-pieces highlight is the short,
punchy sentence. This kind of formation, so obviously
helpful to energetic expression, tends to reach a peak of
concentration and forcefulness when Johnson presses
forward into the thick of his dialectical 'to-ing and fro-
ing' ("Wit was daring and adventurous; Learning cautious
and deliberate. Wit thought nothing reproachful but
dulness; Learning was afraid of no imputation, but that of
error" - and so forth) . The forceful brevity of the
greater number of the sentences in the set-pieces stands
out all the more emphatically when it is contrasted with
the elaborate, stately, syntactically complex style that
he is apt on occasion to adopt elsewhere, particularly in
the Ramblers. In the Hebrides Journal, Boswell records his
criticism of Carte's Life of the Duke of Ormond: "The
matter is diffused in too many words; there is no
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animation, no compression, no vigour" (340) . It is
reasonable to infer from this judgment that the attributes
of animation, compression and vigour were ones Johnson
prized, that they ranked high on his scale of stylistic
desiderata; these are precisely the attributes that
distinguish most of the sentences in the contrastive set-
pieces .
Third: the other source of 'vigour' (and of brevity
too, for that matter) which Johnson's practice in the set-
pieces serves to highlight is the use of verbs in the
active voice. It is too little realized how much of our
sense of a text's 'energy' and 'momentum' is traceable to
the use it makes of active constructions. It seems to me
that the contrastive set-pieces are signally well adapted
to enforcing this realization as, on the one hand, they are
a very hive of active constructions (it would not be going
too far, in my judgment, to categorize them as a locus
classicus demonstrating the effective utilization of the
active voice) while, on the other, they exhibit a
particularly high 'energy quotient' (if I may call it
that). It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion
that between these phenomena there is very likely to exist
a significant degree of correlation. This is a conclusion
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to which I believe a careful examination of the passages
cited above will not fail to lend support.
If the set-pieces highlight the way in which the use
of the active voice facilitates an energetic, 'hard-
driving' style, they also point up, through those few
instances in which the passive voice is employed, how this
construction tends to place a curb upon 'vigour' and
impetus. Consider, for example, how the spring and the
forward thrust released by the active constructions and
compressed, forceful periods of
Dryden obeys the motions of his own mind, Pope
constrains his mind to his own rules of
composition. Dryden is sometimes vehement and
rapid,- Pope is always smooth, uniform, and
gentle. ...
are checked, at the beginning of the paragraph immediately
following, by
Of genius, that power which constitutes a
poet... that energy which collects, combines,
amplifies, and animates - the superiority must,
with some hesitation, be allowed to Dryden.
What happens here, as I see it (and, more to the
point, as I experienced it, in terms of my response to the
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'change of gear' at this juncture), is that the spirited
forward movement of the prose simply fizzles out as it runs
on to the 'sandbank' of the passive construction (and of
the latinate inversion in which it is embedded) . The power
of the passive voice to place a curb upon energetic
expression is not to be underestimated. It is my
subjective impression that Johnson is in general rather
sparing of passive constructions, and if this be so I can
only speculate that the reason for it lay in an awareness
of the built-in tendency of the passive voice to hinder
forceful expression - and on forceful expression, as we
know, he set a very high value. But even supposing my
subjective impression is wrong and that in general he is
not sparing of passive constructions, the fact remains that
in the contrastive set-pieces he is. Continuing my
analysis, I propose now to examine the category bearing the
title 'Distinctions by way of Alternatives'.
Distinctions by way of Alternatives
In this category Johnson's distinction-making bent is
articulated through the positing of alternatives -
alternative possibilities, probabilities, and explanations;
alternatives with respect to human desires and conditions
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of life. In all cases the alternatives presented are cast
in the form of constructions based on correlative
conjunctions. The most frequently encountered of these is
the formation 'either X or Y'; its negative counterpart
'neither X nor Y' also crops up fairly often. Less
frequently found is the construction 'whether X or Y' which
Johnson enlists when he wishes to signal the conjectural
or perhaps the doubtful nature of the alternatives posited.
Rarest of all is the formation - a plainly legalistic one -
'If W...let X...; if Y...let Z...'. The grammatical and
structural distinctiveness of these formations, together
with their uniformly sharing the attribute of proposing
alternatives, provided a clear basis for constituting them
as an independent category in their own right. A further
reason for so doing, also referable to a distinctive trait
uniformly shared, is that in these constructions the
alternatives presented are always characterized by parity
of status, by contrast, say, with the construction 'rather
X than Y'74 which, while also presenting alternatives,
74 That this construction is treated under the head of 
'Distinctions of Ideas' rather than here, under 'Rhetorical 
Distinction-making', is the consequence of my entirely subjective 
feeling that it is somehow less rhetorically clear-cut than the 
'either... or' , 'neither.. .nor' or 'whether... or' formations. These 
latter, striking me as a good deal more antithetically complexioned 
than the 'rather X than Y' configuration and, for that reason, as more 
rhetorically explicit, seemed accordingly to assert, as 'rather X than 
Y' did not, an obvious and natural claim to inclusion under the head
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simultaneously signals a preference for one over the other.
In the ordering of my evidence I shall adopt the
following arrangement: to begin with I shall offer
instances of the 'either X or Y' construction, then
examples of its negative counterpart, 'neither X nor Y',
thereafter examples of the formation 'whether X or Y', and
finally an instance of the construction 'If W...let X. . . ;
if Y.. .let Z. . . ' .
The taslc of an author is, either to teach what
is not known, or to recommend known truths, by
his manner of adorning them; either to let new
light in upon the mind, and open new scenes to
the prospect, or to vary the dress and situation
of common objects, so as to give them fresh
grace and more powerful attractions...
Yet there is a certain race of men [the
critics], that either imagine it their duty, or
make it their amusement, to hinder the reception
of every work of learning or genius... (Rambler
3, III 14-15)
No man ever yet became great by imitation.
Whatever hopes for the veneration of mankind
of 'Rhetorical Distinction-making'.
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must have invention in the• design or the
execution; either the effect must itself be new,
or the means by which it is produced. Either
truths hitherto unknown must be discovered, or
those which are already known enforced by
stronger evidence... (Rambler 154, V 59)
...every error in human conduct must arise from
ignorance in ourselves, either perpetual or
temporary; and happen either because we do not
know what is best and fittest, or because our
knowledge is at the time of action not present
to the mind. (Rambler 24, III 131)
[A man's] desire of pleasing those whose favour
he has weakly made necessary to himself, will
not suffer him always to consider how little he
is qualified for the work imposed. Either his
vanity will tempt him to conceal his
deficiencies, or that cowardice, which always
encroaches fast upon such as spend their lives
in the company of persons higher than
themselves, will not leave him resolution to
assert the liberty of choice. (Rambler 21, III
119)
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This practice [the recital of genealogies by
Highland bards] has never subsisted within time
of memory, nor was much credit due to such
rehearsers, who might obtrude fictitious
pedigrees, either to please their masters, or to
hide the deficiency of their own memories.
(Journey 114)
No man yet was ever wicked without secret
discontent, and according to the different
degrees of remaining virtue, or unextinguished
reason, he either endeavours to reform himself,
or corrupt others; either to regain the station
which he has quitted, or prevail on others to
imitate his defection. (Rambler 76. IV 35)
It seems certain, that either a man must believe
that virtue will make him happy, and resolve
therefore to be virtuous, or think that he may
be happy without virtue, and therefore cast off
all care but for his present interest. (Rambler
70, IV 4)
It is, indeed, the fate of controvertists. . . to
be soon laid aside and slighted. Either the
question is decided, and there is no more place
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for doubt and opposition; or mankind despair of
understanding it, and... content themselves with
quiet ignorance... (Rambler 106, IV 203)
...But many...there are, either of greater
resolution or more credulity, who in earnest try
the state [of seclusion] which they have been
taught to think thus secure from cares and
dangers; and retire to privacy, either that they
may improve their happiness, increase their
knowledge, or exalt their virtue. (Adventurer
126, II 472)
...so, perhaps, to each individual of the human
species, nature has ordained the same quantity
of wakefulness and sleep; though divided by some
into a total quiescence and vigorous exertion of
their faculties, and blended by others in a kind
of twilight of existence... in which they either
think without action, or act without thought.
(Adventurer 39, II 348) [The final segment of
this item is simultaneously an instance of
'Distinctions by way of Antimetabole']
On Monday, May 26, I found him at tea...1 asked
if there would be any speakers in Parliament, if
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there were no places to be obtained. JOHNSON:
Yes, Sir. Why do yon speak here? Either to
instruct and entertain, which is a benevolent
motive; or for distinction, which is a selfish
motive. (Life 1236-37)
...nobody suffered more from pungent sorrow at
a friend's death than Johnson, though he would
suffer no one else to complain of their losses
in the same way; "for (says he) we must either
outlive our friends. . .or our friends must
outlive us; and I see no man that would hesitate
about the choice." (Mrs Thrale, Anecdotes of Dr
Johnson in Sherbo 101)
In the next batch of items the schema 'neither X nor
Y' is exemplified:
Thus all the business of the world is transacted
by artless and easy talk, neither sublimed by
fancy, nor discoloured by affectation... (Idler
34, II 108)
He ['Gelidus', the type of the anti-human
scientist] has totally divested himself of all
human sensations; he has neither eye for
beauty, nor ear for complaint; he neither
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rejoices at the good fortune of his nearest
friend, nor mourns for any publick or private
calamity. (Rambler 24, III 133)
I suppose every man is shocked when he hears how
frequently soldiers are wishing for war. ...but
those who desire it most, are neither prompted
by malevolence nor patriotism; they neither pant
for laurels, nor delight in blood; but long to
be delivered from the tyranny of idleness, and
restored to the dignity of active beings.
(Idler 21, II 67)
[The Metaphysical poets] cannot be said to have
imitated any thing: they neither copied nature
nor life; neither painted the forms of matter
nor represented the operations of intellect.
("Cowley", Lives I 19)
Be pleased, Sir, to inform those of my sex, who
have minds capable of nobler sentiments,
that...they may fix a time, at which cards shall
cease to be in fashion, or be left only to those
who have neither beauty to be loved, nor spirit
to be feared; neither knowledge to teach, nor
modesty to learn... (Rambler 15, III 84)
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It bears remarking that in all but one of the examples
presented above there occurs a doubling of the 'neither X
nor Y' formation, a phenomenon that puts one in mind of the
doubling of the 'X without Y' schema when it appears in a
terminal position (v. supra). In discussing the doubling
of the 'X without Y' formation I noted that among the
reasons for it were Johnson's impulse to achieve the
'right' cadence as well as his predilection for the
symmetry of the parallel construction. These same factors,
in my opinion, are operative in the doubling of the
'neither X nor Y' formation. Nor is this doubling a mere
rhetorical 'flourish' (any more than it is in the case of
the 'X without Y' schema). We do not have to do here, in
other words, with a construction whose doubled member
simply restates in different terms the matter of the first
segment just for the sake of formal symmetry or tidy
parallelism; on the other hand, the second member does not
ordinarily introduce a new element into the argument;
instead it functions, through amplification or
qualification, to augment or to modify the idea broached
in the first. The next crop of examples illustrative of
'Distinctions by way of Alternatives' is built on the
formation 'whether X or Y':
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Whether it be that they [women] have less
courage to stand against opposition, or that
their desire of admiration makes them sacrifice
their principles to the poor pleasure of
worthless praise, it is certain... that female
goodness seldom keeps its ground against
laughter, flattery, or fashion. (Rambler 70, IV
6)
. . .whether it be, that every man hates
falsehood, from the natural congruity of truth
to his faculties of reason, or that every man is
jealous of the honour of his understanding, and
thinks his discernment consequentially called in
question, whenever any thing is exhibited under
a borrowed form. (Rambler 20, III 110)
...whether it be that we comprehend but few of
the possibilities of life, or that life itself
affords little variety... ("Butler", Lives I
211)
Whether this new drama [Gay's Beggar's Opera]
was the product of judgement or of luck the
praise of it must be given to the inventor. . .
("Gay", Lives II 283)
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That [Shakespeare] once designed to have brought
Falstaff on the scene again, we know from
himself; but whether he could contrive no train
of adventures suitable to his character, or
could match him with no companions likely to
quicken his humour, or could open no new vein of
pleasantry...he has here [in Henry V] for ever
discarded him. . . (Johnson on Shakespeare VIII
541-42)
...every man, whether he copies or invents,
whether he delivers his own thoughts or those of
another, has often found himself deficient in
the power of expression... (Adventurer 138, II
495)
The final example in this category has a legalistic
coloration, being modelled on the formula 'If W...let X. . . ;
if Y...let Z...' :
There can be no reason, why any debtor should be
imprisoned, but that he may be compelled to
payment; and a term should therefore be fixed,
in which the creditor should exhibit his
accusation of concealed property. If such
property can be discovered, let it be given to
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the creditor; if the charge is not offered, or
cannot be proved, let the prisoner be dismissed.
(Idler 22, II 70)
Continuing to work my way through this grouping of
'Rhetorical Distinction-making' , I next propose to bring
under scrutiny the category to which I have assigned the
title 'Distinctions by way of Denial/Exclusion followed by
Affirmation'.
Distinctions by way of Denial/Exclusion followed by
Affirmation
The principle of differentiation in this category
turns upon something denied being played off against
something affirmed. This basic paradigm articulates itself
formulaically - that is to say, rhetorically - through two
different schemata which reflect different purposes and
circumstances of use: where Johnson distinguishes between
situations or states-of-affairs the play of denial and
affirmation manifests itself in the formation 'not X...but
Y'; where he distinguishes between causes, that is, between
inapplicable ones that are negatived and applicable ones
that are affirmed, the formula which then comes into play
is 'not because X, but because Y'. In a few cases, in both
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formations, the schematic sequence is reversed, such that
'not X. . .but Y' is remodelled as 'X. . .but not Y' , while
'not because X, but because Y' is recast as 'because X, not
because Y' . The first batch of examples given below
consists of items built on the schema 'not X...but Y', the
second batch is built on the schema 'not because X, but
because Y'. Placed at the head of the 'not X...but Yz list
are a couple of items in which the formation is doubled:
The mischievous consequences of vice and
folly...are best discovered by those relations
which are levelled with the general surface of
life, which tell not how any man became great,
but how he was made happy; not how he lost the
favour of his prince, but how he became
discontented with himself. (Idler 84, II 262)
...it is not folly but pride, not error but
deceit, which the world means to persecute, when
it raises the full cry of nature to hunt down
affectation. (Rambler 20, III 112)
[Forgotten authors] owed the honours which they
once obtained, not to judgment or to genius, to
labour or to art, but to the prejudice of
faction, the stratagem of intrigue, or the
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servility of adulation. (Rambler 106, IV 201)
...the world...swarms with writers whose wish is
not to be studied but to be read. (Idler 30, II
94)
...when once [an author] begins to contrive how
his sentiments may be received, not with most
ease to his reader, but with most advantage to
himself, he then transfers his consideration
from words to sounds... and as he grows more
elegant becomes less intelligible. (Idler 36,
II 112-113)
If an author. . .writes not to make others
learned, but to boast the learning which he
possesses himself...he counteracts the first end
of writing... (Idler 70, II 217)
Beauclerk had such a propensity to satire, that
at one time Johnson said to him, "You. . .have
often given me pain, not from the power of what
you said, but from seeing your intention."
(Life 175)
We talked of gaming, and animadverted on it with
severity. ...JOHNSON: Sir, I do not call a
gamester a dishonest man, but I call him an
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unsocial man, an unprofitable man. (Life 481)
In the following instances the schematic sequence is
reversed, such that 'not X. . .but Y' is remodelled as
'X...but not Y':
...good sense alone... manages its possessions
well, but does not increase them; it... preserves
safety, but never gains supremacy. ("Pope",
Lives III 217)
[Sir Thomas Browne's style] strikes, but does
not please; it commands but does not allure.
(in Brown 293)
[Swift's style] instructs, but does not
persuade. ("Swift", Lives III 52)
In the examples given below Johnson distinguishes
between inapplicable and applicable causes, and so the
verbal formula that comes into play is that of 'not because
X, but because Y':
BOSWELL: You would not solicit employment, Sir,
if you were a lawyer. JOHNSON: No, Sir, but not
because I should think it wrong, but because I
should disdain it. (Life 683) [Commenting on
Johnson's pronouncement, Boswell remarks: "This
was a good distinction, which will be felt by
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men of just pride"]
The subject of grief for the loss of relations
and friends [was] introduced... BOSWELL: But,
Sir, we do not approve of a man who very soon
forgets the loss of a wife or a friend.
JOHNSON: Sir, we disapprove of him, not because
he soon forgets his grief, for the sooner it is
forgotten the better, but because we suppose,
that if he forgets his wife or his friend soon,
he has not had much affection for them. (Life
825-26)
...there are minds so impatient of inferiority,
that...they return benefits, not because
recompence is a pleasure, but because obligation
is a pain. (Rambler 87, IV 96) [This item is
simultaneously an instance of 'Distinctions
Modelled on Philosophical Schemata' (positive
vs. negative: pleasure< >pain)3
Men often call themselves poor, not because they
want necessaries, but because they have not more
than they want. (Sermons XIV 59)
[The man given to finding fault with others
rather than with himself] sets himself at ease,
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not because he can refute the charges advanced
against him, but because he can censure his
accusers with equal justice... (Rambler 76, IV
36)
...the arguments for purity of life fail of
their due influence, not because they have been
considered and confuted, but because they have
been passed over without consideration.
(Rambler 87, IV 98) [This item is simultaneously
an instance of 'Distinctions Modelled on
Philosophical Schemata': action vs. abstention]
I eat not because I am hungry, but because I am
idle... (Adventurer 102, II 438)
I conclude my analysis of the present category with
an item that exhibits a reversal of the normal schematic
sequence:
[Newton] stood alone... because he had left the
rest of mankind behind him, not because he
deviated from the beaten tract. (Adventurer
131, II 482)
The category I propose to consider next bears the
title 'Distinctions by way of Antimetabole (or Chiasmus)' .
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Distinctions by way of Antimetabole (or Chiasmus)
In the late nineteenth century the term "chiasmus",
derived from the Greek letter 'chi' (X), began to supersede
the earlier term "antimetabole" as the preferred name for
that rhetorical figure defined by Abrams as "a sequence of
two phrases or clauses which are parallel in syntax, but
reverse the order of the corresponding words" (183). It
is evident, then, that chiasmus is a figure which
mimetically enacts the actual crossover shape of the
grapheme 'chi'. The aptness of this figure for
distinction-making was noted as long ago as 1599 by John
Hoskins who, in his Directions for Speech and Style,
describes antimetabole as "a sharp and witty figure [that]
shows out of the same words a pithy distinction of
meaning..." (in Vickers 110). Antimetabole, indeed,
conjoins to a singular degree among rhetorical figures a
capacity for developing distinctions with the structural
characteristics of balance, equipoise and parallelism. No
wonder this figure so appealed to Johnson75. Here follow
75 In Brian Vickers's view, Johnson's prose style, in its 
totality, is grounded in, and conditioned by, classical rhetoric. 
Says Vickers: "...obviously the prose of Dr Johnson...is built around 
the schemes and tropes evolved by Gorgias and Isocrates" (56) . 
(Gorgias and Isocrates were among the most influential of the ancient 
Greek rhetoricians). Cf. in this context Johnson's remark addressed 
to the German diplomat, H P Sturz: "It is my serious opinion that our 
living languages must be formed quite slavishly on the model of the 
classics if our writings are to endure" (in Hardy 116-17).
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some examples of his use of it, beginning with an instance
of multiple chiasmus:
Not only our speculations influence our
practice, but our practice reciprocally
influences our speculations. We not only do
what we approve, but there is danger lest in
time we come to approve what we do, though for
no other reason but that we do it. A man is
always desirous of being at peace with himself;
and when he cannot reconcile his passions to his
conscience, he will attempt to reconcile his
conscience to his passions... (Sermons XIV 218)
None can be pleased without praise, and few can
be praised without falsehood; few can be
assidious without servility, and none can be
servile without corruption. (Rambler 104, IV
194) [This is a real 'cat's cradle7 of chiasmus]
[P]ride... rather endeavours, by fame, to supply
the want of knowledge, than by knowledge to
arrive at fame. (Sermons XIV 91)
There are in these verses [James Elphinston's
translation of Martial, 1782] too much folly for
madness... and too much madness for folly. (Mrs
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Thrale, Anecdotes of Dr Johnson in Sherbo 80)
Dr. Johnson, being asked by a lady what love
was, replied, "It was the wisdom of a fool and
the folly of the wise." (in Hill II 393)
"Now, Sir, what a man avows, he is not ashamed
to think; though many a man thinks, what he is
ashamed to avow." (Life 930)
He [Waller] doubtless praised some whom he would
have been afraid to marry, and perhaps married
one whom he would have been ashamed to praise.
("Waller", Lives I 254)
"This man (said he [of Lord Chesterfield] ) I
thought had been a Lord among wits; but, I find,
he is only a wit among Lords!" (Life 188)
JOHNSON: I should drink claret too, if it would
give me that ["the careless gaiety of boyish
days"] ; but it does not: it neither makes boys
men, nor men boys. (Life 1127)
The drama's laws the drama's patrons give,
For we that live to please, must please to live.
("Drury-Lane Prologue", Poems VI 89)
It ought to be the first endeavour of a writer
to distinguish nature from custom, or that which
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is established because it is right, from that
which is right only because it is established...
(Rambler 156, V 70)
There may possibly be books without a polished
language, but there can be no polished language
without books. (Journey 116)
...new desires, and artificial passions are by
degrees produced; and, from having wishes only
in consequence of our wants, we begin to feel
wants in consequence of our wishes... (Rambler
49, III 264)
Integrity without knowledge is weak and useless,
and knowledge without integrity is dangerous and
dreadful. (Rasselas. in Bronson 690)
Of things that terminate in human life the world
is the proper judge: to despise its sentence, if
it were possible, is not just; and if it were
just is not possible. ("Pope", Lives III 210)
The necessity of complying with times and of
sparing persons is the great impediment of
biography. . . .Lives can only be written from
personal knowledge, which is growing every day
less, and in a short time is lost for ever.
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What is known can seldom be immediately told,
and when it might be told it is no longer known.
("Addison", Lives II 116)
Much therefore of that humour which transported
the last century with merriment is lost to us,
who do not know the sour solemnity. . .of the
ancient Puritans. ...Our grandfathers knew the
picture from the life; we judge of the life by
contemplating the picture. ("Butler", Lives I
214)
In this work ["The Rape of the Lock"] are
exhibited in a very high degree the two most
engaging powers of an author: new things are
made familiar, and familiar things are made new.
("Pope", Lives III 233)
Hudibras wants a plan, because it is left
imperfect; Alma is imperfect, because it seems
never to have had a plan. ("Prior", Lives II
205)
He that will eat bread, must plow and sow;
though it is not certain, that he who plows and
sows shall eat bread. (Sermons XIV 132)
...few men have been made infidels by argument
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and reflection; their actions are not generally
the result of their reasonings, but their
reasonings of their actions. (Sermons XIV 54)
The difference, he [Johnson] observed, between
a well-bred and an ill-bred man is this: "...You
love the one till you find reason to hate him;
you hate the other till you find reason to love
him." (Life 1311)
He thus discriminated, to Dr Percy, Bishop of
Dromore, his progress at his two grammar-
schools. "At one, I learnt much in the school,
but little from the master; in the other, I
learnt much from the master, but little in the
school." (Life 37)
To the sixth of the categories making up this
grouping, I have assigned the rather cumbersome title
'Distinguishing the "Truth of the Matter" from Commonly
Held Beliefs7.
Distinguishing the "Truth of the Matter" from Commonly Held
Beliefs
Johnson ordinarily signals an intention to distinguish
the "truth of the matter" from a backdrop of commonly held
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beliefs by means of the introductory formula "But the truth
is..."76. When he has recourse to this formula, the
suggestion is that the truth being affirmed is of a more
or less incontrovertible character. An equivalent schema
is "Sir, the very reverse of this is the truth...", which
simply makes explicit what "But the truth is..." only
implies, namely, that the position being affirmed stands
in opposition to the commonly held view outlined
immediately before.
Somewhat more concessive and more argumentative (that
is, less categorical) in complexion than the formulae
remarked above is the collocation "But this reason is for
the most part very falsely assigned...". Then, too, in a
minority of instances, Johnson differentiates the 'truth
of the matter7 from commonly held beliefs by means of
conventionally diffident and demurring formulations - for
example, the schema "It cannot be denied that..." (the very
phrasing of which implicitly acknowledges the possibility
of denial). More diffident still - almost apologetic,
indeed, though conventionally so - is the expression "But
I am afraid..." (suggestive of a wish that 'things' - here
76 It is owing to the formulaic quality of this and its 
affiliated locutions that the present category has been placed under 
the head of 'Rhetorical Distinction-making'. It would otherwise have 
been more appropriately assigned to 'Conceptual Distinction-making'.
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the 'truth of the matter' might somehow be different,
combined with the recognition that they cannot be) .
Finally, when he has recourse to the phrase "Yet I have not
found...", his appeal is to the testimony of personal
experience alone - in contrast to the universal and
categorical purport of "But the truth is...". In the
examples which follow, the progression is from the most
categorical items to the least:
I introduced the topick, which is often
ignorantly urged, that the Universities of
England are too rich... JOHNSON: Sir, the very
reverse of this is the truth; the English
Universities are not rich enough. (Life 726)
...there are readers who discover that in this
passage "So stretch'd out huge in length the
arch-fiend lay"
[Paradise Lost! I. 209
a long form is described in a long line; but the
truth is, that length of body is only mentioned
in a slow line... (Rambler 95, IV 142)
[emphasis in original]
The lines given to the chorus [in Henry VI have
many admirers; but the truth is, that in them a
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little may be praised, and much mu.st be
forgiven... (Johnson on Shakespeare VIII 566)
[Milton's diction] bears little resemblance to
that of any former writer, and... is so far
removed from common use that an unlearned reader
when he first opens his book finds himself
surprised by a new language.
This novelty has been, by those who can
find nothing wrong in Milton, imputed to his
laborious endeavours after words suitable to the
grandeur of his ideas. "Our language," says
Addison, "sunk under him." But the truth is,
that both in prose and verse, he had formed his
style by a perverse and pedantick principle. He
was desirous to use English words with a foreign
idiom. ("Milton", Lives I 189-90)
It is commonly supposed that the uniformity of
a studious life affords no matter for narration;
but the truth is, that of the most studious life
a great part passes without study. (Idler 102,
II 312)
Those who made the laws, have apparently
supposed, that every deficiency of payment is
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the crime of the debtor. But the truth is, that
the creditor always shares the act, and often
more than shares the guilt of improper trust.
(Idler 22, II 70)
Those who are oppressed by their own reputation,
will perhaps not be comforted by hearing that
their cares are unnecessary. But the truth is,
that no man is much regarded by the rest of the
world. (Rambler 159, V 84)
It has been so long said as to be commonly
believed that the true characters of men may be
found in their letters, and that he who writes
to his friend lays his heart open before him.
But the truth is that such were the simple
friendships of the Golden Age, and are now the
friendships only of children. ("Pope", Lives
III 206-207) [emphasis in original]
It is not uncommon to charge the difference
between promise and performance, between
profession and reality, upon deep design and
studied deceit; but the truth is, that there is
very little hypocrisy in the world; we do not so
often endeavour or wish to impose on others as
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on ourselves... (Idler 27, II 85)
"Many things which are false are transmitted
from book to book, and gain credit in the world.
One of these is the cry against the evil of
luxury. Now the truth is, that luxury produces
much good." (Life 755)
Men are supposed to remit their labours, because
they find their labours to have been vain; and
to search no longer after truth and wisdom,
because they at last despair of finding them.
But this reason is for the most part very
falsely assigned. Of learning, as of virtue, it
may be affirmed, that it is at once honoured and
neglected... (Idler 94, II 290)
Nothing is more common than to find men whose
works are now totally neglected, mentioned with
praises by their contemporaries... It cannot,
however, be denied that many have sunk into
oblivion, whom it were unjust to number with
this despicable class. (Rambler 106, IV 201)
We have...been encouraged to believe that our
tongues... may, by the help of our hands and
legs, obtain an uncontroulable dominion over the
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most stubborn audience... If by slight of hand,
or nimbleness of foot...these wonders can be
performed, he that shall neglect to attain the
free use of his limbs may be justly censured as
criminally lazy. But I am afraid that no
specimen of such effects will easily be shewn.
(Idler 90, II 279)
The world has been long amused with the mention
of policy in publick transactions, and of art in
private affairs; they have been considered as
the effects of great qualities, and as
unattainable by men of the common level: yet I
have not found many performances either of art,
or policy, that required such stupendous efforts
of intellect... (Rambler 79, IV 52)
In one of his letters, the poet William Cowper pays
Johnson, his rough contemporary, this handsome compliment:
He has...a happy talent of correcting the
popular opinion, upon all occasions where it is
erroneous; and this he does with the boldness of
a man who will think for himself, but, at the
same time, with a justness of sentiment that
convinces us he does not differ from others
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■ through affectation, but because he has a
sounder judgement. (160)
I doubt whether any aspect of Johnson's output,
written or spoken, better bears out or better merits
Cowper's tribute than his gift for distinguishing the
'truth of the matter' from the 'received view', and for
doing so with such independent-mindedness and psychological
penetration77.
The seventh and last category subsumed under
'Rhetorical Distinction-making' bears the title
'Distinction-making by way of Enumeration/Hierarchical
Ordering'.
Distinction-making by way of Enumeration/Hierarchical
Ordering
It may seem at first sight that the device of
enumeration is not sufficiently formulaic to qualify as a
rhetorical proceeding and should be viewed instead as a
purely organizational one. But in fact enumeration has its
roots in ancient rhetoric, in the figure of enumeratio
which involved recapitulating the heads of an argument in
77 To be "perpetually suspicious of commonly accepted opinions" 
was indeed a kind of Johnsonian watchword, according to James L 
Clifford (1955:245).
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the concluding part of an oration. From the standpoint of
distinction-making, the technique of enumeration stands out
for the clarity and explicitness with which it registers
differentiation. In his use of this technique as a vehicle
for distinction-making, Johnson sometimes explicitly
signals his practice ("In the first place... in the second
place..."), but at other times leaves it implicit, omitting
to number-tag the items he discriminates. The evidence
suggests, somewhat against expectation, that his
enumerations, whether explicit or implicit, are not
ordinarily arranged in hierarchical order; that is, in a
ranked order of perceived importance, with the first-
enumerated item being the most important and the last-
enumerated one the least. Instead, the sequence of
enumerated items/ideas seems in most cases to be more or
less random and, in so far, mutable, even reversible. In
the first two of the ensuing examples, however, the
hierarchizing, evaluative impulse enters into the picture
as well, complementing the purely enumerative one:
There are three distinct kinds of judges upon
all new authors or productions: the first are
those who know no rules, but pronounce entirely
from their natural taste and feelings; the
455
second are those who know and judge by rules;
and the third are those who know, but are above
the rules. These last are those you should wish
to satisfy. Next to them rate the natural
judges; but ever despise those opinions that are
formed by the rules. (Recorded by Fanny Burney;
in Greene (1970) 194)
Talking of conversation, he said, "There must,
in the first place, be knowledge, there must be
materials; in the second place, there must be a
command of words; in the third place, there must
be imagination, to place things in such views as
they are not commonly seen in; and in the fourth
place, there must be presence of mind, and a
resolution that is not to be overcome by
failures: this last is an essential requisite;
for want of it many people do not excel in
conversation." (Life 1195-96)
[Johnson] soon settled to more comfortable Talk;
and first of all agreed that there were three
sorts of Love; the first is that well known
Passion raised by Desire & always accompanied by
it; the second that Love which is excited by
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Tenderness, and accompanied by Contempt, as the
Love one has for Children - & even favourite
Animals; the third is that one feels for one's
Friend; the Delight one has in his Company, the
Pride one shares in his Praises; the
enthusiastic Partiality one has for all he does,
and the Influence one suffers him to have over
all one's other Passions. - this Love says he is
accompanied by Vanity, and the vainest People
are most susceptible of it. (Thrale 57-58)
The two offices of memory are collection and
distribution; by one images are accumulated, and
by the other produced for use. Collection is
always the employment of our first years, and
distribution commonly that of our advanced age.
(Idler 44, II 137)
BOSWELL: No quality will get a man more friends
than a disposition to admire the qualities of
others. I do not mean flattery, but a sincere
admiration. JOHNSON: Nay, Sir, flattery pleases
very generally. In the first place, the
flatterer may think what he says to be true:
but, in the second place, whether he thinks so
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or not, he certainly thinks those whom he
flatters of consequence enough to be flattered.
(Life 627)
JOHNSON: ...When I drank wine, I scorned to
drink it when in company. I have drunk many a
bottle by myself; in the first place, because I
had need of it to raise my spirits; in the
second place, because I would have nobody to
witness its effects upon me. (Life 747)
I asked him why he doated on a coach so? and
received for answer, 'That in the first place,
the company was shut in with him there; and
could not escape, as out of a room: in the next
place, he heard all that was said in a
carriage. . . ' (Mrs Thrale, Anecdotes of Dr
Johnson in Sherbo 151) [emphasis in original]
On occasion of Dr. Johnson's publishing his
pamphlet of The False Alarm, there came out a
very angry answer...In the answerer's pamphlet,
it had been said with solemnity, "Do you
consider, Sir, that a House of Commons is to the
people as a Creature is to its Creator?" To
this question, said Dr. Johnson, I could have
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replied, that - in the first place - the idea of
a CREATOR must be such as that He has a power to
unmake or annihilate His creature.
Then it cannot be conceived that a creature
can make laws for its CREATOR. (Life 1087)
...when I rose to go to church in the afternoon,
I was informed there had been an earthquake, of
which, it seems, the shock had been felt, in
some degree, at Ashbourne. JOHNSON: Sir, it
will be much exaggerated in popular talk: for,
in the first place, the common people do not
accurately adapt their thoughts to the objects;
nor, secondly, do they accurately adapt their
words to their thoughts... (Life 825)
In the two concluding examples given below, Johnson's
enumerative procedure is implicit - the discriminated
items, we observe, are not number-tagged:
It is difficult to enumerate the several
motives, which procure to books the honour of
perusal: spite, vanity, and curiosity, hope and
fear, love and hatred, every passion which
incites to any other action, serves at one time
or other to stimulate a reader. (Adventurer
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137, II 490) ■
It is difficult to enumerate every species of
authors whose labours counteract themselves.
The man of exuberance and copiousness, who
diffuses every thought thro' so many diversities
of expression, that it is lost like water in a
mist. The ponderous dictator of sentences,
whose notions are delivered in the lump, and
are, like uncoined bullion, of more weight than
use. The liberal illustrator, who shews by
examples and comparisons what was clearly seen
when it was first proposed; and the stately son
of demonstration, who proves with mathematical
formality what no man has yet pretended to
doubt. (Idler 36, II 113)
In both the above instances Johnson's enumeration is
preceded, interestingly enough, by the semi-disclaimer "It
is difficult to enumerate...". This move amounts to a form
of preterition, the rhetorical gambit whereby one contrives
to say something under cover of professing to avoid mention
of it. It is a move that dramatizes in miniature what is
'writ large' by the evidence contained in the seven
categories mustered under the head of 'Rhetorical
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Distinction-making' - namely, that Samuel Johnson was a
complete master of the tropes and figures of rhetoric, and
that he was expert at putting this mastery to use in the
service of distinction-making.
Functional Distinction-making
Under this head are subsumed but two categories which
bear the following titles: 'Disallowing a Distinction
Claimed - in order to Dispel Confusion or Misperception',
and its inverse, 'Asserting a Distinction in order to
Dispel Confusion or Misperception'. The phrase "in order
to..." in these titles unmistakably points to the
grouping's functional character which derives from the
purposive nature of the distinctions that the items in the
two categories are built on. These items could doubtless
have found a comfortable enough billet under the roof of
some other category or grouping (most readily perhaps under
the roof of 'Conceptual Distinction-making'), but since
what they presidingly stood out for, in my judgment, was
their functional, purposive character, it seemed well to
set them apart with a view to provisioning separate
categories organized into an independent grouping labelled
'Functional'. I propose now to examine the two categories
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making up this slender grouping.
Disallowing a Distinction Claimed - in order to Dispel
Confusion or Misperception
Although there seems at first sight to be no
justification for viewing as an instance of actual
distinction-making on Johnson's part his refusal to allow
a distinction claimed by an interlocutor, in point of fact
the terms in which the claimed distinction is disallowed
are such as shadow forth the lineaments of an alternative
distinction - the one he upholds. That being so, the
inclusion of this category in a study devoted to Johnson's
distinction-making seemed to me justifiable. The items
provisioning this category are these:
At the Reverend Mr M'Lean's, Dr Johnson asked
him, if the people of Col had any superstitions.
He said, "No." The cutting peats at the
increase of the moon was mentioned as one; but
[M'Lean] would not allow it, saying, it was not
a superstition, but a whim. Dr Johnson would
not admit the distinction. There were many
superstitions, he maintained, not connected with
religion; and this was one of them. (Hebrides
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Journal 347)
Disallowing the distinction implied by the line "An
honest courtier, yet a patriot too" from Pope's epitaph on
Sir William Trumbull, Johnson observes:
There is no opposition between an honest
courtier and a patriot; for an honest courtier
cannot but be a patriot78. ("Pope", hives III
258) [emphasis in original]
On Friday, May 7, I breakfasted with him at Mr.
Thrale's in the Borough. While we were alone,
I endeavoured as well as I could to apologise
for a lady who had been divorced from her
husband by act of Parliament. I said, that he
had used her very ill, had behaved brutally to
her, and that she could not continue to live
with him without having her delicacy
contaminated... Seduced, perhaps, by the charms
of the lady in question, I thus attempted to
palliate what I was sensible could not be
justified; for, when I had finished my harangue,
my venerable friend gave me a proper check: "My
78 With reference to this pronouncement, the editor of the Lives, 
G B Hill, slyly comments: "Johnson forgot his description of 
patriotism as 'the last refuge of a scoundrel.'" (Ill 258, footnote 
1)
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dear Sir, never accustom your mind to mingle
virtue and vice. The woman's a whore, and
there' s an end on' t." (Life 536-37) [The
distinction implicitly claimed by Boswell is
between well-used and ill -used wives.
Disallowing this claim, Johnson for his part
implicitly contends that the only valid
distinction is between honourable and
dishonourable ones]
allowing the implicit claim of a distinction
between a despotic father and a despotic prince, Johnson
takes the view that
The regal and parental tyrant differ only in the
extent of their dominions, and the number of
their slaves. The same passions cause the same
miseries... Capricious injunctions, partial
decisions, unequal allotments, distributions of
reward not by merit but by fancy, and
punishments regulated not by the degree of the
offence, but by the humour of the judge, are too
frequent where no power is known but that of a
father. (Rambler 148, V 25) [So the proper
distinction, Johnson implicitly argues, is not
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between tyrant- father and tyrant-prince but
rather between tyranny on the one side
(symbolized by the figure of the father) and
non-tyranny on the other (symbolized by the
figure of the mother?)]
The examples and events of history press,
indeed, upon the mind with the weight of truth;
but when they are reposited in the memory, they
are oftener employed for shew than use... Between
falsehood and useless truth there is little
difference. (Idler 84, II 262) [Johnson is
implying, therefore, that the correct
distinction is not between falsehood and truth
(as is universally supposed) but rather between
falsehood and useful truth]
I proceed now to a consideration of the second
category in this grouping.
Asserting a Distinction in order to Dispel Confusion or
Misperception
The first example I propose to bring forward under
this head is an extended one. It features Johnson, in
virtuoso form, launching a broadside of incisive
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distinctions aimed at dispelling the perplexities with
which the "sons of sophistry" have "darkened" the
perspicuous injunction "Whatsoever ye would that men should
do unto you, even so do unto them." After this lengthy
item there follow several shorter ones constructed on
basically the same plan; this involves a two-step operation
in which Johnson first zeroes in on the erroneous
distinction and clears it out of the way, and then
explicitly formulates the correct one, the one he regards
as necessary to the purpose of dispelling confusion and
misperception. He also has recourse to a more compact
method of achieving this end; here his procedure is to
formulate, with singular precision, the distinction as it
should be, while at the same time noting (ordinarily
through the use of the verb 'confound') that it has fallen
victim to confusion or misperception. Admirably
economical, this is a one-step operation which enables
Johnson to register a correct distinction in the very act
of pointing up somebody else's failure to do so. The two
techniques here outlined furnish a principle of arrangement
for the evidence now to be presented: accordingly, the
first four items below exemplify the two-step approach
while the last six illustrate the one-step method:
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The measure of justice prescribed to us, in our
transactions with others, is remarkably clear
and comprehensive: "Whatsoever ye would that men
should do unto you, even so do unto them." ...
Over this law, indeed, some sons of
sophistry have been subtle enough to throw
mists, which have darkened their own eyes. To
perplex this universal principle, they have
enquired whether a man, conscious to himself of
unreasonable wishes, be bound to gratify them in
another. But surely there needed no long
deliberation to conclude, that the desires,
which are to be considered by us as the measure
of right, must be such as we approve, and that
we ought to pay no regard to those expectations
in others which we condemn in ourselves, and
which, however they may intrude upon our
imagination, we know it our duty to resist and
suppress.
One of the most celebrated cases which have
been produced as requiring some skill in the
direction of conscience to adapt them to this
great rule, is that of a criminal asking mercy
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of his judge, who cannot but know that if he was
in the state of the supplicant, he should desire
that pardon which he now denies. The difficulty
of this sophism will vanish, if we remember that
the parties are, in reality, on one side the
criminal, and on the other the community of
which the magistrate is only the minister, and
by which he is intrusted with the publick
safety. The magistrate, therefore, in pardoning
a man unworthy of pardon, betrays the trust with
which he is invested, gives away what is not his
own, and, apparently, does to others what he
would not that others should do to him. . . .
One occasion of uncertainty and hesitation,
in those by whom this great rule has been
commented and dilated, is the confusion of what
the exacter casuists are careful to distinguish,
"debts of justice" and "debts of charity." ...
The discharge of the "debts of charity", or
duties which we owe to others not merely as
required by justice, but as dictated by
benevolence, admits in its own nature greater
complication of circumstances and greater
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latitude of choice. Justice is indispensably
and universally necessary, and what is necessary
must always be limited, uniform, and distinct.
But beneficence. . . is . . .for the most
part... elective and voluntary. We may
certainly, without injury to our fellow-beings,
allow in the distribution of kindness something
to our affections, and change the measure of our
liberality according to our opinions and
prospects, our hopes and fears. (Rambler 81, IV
61-63)
I mentioned with much regret the extravagance of
the representative of a great family in
Scotland, by which there was danger of its being
ruined; and as Johnson respected it for its
antiquity, he joined with me in thinking it
would be happy if this person should die. Mrs
Thrale seemed shocked at this, as feudal
barbarity; and said, "I do not understand this
preference of the estate to its owner; of the
land to the man who walks upon that land."
JOHNSON: Nay, Madam, it is not a preference of
the land to its owner, it is the preference of
469
a family to an individual. Here is an
establishment in a country, which is of
importance for ages , not only to the chief but
to his people...; that this should be destroyed
by one idle fellow is a sad thing. (Life 681)
Talking on the subject of taste in the arts, he
said, that difference of taste was, in truth,
difference of skill. BOSWELL: But, Sir, is
there not a quality called taste, which consists
merely in perception or in liking? For
instance, we find people differ much as to what
is the best style of English composition. Some
think Swift's the best; others prefer a fuller
and grander way of writing. JOHNSON: Sir, you
must first define what you mean by style, before
you can judge who has a good taste in style, and
who has a bad. The two classes of persons whom
you have mentioned don't differ as to good and
bad. They both agree that Swift has a good neat
style; but one loves a neat style, another loves
a style of more splendour. (Life 492-93)
"I think (said Hicky) gentility and morality are
inseparable." BOSWELL: By no means, Sir. The
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genteelest characters are often the most
immoral. Does not Lord Chesterfield give
precepts for uniting wickedness and the
graces?...[M]ost vices may be committed very
genteelly: a man may debauch his friend's wife
genteelly: he may cheat at cards genteelly.
HICKY: I do not think that is genteel. BOSWELL:
Sir, it may not be like a gentleman, but it may
be genteel. JOHNSON: You are meaning two
different things. One means exteriour grace;
the other honour. It is certain that a man may
be very immoral with exteriour grace. Lovelace,
in Clarissa. is a very genteel and a very wicked
character. (Life 610) [emphasis in original]
The following items exemplify Johnson's condensed
one-step' method:
MISS SEWARD: There is one mode of the fear of
death, which is certainly absurd; and that is
the dread of annihilation, which is only a
pleasing sleep without a dream. JOHNSON: It is
neither pleasing, nor sleep; it is nothing.
...The lady confounds annihilation, which is
nothing, with the apprehension of it, which is
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dreadful. It is in the apprehension of it that
the horrour of annihilation consists. (Life
950-51)
...far the greater part of mankind has, in the
wantonness of abundance, confounded natural with
artificial desires... (Idler 37, II 115)
When first I came to this lady, I had nothing
like the learning that I have now. . .1 was an
ignorant girl; and she... confound[ing] want of
knowledge with want of understanding, began...to
despair of bringing me to any thing... (Idler
46, II 144-45)
Money and wealth have by the use of commercial
language been so long confounded, that they are
commonly supposed to be the same. . . (Journey
147)
Affectation [in poetry], however opposite to
ease, is sometimes mistaken for it, and those
who aspire to gentle elegance, collect female
phrases and fashionable barbarisms, and imagine
that style to be easy which custom has made
familiar. (Idler 77, II 240)
Whence these criticks derived the notion of a
472
new language appropriated to Caliban I cannot
find: They certainly mistook brutality of
sentiment for uncouthness of words. (Johnson on
Shakespeare VII 123)
The Long Haul is almost over - this chapter at last
is heading into the home straight: only one more grouping
and category remains to be examined; I have named the
grouping 'Pictorial Distinction-making'.
Pictorial Distinction-making
This grouping is so denominated because the items it
contains frame what Johnson in the last of the Ramblers
calls his "pictures of life" (V 319) . So what I'm going
to be dealing with under this head are examples of his
descriptive prose, a vein of writing neither as significant
in his output nor as frequently met with as his
argumentative, expository or didactic styles. Still,
Johnson's 'pictures of life' are not to be dismissed as a
trifling or merely incidental aspect of his oeuvre; they
are a product after all of his indefatigable, searching
and, as often as not, disenchanted survey of humankind and
its doings. One is reminded in this connection of Mrs
Thrale's comment that Johnson by the age of fifty-five
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(when she first met him) had already "looked on the still-
shifting scenes of life till he was weary" (in Sherbo 158)
- an understandable weariness, considering how "very close"
his "inspection of life" was (Life 145).
The question that suggests itself, though, is this:
what do the 'still-shifting scenes of life7 have to do with
distinction-making? On what basis, in other words, can a
grouping labelled 'Pictorial' find a place in a study
devoted to Johnson's drive to distinguish? The answer to
this question bears upon the particular way in which he is
wont to view the ever-changing scene of life: the evidence
suggests something approaching an inability to look upon
it without at once breaking it up into a multiplicity of
facets and 'angles', such that the 'pictures of life' which
result turn out to be characterized by an extraordinarily
high degree of differentiation and variegation. His wont,
then, is to observe life with a gaze not only extensive
(cf. "The Vanity of Human Wishes", line 1) but also
intensive and finely discriminating - his is "a nice
observation of the... external appearances of life", as
Boswell puts it (Life 155) . To be sure, many writers,
particularly novelists and essayists, compose 'pictures of
life' that impress by reason of their variegation and
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differentiation, but my point here is that Johnson in this
regard pushes things to a kind of limit, as I believe the
evidence I shall be adducing will demonstrate. Therein
lies the justification, it seems to me, for including the
'pictures of life' in a study devoted to his distinction­
making .
There are however three further points I need to make
before leading my evidence. First: Johnson's vivid and
variegated 'pictures of life' are a product, as they are
a proof, of the vigorous operation of his "most fertile
imagination" (Life 1402). Second: in quite a number of
them the pictorial element (or, synaesthetically, but
perhaps more aptly expressed, the pictorial 'resonance')
is particularly marked. While this feature plainly owes
much to Johnson's manifest gift for lively and forceful
description (several of the 'pictures' giving the
impression indeed of being 'sallies', with the author out
simply to delight in the exercise of his descriptive - and
comical - powers), it owes even more to the fact that in
the instances under discussion the various doings and
happenings diversifying the described scene are represented
as occurring simultaneously. And simultaneity of
impression is the very hallmark of the way the pictorial
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medium is experienced, of the way it is registered by eye
and mind: being organized spatially, pictorial compositions
are perforce 'read' simultaneously across their whole
expanse (in contrast to the written word which, as it
requires to be 'tracked' through time, can only be
experienced linearly and consecutively). So by projecting
the various facets of his scene on to the plane of
simultaneity, Johnson succeeds in enhancing the pictorial -
one could say the painterly - 'resonance' of several of his
word-pictures, such that the impression they convey is
rather of life paraded than just depicted79.
The 'pictures of life' in which an effect of
simultaneity is aimed at evoke not only a particularly
strong painterly 'feel' but (for me, anyhow) even a
particular painter. I refer to William Hogarth, whose
energetic, often sardonic, depictions of the English social
scene are crowded, like Johnson's verbal pictures, "with
79 The most pictorially 'resonant' of Johnson's 'pictures of 
life' may perhaps be viewed as social, humanly-busy analogues of the 
pictorially-conditioned landscape poetry composed by authors like Dyer 
and Thomson who, influenced in particular by the landscape paintings 
of Claude and Salvator Rosa (Hussey 19), came to see landscape through 
a painterly lens and to frame their descriptions of it in a self­
consciously pictorializing way. Hussey calls these authors and their 
immediate followers the "Picturesque Poets" (18) . In the opening 
section of Windsor Forest Pope briefly becomes one of their number as 
he sets about his descriptive business in a similarly pictorializing 
manner: building up his word-picture on an unmistakably painterly 
plan, he carefully 'blocks in', on an imaginary canvas, the principal 
natural features of a landscape imagined as lying stretched out 
beneath his gaze.
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a bewildering array of discrepant incidents" (E D H Johnson
16) all represented (necessarily so, given the medium) as
taking place simultaneously80. Though the comparison may
seem an odd one, in light especially of Johnson's known
indifference to the pictorial arts81, nevertheless, when he
sets to work filling a broad canvas with a multitude of
activities represented as occurring simultaneously, I can't
help thinking of him as a kind of literary Hogarth, working
through the medium of words in much the way that Hogarth
does through line, plane and colour. (This is not of course
to suggest that Johnson was consciously influenced by
Hogarth in the composition of his 'scenes'. There is no
reason to doubt that each ploughed his own furrow, and
therefore that similarities of approach or effect between
some of their productions are the result purely of
coincidence. Nonetheless, see Idler 15 (II 48-50) and
Hogarth's engraving of "Evening", facing p.50 (in this, the
Yale edition). Have we to do here with a manifestation of
80 One may cite, by way of example, the series The Four Times of 
the Day and An Election, and the individual works Southwark Fair and 
The March to Finchley.
81 Johnson's "scorn of painting was such, that I have heard him 
say, that he should sit very quietly in a room hung round with the 
works of the greatest masters, and never feel the slightest 
disposition to turn them if their backs were outermost, unless it 
might be for the sake of telling Sir Joshua [Reynolds] that he had 
turned them" (Mrs Thrale, in Sherbo 93) [emphasis in original].
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unconscious influence?).
The third and last point I want to make is this: in
breaking up his scenes into their many facets, Johnson not
seldom does so in a particular way, pressing into service
a feature that bears remarking on. This is the feature of
tagging each of the discriminated facets by means of an
introductory cue or marker. Invariably these markers are
pronouns which, being repeated or varied as the sentence
(or passage) unfolds, develop by accumulation into 'pronoun
chains', as it were. Examples of such 'chains' are:
"Some. . .some. . .some. . . " ;
"Some...others...none ..."
"One.. .another. ..others ..."
and so forth. These 'pronoun chains' not infrequently come
into the picture when Johnson reaches for an effect of
simultaneity; that this should be so is no accident since
they are particularly well adapted to the achievement of
such an effect: one of the simplest and most obvious ways
after all of orchestrating an effect of simultaneity is
through the use of constructions built, formulaically
almost, on 'pronoun chains' - as, for example, in the
schema "While some do X, others do Y, and yet others do Z" .
In presenting my evidence I propose to turn the
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contrast between 'pictures of life' that are 'pronoun­
tagged' and those that are not into a principle of
arrangement. Accordingly, the first batch of examples I
shall be bringing forward consists of 'pronoun-tagged'
items only.
The present grouping, in common with the one I have
designated 'Ethical', contains but one category, to which
I have given the title 'Discriminating the Manifold Facets
of a "Picture of Life"'.
Discriminating the Manifold Facets of a 'Picture of Life'
The unifying feature of this first batch of items is,
as I have noted, the fact that they are all 'pronoun­
tagged' -strung out on 'pronoun chains', so to speak. As
I am also interested, however, in spotlighting instances
in which an effect of simultaneity is aimed at, I propose
to place the four examples illustrative of this at the head
of the listing which follows:
When we analize the croud into individuals, it
soon appears that the passions and imaginations
of men will not easily suffer them to be
idle...we see men conspire to fix an arbitrary
value on that which is worthless in itself, and
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then contend for the possession. One is a
collector of fossils, of which he knows no other
use than to shew them. . . The florist nurses a
tulip, and repines that his rival's beds enjoy
the same showers and sun shine with his own.
This man is hurrying to a concert, only lest
others should have heard the new musician before
him; another bursts from his company to the
play, because he fancies himself the patron of
an actress; some spend the morning in
consultations with their taylor, and some in
directions to their cook; some are forming
parties for cards, and some laying wagers at a
horse race. (Adventurer 128, II 477)
[I] f we look round upon mankind, whom shall we
find...that is not tormenting himself with a
wish for something, of which all the
pleasure... will cease at the moment of
attainment? One man is beggering his posterity
to build a house, which when finished he never
will inhabit; another is levelling mountains to
open a prospect, which, when he has once enjoyed
it, he can enjoy no more; another is painting
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cielings [sic], carving wainscot, and filling
his apartments with costly furniture, only that
some neighbouring house may not be richer or
finer than his own. (Adventurer 119, II 463-64)
. . .money and time are the heaviest burthens of
life, and...the unhappiest of all mortals are
those who have more of either than they know how
to use. To set himself free from these
incumbrances, one hurries to New-market; another
travels over Europe; one pulls down his house
and calls architects about him; another buys a
seat in the country... one makes collections of
shells, and another searches the world for
tulips and carnations. (Idler 30, II 93)
Our military operations are at last begun...
Some are hoping for a bloody battle, because a
bloody battle makes a vendible narrative; some
are composing songs of victory; some are
planning arches of triumph; and some are mixing
fireworks for the celebration of a peace.
(Idler 5, II 16-17)
In a long series of action, some will languish
with fatigue, and some be drawn off by present
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gratifications, some will loiter because others
labour, and some will cease to labour because
others loiter; and if once they come within
prospect of success and profit, some will be
greedy and others envious; some will undertake
more than can perform...some will perform less
than they undertake... (Adventurer 45, II 358)
[Note the 'Distinctions by way of Antimetabole'
in this passage]
Names are easily collected [for a petition] .
One man signs because he hates the papists;
another because he has vowed destruction to the
turnpikes; one because it will vex the parson;
another because he owes his landlord nothing;
one because he is rich; another because he is
poor; one to shew that he is not afraid, and
another to shew that he can write. ("The False
Alarm", X 338)
Some [readers of books] are fond to take a
celebrated volume into their hands, because they
hope to distinguish their penetration, by
finding faults which have escaped the public;
others eagerly buy it in the first bloom of
482
reputation, that they may join the chorus of
praise...
Some read for stile, and some for argument:
one has little care about the sentiment, he
observes only how it is expressed; another
regards not the conclusion, but is diligent to
mark how it is inferred...
Some read that they may embellish their
conversation, or shine in dispute; some that
they may not be detected in ignorance, or want
the reputation of literary accomplishments...
(Adventurer 137, II 490)
Of the greater part [of mankind] it may be said,
that God is not in their thoughts. One forgets
him in his business, another in his amusements;
one in eager enjoyment of today, another in
solicitous contrivance for tomorrow. Some die
amidst the gratifications of luxury, and some in
the tumults of contests undecided, and purposes
uncompleated. (Sermons XIV 161)
I come now to my next (and last) batch of examples -
these are the ones without 'pronoun-tagging' . While all
of them present highly variegated 'pictures of life', a few
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stand out for their decidedly pictorial, indeed decidedly
Hogarthian, 'resonance' - as evidenced in their liveliness,
their busyness, their being crowded with an 'array of
discrepant incidents', and their manifesting not just a
comic but a caricatural quality.
The item which I have placed at the head of the list
is particularly interesting for the explicitness and self­
consciousness of its pictorializing stance. One observes
that the passage begins by positing an explicitly painterly
frame of reference for the description which is to follow
and that it ends on a similarly iconographic note. In
between Johnson composes his 'scene'. That he does so
within the painterly frame of reference posited is evident,
but it is equally evident that it is composed very much on
the basis of his moral and political conception of what the
painter should find significant in it. There is
accordingly no mention made of the proper disposition of
planes, objects and human figures, or of a fitting
distribution of light and shade, or of a suitable palette
of colours; instead, Johnson implicitly instructs the
painter to focus on the revelation of character (as
uniformly odious), on the presentation of emotion (as
uniformly gross) and on the suggestion of mood and ambience
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(as uniformly nasty). So the scene, while painterly, is
painterly strictly on his terms and in accordance with his
prepossession's; in other words, his 'picture’ is really
just the mirror of his prejudices and partisan opinions.
What this strongly implies is that the summons to "our
painters" at the beginning of the passage is no more than
a rhetorical move. If this be so, as I believe it is, then
it is a rhetorical move that belongs to a particular
literary genre which enjoyed a short-lived vogue in the
latter half of the seventeenth century, the genre of the
'Advice to a Painter'82.
So much by way of preamble; now let the evidence
speak:
If the design were not too multifarious and
82 That Johnson presses this genre into service is not without 
its seasoning of irony as in his Life of Blackmore he makes the 
observation that Steele's satirical swipe (in Tatler 3, April 1709) at 
that author's "Advice to a Weaver of Tapestry" effectively "put an end 
to the species of writers that gave Advice to Painters" (Lives II 242) 
[emphasis in original].
The conventions of the 'Advice to a Painter' genre have been 
outlined by Mary T Osborne in her monograph Advice-to-a-Painter Poems. 
It is evident from her account of these conventions that Johnson, in 
the passage under discussion, adheres to them pretty closely. Osborne 
writes:
'...the device of directing an artist was purely 
rhetorical, even when a specific painter was named. No 
picture was expected to result from the directions. The 
"advice" motif [served as a rhetorical resource enabling] 
the author to give pictorial, concrete, and, at times, 
even dramatic treatment to his subject matter... [It also] 
served as a framework for the poet's expression of 
opinions, prejudices, and emotions, for his 
characterizations and caricatures, for his description and 
narration of events. (9-10)
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extensive, I should wish that our painters would
attempt the dissolution of the parliament by
Cromwel. The point of time may be chosen, when
Cromwel, looking round the pandaemonium with
contempt, ordered the bauble to be taken away;
and Harrison laid hands on the Speaker to drag
him from the chair.
The various appearances, which rage, and
terror, and astonishment, and guilt, might
exhibit, in the faces of that hateful
assembly... the irresolute repugnance of some,
the hypocritical submissions of others, the
ferocious insolence of Cromwel, the rugged
brutality of Harrison, and the general
trepidation of fear and wickedness, would, if
some proper disposition could be contrived, make
a picture of unexampled variety, and
irresistible instruction. (Idler 45, II 142)
Of declining reputation the symptoms are not
less easily observed. If the author enters a
coffee-house, he has a box to himself; if he
calls at a bookseller's, the boy turns his back;
and, what is the most fatal of all prognosticks,
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authors will visit him in the morning, and talk
to him hour after hour of the malevolence of
criticks... [T] o this might be added all the
changes of the countenance of a patron, traced
from the first glow which flattery raises in his
cheek, through ardour of fondness, vehemence of
promise, magnificence of praise, excuse of
delay, and lamentation of inability, to the last
chill look of final dismission... (Idler 102,
II 313)
. . .he, who cannot persuade himself to withdraw
from society, must be content to pay a tribute
of his time to a multitude of tyrants; to the
loiterer, who makes appointments which he never
keeps; to the consulter, who asks advice which
he never takes; to the boaster, who blusters
only to be praised; to the complainer, who
whines only to be pitied; to the projector,
whose happiness is to entertain his friends with
expectations which all but himself know to be
vain; to the oeconomist, who tells of bargains
and settlements; to the politician, who predicts
the fate of battles and breach of alliances; to
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the usurer, who compares the different funds;
and to the talker, who talks only because he
loves to be talking. (Idler 14, II 47-48)
He that stands to contemplate the crouds that
fill the streets of a populous city, will see
many passengers whose air and motion it will be
difficult to behold without contempt and
laughter... The disposition to derision and
insult is awakened by the softness of foppery,
the swell of insolence, the liveliness of
levity, or the solemnity of grandeur; by the
sprightly trip, the stately stalk, the formal
strut, and the lofty mien; by gestures intended
to catch the eye, and by looks elaborately
formed as evidences of importance. (Rambler
179, V 177-78) [Johnson in this passage is
discriminating the various facets of
affectation]
To bring a lover, a lady and a rival into the
fable; to entangle them in contradictory
obligations, perplex them with oppositions of
interest, and harrass them with violence of
desires inconsistent with each other; to make
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them meet in rapture and part in agony; to fill
their mouths with hyperbolical joy and
outrageous sorrow; to distress them as nothing
human ever was distressed; to deliver them as
nothing human ever was delivered, is the
business of a modern dramatist. ("Preface" to
Shakespeare. in Bronson (1971) 264-65)
Pleasure is therefore seldom such as it appears
to others, nor often such as we represent it to
ourselves. Of the ladies that sparkle at a
musical performance, a very small number has any
quick sensibility of harmonious sounds. But
every one that goes has her pleasure. She has
the pleasure of wearing fine cloaths, and of
shewing them, of outshining those whom she
suspects to envy her; she has the pleasure of
appearing among other ladies in a place whither
the race of meaner mortals seldom intrudes, and
of reflecting that, in the conversations of the
next morning, her name will be mentioned among
those that sat in the first row; she has the
pleasure of returning courtesies, or refusing to
return them, of receiving compliments with
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civility, or rejecting them with disdain. She
has the pleasure of meeting some of her
acquaintance, of guessing why the rest are
absent, and of telling them that she saw the
opera, on pretence of inquiring why they would
miss it. She has the pleasure of being supposed
to be pleased with a refined amusement, and of
hoping to be numbered among the votresses of
harmony. She has the pleasure of escaping for
two hours the superiority of a sister, or the
controul of a husband; and from all these
pleasures she concludes that heavenly musick is
the balm of life. (Idler 18, II 57-58)
Of fifty thousand men, now destined to different
[military] stations, if we allow each to have
been occasionally necessary only to four women,
a short computation will inform us, that two
hundred thousand ladies are left to languish in
distress; two hundred thousand ladies, who must
run to sales and auctions without an attendant;
sit at the play, without a critick to direct
their opinion; buy their fans by their own
judgment; dispose shells by their own invention;
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walk in the Mall without a gallant; go to the
Gardens without a protector; and shuffle cards
with vain impatience for want of a fourth to
complete the party. (Idler 5, II 17)
Dear Mr. Rambler, did you ever hear any thing so
charming? a whole year of confusion! When there
has been a rout at mamma's, I have thought one
night of confusion worth a thousand nights of
rest; and if I can but see a year of confusion,
a whole year, of cards in one room, and dancings
in another, here a feast, and there a
masquerade, and plays, and coaches, and hurries,
and messages, and milaners, and raps at the
door, and visits, and frolicks, and new
fashions, I shall not care what they do with the
rest of the time... (Rambler 107, IV 206) 83
83 This passage and. the two which immediately precede it train 
their satiric sights on the same target -the leisured (young) lady. 
Though these three vignettes are composed in an Horatian rather than 
a Juvenalian 'key' - their stance being detached and amused, their 
register comic and their mockery restrained, focussing rather on 
foibles than on vices - for all that they present a view of the 
'modern fine lady' as a silly, superficial, giddy creature, socially 
emulous and given to frivolous and trifling pursuits. To the best of 
my knowledge, there will nowhere be found in Johnson's oeuvre 
comparable satirical sallies directed against a particular male type 
or against a particular subdivision of the male species (the "Short 
Song of Congratulation" on Sir John Lade's entering his majority is an 
individual satire). It comes not amiss in the present context to cite 
Mrs Thrale's complaint that Johnson "did indeed say very contemptuous 
things of our sex" (in Sherbo 149). She does not of course accuse him 
of doing this habitually but there is no reason to suppose that she is
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To bring an inclusive gaze to bear on the exampl-es (in
both batches) adduced above, viewing them in their
ensemble, is to be struck by the fact that the greater
number by far are drawn from the Idler and Adventurer
series which by common consent are considered to exemplify
Johnson's 'lighter' manner - lighter, that is, than the
studiedly dignified, strenuously moral, purposely
preceptive manner characteristic of many if not most of the
Rambler essays. That so many of the 'pictures of life' are
met with in the Idler and Adventurer series is no doubt a
overstating the case in alleging occasional lapses on his part. But 
even disregarding the imputation of contempt, the truth is that 
Johnson's first and characteristic impulse was to side with the man 
against the woman, with the husband against the wife: "When any 
disputes arose between our married acquaintance... Mr. Johnson always 
sided with the husband, 'whom (he said) the woman had probably 
provoked so often, she scarce knew when or how she had disobliged him 
first'" (Mrs Thrale, in Sherbo 110; see also Life 1035; however, for 
a view of Johnson taking a rather different tack see Boswell's 
Hebrides Journal 294).
The three satirical vignettes referred to above are, on their 
own, sufficient proof - if proof were needed - of how mistaken Sir 
Leslie Stephen was in his view of Johnson as a writer with no gift at 
all for satire pitched in an Horatian 'key'. In his book on Johnson 
(first published in 1878), Stephen argues that
Neither his education nor the manners acquired in Grub 
Street had qualified him to be an observer of those 
lighter foibles which were touched by Addison with so 
dexterous a hand. When he ventures upon such topics he 
flounders dreadfully, and rather reminds us of an artist 
who should attempt to paint miniatures with a mop. (172)
While this judgment may strike today's reader, encountering it 
more than a century after it was formulated, as notoriously wrong­
headed, it ought yet to be borne in mind that when Stephen framed it 
he was merely expressing (though at the same time doing his bit to 
entrench) the outlook of his age - the later Victorian - regarding 
this particular aspect of the Johnsonian performance. One should add, 
however, that the view of Johnson as a writer with no aptitude at all 
for the lighter, satirically-complexioned type of composition was the 
prevailing one not just in the later years of the Victorian epoch but 
throughout the whole of it.
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reflection of Johnson's having decided in advance to impart
a lighter character to these two sequences, thus earmarking
them as a natural home for his 'pictures' . At the same
time, however, there is a reciprocal process at work which
should not be overlooked: while certainly it is the case
that so many of the 'pictures of life' are met with in the
Idlers and Adventurers thanks to their preordained lighter
tone, it is equally the case that this lighter tone in no
small measure comes to be what it is thanks precisely to
the presence and influence of those very 'pictures' which,
on balance, it seems to me, end up contributing at least
as much to the two series' more genial 'feel' as they
borrow from it.
The imaginative verve vitalizing the most spirited of
the 'pictures of life' (many of which are cited above) is
very striking. What they bear witness to is an imagination
rejoicing in its powers - an imagination vivacious,
inventive, diversified and, on occasion, playful; with a
taste, and a talent, for comic and even, at times,
caricatural portraiture; an imagination alert to the
incongruous, absurd and affected in human behaviour, and
endued with an aptitude, and a relish too, for exposing
these shortcomings through restrained satire. It goes
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without saying that these particular aspects of Johnson's
'most fertile imagination' are for the most part studiously
excluded from the Rambler series as well as from his other
serious writings, as running counter to their prevailing
mood and objectives. Consequently, of the more sprightly,
more sportive, more diverting side of his imaginative make­
up those readers can know little or nothing who know him
only from the Ramblers. from Rasselas and from The Vanity
of Human Wishes (which are precisely the works most readers
do know him by)84; or, alternatively, who know him only
34 If the critic, William Mudford, writing in 1802, had been 
acquainted not just with these works, which is where his encounter 
with the Johnsonian oeuvre appears to have begun and ended, but with 
the rest of it as well, would he have suffered himself to pronounce 
upon Johnson this kind of verdict:
As his reflections were always melancholy, so his writings 
have the same cast. ...It is difficult to conceive a man 
more oppressed with melancholy, or more governed by 
prejudice than Dr. Johnson. In him there is no variation; 
he is for ever one and the same. All his pictures are 
alike, and in all we trace the reflection of a cynic. His 
sensations could seldom be enviable; he must have turned 
away with visible horror and disgust from all that bore 
the smiles of happiness, or the gaiety of mirth... (in 
Boulton 47, 77)
The more colourful, more sprightly side of Johnson's imagination 
is largely, or wholly, excluded from the works mentioned above not 
only because it is deemed to sort ill with the moralizing stance and 
serious purposes determined for them in advance, and also to be at 
odds with the preceptive role he conceives for himself as their 
author, but also, more generally, because Johnson, although delighting 
not seldom in the exercise of his imaginative powers, basically 
mistrusts imagination, his own especially, fearing its potential for 
unruliness, for running out of control. B H Bronson speaks of his 
"lifelong effort to hold it [his imagination] in check" (1965:5), a 
judgment which seems to me to hit the mark (v. too Bronson's essay 
"The Double Tradition of Dr. Johnson", ibid. 156-76, esp. p.170). 
Also relevant in the present context is the forty-fourth chapter of 
Rasselas, the one entitled "The Dangerous Prevalence [= dominion, 
ascendancy] of Imagination", in which Imlac, who ordinarily serves as
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from his popular-image as the Sage, or the Moral Mentor or
the Literary Dictator of his epoch. Thus the 'pictures of
life' exhibited in the exemplary passages mustered above
(not to speak of many others dotted about in the oeuvre
which are less lively and less variegated than the ones I
have cited) may be able to offer such readers a fresh
perspective on Johnson, presenting him in a perhaps less
managing by dint of constant 
volatile temperament in check
Johnson's mouthpiece in the tale, advances the view that "All power of 
fancy [a term still interchangeable with 'imagination' in the pre- 
Coleridgean era} over reason is a degree of insanity", and warns 
against its being allowed to grow "imperious" and "despotick", for 
then "fictions begin to operate as realities... and life passes in 
dreams of rapture or of anguish" (in Bronson (1971) 693, 694) .
Recasting Imlac's statement in positive terms, Johnson elsewhere 
declares that "Reason is the only Source of happiness to reasonable 
Beings" (Mrs Thrale, in Ingrams 104) . While he had no difficulty 
granting this proposition his philosophical assent, turning it into 
a precept to live by, and act by, proved to be a quite different, and 
altogether more complicated matter - because, essentially, it ran 
counter to the true impulse of his nature (as it probably does to the 
true impulse of human nature in general) . In the end, however, 
struggle and vigilance to hold his 
(cf. Reynolds in Hill II 225-26), he
succeeded in 'standing fast for Reason' - but one can only wonder at 
what emotional cost.
In making happiness contingent upon right reason, Johnson in 
fact enacts one of the pivotal moves of the Enlightenment's 
philosophical programme. Consider how close is his phraseology in the 
formulation above to that of Leibniz who definitively adumbrated the 
connection between happiness and Reason for the German Enlightenment 
as a whole (Cassirer 122) in his treatise On Wisdom, from which I cite 
the following affirmation: "...nothing serves happiness more than the 
light of reason and the exercise of the will to act at all times 
according to reason..." (in Cassirer 122).
John Wain summarizes in the following statement some of the main 
issues raised in the paragraphs above:
Johnson's trust was in reason. Not only did he come from 
a civilization that held this faith; he also endured a 
permanent inner turmoil that had to be held within bounds. 
He could, of course, have given way to that turmoil and 
let its waves carry him to some unknown shore. But to say 
this is to say that Johnson should have been Smart or 
Holderlin and not Johnson. (157)
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familiar though probably more congenial light.
With these remarks I bring to a conclusion this
extended - dare I say over-extended - project of
marshalling evidence in support of my thesis that the very
build of Johnson's mind was 'lexicographic', that is to say
(in the special context of this study) , formed for the
making of distinctions; and that his making of them was as
inveterate as it was because his drive to distinguish was
an elemental, inwoven and presiding feature of his psychic
organization.
Given the volume, as well as (in my judgment) the
cogency of the evidence brought to bear in the foregoing
pages, I do not believe that my thesis, as stated in the
paragraph above, will easily be dislodged by the argument
that, when all is said and done, Johnson really is not all
that different, as a maker of distinctions, from anybody
else. After all, everybody is busy making distinctions all
the time, and were one minded to keep a count of them, one
would no doubt notch up a pretty sizable tally by the end
of an average day. Yet where the 'man in the street' is
concerned it occurs to nobody to assert the claim that they
constitute presumptive evidence of a 'mind formed for
distinction-making'; so why should this claim be asserted,
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and allowed, where Johnson is concerned? Alternatively,
if it be allowed in his case, why should it not be allowed
in everybody else's? If then, insofar as distinction­
making is concerned, he is 'just like everybody else' (or
everybody else is just like him), why the great to-do about
the build specifically of his mind? Where is the
justification for focussing specifically on his psyche as
one 'formed for distinction-making'? So the argument might
run.
Well, as I have indicated, I don't believe the thesis
I have been defending in this study risks being dislodged,
or even modified, by the line of argument hypothesized
above. The evidence makes it sufficiently clear, it seems
to me, that Johnson is different: he is different by reason
of the sheer quantity of distinctions he generates (and
prodigious though this quantity is, it represents only what
'made it' into the evidential record. What about all the
distinctions that didn't - those many distinctions which,
purely on the argument that he really was 'just like
anybody else' , he may be assumed to have fathered in the
course of an average day?); he is different also because
he frames distinctions of so many different kinds and sub­
kinds, and different in being able to do this so
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effortlessly; he is different because the distinctions he
frames with such ease and naturalness are so incisive and,
technically speaking, so accomplished. Accordingly, 'when
all is said and done' , what still remains to be said,
insisted upon, indeed, is that Johnson is different; and
this difference, I further submit, has everything to do
with the particular 'set' and workings of his psyche.
* ★ *
I want to ring down the curtain on this chapter by
posing a question which I daresay must more than once have
crossed the reader's mind in the course of the preceding
two hundred or so pages. The question is this: how self­
conscious a maker of distinctions was Johnson? After all,
he makes an enormous number of them, of many different
kinds85 - so (to somewhat rephrase the question) how aware
was he of just what he was doing when he was framing all
these distinctions? Naturally, we cannot hope for more
than an approximate answer to this question as we have no
way of directly interrogating Johnson's psyche; being
85 I may as well reiterate here a point made earlier, namely, 
that the very considerable number of examples of distinction-making 
adduced in this lengthy chapter represents but a fraction of the 
number actually amassed.
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obliged, therefore, to proceed by indirect means, our
appeal has to be to the evidential record - and what it
suggests, in its written and spoken parts alike, is that
any answer to the question posed which is not formulated
in terms of the notion of grades or levels of awareness is
bound to fall short.
The first point I would want to make is that in the
vast majority of cases (about 90% of them at least, I
should think) Johnson frames distinctions (of all types)
without betraying any awareness whatever of being engaged
in the business of distinction-making. He simply
formulates his distinction and there he leaves it; no
further comment of a possibly reflexive or self-regarding
character comes into the picture at all. As the absence
of any suggestion of self-conscious awareness affects such
a very high percentage of his distinction-making output,
it has to be viewed as a highly significant phenomenon86,
and one moreover which both accords with, and appears to
bear out, a basic hypothesis of this study, the hypothesis
86 In viewing as 'highly significant' the near-total absence from 
Johnson's distinction-making of any self-conscious awareness, I am 
only too well aware myself of being reliant on the argument urn e 
silentio (the argument from silence) which, though plainly susceptible 
of misuse, and obviously of questionable validity when put to 
questionable uses, seems to me, in the present instance, to be a 
legitimate argumentative resource - and a telling one too.
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that Johnson's distinction-making bent was a feature of his
psychic organization so elemental as to result, in the
overwhelming majority of cases, in wholly involuntary and
unconscious acts of distinction-making ('unwilled
accomplishments', to recur to Ohmann's phrase), thanks to
which they would necessarily have passed unnoticed, and
would therefore have escaped remark, at the moment of
occurrence. So one would have to conclude, with reference
to the question posed, that Johnson, so far from being a
self-conscious maker of distinctions, was, in the
overwhelming majority of cases, an unconscious maker of
them.
In a small minority of instances, however, his
distinction-making praxis does manifest a measure of self­
consciousness which takes the form, at a lower level of
cognition, of his signalling at least an implicit awareness
of the presence of a distinction in his discourse. In
addition, he on occasion rises to a relatively higher level
of self-consciousness; this is the level at which he
reveals an implicit awareness of himself as a maker of
distinctions, as actually engaged in the enterprise of
distinction-making. Having discriminated these two levels
of self-consciousness, let me begin my analysis by
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considering manifestations of distinction-making that
exhibit what to me seems to be a 'low grade7 of awareness.
I refer under this head to instances in which Johnson,
through the purposeful inclusion of the terms 'distinction7
or 'difference7 in the wording of a statement, implicitly
signals his awareness of its containing - indeed, of its
pivoting on - a distinction. But taking the further step
of actually pointing up his role as a distinction-maker is
something he does not do - not here; that only happens at
the second level of awareness, and even then only
implicitly. For the present, however, let me bring forward
some examples of distinction-making operating at what I
view as a low level of self-consciousness:
There is a great difference between what is said
without our being urged to it, and what is said
from a kind of compulsion. (Life 390)
The distinction is clear between what is of
moral and what is of ritual [in the religious
sense] obligation. (Life 636)
...the difference between approving laws, and
obeying them, is frequently forgotten...
(Rambler 76, IV 34)
...though the printing-house may properly be
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compared -to the infernal regions, for the
facility of its entrance, and the difficulty
with which authors return from it; yet there is
this difference, that a great genius can never
return to his former state, by a happy draught
of the waters of oblivion. (Rambler 16, III 87­
88)
This 'low-grade' paradigm also comes to expression in
a more emphatic form; in these instances not only is the
distinction itself 'pitched' in a rather more emphatic
register but a strong sense of its needfulness is conveyed
as well, and so the impression is created of Johnson's
being conscious not just of his discourse containing a
distinction but of that distinction's being also of some
considerable importance. This more emphatic and at the
same time somewhat more self-conscious mode of distinction­
making is exemplified by the following items:
...one of the company... asked Sir James Johnston
if he intended to be present [at the bar of the
House of Commons]. He answered that he believed
he should not, because he paid little regard to
the arguments of counsel at the bar of the House
of Commons. "Wherefore do you pay little regard
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to their arguments, Sir?" said Dr. Johnson.
"Because," replied Sir James, "they argue for
their fee." "What is it to you, Sir," rejoined
Dr. Johnson, "what they argue for? you have
nothing to do with their motive, but you ought
to weigh their argument. Sir, you seem to
confound argument with assertion, but there is
an essential distinction between them.
Assertion is like an arrow shot from a long-bow;
the force with which it strikes depends on the
strength of the arm that draws it. But argument
is like an arrow from a cross-bow, which has
equal force, whether shot by a boy or a giant."
(in Hill II 409)
"Sir, (continued he) there is all the difference
in the world between characters of nature and
characters of manners; and there is the
difference between the characters of Fielding
and those of Richardson." (Life 389) [emphasis
in original]
JOHNSON: I do not myself think that a man should
say in a dedication what he could not say in a
history. However, allowance should be made; for
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there is a great - difference. The known style of
a dedication is flattery: it professes to
flatter. (Hebrides Journal 333)
. . .This led us to consider whether it did not
require great abilities to be very wicked.
JOHNSON: ...Consider only what act of wickedness
requires great abilities to commit it, when once
the person who is to do it has the power; for
there is the distinction. It requires great
abilities to conquer an army, but none to
massacre it after it is conquered. (Hebrides
Journal 288) [emphasis in original]
The second, relatively higher level of self­
consciousness attained by Johnson is one at which he seems
to be, in some degree, actually 'present' to himself as a
maker of distinctions. This higher level of awareness
tends to come into view in association with his adopting
a posture of advocacy relative to a given distinction; that
is to say, when he seeks, by means of certain cues, to
impress upon his reader (or interlocutor) the necessity of
being particularly attentive to the distinction being (or
about to be) drawn. That he enjoins this kind of
attentiveness upon his interlocutor (or reader) surely
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implies an at least tolerably well-defined sense of himself
as a framer of distinctions worthy of attention. The mere
fact, however, that in order to arrive at this conclusion
I am compelled to fall back upon the expedient of
inferential reasoning makes it clear that the evidence for
Johnson's 'second, relatively higher level of self­
consciousness ' is never better than implicit, indirect.
For all that, it still manages, in my view, to convey a
sense of his being, to some degree, 'present' to himself
as a maker of distinctions. When he says to Mrs Thrale,
in the first passage cited below, "Madam, we must
distinguish", he seems, implicitly, to be thus 'present'
to himself; and so too, it seems to me, in the other five
examples. But let the reader judge for himself; here is
the evidence:
A young lady who had married a man much her
inferiour in rank being mentioned, a question
arose how a woman's relations should behave to
her in such a situation. ...Mrs Thrale was all
for mildness and forgiveness, and, according to
the vulgar phrase, 'making the best of a bad
bargain.' JOHNSON: Madam, we must distinguish.
Were I a man of rank, I would not let a daughter
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starve who had made a mean marriage; but having
voluntarily degraded herself from the station
which she was originally entitled to hold, I
would support her only in that which she herself
had chosen; and would not put her on a level
with my other daughters. (Life 601)
The author of these memoirs [Arthur Murphy, an
Irishman] well remembers, that Johnson one day
asked him, "Have you observed the difference
between your own country impudence and Scottish
impudence?" The answer being in the negative:
"Then I will tell you," said Johnson. "The
impudence of an Irishman is the impudence of a
fly, that...teazes you. The impudence of a
Scotsman is the impudence of a leech,
that... sucks your blood." (in Hill I 427)
. . .he who does his best, however little, is
always to be distinguished from him who does
nothing. (Rambler 177, V 172)
Affectation is always to be distinguished from
hypocrisy, as being the art of counterfeiting
those qualities, which we might, with innocence
and safety, be known to want. (Rambler 20, III
506
113)
When the discovery of secrets is under
consideration, there is always a distinction
carefully to be made between our own and those
of another... (Rambler 13, III 70)
Patience and submission are very carefully to be
distinguished from cowardice and indolence.
(Rambler 32, III 177)
Although the examples assembled above show Johnson
reaching a 'crowning point' of self-consciousness as a
maker of distinctions, it is evident that this point,
measured by any more general standard, is actually a very
modest one indeed; Johnson's peak, judged by a more
universal yardstick, comes out looking like a hummock. To
'make the grade' as a genuinely, ' certif iably' self­
conscious framer of distinctions, he would need to have
executed a series of moves which in fact he never does
execute: he would need formally and deliberately to have
called attention to himself as a maker of distinctions, and
to have pronounced with reflexive awareness on their role,
as well as on their importance, both in his oeuvre and in
the organization and operation of his psyche; he would need
somehow to have stepped outside himself, viewing his
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distinction-making praxis objectively and impersonally, as
if through the eyes of another; detachedly appraising his
proficiency at it - rather as, in a miniature manifestation
of self-conscious reflection, he appraises the quality of
his performance as a lexicographer:
BOSWELL [referring to Johnson's Dictionary! : You
did not know what you were undertaking.
JOHNSON: Yes, Sir, I knew very well what I was
undertaking - and very well how to do it - and
have done it very well. (Life 1034)
Of the various 'moves' detailed above, Johnson
executed none - to go by what the evidential record tells
us, at any rate. While not gainsaying this fact, we may
yet very properly ask whether he could have been, or why
he should have been, more aware of his distinction-making
praxis, and of himself as a distinction-maker, than in fact
he was (or, more accurately, perhaps, wasn't) . So could
he have been more self-conscious than he in fact turned out
to be? Assuming, as I do, such a very high level of
involuntariness in his distinction-making praxis, I would
have to say that I doubt it - because if his distinction­
making were as unconscious and involuntary an activity as
I believe it to have been, one would then have to ask where
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those perceivable, 'outcropping' cues (one could also think
of them as 'triggers') could have come from upon which even
the possibility of his switching into a more self-conscious
mode of awareness would necessarily have depended. Then,
aside from the issue of his capacity for greater self­
consciousness, there is the further question of why he ever
should have been more self-conscious as a framer of
distinctions than he was. What incentive, what spur, was
there to make him so? I can think of none; on the
contrary, I can only think of disincentives. For a start,
designedly to train the spotlight upon oneself, one's
mental peculiarities, and the methods and mannerisms
characteristic of one's praxis, deliberately framing them
as a focus of attention, would have been viewed, in the
pre-Romantic era, as being in very questionable taste, as
tending indeed towards singularity, if not out-and-out
freakishness. And, certainly, there is nothing I can point
to in Johnson's social and literary milieu which might have
prompted, or tempted, him to behave in that kind of way.
On the contrary, the decorous, sociable, 'clubable' circles
in which he moved and had his being would have acted as a
natural brake upon any unseemly drift towards hyper-self­
conscious oddity. The fact is that a hyper-self-conscious
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posture, praxis, and 'perspective-on-things',-in the arts
especially, are much more a later twentieth-century ideal
than they ever were a later eighteenth-century one - and
Sterne's Tristram Shandy is surely the exception that
proves the rule: it was certainly felt in its day to stand
out as an anomaly, if not an aberration87. In conclusion,
then, I have to say that I am unable to detect anything in
Johnson's milieu which might have served as an incentive
spurring him to be more self-conscious as a maker of
distinctions than in fact he was.
If Johnson never self-consciously (in the generally
accepted sense of the word) brings under scrutiny either
his distinction-making praxis or himself as a framer of
distinctions, he equally never (to judge from the
evidential record) turns a detached, impersonal gaze upon
the activity of distinction-making per se - that is,
considered in its own right and as a theoretical construct.
Thus considered, this activity may be examined from a
number of angles - as an aspect of the workings of the
87 Cf. Johnson's observation: "Nothing odd will do long. 
Tristram Shandy did not last" (Life 696). If this was true in 1776, 
when Johnson made the observation, and if it remained true through the 
nineteenth century, it certainly is true no longer. But is not the 
twentieth century's ‘rediscovery' of this work precisely, and first 
and foremost, a reflection of our current obsession with metafiction, 
and with trying to discover, and recover, past evidences of it?
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mind; as an attribute of discourse, or simply as a topic
worthy of general disinterested discussion, perhaps at a
Johnsonian 'symposium' at the Turk's Head or the Mitre.
Johnson examines the activity of distinction-making from
none of these angles. It is not just that he never
interrogates this subject 'philosophically' - that is,
systematically, theoretically, with an eye to giving an
account of its foundations, nature, and import - he simply
never interrogates it at all. This is an abstention which
I suppose could be accounted for (at a theoretical level,
anyway) in terms of the observation (made of Cicero) that
a "great practitioner does not need to explain the
theoretical basis of his art" (in Vickers 99). Johnson is
undoubtedly a great practitioner of distinction-making, but
it is not, in my view, for the reason suggested in this
dictum that he has nothing to say about the 'theoretical
basis of his art'. One could of course also speculate that
neither his interests nor his circle of acquaintance were
such as to prompt, or to provoke, a disinterested
discussion about distinction-making regarded as a
'warrantable' topic of conversation in its own right.
Given the intellectual climate of the day, such a subject
would indeed have had an outlandish 'feel' to it were it
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to be proposed as a serious topic for discussion. But, as
against these surmises, it is well to remember that when
it came to topics for discussion and debate, there was very
little that Johnson and his circle shrank from; they were
quite ready to 'take on board' almost any subject under the
sun, outlandish or otherwise, and without needing to be
'provoked' into doing so88. No, the reason, it seems to
me, why he has nothing to say about the activity of
distinction-making per se is that he was simply too close
to it in his experience and praxis to be aware of it as an
autonomous phenomenon inviting disinterested scrutiny.
Summing up, then, my conclusions are, first, that
Johnson was but rarely 'present' to himself as a maker of
distinctions, and that when he was, it was at a level of
self-consciousness that one would have to characterize as
very modest - at best (to describe even its 'crowning
point' as 'high-grade' would be to appeal to a yardstick
so permissive as to be meaningless) . Second: of a
deliberate, disinterested, objective scrutiny of his
distinction-making praxis there is no suggestion at all in
88 Pertinent in this connection is Thomas Woodman's observation 
that there "seems to be nothing that Johnson cannot grasp, nothing 
that he is not interested in and prepared to speak about" (33) . 
Woodman frames this well-aimed judgment within the context of a 
consideration of "the amazing range and copiousness of [Johnson's] 
conversation" (idem).
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the evidential record. Nor, finally, is there any hint in
it of his inquiring into the distinction-making activity
as such, as an autonomous phenomenon, or of his being even
tempted to do so. Thus it is that in pursuing the question
of how self-conscious Johnson was as a maker of
distinctions, our search leads us, more often than not, to
a silence - a silence which is not the product of
deliberate choice but instead reflects the absence from his
milieu, social and literary, of any spur to pronounce
reflexively and self-consciously either upon his own
distinction-making praxis or upon the activity of
distinction-making considered per se; or, having regard to
the extremely high level of involuntariness characterizing
his praxis, it is a silence which may be seen as reflecting
the likelihood of self-conscious pronouncement on this
subject being virtually beyond the reach of possibility for
him.
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CONCLUSION
Johnson's mind and 'soul' were sufficiently
comprehensive, his interests sufficiently wide-ranging, his
acquirements sufficiently numerous and variegated, his
opinions, written and spoken, sufficiently abundant and
diversified (as well as sufficiently well-documented and,
let it be said, sufficiently inconsistent among themselves
- v. Fussell (1972) 42-43, 60-61), to render not just
explicable but also well-aimed and pertinent Marshall
Waingrow's observation that "Samuel Johnson will always be
somebody's hypothesis" (1). Truly spoken; for Johnson is
a vast and various continent with enough in it to support
many, and perhaps conflicting, hypothetical constructs.
So the hypothesis I have advanced and have endeavoured, in
the pages of this study, to defend, is but one 'reading'
among the many that the 'Great Cham's' comprehensiveness
and many-sidedness undoubtedly invite. No wonder that when
he died William Gerard Hamilton spoke, not less truthfully
than memorably (and in the best tradition of Johnson's own
distinction-making praxis to boot) of the "chasm" he had
left "which not only nothing can fill up, but which nothing
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has a tendency to fill up" (Life 1394-95).
So, then, taking my cue from Waingrow's observation,
and only too aware of how limited and partial (unavoidably
so) must be my view of the man and his mind, let me
recapitulate my Johnsonian hypothesis. I see him as a
having a mind formed for distinction-making, and as having
been born into the world with that kind of mind which,
given its particular disposition, is not unreasonably
characterized as 'lexicographic'. This posited, it follows
that I view his actual 'drive to distinguish', that is, the
observable praxis, as manifested in innumerable individual
instances of distinction-making, as the expression of a
constitutional mental bent, as the palpable projection, the
'staging', of the very cast and 'set' of his psyche (or of
one of its principal facets, at any rate) . With a mind
built the way his was, Johnson's pre-eminence as a 'high­
flyer' among distinction-makers (lexicographers
particularly) was doubtless assured, regardless of whether
or not additional factors came into play to accelerate the
development or boost the potency of his distinction-making
bent. It seems to me, however, that an intensifying
intervention did in fact occur, and its effect was to turn
what in any case would never have been less than a leading
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temperamental trait into something much more like a habit
of mind which then, over time, became a more or less
involuntary 'reflex'. So in what did this 'intensifying
intervention' consist? It consisted in the boost given to
Johnson's already healthy distinction-making bent by two
inter-related and puissant aspirations. Dating very
probably from the years of his young manhood, these were,
first, to be always as perspicuous as possible1 and,
second, to "disentangl[e] combinations and separat[e]
similitudes" (in Bronson (1971) 253) . The boost these
aspirations gave to Johnson's distinction-making bent arose
from the fact that their own realization depended upon the
making of distinctions as a prerequisite move.
Since the brief I have given myself in this study is
to build a defensible case in relation to a phenomenon as
complex, enigmatic, inscrutable, even, as the 'set' and
operations of a mind, it becomes a matter of the first
1 Pertinent in this context is the following passage taken from 
the Life:
Sir Joshua Reynolds once asked [Johnson] by what means he 
had attained his extraordinary accuracy and flow of 
language. He told him, that he had early laid it down as 
a fixed rule to do his best on every occasion, and in 
every company; to impart whatever he knew in the most 
forcible language he could put it in; and that by constant 
practice, and never suffering any careless expressions to 
escape him, or attempting to deliver his thoughts without 
arranging them in the clearest manner, it became habitual 
to him. (145)
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importance, if the hypothesis I advance is to be vindicable
and, beyond that, persuasive, to adduce enough evidence.
To recur to a point made in my Introduction but one that
bears restating: no investigation conducted on
psychocritical lines that is not built on a solid, indeed
dense, evidential base can hope to be taken seriously or
to have staying power; where there is no such base, there
is only free-fall (exciting perhaps for a while, but in the
end fatal) into the untethered realm of unsupported
assertion, conjecture, guesses and hunches. It is well to
underline the point that in investigations of a
psychocritical character the notion of a 'solid evidential
base' implies, in the first instance, a sufficient quantity
of evidence; in such investigations the volume of evidence
is as important as its cogency. Even so, I cannot but be
aware that I will be thought to have overdone things as
regards the amount of evidence presented. In seeking to
counter this charge I am obliged to fall back on the 'plea
in extenuation' - one, however, that is modelled on an
argument Johnson himself relies on in the apologia with
which he brings to a close his Plan of a Dictionary of the
English Language. So my plea, echoing Johnson's, is that
sometimes the desire to carry conviction "urge[d] me to
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superfluities" . And, by the way, though the reader may not
believe it, I am able, in good faith, to echo his next
sentence as well, and to affirm, without exaggeration, that
"sometimes the fear of prolixity betray[ed] me to
omissions" (in Wilson 139). Be that as it may, one thing
is certain, and that is that no quantity of evidence,
however voluminous, will ever be able to force 'final,
incontrovertible proofs' out of any inquiry conducted on
psychocritical lines; that this is so is simply in the
nature of the case. Amplitude of evidence may be able to
persuade, to bear out an hypothesis, to impart to argument
the force of demonstration, but it will never be able to
lay bare the 'foundational truth' about the psyche of
someone like Johnson, who now lives, vigorously and vividly
though it be, only in the record of his discourse.
Accordingly, as I said in an earlier chapter, I have not
been looking to furnish 'proofs' in this study, but simply
to construct a plausible, defensible case.
While engaged in the present inquiry I have from time
to time heard the view expressed that "Everybody knows
Johnson was a maker of distinctions, so why the need for
an elaborate investigation to show what is already known?"
The answer I would want to return to this objection falls
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into two inter-connecting parts: to begin with, I would
have to pose the question whether there can ever be
'knowing' without 'showing'. Can there really be knowledge
(properly so called) without demonstration (be it never so
toilsome and tedious)? I greatly doubt it; and when the
pressure of such doubt becomes insistent enough, it is then
that someone feels the need, whatever may be his field of
inquiry, to actually show what 'everybody' claims to
'know'. In this point is already discernible its
concomitant, namely, that formulations such as 'Everybody
knows...' are notoriously loose, inexact and 'sleight-of-
handish' (probably designedly so) . Staying with this
locution, what one notices is that the word 'know' is
really just a cover-term performing the office of screening
from view behind a fagade of cool certitude and implied
unchallengeability nothing more than a congeries of
sensings, hunches and intuitions, none of which have very
much in common with 'knowing' and 'knowledge', properly so
called. And it surely cannot be accounted any great fault
to wish to replace hunches and intuitions with something
more dependable, more secure, something perhaps even
approaching knowledge. Johnson speaks in Rambler 92 of
criticism having among its objectives the task of
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"improv [ing] opinion into knowledge" (IV 122) ; if this
study goes some of the way towards achieving that goal I
shall be well content. There is a passage in Idler 36
which bears directly upon the issue being raised here. It
is a passage in which Johnson tilts wittily at the "stately
son of demonstration, who proves with mathematical
formality what no man has yet pretended [= professed] to
doubt" (II 113). But to look beyond this diverting sally
at the expense of a pretty easy target is to recognize, I
believe, that Johnson is being unfair to the 'son of
demonstration' ; and he is being unfair because, ruled, by
his satiric purpose, he on this occasion forbears to draw
a distinction: that is the distinction. - and it is an
important one - between not claiming to doubt something and
being actually furnished with the grounds that, at a
pragmatic level (if not at an abstract, theoretical one),
might render doubt unnecessary and, in so far, help to
'improve opinion into knowledge'. And who is it that is
best placed to furnish such grounds if it is not the 'son
of demonstration'? So, despite Johnson's disparaging
swipe, the 'son of demonstration' has, it seems to me, a
valid and necessary role to perform. It is such a role
that I have sought to discharge in the pages of the present
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inquiry.
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APPENDIX A
HOW TRUSTWORTHY A RECORDER OF JOHNSON'S
CONVERSATION WAS BOSWELL?
To this question my answer is "trustworthy enough".
While Boswell obviously could not preserve everything that
Johnson said, what he did preserve constitutes, in
essentials, a sufficiently reliable record of his
"illustrious friend's" conversation. Though he left gaps
he neither made things up (though he did touch them up) nor
falsified them. What he claims for his chronicle of
Johnson's conversation is the following:
I must, again and again, intreat of my readers
not to suppose that my imperfect record of
conversation contains the whole of what was said
by Johnson, or other eminent persons who lived
with him. What I have preserved, however, has
the value of the most perfect authenticity.
(Life 617)
The form of words used by Boswell here is notably
careful, even lawyerly - "What I have preserved has the
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value of the most perfect authenticity" he writes, the
suggestion being that while his record of Johnson's talk
is not to be held to a literal, verbatim standard of
authenticity, nonetheless it can still justifiably claim
to have "the value of the most perfect authenticity" in
that it constitutes in all essentials an accurate and
reliable record1. If this is Boswell's claim, as I believe
it is, then it is, I further believe, a well-founded one.
My reasons for maintaining this view are the following:
First, at the most general level: Boswell looked upon
the writing of the Life of Johnson as a sacred trust1 2, and
to have paltered with the truth in composing the biography
of a man who so reverenced it3 would have been to betray
1 Thus also Pat Rogers: "Of course we do not have in any of these 
cases [i.e. the various extant records of Johnson's talk] a literal 
word-for-word transcription of the conversation, but the main flow and 
the spirit have survived" (75).
2 Germane in this connection is the following passage from the 
Journal of the Hebrides tour:
The Sunday evening that we sat by ourselves at Aberdeen, 
I asked him several particulars of his early years, which 
he readily told me; and I wrote them down before him. 
This day I proceeded in my inquiries, also writing them in 
his presence. I have them on detached sheets. I shall 
collect authentick materials for The Life of Samuel 
Johnson, LL.D.; and, if I survive him, I shall be one who 
will most faithfully do honour to his memory. (351)
3 Germane here is this passage from the Life
He [Johnson] inculcated upon all his friends the 
importance of perpetual vigilance against the slightest 
degrees of falsehood; the effect of which, as Sir Joshua 
Reynolds observed to me, has been, that all who were of 
his school are distinguished for a love of truth and
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this trust. Boswell would not have been blind, or
indifferent, to the point of moral delicacy involved here
since he was not blind or indifferent to it elsewhere - for
example, in the difficult matter of getting on with his
father, in his endeavour to reconcile the claims of wife
and family with his special feeling for Johnson and for his
other London friends, in his attempts (as often as not
ineffectual) to confront his numerous lapses and
shortcomings. Boswell was a complex and contradictory man4
but he was not a moral philistine.
The status of the Life as a sacred trust imposed upon
him, in a manner particularly exigent, the obligations of
fidelity and scrupulousness. Of these obligations he did
not cease to be sensible. In his Advertisement to the
first edition of the Life he notes the pains he has been
at in order to "ascertain with a scrupulous authenticity"
"innumerable detached particulars" (4) . He recalls that
accuracy, which they would not have possessed in the same 
degree, if they had not been acquainted with Johnson. 
(900) [emphasis in original]
This passage suggests the following thought: Boswell was himself 
of course of Johnson's 'school', and known to be. In light of this 
fact does not his mention of Reynolds's observation look a bit like a 
canny manoeuvre intended to lend additional support, by indirect 
means, to his claim to be a truthful and accurate reporter in the 
Life?
4 Witness the following from his London Journal: "What a curious, 
inconsistent thing is the mind of man! In the midst of divine service 
I was laying plans for having women, and yet I had the most sincere 
feelings of religion" (54).
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"I have sometimes been obliged to run half over London, in
order to fix a date correctly" (idem). In his Dedi-cation
to Edmond Malone prefatory to the Journal of the Hebrides
tour (1785) , he is careful to place on record the
following: "You have obligingly taken the trouble to peruse
the original manuscript [vetted by Johnson himself5] of
this tour, and can vouch for the strict fidelity of the
present publication" (155). In my opinion, Boswell, in the
examples here given (as well as in many others), protests
persuasively rather than 'too much' . The fact of the
matter is, after all, that "none of Johnson's friends
complained about the reliability of Boswell's reports"
(Rogers 75) . This "crucial fact", as Rogers terms it,
points to the conclusion that " [i]f the persons best
qualified to judge, that is, the circle of Johnson's
acquaintance who had heard him perform so often, were
disinclined to fault Boswell for accuracy... it would be
comic for a twentieth-century reader to harbour suspicions
of grave acts of tampering with the text" (idem).
5 As, indeed, he vetted - or, at the least, perused - Boswell's 
Journal entries upon which, he already knew, the intended Life was to 
he based: "He was much pleased with my paying so great attention to 
his recommendation in 1763, the period when our acquaintance began, 
that I should keep a journal; and I could perceive he was secretly 
pleased to find so much of the fruit of his mind preserved; and as he 
had been used to imagine and say that he always laboured when he said 
a good thing - it delighted him, on a review, to find that his 
conversation teemed with point and imagery" (Life 923).
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Second: through happy chance more than anything else,
Boswell was singularly well prepared and well equipped to
be the recorder of Johnson's conversation. He was blessed
with a retentive memory. On top of that "he had been
engaged in j ournal-writing of one sort or another ever
since he was a boy in his teens. When he first met
Johnson, in May, 1763, at the age of twenty-two and a half,
he was already a master of this practice. He had formed
the habit of recording anecdotes, partly, no doubt, that
he might be qualified as a raconteur of renown, and partly
to train himself in accuracy of statement" (C B Tinker
"Introduction" to Boswell's Life (Oxford Standard Authors)
xvi) . Moreover, Boswell, by training and calling, was a
lawyer; he belonged to a profession in which accuracy of
statement is a sine qua non. Says Tinker: "He had the
ardour of the collector united to the accuracy of the
lawyer" (ibid, xii).
Third: Boswell's methodology in recording, compiling
and, finally, giving shape and coherence to the chronicle
of Johnson's conversation was such, on the whole, as to
inspire confidence in the accuracy of his transcript.
Sometimes, "in defiance of social decorum", he would
separate himself "from the company to make a written record
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of what was taking place" - an idiosyncrasy which
"disconcerted or displeased" (Page xi) . At other times,
relying on the retentiveness of his memory and.on his long
training as a journal-keeper, he would commit to his page
rough notes of the most notable passages and most striking
phrases in Johnson's conversation not long after they had
been uttered (usually the same evening or the next day)6.
These jottings would later be worked up into a more
intelligible form which Tinker designates the "second
state" ("Introduction" op. cit. xvii)7. The jottings of
6 Consider, in this connection, the testimony of the Scottish 
philosopher, Dugald Stewart, a rough contemporary of Boswell. Stewart 
speaks of the "scrupulous fidelity with which...he was accustomed to 
record every conversation which he thought interesting, a few hours 
after it took place" (in Hill II 425).
7 Boswell's record-keeping practices, as they bear upon both the 
first and second 'states' (to use Tinker's terminology) of the 
conversational record, are revealingly alluded to in the following 
passage from the Life:
...and during the remaining part of my stay in London [I] 
kept very imperfect notes of his [Johnson's] conversation, 
which had I according to my usual custom written out at 
large soon after the time, much might have been preserved, 
which is now irretrievably lost. I can now only record 
some particular scenes, and a few fragments of his 
memorabilia. (632)
Marshall Waingrow, working from those of the Boswell Papers that 
pertain to the writing of the Life. shows, by way of some striking 
examples, how Boswell's text changed as it passed through its 
successive 'states'. These examples shed a fascinating light upon the 
biographer's compositional and editorial practice as he pushed forward 
to the final version of his magnum opus. In the specimen I have 
chosen for citation, Boswell has to do, as it happens, not with 
Johnson's discourse but with that of Dr Adams; however, the way he 
goes about things here reflects his habitual practice, and so his 
procedure would not have been any different had his 'raw material' 
been of Johnsonian provenance.
The jottings that Tinker refers to as the 'first state', 
Waingrow labels "Rough Notes"; and what Tinker designates the 'second
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the Hebrides Journal were worked up into their 'second
state' Waingrow styles "Expansion". The specimen presented here is 
tracked through three successive versions, beginning with the 
'shorthand' jottings and ending with the finished product, the 
published text:
Rough Notes
present first night of Irene [Johnson's only play] 
Catcalls Then murder etc. Mrs Pritch obliged to go off 
alive.
Expansion
Dr. Adams told me he was present the first night when 
Irene was acted. There were Catcalls whistling before the 
Curtain drew up which was alarming. The Prologue soothed 
the Audience. The play went off tolerably, till it came 
to the Conclusion when Mrs Pritchard was to be strangled 
upon the Stage, and was to speak two lines with the 
bowstring round her neck. They cried out Murder Murder. 
She several times attempted to speak. But in vain. At 
last she was obliged to go off the Stage alive. Dr. Adams 
beleives [sic] it was altered afterwards.
Life [140-41]
Dr. Adams was present the first night of the 
representation of Irene, and gave me the following 
account: "Before the curtain drew up, there were catcalls 
whistling, which alarmed Johnson's friends. The Prologue, 
which was written by himself in a manly strain, soothed 
the audience, and the play went off tolerably, till it 
came to the conclusion, when Mrs. Pritchard, the heroine 
of the piece, was to be strangled upon the stage, and was 
to speak two lines with the bowstring round her neck. The 
audience cried out 'Murder! Murder!' She several times 
attempted to speak; but in vain. At last she was obliged 
to go off the stage alive." This passage was afterwards 
struck out, and she was carried off to be put to death 
behind the scenes, as the play now has it.
On the basis of the examples he offers, Waingrow draws the 
following general conclusions:
The refinement of language was Boswell's confirmed 
practice, whether he was working with his own texts or 
those of others; but it was not his custom to call 
attention to this freedom. [However]...when he gives a 
verbatim reproduction of his text...he lets the reader 
know it. ...Taken together, [his] revisions may be 
understood as filling out an elliptical record and 
polishing an abbreviated or colloquial style. ...[T]here 
has been no loss or distortion of the essential content... 
(xxviii-xxxi)
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state' with little delay because Boswell wanted to have new
copy for Johnson to scrutinize at short and regular
intervals. It was owing to this circumstance that the
Journal, in contrast to the Life, proved relatively easy
to prepare for publication.
A few pages back, in a footnote, I cited a passage
from the Hebrides Journal which highlights Boswell's
fastidiousness as a chronicler and record-keeper: having
obtained at first hand particulars of Johnson's early years
he then takes care to place them on record "in his
presence" (351) . Sometimes he treated Johnson's
conversation in the same way: there were occasions when he
was so struck by the penetration and trenchancy of his
friend's discourse that he would insist there and then on
taking down a verbatim transcript from dictation, as in
the following instance:
One day, when I told him that I was a zealous
Tory, but not enough 'according to knowledge',
and should be obliged to him for a 'reason', he
was so candid, and expressed himself so well,
that I begged of him to repeat what he had said,
and I wrote down as follows... (Life 1154)
In general, Boswell made good use of the advantage he
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enjoyed, while amassing his 'authentick materials' for the
prospective Life, of being able to consult with its subject
on the accuracy of the record. One such consultation took
place on Friday, 10 April 1778:
I found Johnson at home in the morning. We
resumed the conversation of yesterday. He put
me in mind of some of it which had escaped my
memory, and enabled me to record it more
perfectly than I otherwise could have done.
(Life 923)
If this proceeding, together with the others I have
noted, bolsters confidence in Boswell's claim to be a
reliable chronicler of his friend's conversation, so does
another which tends in the same direction, though more
obliquely. I refer here to his not infrequent outbursts
of self-recrimination in which he upbraids himself for
having neglected, through indolence or inattention, to
place Johnson's conversation on record. Here is a
representative enough example drawn from the Hebrides
Journal:
Often must I have occasion to upbraid myself,
that soon after our return to the main land, I
allowed indolence to prevail over me so much, as
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to shrink from the labour of continuing my
Journal with the same minuteness as before;
sheltering myself in the thought, that we had
done with the Hebrides; and not considering,
that Dr Johnson's Memorabilia were likely to be
more valuable when we were restored to more
polished society. Much has thus been
irrecoverably lost. (393)
The admissions made in this passage (and in others
like it) function in two ways, both of them indirect, to
bolster Boswell's credit as a trustworthy chronicler. In
the first place, his candour as such speaks in his favour:
after all, these are admissions and self-recriminations
which need never have seen the light of day; he could
easily have chosen to pass over the whole issue in silence,
and nobody would have been the wiser. Thus, by an
interesting paradox, Boswell's admission that something is
missing from his text testifies as loudly in his favour as
what is actually there. In the second place (and more to
the purpose in the present context), there is this point:
that embedded in the admissions he makes, and particularly
the last, "Much has thus been irrecoverably lost", is a
suggestion that cannot but work in his favour - the
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suggestion that he would not think of stooping to
invention, making things up, in order to plug the gaps
created by what had been 'irrecoverably lost'. That the
loss is irrecoverable may be lamented, but irrecoverable
it remains, and there can be no question of trying to make
it good through a resort to dishonest expedients.
Boswell allowed himself the liberty of making
adjustments (which in no way implies falsification) to the
Johnsonian record at what Tinker refers to as the "final
stage of the... work": "It was at this point that he
permitted himself the subtle privilege... of occasionally
touching up a Johnsonian phrase, submitting it to that
Johnsonian 'ether' with which...his mind had gradually
become impregnated"8 (op. cit. xvii) . More recent
criticism, which has tended to highlight the
fictionalizing, dramatizing, imaginatively recreating
aspects of the Life and the Journal to a degree Tinker
could not have imagined necessary or even possible, sees
in what he called Boswell's 'touching up' of Johnson's talk
something a good deal more interventionist (v. Clingham,
Boswell: The Life of Johnson 5, 41ff) . But even taking
8 Cf. R W Chapman: "Boswell was not content merely to transcribe 
his memoranda. He was not afraid to be an artist, and to let his 
knowledge and genius 'Johnsonise' what was necessarily raw material" 
(in Page xv).
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account of the caveats entered by recent critics, I still
believe that we can feel confident about the basic
reliability of the Johnsonian record as handed down to us
by Boswell, provided we don't expect it to be a kind of
official Hansard of Johnson's talk. Frederick Pottle has
made the comment that "Johnson's conversation as Boswell
reported it, is, for all its veridicality an imaginative
construction; it is embedded in a narrative made
continuously lively by unobtrusive specks of imagination"
(in Clingham 44) . Fair enough, but I don't think any
violence is done to the truth if, switching around Pottle's
distribution of emphasis, we were to say that Boswell's
Johnsonian record is, first and foremost, a veridical
construction, and is not any the less so for being at the
same time an imaginative one.
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APPENDIX B
JOHNSON'S DISTINCTION-MAKING BY TYPE:
AS ARRANGED IN CATEGORIES GROUPED UNDER 'THEMATIC' HEADS
ETHICAL
PHILOSOPHICAL
CONCEPTUAL
VERBAL
RHETORICAL
FUNCTIONAL
PICTORIAL
(1) Distinctions Bearing on Moral Concerns
(2) Distinctions Modelled on Philosophical 
Schemata
(3) Things in Themselves Distinguished from their 
Effects
(4) Distinctions of Ideas
(5) A Specific Instance Expressly Distinguished 
from a more or less Undifferentiated Backdrop
(6) Distinctions to Clarify a Word's Signification 
or Usage
(7) Shades of Verbal Meaning: Distinctions between 
Near-Synonyms
(8) Distinctions by appeal to Analogy
(9) Distinction-making within the Frame of the 
Contrastive Set-piece
(10) Distinctions by way of Alternatives
(11) Distinctions by way of Denial/Exclusion 
followed by Affirmation
(12) Distinctions by way of Antimetabole
(Chiasmus)
(13) Distinguishing the 'Truth of the Matter' from
Commonly Held Beliefs
(14) Distinction-making by way of
Enumeration/Hierarchical Ordering
(15) Disallowing a Distinction Claimed - in order 
to Dispel Confusion or Misperception
(16) Asserting a Distinction in order to Dispel 
Confusion or Misperception
(17) Discriminating the Manifold Facets of a 
'Picture of Life'
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